# Molten Network

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/molten

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

**Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

- Total Value Secured: $9.47 K (-1.26% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $9.47 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
- Gas token: MOLTEN
- Type: Other
- Purpose: Universal
- Host chain: Arbitrum One
- Chain ID: 360

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: Onchain (sentiment: good)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Self propose (sentiment: good)

### About

Molten is an Orbit stack L3 on Arbitrum with Celestia DA, created by the UniDex team.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/molten#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/molten)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/molten/breakdown)

## Activity

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/molten#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/molten)

## Data posted

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/molten#data-posted).

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2025-01-30: [Molten integrates Espresso sequencer](https://x.com/EspressoSys/status/1929531777686630866). Molten adds the Espresso TEE sequencer to their Celestia DA with Blobstream.
- 2024-11-13: [Molten starts using Blobstream](https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x9a8ae683e857b80a843f7f071b0f831ac8162c6ac2c09fd9a8a514809d80c7af). Upgraded ChallengeManager contract to the version that uses Celestia with Blobstream bridge
- 2024-03-31: [Mainnet Launch](https://x.com/MoltenL3/status/1774485708742205545). Molten launches its Mainnet.

## Risk summary

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL)
2. none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

### MEV can be extracted if

3. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

### Withdrawals can be delayed if

4. the owner of EspressoTEEVerifier updates the contract verification values (enclave hash, signer) and it is no longer possible to verify the TEE quote.

## Risk analysis

The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.

**Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

The risks below reflect combined L2 & L3 risks.

### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.

### State validation

Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)

No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.

### Data availability

Onchain (sentiment: good)

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

### Proposer failure

Self propose (sentiment: good)

Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

## Stage

Molten Network is not even a Stage 0 project.

### Stage 0

- [x] A complete and functional proof system is deployed.
- [ ] Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized.
- [x] The project calls itself a rollup.
- [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/)

### Stage 1

- [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
- [x] Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators.
- [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up.
- [x] The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.

### Stage 2

- [ ] Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors.
- [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
- [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.

## Data availability

### All transaction data is recorded on chain

All executed transactions are submitted to an on chain smart contract. The execution of the rollup is based entirely on the submitted transactions, so anyone monitoring the contract can know the correct state of the rollup chain.

**References**

- [Sequencing followed by deterministic execution - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/#sequencing-followed-by-deterministic-execution)
- [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, addSequencerL2BatchFromOrigin function](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x481863c96f949F5E13932ec2F65470C0CF83808d#code)

## State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

### State root proposals

Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ](https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction)

### Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.

**References**

- [Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a)

## Upgrades & Governance

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/molten#updates).

## Operator

### The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

**References**

- [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x481863c96f949F5E13932ec2F65470C0CF83808d#code)
- [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job)

## Sequencing

### Espresso TEE sequencer

Integration with Espresso sequencing. 
In addition to providing regular pre-confirmations, the sequencer publishes blocks to the Espresso Network.
The integration expects the transaction batch poster to run inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and it is programmed to verify batch inclusion in a Espresso Network block before publishing it to the host chain.
However, the confirmations provided by Espresso Network are additive, and the batch poster can skip Espresso inclusion checks should the Espresso Network be down or unavailable.
To ensure the batch poster is running inside a TEE, the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain was updated so that the data posting function also includes a TEE attestation as input (a "quote" / signature) that is verified onchain by the EspressoTEEVerifier for each batch transaction. 
The verifier checks whether the signature originates from inside the TEE and reverts if unsuccessful.

**Risks**

- Withdrawals can be delayed if the owner of EspressoTEEVerifier updates the contract verification values (enclave hash, signer) and it is no longer possible to verify the TEE quote.

**References**

- [Nitro Espresso Integration](https://github.com/EspressoSystems/nitro-espresso-integration/blob/7ddcc6c036fa05cc47560552c85f30b5adedf32c/arbnode/batch_poster.go#L574)
- [SGX Quote](https://gramine.readthedocs.io/en/stable/sgx-intro.html#:~:text=The%20SGX%20quote%20is%20a%20signed%20report%20that%20contains%20the%20enclave%20measurement%20and%20the%20signer%20measurement%20of%20the%20enclave%20and%20the%20signer%20of%20the%20signer%20process%20that%20created%20the%20report.)

## Withdrawals

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

**References**

- [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle)
- [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging)
- [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e)

### Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

**References**

- [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/)

## Permissions

### Arbitrum One

#### Actors

##### Caldera Multisig 1

Addresses: [0x6FD149B3d41fd860B9Da1A6fE54e902eF41F68BF](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x6FD149B3d41fd860B9Da1A6fE54e902eF41F68BF)

A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor]
  * SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * ERC20Gateway [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * ChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * GatewayRouter [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor]

##### SafeL2

Addresses: [0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5)

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. 
* Can interact with EspressoTEEVerifier
  * change the modular TEE verifier contracts 
* Can interact with EspressoSGXTEEVerifier
  * set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave's code and initial data) and delete all registered signers 
* Can interact with EspressoNitroTEEVerifier
  * set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave's code and initial data) and delete all registered signers 

##### BlobstreamMultisig

Addresses: [0x738a9b55304f9fcF776B3BA285e50c0f9eF77997](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x738a9b55304f9fcF776B3BA285e50c0f9eF77997)

A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * ArbitrumBlobstream 
* Can interact with ArbitrumBlobstream
  * can freeze the bridge contract and update the list of authorized relayers 

##### SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig

Addresses: [0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878)

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. 
* Can interact with SP1VerifierGatewayArb
  * affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes 

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0x2E5d207a4C0F7e7C52F6622DCC6EB44bC0fE1A13](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x2E5d207a4C0F7e7C52F6622DCC6EB44bC0fE1A13)

* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor]
  * SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * ERC20Gateway [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * ChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * GatewayRouter [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor]

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0x30ea093b14364f21Dd74D7Bd43e2FAB1279D3738](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x30ea093b14364f21Dd74D7Bd43e2FAB1279D3738)

* Can interact with SequencerInbox
  * Add/remove batchPosters (Sequencers) 
  * Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain 

##### EOA 3

Addresses: [0x152FFeF04881BD1390D2A52009f42d56EaC7AA03](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x152FFeF04881BD1390D2A52009f42d56EaC7AA03)

* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain 

##### EOA 4

Addresses: [0xf37831515e1ddf6bB30eE612545bf87047946602](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf37831515e1ddf6bB30eE612545bf87047946602)

* Can interact with NitroEnclaveVerifier
  * set the root certificate, add/remove ZK verifier routes, update verifier and aggregator program IDs, and change the ZK coprocessor configuration 

##### 2 EOAs

Addresses: [0x3243552F3BcbcE720Db6f5ad0C1B7cd15458392D](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x3243552F3BcbcE720Db6f5ad0C1B7cd15458392D) (EOA 5), [0x9c0B0dBBAe8a976CEeA8C2A96F6D00c53839afDC](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x9c0B0dBBAe8a976CEeA8C2A96F6D00c53839afDC) (EOA 6)

* Can interact with ArbitrumBlobstream
  * it is a 'Relayer' and can call commitHeaderRange() to commit block ranges. Since adding and removing Relayers emits no events, there can be more relayers than are presented here 

## Smart contracts

### Arbitrum One

#### RollupProxy

Addresses: [0x0f28D76Ec5c62b502625351726b4A3E3F54FF5F0](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0f28D76Ec5c62b502625351726b4A3E3F54FF5F0#code), [0x4f82B5de97Ad3690ee319878083503178Fd8E0B9](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x4f82B5de97Ad3690ee319878083503178Fd8E0B9#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x8522769aEF1A87bE45530E0C84834BCce38CA9Bd](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8522769aEF1A87bE45530E0C84834BCce38CA9Bd#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x92ff91308F5f1036435f23c2F4F136Bb7475425d](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x92ff91308F5f1036435f23c2F4F136Bb7475425d#code) (Admin)

Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
* Roles:
  * **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
  * **validators**: EOA 3

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### SequencerInbox

Addresses: [0x0fFe9ACC296ddd4De5F616Aa482C99fA4b41A3E2](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0fFe9ACC296ddd4De5F616Aa482C99fA4b41A3E2#code), [0x481863c96f949F5E13932ec2F65470C0CF83808d](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x481863c96f949F5E13932ec2F65470C0CF83808d#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

The Espresso TEE sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. This version of the SequencerInbox also supports commitments to data that is posted to Celestia.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
  * **batchPosterManager**: EOA 2
  * **batchPosters**: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### ChallengeManager

Addresses: [0x7BB97862CA342B5fbe2AE2cF2E954F6327f587b1](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7BB97862CA342B5fbe2AE2cF2E954F6327f587b1#code), [0x0686dc9F334F8C0f0a9646f48775aa002757AFFE](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0686dc9F334F8C0f0a9646f48775aa002757AFFE#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Bridge

Addresses: [0xE1d32C985825562edAa906fAC39295370Db72195](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xE1d32C985825562edAa906fAC39295370Db72195#code), [0x7DD439Ec22c91b0703EE7d80175fd8d5319906A1](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7DD439Ec22c91b0703EE7d80175fd8d5319906A1#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### UpgradeExecutor

Addresses: [0x92ff91308F5f1036435f23c2F4F136Bb7475425d](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x92ff91308F5f1036435f23c2F4F136Bb7475425d#code), [0x20C6be2A0429A82a7bF113905a29d36CF6753B10](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x20C6be2A0429A82a7bF113905a29d36CF6753B10#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
  * **executors**: Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Inbox

Addresses: [0x235000876bd58336C802B3546Fc0250f285fCc79](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x235000876bd58336C802B3546Fc0250f285fCc79#code), [0xbFfd05964F6d7AE4B55eB8A7086d88EEEcbF5f76](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xbFfd05964F6d7AE4B55eB8A7086d88EEEcbF5f76#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### ERC20Gateway

Addresses: [0x5a6f8ea5e1028C80CB98Fd8916afBBC4E6b23D80](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x5a6f8ea5e1028C80CB98Fd8916afBBC4E6b23D80#code), [0x652F65f950b71d7aD04AffB1725F43786ed5f6Cc](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x652F65f950b71d7aD04AffB1725F43786ed5f6Cc#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Outbox

Addresses: [0xb255de22d39a26D4CbcAFd6Cf660ccaCa047e95B](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xb255de22d39a26D4CbcAFd6Cf660ccaCa047e95B#code), [0xCa2F31F3C6553c2FD9897f7AA464406a431959A9](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xCa2F31F3C6553c2FD9897f7AA464406a431959A9#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### GatewayRouter

Addresses: [0xAeAe9616A02dA527FceA2AC444EC918C7BfB9CdF](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xAeAe9616A02dA527FceA2AC444EC918C7BfB9CdF#code), [0x922db00d292477AD99Ef8A0c41101a664Ee79D2b](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x922db00d292477AD99Ef8A0c41101a664Ee79D2b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### NitroEnclaveVerifier

Addresses: [0x0d4cD6C0E9a0f2e744C83547f22Caf03414A3B22](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0d4cD6C0E9a0f2e744C83547f22Caf03414A3B22#code)

ZK-backed verifier for AWS Nitro enclave attestations. Verifies ZK proofs (RiscZero, Succinct SP1 or Pico) that attest AWS Nitro cert chain validation was executed correctly off-chain.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: EOA 4

#### OneStepProofEntry

Addresses: [0x23b7734232dA19D2Cf73010a25C8Ffc4eBfc2f5f](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x23b7734232dA19D2Cf73010a25C8Ffc4eBfc2f5f#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProverMemory

Addresses: [0x59CDE86f1a538a7a2329269d3704CA302DF23736](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x59CDE86f1a538a7a2329269d3704CA302DF23736#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### QuoteVerifier

Addresses: [0x69523d25E25e5c78d828Df90459b75F189D40Cf7](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x69523d25E25e5c78d828Df90459b75F189D40Cf7#code)

The QuoteVerifier contract is used by the EspressoTEEVerifier to verify the validity of the TEE quote. It references a PCCSRouter (0x0d089B3fA00CBAD0a5098025519e9e4620622acF), an access point for Intel SGX 'collateral', crucial references of which some modular contracts are unverified.


#### EspressoTEEVerifier

Addresses: [0x7A7E3B3eB8c799360E65d4fE2f0e108dB78721c3](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7A7E3B3eB8c799360E65d4fE2f0e108dB78721c3#code)

TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports both Intel SGX and AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: SafeL2

#### OneStepProverHostIo

Addresses: [0x7d46570d3Cd9D8F5e01bad3144141a031a94d7B8](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7d46570d3Cd9D8F5e01bad3144141a031a94d7B8#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. This version uses the Blobstream DA bridge (ArbitrumBlobstream) as source of truth for the DA referenced by the fault proof.


#### OneStepProverMath

Addresses: [0x7E67B50d510929610f840fb09707feA01b8E457B](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7E67B50d510929610f840fb09707feA01b8E457B#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code)

* Roles:
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor

#### RollupEventInbox

Addresses: [0x9676D55Ccd46ce72235b16bA645008D1D3350B14](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x9676D55Ccd46ce72235b16bA645008D1D3350B14#code), [0xf2bCB26dbb571EBC82CFAe6453AeF0DE90d93421](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf2bCB26dbb571EBC82CFAe6453AeF0DE90d93421#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8Ab2f49A085490c1592325eE32B6e6a4DA35D238#code) (Admin)

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, Caldera Multisig 1 with no delay

#### ValidatorUtils

Addresses: [0x9e83136d4B3AD04C766591EA51712F9aEa3194C0](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x9e83136d4B3AD04C766591EA51712F9aEa3194C0#code)

This contract implements view only utilities for validators.


#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0xD9d5C8456a168Dd25561064F47bF116111131B1D](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD9d5C8456a168Dd25561064F47bF116111131B1D#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).


#### OneStepProver0

Addresses: [0xe3b13e7b160aE4b799A7B3F9877316e717706291](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xe3b13e7b160aE4b799A7B3F9877316e717706291#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### EspressoSGXTEEVerifier

Addresses: [0xEA25045bC30ceE23A280c51020F0bBb78781A297](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xEA25045bC30ceE23A280c51020F0bBb78781A297#code)

Verifies attestations of an Intel SGX TEE.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: SafeL2

#### EspressoNitroTEEVerifier

Addresses: [0xF99De72165cB3A56766e118B3a20874d4A0aCa89](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xF99De72165cB3A56766e118B3a20874d4A0aCa89#code)

Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE. 
Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: SafeL2

#### ArbitrumBlobstream

Addresses: [0xA83ca7775Bc2889825BcDeDfFa5b758cf69e8794](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xA83ca7775Bc2889825BcDeDfFa5b758cf69e8794#code), [0x46EbfC399d3913BB9b99E73675722417F9c5d416](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x46EbfC399d3913BB9b99E73675722417F9c5d416#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x738a9b55304f9fcF776B3BA285e50c0f9eF77997](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x738a9b55304f9fcF776B3BA285e50c0f9eF77997#code) (Admin)

The Blobstream DA bridge. This contract is used to bridge data commitments between Celestia and the destination chain. It specifies relayers that commit block ranges, but due to the lack of emitted events, there may be more relayers than are presented here.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: BlobstreamMultisig
  * **guardians**: BlobstreamMultisig
  * **relayers**: EOA 5, EOA 6

Can be upgraded by: BlobstreamMultisig with no delay

#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).


#### SP1VerifierGatewayArb

Addresses: [0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e#code)

This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig

#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0).


#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).


The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).