# Base Solana Bridge Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/interop/protocols/basesolbridge ## Summary - Last 24h transfer count: 12 - Last 24h avg. transfer time: Unknown (the transfer times for this protocol could not be derived based on onchain data only) - Last 24h tokens by volume: Unknown - Last 24h transfer type distribution: Lock & Mint: $0.00 ### About Base's native lock-and-mint token and message bridge between Base and Solana. Messages from Solana are verified on Base solely by signatures: 2-of-2 Base validators plus 3-of-10 partner signers managed by Chainlink's CCIP governance. The bridge escrow, all wrapped tokens and all Twin accounts are upgradable by a single EOA without delay. ## Description Base's native lock-and-mint token and message bridge between Base and Solana. Messages from Solana are verified on Base solely by signatures: 2-of-2 Base validators plus 3-of-10 partner signers managed by Chainlink's CCIP governance. The bridge escrow, all wrapped tokens and all Twin accounts are upgradable by a single EOA without delay. ### Architecture A central `Bridge` contract on Base combines an arbitrary message bridge and a lock-and-mint token bridge with Solana: Base-native assets (ETH, ERC20s) are escrowed in the `Bridge`, Solana-native assets (SOL, SPL tokens) are minted as `CrossChainERC20` tokens. Only the Base side is analyzed here; the Solana bridge program and its custody are out of scope. ### Message lifecycle Outgoing messages escrow or burn the asset and are appended to an onchain merkle mountain range accumulator that offchain infrastructure relays to Solana. Incoming messages must first be attested in the `BridgeValidator`; anyone can then execute them via `Bridge.relayMessages()`, which mints or releases tokens, executes arbitrary calls through the sender's `Twin` account, or both. Failed executions can be retried permissionlessly. ### Crosschain validation There are no fraud proofs, validity proofs or light clients: message validity rests entirely on two signature quorums that must both be met — 2 of 2 "Base validators" and 3 of 10 partner signers listed in the `SignerRegistry`. If these two groups collude, they can mint unbacked tokens, drain the escrow, and act through any user's `Twin` account. The Base validator set and both thresholds are fixed (no setter functions, no proxy admin), while the partner signer set is managed by the same `RBACTimelock` (minimum delay 3h) that administers Chainlink's CCIP contracts on Base (tracked in our CCIP review). ### Wrapped tokens and Twin accounts `CrossChainERC20` tokens are deployed permissionlessly through a factory as beacon proxies, minted and burned only by the `Bridge`. Each Solana address gets a deterministic `Twin` beacon proxy that executes arbitrary calls on its behalf on Base. ### Pausing 1 guardian account(s) can pause and unpause the bridge at any time, blocking outgoing messages, attestations and message execution. ### Upgradeability and governance A single EOA is the admin of the `Bridge` proxy, the owner of the `Bridge` (managing guardians), and the owner of both beacons — it can upgrade the escrow and replace the code of every wrapped token and every `Twin` account without delay. The `BridgeValidator` and `CrossChainERC20Factory` proxies have no admin and cannot be upgraded. ## Top tokens by volume The interactive tokens table is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/interop/protocols/basesolbridge#interop-tokens). ## Transfers The interactive transfers table is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/interop/protocols/basesolbridge#interop-transfers). ## Updates Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs. ### [2026-08-27 07:43 UTC](https://l2beat.com/interop/protocols/basesolbridge?update=3ee97f9f) (9 changes) Initial discovery of the Base <> Solana native bridge (Base side): Bridge escrow with MMR (merkle mountain range) message accumulator, BridgeValidator (2-of-2 Base validators + 3-of-10 Chainlink partner signers, fixed at initialization), SignerRegistry owned by the CCIP RBACTimelock (border of this discovery), CrossChainERC20/Twin beacon architecture upgradable by a single EOA. ## Permissions ### Base Chain #### Actors ##### RBACTimelock Addresses: [0x7B0328745A01634c32eFAf041d91432a075B308D](https://basescan.org/address/0x7B0328745A01634c32eFAf041d91432a075B308D) Role based timelock used to administer CCIP contracts. - Can interact with SignerRegistry - add, remove and rotate the partner validator signers (up to 20) that attest Solana -> Base messages in the BridgeValidator - Can interact with RBACTimelock - grant or revoke roles on this timelock ##### 10 EOAs Addresses: [0x1B23E9D34076EAe4C414b95Fc44728ee3F18E992](https://basescan.org/address/0x1B23E9D34076EAe4C414b95Fc44728ee3F18E992) (EOA 1), [0x5cdd49FC6c34cA3075F3c959E99429eE2c8b83ad](https://basescan.org/address/0x5cdd49FC6c34cA3075F3c959E99429eE2c8b83ad) (EOA 3), [0x675aeaCb0586E7B4F53cf087428ce4F67AB37A1F](https://basescan.org/address/0x675aeaCb0586E7B4F53cf087428ce4F67AB37A1F) (EOA 4), [0x77a7d8B04DB676496899a339c5D437b7711CFE02](https://basescan.org/address/0x77a7d8B04DB676496899a339c5D437b7711CFE02) (EOA 5), [0x994Ef538120DB2Ad4769a88A137C7D6F7c711509](https://basescan.org/address/0x994Ef538120DB2Ad4769a88A137C7D6F7c711509) (EOA 6), [0xa0c9e5CddD280370523A56c9866efaE85b36D5aE](https://basescan.org/address/0xa0c9e5CddD280370523A56c9866efaE85b36D5aE) (EOA 7), [0xa379f170d6461365E720cAE4B6512Ec8657875c4](https://basescan.org/address/0xa379f170d6461365E720cAE4B6512Ec8657875c4) (EOA 9), [0xbAB7077c1a5b2071A32554A14d2D688dCdA01b70](https://basescan.org/address/0xbAB7077c1a5b2071A32554A14d2D688dCdA01b70) (EOA 11), [0xC2ea57E68D59bB32299Fd6902D06B70Ca84c5D48](https://basescan.org/address/0xC2ea57E68D59bB32299Fd6902D06B70Ca84c5D48) (EOA 12), [0xDD7D52578cf811aC63Ec3e0142315eCc633a8C93](https://basescan.org/address/0xDD7D52578cf811aC63Ec3e0142315eCc633a8C93) (EOA 13) - Can interact with SignerRegistry - attest messages passed from Solana to Base by co-signing message batches for the BridgeValidator (the partner validator threshold defined there is required, alongside the Base validator signatures). Attested messages are executable on the Bridge without further verification ##### EOA 2 Addresses: [0x25646667cD30e52c0b458bAAcCB9fAdA7046f167](https://basescan.org/address/0x25646667cD30e52c0b458bAAcCB9fAdA7046f167) - Can interact with Bridge - pause and unpause the Bridge, which blocks outgoing messages, incoming relays and new message attestations in the BridgeValidator ##### 2 EOAs Addresses: [0xa0F80e237Be74A580cCAEd06236075C17f1fEc69](https://basescan.org/address/0xa0F80e237Be74A580cCAEd06236075C17f1fEc69) (EOA 8), [0xe018748703F74b806399dd1ECe608453578DDE79](https://basescan.org/address/0xe018748703F74b806399dd1ECe608453578DDE79) (EOA 14) - Can interact with BridgeValidator - attest messages passed from Solana to Base by co-signing message batches (2 of 2 signatures required, alongside 3 partner validator signatures). Attested messages are executable on the Bridge without further verification ##### EOA 10 Addresses: [0xa966054731540a48b28990b63Dcf4f33d8aE57B2](https://basescan.org/address/0xa966054731540a48b28990b63Dcf4f33d8aE57B2) - Can upgrade **with no delay** - Bridge - Can interact with Bridge - grant and revoke the guardian role and transfer ownership of the Bridge - Can interact with TwinBeacon - change the implementation of the TwinBeacon and with it the code of every Twin account contract of the Base <> Solana bridge - Can interact with CrossChainERC20Beacon - change the implementation of the CrossChainERC20Beacon and with it the code of every bridged token (e.g. SOL, JitoSOL) of the Base <> Solana bridge Used in: [Base Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/base#EOA%202) ## Smart contracts ### Base Chain #### CrossChainERC20 Addresses: [0x0c39C78Dc31082187D8D7de9937bA46Ddba3c043](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0c39C78Dc31082187D8D7de9937bA46Ddba3c043#code) Implementation contract for the CrossChainERC20 tokens (beacon proxies) representing Solana-native assets on Base (e.g. SOL, JitoSOL). Only the Bridge can mint and burn them. #### Bridge Addresses: [0x3eff766C76a1be2Ce1aCF2B69c78bCae257D5188](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3eff766C76a1be2Ce1aCF2B69c78bCae257D5188#code), [0x9b937e776cb00cE79036e58ff1dE777df8Ebde48](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9b937e776cb00cE79036e58ff1dE777df8Ebde48#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xa966054731540a48b28990b63Dcf4f33d8aE57B2](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa966054731540a48b28990b63Dcf4f33d8aE57B2#code) (Admin) Core contract of the Base <> Solana bridge on the Base side. Outgoing messages (token transfers and arbitrary Solana instructions) are appended to an onchain merkle mountain range accumulator that is consumed by offchain infrastructure and the bridge program on Solana. Incoming messages from Solana must first be attested in the BridgeValidator and can then be relayed permissionlessly: they mint CrossChainERC20 tokens, release escrowed Base-native assets or execute arbitrary calls through per-user Twin contracts. Base-native assets (ETH, ERC20s) that are bridged to Solana are escrowed in this contract. - Roles: - **admin**: EOA 10 - **guardians**: EOA 2 - **owner**: EOA 10 Can be upgraded by: EOA 10 with no delay #### SignerRegistry Addresses: [0x50Ea62F44f44C17d48390cc9fd235dac8E5e127a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x50Ea62F44f44C17d48390cc9fd235dac8E5e127a#code) Registry of the partner validator set that co-signs attestations of Solana -> Base messages for the BridgeValidator of the Base <> Solana bridge. - Roles: - **owner**: RBACTimelock - **signers**: EOA 1, EOA 11, EOA 12, EOA 13, EOA 3, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 9 #### BridgeValidator Addresses: [0xAF24c1c24Ff3BF1e6D882518120fC25442d6794B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xAF24c1c24Ff3BF1e6D882518120fC25442d6794B#code), [0x8bb6C703e6928fc1A15132459C1eD3AdE9214b8a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8bb6C703e6928fc1A15132459C1eD3AdE9214b8a#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin) Attestation registry for messages passed from Solana to Base: batches of message hashes become valid for execution in the Bridge after being co-signed by at least 2 of 2 Base validators and 3 partner validators listed in the SignerRegistry. The validator set and thresholds are fixed at initialization: the contract exposes no functions to change them and its proxy has no admin. - Roles: - **baseValidators**: EOA 14, EOA 8 #### Twin Addresses: [0xb0887e4793d944Cf7bA674B3b3FA5C15900ddaA7](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb0887e4793d944Cf7bA674B3b3FA5C15900ddaA7#code) Implementation contract for Twin accounts: each Solana address gets a deterministic Twin beacon proxy on Base that executes arbitrary calls on its behalf when instructed via bridge messages from Solana. Only the Bridge can call it. #### TwinBeacon Addresses: [0xb326c02150bb0De265Bb0eCeDA53531ab0163bf6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb326c02150bb0De265Bb0eCeDA53531ab0163bf6#code) A beacon with an upgradeable implementation currently set as Twin. Beacon proxy contracts pointing to this beacon will all use its implementation. - Roles: - **owner**: EOA 10 #### CrossChainERC20Factory Addresses: [0xDD56781d0509650f8C2981231B6C917f2d5d7dF2](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDD56781d0509650f8C2981231B6C917f2d5d7dF2#code), [0x92Fc5119dC6a68eD161AFfBe59792AA04d8C375c](https://etherscan.io/address/0x92Fc5119dC6a68eD161AFfBe59792AA04d8C375c#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin) Factory that permissionlessly deploys CrossChainERC20 token contracts (beacon proxies) representing Solana-native assets (SOL and SPL tokens) on Base. The deployed tokens are minted and burned by the Bridge. #### CrossChainERC20Beacon Addresses: [0xdDc41fdA4B758728d07F4686DbE7D1C75C6b2552](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdDc41fdA4B758728d07F4686DbE7D1C75C6b2552#code) A beacon with an upgradeable implementation currently set as CrossChainERC20. Beacon proxy contracts pointing to this beacon will all use its implementation. - Roles: - **owner**: EOA 10 The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).