# ApeX Pro

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/apex-pro

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

**Warning:** ApeX Pro and the associated StarkEx instances [were sunset](https://www.apex.exchange/blog/detail/ApeX-Pro-Sunset-Delisting-Timeline-for-Trading-Pairs).

**Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

- Total Value Secured: $1.42 M (-0.00% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $1.42 M, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
- Type: Other
- Purpose: Exchange
- Host chain: Ethereum

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Force via L1 (sentiment: good)
- State validation: Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good)
- Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)
- Exit window: 1d (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Use escape hatch (sentiment: good)

### About

ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers
      limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/apex-pro#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/apex-pro)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/apex-pro/breakdown)

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2022-11-21: [ApeX Pro public beta launched](https://twitter.com/officialapexdex/status/1564917523401052162?s=21&t=c-SqpS1PL2KOns-2K7myJA). ApeX Pro beta is launched, with incentives program for users.
- 2022-08-31: [ApeX Pro live on Mainnet](https://twitter.com/officialapexdex/status/1594722304537288706?s=21&t=c-SqpS1PL2KOns-2K7myJA). ApeX Pro, a non-custodial decentralized exchange is now live on Mainnet.

## Detailed description

ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers
      limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

ApeX Pro is running
      two independent StarkEx instances, one for USDC and one for USDT, but that
      technical distinction is not visible to the user.

## Risk summary

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8d delay on code upgrades.

### Funds can be lost if

2. the external data becomes unavailable, (CRITICAL)
3. the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.

### Users can be censored if

4. the committee restricts their access to the external data,
5. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

### MEV can be extracted if

6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

**Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

### Sequencer failure

Force via L1 (sentiment: good)

Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.

### State validation

Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good)

STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

### Data availability

External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

### Exit window

1d (sentiment: bad)

Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.

### Proposer failure

Use escape hatch (sentiment: good)

Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.

## Data availability

Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

### Risk analysis

#### Economic security

None (sentiment: bad)

There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

#### Fraud detection

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

#### Committee security

3/5 (sentiment: bad)

The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

#### Upgradeability

Immutable (sentiment: bad)

The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved.

#### Relayer failure

Self propose (sentiment: good)

Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.

### Technology

#### Architecture
![starkex architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/starkex/architecture.png#center)

The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:

- **Availability Gateway**: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
- **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
- **Data Batches**: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.

Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. 
Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.

When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application's configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. 
This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.

Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.

#### DA Bridge Architecture
![starkex bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/starkex/architectureL2.png#center)

The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge.
The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.

The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract.
In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state.
Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.

**Risks**

- Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.

**References**

- [StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code](https://github.com/starkware-libs/starkex-data-availability-committee)

## State validation

### Validity proofs

Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

**References**

- [Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-off-chain-state.html#enforcing_consistency_in_the_on_chain_state_spot)

## Upgrades & Governance

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/apex-pro#updates).

## Operator

### The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [Operator - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/shared/contract-management.html#operator_perpetual)

### Users can force exit the system

Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain.  The request must be served within 7d. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. Perpetual positions can also be force closed before withdrawing, however this requires the user to find the counterparty for the trade themselves.

**Risks**

- Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
- Funds can be lost if the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.

**References**

- [Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/architecture/overview-architecture.html#8_censorship_prevention)
- [Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/forced-actions-escape-hatch-perpetual.html#forcedtrade)

## Withdrawals

### Regular exit

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds.

**References**

- [Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/withdrawal-perpetual.html)

### Forced exit

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

**References**

- [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/shared/README-forced-operations.html)
- [Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/perpetual-trading-forced-withdrawal-and-forced-trade.html#forced_withdrawal)
- [Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/perpetual-trading-forced-withdrawal-and-forced-trade.html#forced_trade)

### Emergency exit

If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

**References**

- [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/shared/README-forced-operations.html)
- [Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/perpetual-trading-forced-withdrawal-and-forced-trade.html#forced_withdrawal)
- [Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/perpetual-trading-forced-withdrawal-and-forced-trade.html#forced_trade)

## Permissions

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### ApexAdminMultisig

Addresses: [0xC532d2976209A56DdF4a99B844130f7c0daCa7B6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC532d2976209A56DdF4a99B844130f7c0daCa7B6)

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay or with 14d delay**
  * StarkPerpetualUSDC  - or [via: - acting directly with 14d delay]
* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
  * manage the token admin role 
  * Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set 

##### SHARP Multisig

Addresses: [0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4)

A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with 8d delay**
  * SHARPVerifierCallProxy [via: - acting directly with 8d delay]
* Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
  * Administer the CallProxy's `GOVERNANCE_ADMIN` and role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades 
  * Grant and revoke application roles, including the `APP_GOVERNOR` role that controls caller-specific fallback routes 
  * Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier's reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy's explicit `isValid` entry point always queries the default target 

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0x53c6Ec9640761c669B800088F097E01A8207Ac8b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x53c6Ec9640761c669B800088F097E01A8207Ac8b)

* Can upgrade **with no delay or with 14d delay**
  * StarkPerpetualUSDT  - or [via: - acting directly with 14d delay]
* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
  * manage the token admin role 
  * Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set 

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0x5751a83170BeA11fE7CdA5D599B04153C021f21A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5751a83170BeA11fE7CdA5D599B04153C021f21A)

* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDT 
  * FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDC 
* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
  * manage supported tokens 
  * Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability 
* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
  * manage supported tokens 
  * Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability 

##### EOA 3

Addresses: [0xef75e1199B0599BA823b7770AcE8eb34864a1D55](https://etherscan.io/address/0xef75e1199B0599BA823b7770AcE8eb34864a1D55)

Member of ApexAdminMultisig.
* Can upgrade **with no delay or with 14d delay**
  * StarkPerpetualUSDC  - or [via: - acting directly with 14d delay]
* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
  * manage the token admin role 
  * Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set 

##### EOA 4

Addresses: [0x552aA2EBA4B0c5b9B8b4b22507189a7af4198169](https://etherscan.io/address/0x552aA2EBA4B0c5b9B8b4b22507189a7af4198169)

* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
  * Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability 

##### EOA 5

Addresses: [0x78e802d42Bbc1834f962A11B54e0F8e07f52d4Fb](https://etherscan.io/address/0x78e802d42Bbc1834f962A11B54e0F8e07f52d4Fb)

* Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
  * Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability 

## Smart contracts

### Ethereum

#### CommitteeUSDC

Addresses: [0x23Cab3CF1aa7B929Df5e9f3712aCA3A6Fb9494E4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x23Cab3CF1aa7B929Df5e9f3712aCA3A6Fb9494E4#code)

Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.


#### CommitteeUSDT

Addresses: [0x7249082BfAFE9BCA502d38a686Ef3df37A0cf800](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7249082BfAFE9BCA502d38a686Ef3df37A0cf800#code)

Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.


#### StarkPerpetualUSDC

Addresses: [0xA1D5443F2FB80A5A55ac804C948B45ce4C52DCbb](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA1D5443F2FB80A5A55ac804C948B45ce4C52DCbb#code), [0x8C43C9bec15d82D153C52518030e0a9590ABD35d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8C43C9bec15d82D153C52518030e0a9590ABD35d#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x540Ad8576d2F90f28994ab001622F964945854A8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x540Ad8576d2F90f28994ab001622F964945854A8#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x1BC9C618B7FA6b5EfAAD31DC801eB55c608B9310](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1BC9C618B7FA6b5EfAAD31DC801eB55c608B9310#code) (Implementation #3 (Upgradable)), [0x45de249eEa8f9CDB70943B17CceDeb42F5BA0175](https://etherscan.io/address/0x45de249eEa8f9CDB70943B17CceDeb42F5BA0175#code) (Implementation #4 (Upgradable)), [0x31e2d974BaC547101413c24C23443AD488423f64](https://etherscan.io/address/0x31e2d974BaC547101413c24C23443AD488423f64#code) (Implementation #5 (Upgradable)), [0xef75e1199B0599BA823b7770AcE8eb34864a1D55](https://etherscan.io/address/0xef75e1199B0599BA823b7770AcE8eb34864a1D55#code) (Admin), [0xC532d2976209A56DdF4a99B844130f7c0daCa7B6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC532d2976209A56DdF4a99B844130f7c0daCa7B6#code) (Admin)

Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ApexAdminMultisig, EOA 3
  * **operators**: EOA 2, EOA 5
  * **tokenAdmins**: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by: ApexAdminMultisig with no delay, EOA 3 with no delay

#### StarkPerpetualUSDT

Addresses: [0xe53A6eD882Eb3f90cCe0390DDB04c876C5482E6b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe53A6eD882Eb3f90cCe0390DDB04c876C5482E6b#code), [0x3167617e913BF59afb90e5ec1A7B32D4Ea03eae4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3167617e913BF59afb90e5ec1A7B32D4Ea03eae4#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x5a50e280883B1FB39Aa04Eb263BCA47630D17D8E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5a50e280883B1FB39Aa04Eb263BCA47630D17D8E#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x3F3A131caB7eb5b4EAE9497Bebb9E06bE80F2809](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3F3A131caB7eb5b4EAE9497Bebb9E06bE80F2809#code) (Implementation #3 (Upgradable)), [0x5BfbE850d18b73ed98FB830e0A5E9F4970Bb93dA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5BfbE850d18b73ed98FB830e0A5E9F4970Bb93dA#code) (Implementation #4 (Upgradable)), [0x229BbdF97eBc4993efe1433c0ae4A0bE79A4fe21](https://etherscan.io/address/0x229BbdF97eBc4993efe1433c0ae4A0bE79A4fe21#code) (Implementation #5 (Upgradable)), [0x53c6Ec9640761c669B800088F097E01A8207Ac8b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x53c6Ec9640761c669B800088F097E01A8207Ac8b#code) (Admin)

Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: EOA 1
  * **operators**: EOA 2, EOA 4
  * **tokenAdmins**: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay

#### CpuVerifierAllSolidity_2026_13

Addresses: [0x015381651F240Ed6C44122dCba6Cf807c9442CD6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x015381651F240Ed6C44122dCba6Cf807c9442CD6#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### CpuVerifierDex_2026_13

Addresses: [0x0cD0cDf0132c566db61B691BCEEBA2c4D8cA5CdC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0cD0cDf0132c566db61B691BCEEBA2c4D8cA5CdC#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### CairoBootloaderProgram

Addresses: [0x24105e6697AdD9B4B1BDE04079a91BDFCCa24A47](https://etherscan.io/address/0x24105e6697AdD9B4B1BDE04079a91BDFCCa24A47#code)

Stores the complete compiled Cairo outer bootloader used as the top-level program of a SHARP proof. The SHARP verifier copies these words into public memory, pinning this exact executable onchain independently of the separately committed simple, applicative, and recursive-verifier programs.


#### CpuVerifierRecursive_2026_13

Addresses: [0x2867A4509B0969531641A42a3D4A9B0A07109B6B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2867A4509B0969531641A42a3D4A9B0A07109B6B#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### CpuVerifierSmall_2026_13

Addresses: [0x30F3AB988Cb00fe3Fb5ab891F50c13684770419b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x30F3AB988Cb00fe3Fb5ab891F50c13684770419b#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### MemoryPageFactRegistry_2023_9

Addresses: [0x40864568f679c10aC9e72211500096a5130770fA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x40864568f679c10aC9e72211500096a5130770fA#code)

Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.


#### SHARPVerifierCallProxy

Addresses: [0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60](https://etherscan.io/address/0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60#code), [0x3597c5CBCbCB30079a0bD2A68cDE5f98272f9feb](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3597c5CBCbCB30079a0bD2A68cDE5f98272f9feb#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4#code) (Admin)

Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses `call`, not `delegatecall`, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit `isValid` entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target's reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: SHARP Multisig
  * **appGovernor**: SHARP Multisig
  * **appRoleAdmin**: SHARP Multisig
  * **governanceAdmin**: SHARP Multisig

Can be upgraded by: SHARP Multisig with 8d delay

#### SHARPVerifier

Addresses: [0x4956bda1d23F75B988644329c5B06BD1494a72b6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4956bda1d23F75B988644329c5B06BD1494a72b6#code)

Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.


#### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_1

Addresses: [0x5C1Ce45534A9c5f7F3E6683Cd79a8ad57EE3a9fe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5C1Ce45534A9c5f7F3E6683Cd79a8ad57EE3a9fe#code)

Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.


#### CpuVerifierDexWithBitwise_2026_13

Addresses: [0x6a67796ee97700B5B5f5aFBCFFDCbc5F80803F11](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6a67796ee97700B5B5f5aFBCFFDCbc5F80803F11#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### CpuVerifierStarknet_2026_13

Addresses: [0x71574057D12541ccDa98643aC56441838353A26D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x71574057D12541ccDa98643aC56441838353A26D#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_2

Addresses: [0x7Da1225C752ab37E610a242D9D8a0548262E3fF7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Da1225C752ab37E610a242D9D8a0548262E3fF7#code)

Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.


#### CpuVerifierRecursiveLargeOutput_2026_13

Addresses: [0xbe0F8F150Fd10798524B4de80eD75751658CAEF3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbe0F8F150Fd10798524B4de80eD75751658CAEF3#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### MemoryPageFactRegistry

Addresses: [0xe583BcDE0160b637330b27a3ea1F3c02ba2eC460](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe583BcDE0160b637330b27a3ea1F3c02ba2eC460#code)

Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.


#### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_3

Addresses: [0xE67515a751291445B85b2F176c1eCdf08e86b406](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE67515a751291445B85b2F176c1eCdf08e86b406#code)

Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.


#### CpuVerifierPerpetual_2026_13

Addresses: [0xFFC7974cd74b95f631f454cd787AAc28F0476b44](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFFC7974cd74b95f631f454cd787AAc28F0476b44#code)

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`.


#### FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDT

Addresses: [0x40e1e5Ece49A878062fA9F87eA6dc81281098B22](https://etherscan.io/address/0x40e1e5Ece49A878062fA9F87eA6dc81281098B22#code)

Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (`770346231394331402493200980986217737662224545740427952627288191358999988146`), which can be changed until the adapter is finalized.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: EOA 2 if the adapter is not finalized

Can be upgraded by: EOA 2 with no delay

#### PerpetualEscapeVerifier

Addresses: [0xaadFdB9CAc145c65f2284fBe24600d07fb37F7BD](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaadFdB9CAc145c65f2284fBe24600d07fb37F7BD#code)

Special verifier for the escape() function.


#### FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDC

Addresses: [0xE741e26573782ae3C0ea9EC710FA99Fcd27fB953](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE741e26573782ae3C0ea9EC710FA99Fcd27fB953#code)

Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (`2530337539466159944237001094809327283009177793361359619481044346150483328860`), which can be changed until the adapter is finalized.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: EOA 2 if the adapter is not finalized

Can be upgraded by: EOA 2 with no delay

#### CpuFrilessVerifier

Addresses: [0x03Fa911dfCa026D9C8Edb508851b390accF912e8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03Fa911dfCa026D9C8Edb508851b390accF912e8#code), [0x217750c27bE9147f9e358D9FF26a8224F8aCC214](https://etherscan.io/address/0x217750c27bE9147f9e358D9FF26a8224F8aCC214#code), [0x630A97901Ac29590DF83f4A64B8D490D54caf239](https://etherscan.io/address/0x630A97901Ac29590DF83f4A64B8D490D54caf239#code), [0x78Af2BFB12Db15d35f7dE8DD77f29C299C78c590](https://etherscan.io/address/0x78Af2BFB12Db15d35f7dE8DD77f29C299C78c590#code), [0x8488e8f4e26eBa40faE229AB653d98E341cbE57B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8488e8f4e26eBa40faE229AB653d98E341cbE57B#code), [0x9E614a417f8309575fC11b175A51599661f2Bd21](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9E614a417f8309575fC11b175A51599661f2Bd21#code), [0xC879aF7D5eD80e4676C203FD300E640C297F31e3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC879aF7D5eD80e4676C203FD300E640C297F31e3#code), [0xe9664D230490d5A515ef7Ef30033d8075a8D0E24](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe9664D230490d5A515ef7Ef30033d8075a8D0E24#code)

#### CairoBootloaderProgram_2022_7

Addresses: [0x5d07afFAfc8721Ef3dEe4D11A2D1484CBf6A9dDf](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5d07afFAfc8721Ef3dEe4D11A2D1484CBf6A9dDf#code)

#### MemoryPageFactRegistry_2022_7

Addresses: [0xFD14567eaf9ba941cB8c8a94eEC14831ca7fD1b4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFD14567eaf9ba941cB8c8a94eEC14831ca7fD1b4#code)

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8d delay on code upgrades.