# Degen Chain

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

**Warning:** Degen Chain is sunsetting on August 31, 2026. See the [announcement](https://x.com/degentokenbase/status/2086430796412576030) and make sure to bridge off your funds before the deadline.

**Warning:** Why is the project listed in others? There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges. Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds. There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability. Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds. Learn more about the [recategorisation](https://medium.com/l2beat/framework-update-l2-projects-recategorisation-5d43b0d1fe50).

- Total Value Secured: No data
- Past day UOPS: No data
- Gas token: DEGEN
- Type: Other
- Purposes: Universal, Social
- Host chain: Base Chain
- Chain ID: 666666666
- Risks shown: combined with host chain Base Chain; Risk analysis also lists each separately

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (5d 14h challenge period; sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Self propose (sentiment: good)

### About

Degen Chain is an ultra-low-cost L3 for the Degen community built with Arbitrum Orbit, Base for settlement, and AnyTrust for data availability. DEGEN is the native gas token.

### Links

- Website: https://syndicate.io/blog/degen-chain
- Bridge: https://bridge.degen.tips/, https://degen.tips/
- Docs: https://docs.syndicate.io/docs/core/get-started/introduction
- Explorer: https://explorer.degen.tips/
- Social: https://twitter.com/degentokenbase, https://warpcast.com/~/channel/degen, https://t.me/degentokenbase
- Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/degen

### Badges

- EVM: This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language
- Data Availability Committee: There is a Data Availability Committee that provides/attests to data availability
- Built on Arbitrum Orbit: The project is built on Arbitrum Orbit
- Built on top of Base: The project has Base as its host chain
- Alchemy: This project was deployed via the rollup-as-a-service provider Alchemy

## Activity

The interactive activity chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/degen?range=max)

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2024-05-13 (incident): [Degen Chain halts for two days](https://x.com/degentokenbase/status/1789944238731297188). Degen Chain halts for two days due to a chain misconfiguration.
- 2024-03-28: [Degen Chain launches Mainnet](https://x.com/syndicateio/status/1773351144858750990). Degen Chain launches its mainnet.

## Risk summary

There are 1 additional risks coming from the host chain [Base Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/base)

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. the security stack of the whitelisted LayerZero adapter changes or is compromised (CRITICAL),
2. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
3. none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL),
4. validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL).

### Funds can be lost if

5. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

### Users can be censored if

6. the committee restricts their access to the external data.

### MEV can be extracted if

7. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

|  | Sequencer failure | State validation | Data availability | Exit window | Proposer failure |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Base Chain (L2) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | Fraud proofs (1R, ZK) (sentiment: good) | Onchain (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Self propose (sentiment: good) |
| Degen Chain (L3, individual) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) | External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) | None (sentiment: bad) | Self propose (sentiment: good) |
| Degen Chain (L3, combined) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) | External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) | None (sentiment: bad) | Self propose (sentiment: good) |

### L3 combined risks

The information below reflects combined L2 & L3 risks.

#### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d 12h delay on this operation.

#### State validation

Fraud proofs (INT) (5d 14h challenge period; sentiment: bad)

Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.

#### Data availability

External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

#### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

#### Proposer failure

Self propose (sentiment: good)

Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 15h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

## Stage

Degen Chain is not even a Stage 0 project.

**Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review.

### Stage 0

1 issue needs fixing.

- Met: The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium.
- Met: State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- Met: A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed.
- Under review: A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code.
- Issue: Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized.

### Stage 1

3 issues need fixing.

**Principle**

- Issue: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely.

**Guidelines**

- Met: Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible.
- Met: The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.
- Issue: Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- Issue: The Security Council is not properly set up.

[Learn more about Stages](https://l2beat.com/stages).

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

## Data availability

Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

### Risk analysis

#### Economic security

None (sentiment: bad)

There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

#### Fraud detection

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

#### Committee security

2/3 (sentiment: bad)

The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

#### Upgradeability

No delay (sentiment: bad)

There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed.

#### Relayer failure

No mechanism (sentiment: bad)

The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity.

### Technology

#### Architecture
![Anytrust architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/anytrust/architecture3.png#center)

The DAC uses a data availability solution built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components:
- **Sequencer Inbox**: Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches.
- **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of members responsible for storing and providing data on demand.
- **Data Availability Certificate (DACert)**: A commitment ensuring that data blobs are available without needing full data posting on the L1 chain.

Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs.
The Sequencer API allows the rollup Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hash.
When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it.
Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox.
If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain as calldata.

A DACert includes a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data.
The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature.
L2 nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp.
If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members.

#### DA Bridge Architecture
![Anytrust bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/anytrust/architectureL3.png#center)

The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge.
The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data.
The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the destination chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving destination chain transaction ordering finality in a single onchain transaction.

**Risks**

- Funds can be lost if a malicious committee attests to an invalid data availability certificate.
- Funds can be lost if the bridge contract or its dependencies receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.

**References**

- [Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum Docs](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-anytrust)

## State validation

![A diagram of the state validation](https://l2beat.com/static/images/state-validation/orbit.b691a319.png)

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

### State root proposals

Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 2m 30s. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ](https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction)

### Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 5d 14h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.

**References**

- [Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a)

### Fast confirmations

Whitelisted validators can fast-confirm state-roots after the initial 2m 30s minimum assertion period has passed on a state root and skip the 5d 14h challenge period. This finalizes the fast-confirmed state root an permits withdrawals based on it.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [Fast withdrawals for AnyTrust chains - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/launch-orbit-chain/how-tos/fast-withdrawals#fast-withdrawals-for-anytrust-chains)

### Program Hashes

#### ArbOS wasmModuleRoot v51.1

A commitment to the exact WASM binary version used for Orbit stack optimistic dispute games.

- Hash: `0xc2c02df561d4afaf9a1d6785f70098ec3874765c638e3cb6dbe8d3c83333e14c`
- Repository: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/tree/consensus-v51.1/arbos
- Verification: successful
- Used in: [Edge Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/edgechain), [Degen Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen), [Earnm](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/earnm)

##### Verification steps

Even though the program is compiled in docker for reproducibility reasons, it gives the correct results only on linux OS. Steps below were done on Ubuntu 22.04 OS. The steps below consume ~35 GiB disk space.

1. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/).
2. Checkout the correct branch in [nitro](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro) repo: `git checkout consensus-v51.1` . Commit hash should be `e5dab3512419c50893813f4226c0621c3bfe2bdc`.
3. Update git submodules `git submodule update --init --recursive --force`.
4. Generate wasm module root in docker: `docker buildx build --target nitro-node-dev -t nitro-node-dev .`.
5. Export the value from the docker: `docker run --rm --entrypoint cat nitro-node-dev /home/user/target/machines/latest/module-root.txt`.

## Upgrades & Governance

### Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

- Count of upgrades: 7
- Last upgrade: 1y 5mo ago
- Avg upgrade interval: 1y

- 2025-05-07 20:41 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b](https://basescan.org/tx/0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b), implementations: [0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999](https://basescan.org/address/0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8/base:0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999))
- 2025-05-07 20:41 UTC, upgrade of [Inbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7#code): transaction [0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b](https://basescan.org/tx/0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b), implementations: [0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5](https://basescan.org/address/0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2/base:0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5))
- 2025-05-06 22:36 UTC, upgrade of [Bridge](https://basescan.org/address/0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C#code): transaction [0xb5cacac7e409b6c786dc0e6e3d171a2f6ea8758fda7637fa88c333aa5817d35d](https://basescan.org/tx/0xb5cacac7e409b6c786dc0e6e3d171a2f6ea8758fda7637fa88c333aa5817d35d), implementations: [0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0](https://basescan.org/address/0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5/base:0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0))
- 2025-01-13 19:31 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26](https://basescan.org/tx/0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26), implementations: [0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7](https://basescan.org/address/0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79/base:0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7))
- 2025-01-13 19:31 UTC, upgrade of [RollupProxy](https://basescan.org/address/0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143#code): transaction [0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26](https://basescan.org/tx/0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26), implementations: [0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41](https://basescan.org/address/0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf/base:0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41)), [0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266](https://basescan.org/address/0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A/base:0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266))
- 2024-07-02 00:12 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7](https://basescan.org/tx/0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7), implementations: [0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8](https://basescan.org/address/0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A/base:0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8))
- 2024-07-02 00:12 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7](https://basescan.org/tx/0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7), implementations: [0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79](https://basescan.org/address/0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677/base:0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A](https://basescan.org/address/0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Inbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2](https://basescan.org/address/0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://basescan.org/address/0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5](https://basescan.org/address/0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677](https://basescan.org/address/0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [RollupProxy](https://basescan.org/address/0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf](https://basescan.org/address/0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf#code), [0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A](https://basescan.org/address/0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [UpgradeExecutor](https://basescan.org/address/0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746](https://basescan.org/address/0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Outbox](https://basescan.org/address/0xe63ddb12FBb6211a73F12a4367b10dA0834B82da#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c](https://basescan.org/address/0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c#code)
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [RollupEventInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x766DD3A13d17C6D175975C89225bde89F052dBc4#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93](https://basescan.org/address/0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93#code)

## Updates

Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs.

### [2026-06-11 11:22 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=337ad264) (2 changes)

RollupProxy `wasmModuleRoot` updated to ArbOS v51.1.

### [2026-05-11 14:14 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=4b942fc3) (1 change)

OrbitERC20OFTAdapter (`base:0xDb8E7598...`) — `owner` changed from `0x490a9D8A...` (Friday's new owner) to `0x2448e648...`. This contract is the LayerZero-side adapter that as a designated allowed outbox can pull funds from the Degen L3 canonical bridge escrow; ownership rotated again three days after the previous transfer.

### [2026-05-08 09:35 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=5feba459) (1 change)

OrbitERC20OFTAdapter (`base:0xDb8E7598...`) — `owner` changed from `0xa79c47C3...` → `0x490a9D8A...`. This contract is the LayerZero-side adapter that, as a designated allowed outbox, can pull funds from the Degen L3 canonical bridge escrow; the new owner inherits that bridge-escrow access.

### [2026-03-04 20:41 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=b05fb9f3) (1 change)

One member of AlchemyMultisig2 was rotated: 0xA351...700a replaced by 0x04a2...7Bd.

### [2025-10-10 10:09 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=2d37d0cf) (2 changes)

Upgrade to Arb OS v40.

### [2025-09-19 12:55 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=89d78f63) (1 change)

Multisig key rotation.

### [2025-09-14 22:12 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=478ce28c) (1 change)

Added LayerZero OFT adapter to the canonical bridge.

### [2025-07-14 12:44 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=f88e098b) (19 changes)

Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

### [2025-06-18 11:58 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=bc8116c4) (1 change)

alchemy MS signer change.

### [2025-05-08 09:51 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=8c4fa544) (high severity, 30 changes)

Standard orbit upgrade.

### [2025-03-31 12:32 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=598584f0) (10 changes)

Alchemy MS signer change.

### [2025-01-30 10:58 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=26614e92) (14 changes)

Add 1/1 fastConfirmer.

### [2025-01-15 14:12 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=02460f2c) (high severity, 31 changes)

ArbOS v32 upgrade to known shapes and maxTimeVariation reset.

### [2024-12-10 04:17 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=f7595f50) (19 changes)

EOA upgrader removed, move to 1 validator and back to 2/3 anytrust.

### [2024-12-09 18:27 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=2fbe5f2c) (28 changes)

EOA executor added (redwarn with link to twitter announcement).

### [2024-11-18 17:19 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=e1044c05) (2 changes)

A new OFT adapter contract (for the DEGEN token) is added as allowed Outbox to the main bridge. This gives the OFT adapter the permission to make any calls as the bridge (including sending all tokens from the bridge). See the Sanko L3 on Arbitrum for a similar construction. The LayerZero AMB now has access to the canonically escrowed funds and the bridge escrow serves doubly as a canonical escrow and OFT adapter lockbox.

### [2024-11-08 09:23 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=4a5ff5ab) (13 changes)

Governance moved to DegenMultisig.

### [2024-11-05 16:03 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=4386a853) (8 changes)

Single signer added to ConduitMultisig3 (3/7).

### [2024-11-01 15:09 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=18464039) (7 changes)

ConduitMultisig3 added member and kept threshold, now 3/6.

### [2024-07-02 09:34 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=3edbdcc1) (high severity, 25 changes)

Degen is upgraded to [ArbOS Version 20 "Atlas"](https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-arbos-version-20-atlas/20957).
This upgrade comes with blobs support (but Degen is an L3 on Base) and was reviewed thoroughly in `packages/backend/discovery/arbitrum/ethereum/diffHistory.md` at "Diff at Fri, 22 Mar 2024 07:51:09 GMT:".

TLDR of changes:
- SequencerInbox changes are related to blobs support
- Critical values like maxTimeVariation in the SequencerInbox (self sequencing delay) stay the same
- ChallengeManager is the same except for pointing to new OneStepProof contract

### [2024-05-14 07:08 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=46d3b4a3) (2 changes)

This update extends the sequencer-only window for degen chain by 1000x to 1000d. (MaxTimeVariation.delayBlocks, maxTimeVariation.delaySeconds)
Context: Big chain reorg on the L2, no batches posted for the last ~30h.

### [2024-04-08 19:50 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen?update=d436bd4a) (19 changes)

Provide description of changes. This section will be preserved.

## Operator

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to [Base Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/base)

### The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 4d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

**References**

- [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://basescan.org/address/0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999#code)
- [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job)

## Sequencing

### Delayed forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue "delayed" messages in the "delayed" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 4d.

## Withdrawals

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to [Base Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/base)

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

**References**

- [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle)
- [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging)
- [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e)

### Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

**References**

- [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/)

## Permissions

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/degen

### Base Chain

#### Actors

##### AlchemyMultisig2

Addresses: [0x871e290d5447b958131F6d44f915F10032436ee6](https://basescan.org/address/0x871e290d5447b958131F6d44f915F10032436ee6)

A Multisig with 5/8 threshold.
- Can upgrade **with no delay**
  - Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - ChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor]
  - Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  - Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
- Can interact with RollupProxy
  - Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor]

Participants (8): [0xB2aa0C2C4fD6BFCBF699d4c787CD6Cc0dC461a9d](https://basescan.org/address/0xB2aa0C2C4fD6BFCBF699d4c787CD6Cc0dC461a9d), [0xa3353Ae4458F663f1F888705b044269bd30cd110](https://basescan.org/address/0xa3353Ae4458F663f1F888705b044269bd30cd110), [0xFB00073F931A817b244bF211aA2E5DCBfff8B1ca](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB00073F931A817b244bF211aA2E5DCBfff8B1ca), [0x35A2079110aa30d1De381cf75aCd1836b6dEE1d7](https://basescan.org/address/0x35A2079110aa30d1De381cf75aCd1836b6dEE1d7), [0x001271c57AeC639952B5201D052767c316755512](https://basescan.org/address/0x001271c57AeC639952B5201D052767c316755512), [0x04a25F65200E56EAd142652b7E5eF372E169F2Bd](https://basescan.org/address/0x04a25F65200E56EAd142652b7E5eF372E169F2Bd), [0xd1447Dd15D9e24ddFF99f0fE3C88Bf64d23D1670](https://basescan.org/address/0xd1447Dd15D9e24ddFF99f0fE3C88Bf64d23D1670), [0xeD9919D57162D518014C391a687AA8fb9DB55654](https://basescan.org/address/0xeD9919D57162D518014C391a687AA8fb9DB55654)

##### DegenFastConfirmerMultisig

Addresses: [0xc207cbC35DD3CD172059730380A45aE14eb0e403](https://basescan.org/address/0xc207cbC35DD3CD172059730380A45aE14eb0e403)

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold.

Participants (1): [0x3cAF7ceF6B2aECA72102E8835325B26BF99FE9E0](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen#EOA-1) (EOA 1)

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0x3cAF7ceF6B2aECA72102E8835325B26BF99FE9E0](https://basescan.org/address/0x3cAF7ceF6B2aECA72102E8835325B26BF99FE9E0)

Member of DegenFastConfirmerMultisig.
- Can interact with RollupProxy
  - Can finalize a state root before the challenge period has passed. This allows withdrawing from the bridge based on the state root [via: DegenFastConfirmerMultisig]
  - Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain [via: DegenFastConfirmerMultisig - or - acting directly]

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0xc98A32DdD1b30B3788670C9992f3B18EF83Da491](https://basescan.org/address/0xc98A32DdD1b30B3788670C9992f3B18EF83Da491)

- Can interact with SequencerInbox
  - Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain

##### EOA 3

Addresses: [0x2448e6487c3603860Cf48F0A82f8ab944B761e9B](https://basescan.org/address/0x2448e6487c3603860Cf48F0A82f8ab944B761e9B)

- Can interact with OrbitERC20OFTAdapter
  - Can control the LayerZero OrbitERC20OFTAdapter contract for the DEGEN token and thus potentially steal all funds from the canonical bridge

##### EOA 4

Addresses: [0x690f4e2f19717A06E1C146B2dCE68c2d23e36f4c](https://basescan.org/address/0x690f4e2f19717A06E1C146B2dCE68c2d23e36f4c)

- Can interact with UTBDecent
  - directly controls the UTB contract's critical functions like updating all roles and modules

## Smart contracts

![A diagram of the smart contract architecture](https://l2beat.com/static/images/architecture/orbit-optimium-fastconfirm.3f3e58f9.png)

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/degen

### Base Chain

#### SequencerInbox

Addresses: [0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code), [0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999](https://basescan.org/address/0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 2, Last upgrade: 1y 5mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 10mo 15d)

- 2025-05-07 20:41 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b](https://basescan.org/tx/0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b), implementations: [0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999](https://basescan.org/address/0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8/base:0x40Cd7D713D7ae463f95cE5d342Ea6E7F5cF7C999))
- 2024-07-02 00:12 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7](https://basescan.org/tx/0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7), implementations: [0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8](https://basescan.org/address/0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A/base:0x98DB769A9E15D66EA04665da0dF616596c296BA8))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [SequencerInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x6216dD1EE27C5aCEC7427052d3eCDc98E2bc2221#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A](https://basescan.org/address/0x5ad3e9141D0EAd2132afFF0CD74487964cE9135A#code)

A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2
  - **batchPosters**: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### ChallengeManager

Addresses: [0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code), [0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7](https://basescan.org/address/0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 2, Last upgrade: 1y 9mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 10mo 15d)

- 2025-01-13 19:31 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26](https://basescan.org/tx/0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26), implementations: [0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7](https://basescan.org/address/0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79/base:0x5C2950Bd136716540e1F5CF442f2AB0aD2F413A7))
- 2024-07-02 00:12 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7](https://basescan.org/tx/0xc313d7714edf75e41115f458d8704acc2174d14247b8944202d64dd32d678fa7), implementations: [0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79](https://basescan.org/address/0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677/base:0x377A5b786E94cAcdcB2B309451C373c8F2166A79))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [ChallengeManager](https://basescan.org/address/0x67812161Bbb6aCF891aA6028BC614a660961ceD8#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677](https://basescan.org/address/0x9Db0bB898C500DD84C7c7bd7fFFFE914569a6677#code)

Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### RollupProxy

Addresses: [0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143](https://basescan.org/address/0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143#code), [0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41](https://basescan.org/address/0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266](https://basescan.org/address/0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028](https://basescan.org/address/0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 9mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 3mo)

- 2025-01-13 19:31 UTC, upgrade of [RollupProxy](https://basescan.org/address/0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143#code): transaction [0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26](https://basescan.org/tx/0xd67a1ccd5e97907f82409a506ecc0d1ae8b8963ab6ced7f837b9643375be4f26), implementations: [0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41](https://basescan.org/address/0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf/base:0xb760B98D6256F8D135cEB738Eb9A9E44Af9B3b41)), [0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266](https://basescan.org/address/0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A/base:0x747D88df773721558575BA29fEf11FE28ED25266))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [RollupProxy](https://basescan.org/address/0xD34F3a11F10DB069173b32d84F02eDA578709143#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf](https://basescan.org/address/0x3A59b13eB3F661DE35a1e203Bd12b3B4123976cf#code), [0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A](https://basescan.org/address/0xB7202d306936B79Ba29907b391faA87D3BEec33A#code)

Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
- Roles:
  - **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2
  - **anyTrustFastConfirmer**: DegenFastConfirmerMultisig; ultimately EOA 1
  - **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2
  - **validators**: DegenFastConfirmerMultisig, EOA 1; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### Bridge (escrow)

Addresses: [0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C](https://basescan.org/address/0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C#code), [0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0](https://basescan.org/address/0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 5mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 3mo)

- 2025-05-06 22:36 UTC, upgrade of [Bridge](https://basescan.org/address/0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C#code): transaction [0xb5cacac7e409b6c786dc0e6e3d171a2f6ea8758fda7637fa88c333aa5817d35d](https://basescan.org/tx/0xb5cacac7e409b6c786dc0e6e3d171a2f6ea8758fda7637fa88c333aa5817d35d), implementations: [0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0](https://basescan.org/address/0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5/base:0xf48cBc0e2Bd8d9ED8d76A54A3672bbb6e07Cf6D0))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://basescan.org/address/0xEfEf4558802bF373Ce3307189C79a9cAb0a4Cb9C#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5](https://basescan.org/address/0xc00336Cdf86AE7AD58D8773B0114082C190D28D5#code)

Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation: DEGEN

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### UpgradeExecutor

Addresses: [0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028](https://basescan.org/address/0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028#code), [0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746](https://basescan.org/address/0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [UpgradeExecutor](https://basescan.org/address/0xaA3A7A2ec2477A61082E1C41a2c6710587917028#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746](https://basescan.org/address/0x3C4DF76De31816443C207E49F9fE48737C8F2746#code)

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2
  - **executors**: AlchemyMultisig2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### Inbox

Addresses: [0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7](https://basescan.org/address/0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7#code), [0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5](https://basescan.org/address/0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 5mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 3mo)

- 2025-05-07 20:41 UTC, upgrade of [Inbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7#code): transaction [0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b](https://basescan.org/tx/0xcae4abe1fb86f2d6e7db916c62b946b605a8ae100571f7db7ccccab07b2b1f3b), implementations: [0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5](https://basescan.org/address/0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/base:0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2/base:0xa9Fa7dFC5885E83af241c31c865d5f59eD4669d5))
- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Inbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x21A1e2BFC61F30F2E81E0b08cd37c1FC7ef776E7#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2](https://basescan.org/address/0xcA00Db0289131B71A6624f62666bd54305697BB2#code)

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### Outbox

Addresses: [0xe63ddb12FBb6211a73F12a4367b10dA0834B82da](https://basescan.org/address/0xe63ddb12FBb6211a73F12a4367b10dA0834B82da#code), [0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c](https://basescan.org/address/0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [Outbox](https://basescan.org/address/0xe63ddb12FBb6211a73F12a4367b10dA0834B82da#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c](https://basescan.org/address/0x20fA6358f89Ed16d48F6588a8f500887354Ff56c#code)

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### OneStepProofEntry

Addresses: [0x15D2a9A14de6Ea03AADE944641eAb497a3A4c9DF](https://basescan.org/address/0x15D2a9A14de6Ea03AADE944641eAb497a3A4c9DF#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

#### OneStepProverMemory

Addresses: [0x173FCB92df1854c3B78dC8696C23B1c88437b892](https://basescan.org/address/0x173FCB92df1854c3B78dC8696C23B1c88437b892#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

#### ValidatorUtils

Addresses: [0x23b0348788b96ee1cE4e7DdED4AC2A99de516F51](https://basescan.org/address/0x23b0348788b96ee1cE4e7DdED4AC2A99de516F51#code)

This contract implements view only utilities for validators.

#### OneStepProverHostIo

Addresses: [0x320e29bc3f34bc6B8834bBD2B6b013ef6620E69F](https://basescan.org/address/0x320e29bc3f34bc6B8834bBD2B6b013ef6620E69F#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

#### UTBDecent

Addresses: [0x43019F8BE1F192587883b67dEA2994999f5a2de2](https://basescan.org/address/0x43019F8BE1F192587883b67dEA2994999f5a2de2#code)

The UTB contract serves as an L2<->L3 gateway by integrating with Decent (LayerZero app) to allow bridging and swapping in- and out of Degen L3. This is achieved using external modules (smart contracts) like swappers and bridgers that can be registered in the UTB contract.
- Roles:
  - **cessControl**: EOA 4

#### RollupEventInbox

Addresses: [0x766DD3A13d17C6D175975C89225bde89F052dBc4](https://basescan.org/address/0x766DD3A13d17C6D175975C89225bde89F052dBc4#code), [0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93](https://basescan.org/address/0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-03-10 16:17 UTC, deployment of [RollupEventInbox](https://basescan.org/address/0x766DD3A13d17C6D175975C89225bde89F052dBc4#code): transaction [0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec](https://basescan.org/tx/0x85708428ba3eb696c32b3e634fed7ac46016b61d6c0df46959a494d6ecc2bdec), implementations: [0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93](https://basescan.org/address/0x4326B3755539d35b0A8846bF9b33982A8eA42c93#code)

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately AlchemyMultisig2

Can be upgraded by: AlchemyMultisig2 with no delay

#### OneStepProver0

Addresses: [0x97ba9522f2e5D67e96FeA6B612e794dc96637AAc](https://basescan.org/address/0x97ba9522f2e5D67e96FeA6B612e794dc96637AAc#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

#### OrbitERC20OFTAdapter

Addresses: [0xDb8E759859058952c34953c8469f464109826e52](https://basescan.org/address/0xDb8E759859058952c34953c8469f464109826e52#code)

As a designated allowed outbox, this contract can access all funds of the canonical bridge escrow. It also interfaces with the LayerZero AMB, giving this external bridge access to the Degen L3 canonical bridge and making canonical bridge security dependent on LayerZero security.
- Roles:
  - **owner**: EOA 3

#### OneStepProverMath

Addresses: [0xDf6C4562e853C4F775285710B467e2EE4Ca8D22c](https://basescan.org/address/0xDf6C4562e853C4F775285710B467e2EE4Ca8D22c#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677](https://basescan.org/address/0xFB48D385Fa3da33762B350e1d705b9E46054E677#code)

- Roles:
  - **owner**: UpgradeExecutor

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if the security stack of the whitelisted LayerZero adapter changes or is compromised (CRITICAL).
- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

### Program Hashes

#### ArbOS wasmModuleRoot v51.1

A commitment to the exact WASM binary version used for Orbit stack optimistic dispute games.

- Hash: `0xc2c02df561d4afaf9a1d6785f70098ec3874765c638e3cb6dbe8d3c83333e14c`
- Repository: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/tree/consensus-v51.1/arbos
- Verification: successful
- Used in: [Edge Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/edgechain), [Degen Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/degen), [Earnm](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/earnm)

##### Verification steps

Even though the program is compiled in docker for reproducibility reasons, it gives the correct results only on linux OS. Steps below were done on Ubuntu 22.04 OS. The steps below consume ~35 GiB disk space.

1. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/).
2. Checkout the correct branch in [nitro](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro) repo: `git checkout consensus-v51.1` . Commit hash should be `e5dab3512419c50893813f4226c0621c3bfe2bdc`.
3. Update git submodules `git submodule update --init --recursive --force`.
4. Generate wasm module root in docker: `docker buildx build --target nitro-node-dev -t nitro-node-dev .`.
5. Export the value from the docker: `docker run --rm --entrypoint cat nitro-node-dev /home/user/target/machines/latest/module-root.txt`.