# Cyber Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber ## Summary **Warning:** There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated. - Total Value Secured: $3.00 M (-9.03% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $582.78 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $2.41 M; 80.5% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - **Warning:** The CYBER token associated with Cyber accounts for 80.5% of the TVS! (sentiment: bad) - Past day UOPS: <0.01 (-46.9% compared to seven days ago) - Gas token: ETH - Type: Other - Purposes: Universal, Social - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 7560 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good) - State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) - Data availability: External (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About Cyber is a chain designed for social applications using an implementation of OP Plasma with DA challenges. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/cyber) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/cyber/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/cyber) ## Onchain costs Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber#onchain-costs). ## Liveness Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber#liveness). ## Risk summary **Warning:** The project relies on program hashes that could not be successfully reproduced from their published sources (CRITICAL). **Warning:** The fault proof system is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to the placeholder absolute prestate from the OP Stack deployment template rather than to a reproducible op-program build for this chain. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposer and challengers. ### Funds can be stolen if 1. the sequencer is malicious and is able to economically outspend the altruistic challengers, 2. there is no challenger willing to challenge unavailable data commitments, 3. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL) 4. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL). ### MEV can be extracted if 5. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis **Warning:** The fault proof system is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to the placeholder absolute prestate from the OP Stack deployment template rather than to a reproducible op-program build for this chain. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposer and challengers. ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation. ### State validation Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed. ### Data availability External (sentiment: bad) Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. ## Stage Cyber is not even a Stage 0 project. **Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review. ### Stage 0 - [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium. - [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - [ ] (under review) A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. - [ ] Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized. ### Stage 1 - [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. - [ ] Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators. - [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. - [ ] Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated. ### Stage 2 - [ ] Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors. - [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit. - [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs. ## Data availability CyberDA is a data availability solution using data availability challenges (DA Challenges). ### Risk analysis #### Economic security DA Challenges (sentiment: bad) There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack. However, there is a mechanism that allows users to challenge unavailability of data. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers, and there is no pool of funds onchain to incentivize challengers. #### Fraud detection None (sentiment: bad) There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. #### Committee security None (sentiment: bad) The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability. #### Upgradeability No delay (sentiment: bad) There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. #### Relayer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. ### Technology #### Architecture ![CyberDA layer](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/cyberda/architecture.png#center) #### Data Availability Challenges Cyber relies on DA challenges for data availability. The DA Provider submits an input commitment on Ethereum, and users can request the data behind the commitment off-chain from the DA Provider. If a DA challenger finds that the data behind a tx data commitment is not available, they can submit a challenge which requires locking a bond within 12h. A challenge can be resolved by publishing the preimage data within an additional 12h. In such case, a portion of the challenger bond is burned, with the exact amount estimated as the cost incurred by the resolver to publish the full data, meaning that the resolver and challenger will approximately lose the same amount of funds. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers. If instead, after a challenge, the preimage data is not published, the chain reorgs to the last fully derivable state. #### DA Bridge Only hashes of data batches are posted as DA commitments to an EOA on Ethereum. However, there is a mechanism that allows users to challenge unavailability of data. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an invalid data availability commitment and there are no challengers. - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an invalid data availability commitment, and they are able to outspend the challengers. **References** - [Alt-DA Specification](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/experimental/alt-da.md) - [Security Considerations - Ethresear.ch ](https://ethresear.ch/t/universal-plasma-and-da-challenges/18629) ## State validation Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals. ### State root proposals Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL). **References** - [OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game) ### Challenges Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge period) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)). **References** - [Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/cyber#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. **References** - [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window) - [OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code) ## Withdrawals ### Regular exits The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof. **References** - [OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code) - [OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code) ### Forced messaging If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message. **References** - [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction) ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2. **References** - [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### Cyber Multisig 1 Addresses: [0xc2259E7Fb719411f97aBdCdf449f6Ba3B9D75398](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc2259E7Fb719411f97aBdCdf449f6Ba3B9D75398) A Multisig with 3/4 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * AnchorStateRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin] * DataAvailabilityChallenge [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismPortal2 [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin] * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin] * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin] * DisputeGameFactory [via: ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with AddressManager * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with DelayedWETH * can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency ##### Cyber Multisig 2 Addresses: [0x68ca4cDCb0F47457273B554E60ff8321D5C133E4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x68ca4cDCb0F47457273B554E60ff8321D5C133E4) A Multisig with 3/4 threshold. * Can interact with SystemConfig * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system ##### OpFoundationUpgradeSafe Addresses: [0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92](https://etherscan.io/address/0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) [via: LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig] ##### SaferSafes Addresses: [0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a) A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling. * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) [via: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig] ##### Optimism Security Council Addresses: [0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) [via: Optimism Guardian Multisig] ##### SuperchainProxyAdminOwner Addresses: [0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) A Multisig with 2/2 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * SuperchainConfig [via: SuperchainProxyAdmin] * Can interact with AddressManager * set and change address mappings [via: SuperchainProxyAdmin] ##### LivenessGuard Addresses: [0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25](https://etherscan.io/address/0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25) Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners. * Can interact with LivenessModule * can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d ##### Optimism Guardian Multisig Addresses: [0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2) A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module). ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0x2F8Fd76923E2B0D0ba8F9C1a52A365CC6E7c040f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2F8Fd76923E2B0D0ba8F9C1a52A365CC6E7c040f) * Can interact with SystemConfig * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 2 Addresses: [0xc76C563185d01284AdbC9cF5bb909162dD2F15e7](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc76C563185d01284AdbC9cF5bb909162dD2F15e7) Member of Cyber Multisig 2. * Can interact with DataAvailabilityChallenge * can upgrade the parameters of DA challenges like the bond size or refund percentages, potentially making challenges infeasable or insecure ##### Optimism EOA 1 Addresses: [0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c) * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) [via: DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function → Optimism Guardian Multisig] ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### DataAvailabilityChallenge Addresses: [0x10E34EfE14E4D270C0f77Bf1aF01b6C832161B49](https://etherscan.io/address/0x10E34EfE14E4D270C0f77Bf1aF01b6C832161B49#code), [0x0d93eAA86eb6948b977857750A5512Bef6B05C51](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0d93eAA86eb6948b977857750A5512Bef6B05C51#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) The DataAvailabilityChallenge contract is used to challenge the full availability of data behind commimted transaction data hashes. See the technology section for more details. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 * **owner**: EOA 2 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### OptimismPortal2 Addresses: [0x1d59bc9fcE6B8E2B1bf86D4777289FFd83D24C99](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1d59bc9fcE6B8E2B1bf86D4777289FFd83D24C99#code), [0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### SystemConfig Addresses: [0x5D1F4bbaF6D484fA9D5D9705f92dE6063bff6055](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D1F4bbaF6D484fA9D5D9705f92dE6063bff6055#code), [0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375](https://etherscan.io/address/0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 * **batcherHash**: EOA 1 * **owner**: Cyber Multisig 2 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### DisputeGameFactory Addresses: [0xaCc66304d26a01A9bd60d0584dCEdbaCeC8e10e0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaCc66304d26a01A9bd60d0584dCEdbaCeC8e10e0#code), [0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### SuperchainConfig Addresses: [0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C#code), [0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04](https://etherscan.io/address/0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04#code) (Admin) Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. * Roles: * **admin**: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner * **guardian**: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security Council, SaferSafes Can be upgraded by: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner with no delay #### L1StandardBridge Addresses: [0x12a580c05466eefb2c467C6b115844cDaF55B255](https://etherscan.io/address/0x12a580c05466eefb2c467C6b115844cDaF55B255#code), [0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### L1CrossDomainMessenger Addresses: [0x3c01ebF22e9c111528c1E027D68944eDaB08Dfc9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3c01ebF22e9c111528c1E027D68944eDaB08Dfc9#code), [0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### L1ERC721Bridge Addresses: [0x4F4B716627D2Ba0439327Ce8B563b4443aF47Dbd](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4F4B716627D2Ba0439327Ce8B563b4443aF47Dbd#code), [0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### LivenessModule Addresses: [0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748#code) used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig * Roles: * **fallbackOwner**: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 * **livenessGuard**: LivenessGuard #### AnchorStateRegistry Addresses: [0x0Ca6c5aef8dBC91368C61871fDC51Ef884843e07](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0Ca6c5aef8dBC91368C61871fDC51Ef884843e07#code), [0x795F854562d82b3A051e415f6c48B2766521C855](https://etherscan.io/address/0x795F854562d82b3A051e415f6c48B2766521C855#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### OptimismMintableERC20Factory Addresses: [0x51A00470Eb50D758EcFF3B96DB0bF4A8e86268F4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x51A00470Eb50D758EcFF3B96DB0bF4A8e86268F4#code), [0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### SuperchainProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04](https://etherscan.io/address/0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04#code) * Roles: * **owner**: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner #### MIPS Addresses: [0x5fE03a12C1236F9C22Cb6479778DDAa4bce6299C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5fE03a12C1236F9C22Cb6479778DDAa4bce6299C#code) The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. #### DelayedWETH Addresses: [0x6A9AFfDcfeF73f66177a1386590607F444520571](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6A9AFfDcfeF73f66177a1386590607F444520571#code), [0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087](https://etherscan.io/address/0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) (Admin) Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Cyber Multisig 1 * **owner**: Cyber Multisig 1 Can be upgraded by: Cyber Multisig 1 with no delay #### DeputyPauseModule Addresses: [0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754](https://etherscan.io/address/0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754#code) Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module. * Roles: * **deputy**: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E54107731EC43e78DA678DFa5fB6222Ad036e03#code) * Roles: * **owner**: Cyber Multisig 1 #### PermissionedDisputeGame Addresses: [0x924B10d37392414b0813190F01DbaF6c3322E906](https://etherscan.io/address/0x924B10d37392414b0813190F01DbaF6c3322E906#code) Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. #### PreimageOracle Addresses: [0x9c065e11870B891D214Bc2Da7EF1f9DDFA1BE277](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9c065e11870B891D214Bc2Da7EF1f9DDFA1BE277#code) The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).