# Immutable X Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/immutablex ## Summary **Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained. - Total Value Secured: $657.59 K (-1.00% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $657.59 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - Type: Other - Purposes: NFT, Exchange - Host chain: Ethereum ### Risks - Sequencer failure: No mechanism (sentiment: bad) - State validation: Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good) - Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: 14d (sentiment: warning) - Proposer failure: Use escape hatch (sentiment: good) ### About Immutable X is an NFT-focused Validium providing zero gas fees, instant trades and scalability for applications. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/immutablex#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/immutablex) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/immutablex/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/immutablex#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/immutablex) ## Milestones & Incidents - 2026-03-05: [Immutable X migrated to Immutable zkEVM](https://x.com/Immutable/status/2016389261575258446). Immutable X deployed contracts for migration to Immutable zkEVM. Operation of Immutable X halts. - 2022-06-29: [IMX Token introduced](https://www.immutable.com/blog/introducing-imx-to-power-ethereums-first-layer-2-for-nfts). Immutable announce IMX, the native ERC-20 utility token of Immutable X. - 2021-04-08: [Trading is live on Immutable X Marketplace](https://twitter.com/immutable/status/1380269810525872131?s=21&t=kyMdE6ORI9f76e8aqizlpg). Immutable has launched the first phase of its Layer 2 scaling protocol. ## Risk summary ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 14d delay on code upgrades. ### Funds can be lost if 2. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL). ### Users can be censored if 3. the committee restricts their access to the external data, 4. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system. ### MEV can be extracted if 5. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis ### Sequencer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. ### State validation Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good) STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. ### Data availability External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data. ### Exit window 14d (sentiment: warning) Users have 14d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 14d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed. ### Proposer failure Use escape hatch (sentiment: good) Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit. ## Data availability ### Data is not stored on chain The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL). - Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data. **References** - [Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/con_data_availability.html#data_availability_modes) - [Validium - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/con_data_availability.html#validium_starkex) - [Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/contract-management.html#availability_verifiers_spot) ## State validation ### Validity proofs Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots. **References** - [Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-off-chain-state.html#enforcing_consistency_in_the_on_chain_state_spot) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/immutablex#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [Operator - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/shared/contract-management.html#operator_perpetual) ### Users can force exit the system Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. **Risks** - Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system. **References** - [Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/architecture/solution-architecture.html#8-censorship-prevention) ## Withdrawals ### Regular exit The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1. **References** - [Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/withdrawal.html) ### Forced exit If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit. **References** - [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-forced-operations.html) - [Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/spot-trading-full-withdrawals.html) ### Emergency exit If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction. **References** - [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-forced-operations.html) - [Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/spot-trading-full-withdrawals.html) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### IMXAdminMultisig Addresses: [0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor [via: ProxyAdmin] * StarkExchange * RootERC20BridgeFlowRate [via: ProxyAdmin] ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0x72164D4448fe6cfA472946feDC71e83b4628B1aF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x72164D4448fe6cfA472946feDC71e83b4628B1aF) * Can upgrade **with no delay** * AxelarGasService ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### AxelarGasService Addresses: [0x2d5d7d31F671F86C782533cc367F14109a082712](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2d5d7d31F671F86C782533cc367F14109a082712#code), [0xcb5C784DCf8FF342625DbC53B356ed0Cbb0EBB9b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xcb5C784DCf8FF342625DbC53B356ed0Cbb0EBB9b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x72164D4448fe6cfA472946feDC71e83b4628B1aF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x72164D4448fe6cfA472946feDC71e83b4628B1aF#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### AxelarGatewayProxyMultisig Addresses: [0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5#code) #### RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor Addresses: [0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932#code), [0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately IMXAdminMultisig Can be upgraded by: IMXAdminMultisig with no delay #### StarkExchangeMigration Addresses: [0x58b5484F489f7858DC83a5a677338074b57de806](https://etherscan.io/address/0x58b5484F489f7858DC83a5a677338074b57de806#code) #### StarkExchange Addresses: [0x5FDCCA53617f4d2b9134B29090C87D01058e27e9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5FDCCA53617f4d2b9134B29090C87D01058e27e9#code), [0x273b65a7231321D4ee47a4c47408Ef43517455Ec](https://etherscan.io/address/0x273b65a7231321D4ee47a4c47408Ef43517455Ec#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: IMXAdminMultisig Can be upgraded by: IMXAdminMultisig with no delay #### Operators Addresses: [0x7DdB2d76b80B0AA19bDEa48EB1301182F4CeefbC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7DdB2d76b80B0AA19bDEa48EB1301182F4CeefbC#code) #### ChildERC20 Addresses: [0x8804A8aA1F18f23aE8A456dD73806FdA3219FaD1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8804A8aA1F18f23aE8A456dD73806FdA3219FaD1#code) #### VaultRootSenderAdapter Addresses: [0x9Fabd9Cc71f15b9Cfd717E117FBb9cfD9fC7cd32](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9Fabd9Cc71f15b9Cfd717E117FBb9cfD9fC7cd32#code) #### RootERC20BridgeFlowRate Addresses: [0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6#code), [0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154](https://etherscan.io/address/0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately IMXAdminMultisig Can be upgraded by: IMXAdminMultisig with no delay #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8#code) * Roles: * **owner**: IMXAdminMultisig The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 14d delay on code upgrades.