# Corn

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

- Total Value Secured: $128.39 K (-4.48% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $0.00, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $128.39 K; 99.9% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
- Gas token: BTCN
- Type: Other
- Purposes: Universal, Bitcoin DApps
- Host chain: Ethereum
- Chain ID: 21000000

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

### About

Corn is an Orbit Stack-based Layer 2 focused on Bitcoin-centric DeFi applications. Corn uses Bitcorn (BTCN) as its gas token, the popCORN System for long-term incentives, and LayerZero for cross-chain asset transfers.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/corn)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/corn/breakdown)

## Activity

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/corn)

## Onchain costs

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn#onchain-costs).

## Liveness

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn#liveness).

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2024-08-22: [Mainnet Launch](https://blog.usecorn.com/corn-the-genesis-of-the-super-yield-network-f52170ffbe84). Corn launches its super yield network.

## Risk summary

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL)
2. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires, (CRITICAL)
3. an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.

### Funds can be lost if

4. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

### Users can be censored if

5. the committee restricts their access to the external data.

### MEV can be extracted if

6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.

### State validation

Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)

No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.

### Data availability

External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

### Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

## Stage

Corn is not even a Stage 0 project.

**Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review.

### Stage 0

- [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium.
- [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed.
- [ ] (under review) A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code.
- [ ] Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized.

### Stage 1

- [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely.
- [x] Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible.
- [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up.
- [x] The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.

### Stage 2

- [ ] Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors.
- [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit.
- [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.

## Data availability

Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

### Risk analysis

#### Economic security

None (sentiment: bad)

There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

#### Fraud detection

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

#### Committee security

1/1 (sentiment: bad)

The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

#### Upgradeability

No delay (sentiment: bad)

There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed.

#### Relayer failure

No mechanism (sentiment: bad)

The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity.

### Technology

#### Architecture
![Anytrust architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/anytrust/architecture1.png#center)

The DAC uses a data availability solution built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components:
- **Sequencer Inbox**: Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches.
- **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of members responsible for storing and providing data on demand.
- **Data Availability Certificate (DACert)**: A commitment ensuring that data blobs are available without needing full data posting on the L1 chain. 


Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs. 
The Sequencer API allows the rollup Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hash. 
When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it. 
Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox. 
If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain as calldata. 


A DACert includes a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. 
The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature. 
L2 nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp. 
If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members.

#### DA Bridge Architecture
![Anytrust bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/anytrust/architectureL2.png#center)

The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge.
The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data.
The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the destination chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving destination chain transaction ordering finality in a single onchain transaction.

**Risks**

- Funds can be lost if a malicious committee attests to an invalid data availability certificate.
- Funds can be lost if the bridge contract or its dependencies receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.

**References**

- [Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum Docs](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-anytrust)

## State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

### State root proposals

Validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. State roots are referred to as "assertions" within the contracts. Each chain of assertions only requires one stake, and validators staked on assertions with a child are considered inactive and can either move their stake to a new node or withdraw it. The function used to propose a new assertion is the `stakeOnNewAssertion` function. The stake is currently set to 0.1 ETH, and it can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. The protocol allows such funds to be trustlessly pooled together if necessary. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period, currently set to 15m. An assertion without "rivals" can be confirmed after the challenge period has passed, currently set to 5d 14h. If a rival is present, then it is checked that the assertion is the winner in the challenge protocol.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [BoLD paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.10491)

### Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `createLayerZeroEdge` function in the `ChallengeManager` contract. Edges represent assertions, or bisected assertions, within the challenge protocol. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserters and challengers play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner. An edge can only be bisected when rivaled. The bisection process requires no new stake as their validity is checked against a parent "history root" that contains all intermediate states. An edge can also be confirmed if itself or its descendants spend enough time being unrivaled. Such time is set to 5d 14h. If both actors play as slow as possible, the maximum time to confirm an edge is double such value, i.e. 11d 4h. Due to the complexities of maintaining the history root, the challenge protocol is divided into 3 levels, where the lowest level represents assertions over blocks, the highest level represents assertions over single WASM instructions, and intermediate levels represent assertions over chunks of WASM instructions. When moving between levels, a new stake is required. Level 0 (block level) requires a stake of 0.0 ETH, level 1 requires a stake of 0.1 ETH, level 2 requires a stake of 0.1 ETH. The ratio between such stakes can be exploited to perform resource exhaustion attacks.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.

**References**

- [Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum BoLD](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a)

## Upgrades & Governance

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/corn#updates).

## Operator

### The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

**References**

- [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324#code)
- [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job)

## Sequencing

### Buffered forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue "delayed" messages in the "delayed" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is defined to be the minimum between 1d and the time left in the delay buffer. The delay buffer gets replenished over time and gets consumed every time the sequencer doesn't timely process a message. Only messages processed with a delay greater than 428424622y 1mo consume the buffer. The buffer is capped at 428424622y 1mo. The replenish rate is currently set at 1m every 20m. Even if the buffer is fully consumed, messages are still allowed to be delayed up to 428424622y 1mo.

**References**

- [Sequencer and censorship resistance - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer)

## Withdrawals

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

**References**

- [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle)
- [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging)
- [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e)

### Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

**References**

- [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/)

## Permissions

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### CornMultisig

Addresses: [0xCff1ad9f09b32252171207e8525c90B18D4E2C7D](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCff1ad9f09b32252171207e8525c90B18D4E2C7D)

A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor]
  * Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * EdgeChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor]

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0xe2F1D1E0ACc476455044a9D053B5d667C0a2D61c](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F1D1E0ACc476455044a9D053B5d667C0a2D61c)

* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain 

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0xfFb9B41320a47FDE7c2939BA0c1f1d58E80648FB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xfFb9B41320a47FDE7c2939BA0c1f1d58E80648FB)

* Can interact with SequencerInbox
  * Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain 

## Smart contracts

### Ethereum

#### RollupProxy

Addresses: [0x09eD7e66Dd7c7129Ec3994498A521B502Ca7D61b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x09eD7e66Dd7c7129Ec3994498A521B502Ca7D61b#code), [0x16aD566aaa05fe6977A033DE2472c05C84CAB724](https://etherscan.io/address/0x16aD566aaa05fe6977A033DE2472c05C84CAB724#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0xA4892FFE3Deab25337D7D1A5b94b35dABa255451](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA4892FFE3Deab25337D7D1A5b94b35dABa255451#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x8672705351C81f40B55b1ac2A1998de66166d0eA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8672705351C81f40B55b1ac2A1998de66166d0eA#code) (Admin)

Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called Validators).
* Roles:
  * **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CornMultisig
  * **getValidators**: EOA 1
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### SequencerInbox

Addresses: [0x4ad144ea249A98F77e0b78104D3B6eB6cd3a76DA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4ad144ea249A98F77e0b78104D3B6eB6cd3a76DA#code), [0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig
  * **batchPosters**: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### Bridge

Addresses: [0x7E31f112d340a4D0cB0e4bD82f2853089d1bF10C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E31f112d340a4D0cB0e4bD82f2853089d1bF10C#code), [0x81be1Bf06cB9B23e8EEDa3145c3366A912DAD9D6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x81be1Bf06cB9B23e8EEDa3145c3366A912DAD9D6#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### EdgeChallengeManager

Addresses: [0x90f6C3e6C11959A01eDc6ea392e6f659605b4237](https://etherscan.io/address/0x90f6C3e6C11959A01eDc6ea392e6f659605b4237#code), [0x93069fFd7730733eCfd57A0D2D528CF686248524](https://etherscan.io/address/0x93069fFd7730733eCfd57A0D2D528CF686248524#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof system.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### UpgradeExecutor

Addresses: [0x8672705351C81f40B55b1ac2A1998de66166d0eA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8672705351C81f40B55b1ac2A1998de66166d0eA#code), [0x011d8F10fbC20C14B453768253CdFF7EB5B96917](https://etherscan.io/address/0x011d8F10fbC20C14B453768253CdFF7EB5B96917#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig
  * **executors**: CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### Outbox

Addresses: [0x2a3C554f212E3e0c78eaF0808f5313A10542dA2d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2a3C554f212E3e0c78eaF0808f5313A10542dA2d#code), [0x17E0C5fE0dFF2AE4cfC9E96d9Ccd112DaF5c0386](https://etherscan.io/address/0x17E0C5fE0dFF2AE4cfC9E96d9Ccd112DaF5c0386#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### Inbox

Addresses: [0x37693F11f3D724E55D0B03D5F328D8202C913243](https://etherscan.io/address/0x37693F11f3D724E55D0B03D5F328D8202C913243#code), [0xD210b64eD9D47Ef8Acf1A3284722FcC7Fc6A1f4e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD210b64eD9D47Ef8Acf1A3284722FcC7Fc6A1f4e#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### wBTC Escrow

Addresses: [0x00943b11764176C3a8323aEFCBd6fE70CFb6272d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x00943b11764176C3a8323aEFCBd6fE70CFb6272d#code), [0xbE28926dAaD466B27C5Dea3A92797F0823e3737C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbE28926dAaD466B27C5Dea3A92797F0823e3737C#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

#### OneStepProverMemory

Addresses: [0x29efff3EfE3E01A3F69011a054C33410edFc2283](https://etherscan.io/address/0x29efff3EfE3E01A3F69011a054C33410edFc2283#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### Governor

Addresses: [0x515C7d8Fcb950f8b030ac08C994b37b4b8F3F7B5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x515C7d8Fcb950f8b030ac08C994b37b4b8F3F7B5#code)

#### RollupEventInbox

Addresses: [0x6282197777e7c318C7209bd7059110886aa429C6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6282197777e7c318C7209bd7059110886aa429C6#code), [0x0d079b22B0B4083b9b0bDc62Bf1a4EAF4a95bDEe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0d079b22B0B4083b9b0bDc62Bf1a4EAF4a95bDEe#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code) (Admin)

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CornMultisig

Can be upgraded by: CornMultisig with no delay

#### OneStepProver0

Addresses: [0x7368F782E109518fD3914e8b315eE45E51C15835](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7368F782E109518fD3914e8b315eE45E51C15835#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProofEntry

Addresses: [0x91cB57F200Bd5F897E41C164425Ab4DB0991A64f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91cB57F200Bd5F897E41C164425Ab4DB0991A64f#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### cbBTC Escrow

Addresses: [0x957C9DC25DE6B8E46a7Fa0D081bA749DD005B54f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x957C9DC25DE6B8E46a7Fa0D081bA749DD005B54f#code), [0xbE28926dAaD466B27C5Dea3A92797F0823e3737C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbE28926dAaD466B27C5Dea3A92797F0823e3737C#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

#### OneStepProverMath

Addresses: [0xD1D75248ed95450B793d80F9fb418C2eD4c5F5e4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD1D75248ed95450B793d80F9fb418C2eD4c5F5e4#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProverHostIo

Addresses: [0xDdaD5E59D056078A4E67a9d42e21Ce8057F22D60](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDdaD5E59D056078A4E67a9d42e21Ce8057F22D60#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEE9924C5fd94601C80fF8010f577C9f7f3C20B84#code)

* Roles:
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).