# GM Network Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/gmnetwork ## Summary **Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained. - Gas token: ETH - Type: Other - Purposes: Universal, AI - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 2777 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good) - State validation: None (sentiment: bad) - Data availability: External (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About GM Network is an OP stack L2 in alt-DA mode aiming to deepen the integration of smart, connected devices within everyday human activities by blending Artificial Intelligence and the Internet of Things. ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/gmnetwork#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/gmnetwork) ## Onchain costs Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/gmnetwork#onchain-costs). ## Milestones & Incidents - 2025-03-31: [GM Network sunsets](https://x.com/GMNetwork_AI/status/1894592894893527317). GM Network has officially sunset. ## Risk summary **Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots. ### Funds can be stolen if 1. the sequencer is malicious and is able to economically outspend the altruistic challengers, 2. there is no challenger willing to challenge unavailable data commitments, 3. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL) 4. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be frozen if 5. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL). ### MEV can be extracted if 6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis **Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots. ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation. ### State validation None (sentiment: bad) Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview. ### Data availability External (sentiment: bad) Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. ## Data availability GM Network DA is a data availability solution using data availability challenges (DA Challenges). ### Risk analysis #### Economic security DA Challenges (sentiment: bad) There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack. However, there is a mechanism that allows users to challenge unavailability of data. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers, and there is no pool of funds onchain to incentivize challengers. #### Fraud detection None (sentiment: bad) There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. #### Committee security None (sentiment: bad) The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability. #### Upgradeability No delay (sentiment: bad) There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. #### Relayer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. ### Technology #### Architecture ![gmnetworkDA layer](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/gmnetworkda/architecture.png#center) #### Data Availability Challenges GM Network relies on DA challenges for data availability. The DA Provider submits an input commitment on Ethereum, and users can request the data behind the commitment off-chain from the DA Provider. If a DA challenger finds that the data behind a tx data commitment is not available, they can submit a challenge which requires locking a bond within 12h. A challenge can be resolved by publishing the preimage data within an additional 12h. In such case, a portion of the challenger bond is burned, with the exact amount estimated as the cost incurred by the resolver to publish the full data, meaning that the resolver and challenger will approximately lose the same amount of funds. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers. If instead, after a challenge, the preimage data is not published, the chain reorgs to the last fully derivable state. #### DA Bridge Only hashes of data batches are posted as DA commitments to an EOA on Ethereum. However, there is a mechanism that allows users to challenge unavailability of data. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an invalid data availability certificate and there are no challengers. - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an invalid data availability certificate, and they are able to outspend the challengers. **References** - [Alt-DA Specification](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/experimental/alt-da.md) - [Security Considerations - Ethresear.ch ](https://ethresear.ch/t/universal-plasma-and-da-challenges/18629) ## State validation ### No state validation OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL). **References** - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5#code) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/gmnetwork#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5#code) - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5#code) ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. **References** - [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window) - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03783fe183B68De1Ae3673Cb098039F58Ca49BaF#code) ## Withdrawals ### Regular messaging The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. **Risks** - Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL). **References** - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03783fe183B68De1Ae3673Cb098039F58Ca49BaF#code) - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03783fe183B68De1Ae3673Cb098039F58Ca49BaF#code) - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5#code) ### Forced messaging If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message. **References** - [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction) ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2. **References** - [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### GmMultisig Addresses: [0xf040a7A04e914E1b4383C04359D03Ab5F12E7828](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf040a7A04e914E1b4383C04359D03Ab5F12E7828) A Multisig with 3/4 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin] * L2OutputOracle [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin] * SuperchainConfig [via: ProxyAdmin] * DataAvailabilityChallenge [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismPortal [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with AddressManager * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin] ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0xA1D6a47973D55FD4F6432B370CE5381fB24A3094](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA1D6a47973D55FD4F6432B370CE5381fB24A3094) * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) * Can interact with OptimismPortal * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) ##### EOA 2 Addresses: [0x4d9D11fF877aCD0918CF467B14cE4C3d8F1b97d9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4d9D11fF877aCD0918CF467B14cE4C3d8F1b97d9) * Can interact with L2OutputOracle * Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer ##### EOA 3 Addresses: [0x4FACE9ec6237C04a22d434989Beb30b43055886D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4FACE9ec6237C04a22d434989Beb30b43055886D) * Can interact with L2OutputOracle * Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 4 Addresses: [0x652b0ee2F6727e3627328E170Fa2373B50E81601](https://etherscan.io/address/0x652b0ee2F6727e3627328E170Fa2373B50E81601) * Can interact with SystemConfig * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system * Can interact with DataAvailabilityChallenge * can upgrade the parameters of DA challenges like the bond size or refund percentages, potentially making challenges infeasable or insecure ##### EOA 5 Addresses: [0xd668A64E69ef82026deB46491BFCd28ba14024C8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd668A64E69ef82026deB46491BFCd28ba14024C8) * Can interact with SystemConfig * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### L2OutputOracle Addresses: [0x53C64d7c9a28911203Ba4BE2a6cA58254184920a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x53C64d7c9a28911203Ba4BE2a6cA58254184920a#code), [0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a9f35a100B11B71b79969c0527e1d3Cec8A24d5#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig * **challenger**: EOA 2 * **proposer**: EOA 3 Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### SystemConfig Addresses: [0x8C467dAC40f01DFA83666F39108992a0635faeD9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8C467dAC40f01DFA83666F39108992a0635faeD9#code), [0x0351c7341AAe6A69487eb007AA37159BD6878285](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0351c7341AAe6A69487eb007AA37159BD6878285#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig * **batcherHash**: EOA 5 * **owner**: EOA 4 Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### DataAvailabilityChallenge Addresses: [0xd1fe2EEb5637b0F78BfcEd9186ebE716aC73DEb6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd1fe2EEb5637b0F78BfcEd9186ebE716aC73DEb6#code), [0xcEEF52d78DD47b80Cf7d4f19bef646b644A43162](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcEEF52d78DD47b80Cf7d4f19bef646b644A43162#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) The DataAvailabilityChallenge contract is used to challenge the full availability of data behind commimted transaction data hashes. See the technology section for more details. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig * **owner**: EOA 4 Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### OptimismPortal Addresses: [0xd2726bde3D07645faf5aD7cCF15C94817B3556D6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd2726bde3D07645faf5aD7cCF15C94817B3556D6#code), [0x03783fe183B68De1Ae3673Cb098039F58Ca49BaF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03783fe183B68De1Ae3673Cb098039F58Ca49BaF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig * **guardian**: EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### SuperchainConfig Addresses: [0xB83831efA1Cc1bFF0c29ed0d8df1943F834442A0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB83831efA1Cc1bFF0c29ed0d8df1943F834442A0#code), [0x04b259e2a4D3D0B961A3b099861AaEeA6BF39e6D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x04b259e2a4D3D0B961A3b099861AaEeA6BF39e6D#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig * **guardian**: EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### L1StandardBridge Addresses: [0x2321F7982Af3cBbA1Ab9D426ae7fe595E1CF427C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2321F7982Af3cBbA1Ab9D426ae7fe595E1CF427C#code), [0x7f65D6C6CBd3cd796B969583Bb66B6b40f1eA6f3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7f65D6C6CBd3cd796B969583Bb66B6b40f1eA6f3#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### L1ERC721Bridge Addresses: [0x6345b54426A5B80A377d07C97672331Bda3432e6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6345b54426A5B80A377d07C97672331Bda3432e6#code), [0xdF9164F7e66704f5B01a31ace233767946e82F76](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdF9164F7e66704f5B01a31ace233767946e82F76#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### L1CrossDomainMessenger Addresses: [0xea6390d969aacd4BA217F6b4614dDAE4bdDb1B3B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xea6390d969aacd4BA217F6b4614dDAE4bdDb1B3B#code), [0xa537c425181C252eD396592BD2f0Cafbebb6D163](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa537c425181C252eD396592BD2f0Cafbebb6D163#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) * Roles: * **owner**: GmMultisig #### OptimismMintableERC20Factory Addresses: [0x34B4AcC9e4523Cc6bbfC367B9034121c447b4083](https://etherscan.io/address/0x34B4AcC9e4523Cc6bbfC367B9034121c447b4083#code), [0x8d25eE2a806642f7272bad8e5e18CBd79eE5BdcE](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d25eE2a806642f7272bad8e5e18CBd79eE5BdcE#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453](https://etherscan.io/address/0x081A54442Af40a26Ae453Da0F044a49Aa3314453#code) (Admin) A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately GmMultisig Can be upgraded by: GmMultisig with no delay The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).