# Plume Network

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork

## Summary

- Total Value Secured: $90.98 M (+24.0% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $88.32 M, natively minted $19.71 K, externally bridged $2.63 M; 2.89% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
  - **Warning:** The PLUME token associated with Plume Network accounts for 97.0% of the TVS! (sentiment: bad)
- Past day UOPS: 2.33 (+0.91% compared to seven days ago)
- Gas token: PLUME
- Type: Other
- Purposes: Universal, RWA
- Host chain: Ethereum
- Chain ID: 98866

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

### About

Plume is a modular L2 blockchain for real-world assets (RWAs) that integrates asset tokenization and compliance providers directly into the chain.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/plumenetwork)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/plumenetwork/breakdown)

## Activity

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/plumenetwork)

## Onchain costs

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#onchain-costs).

## Data posted

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#data-posted).

## Liveness

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#liveness).

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2026-02-05: [Plume Network migrates to BoLD](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x91f946c6c2aaa8d2d87616f38d39514c8c08650703eb12010de9968db16bed4f). Plume Network upgrades to BoLD dispute protocol with ArbOS v51.
- 2025-11-18: [Plume Network stops using Celestia](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x55fefaa9e30fdcbd6dbaeba2d032922e707f83504a47edaf4da7523ec2d09e58). Plume Network stops using Celestia and switches to ArbOS v32 with a DAC for data availability.
- 2025-05-08: [Plume Network starts using Blobstream](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd2b584ea74be507497164ccdf37ceb1b3b66bad282c58a77811519c0c6b3acf7). Upgraded ChallengeManager contract to the version that uses Celestia with Blobstream bridge.

## Risk summary

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL)
2. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires, (CRITICAL)
3. an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.

### Funds can be lost if

4. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

### Users can be censored if

5. the committee restricts their access to the external data.

### MEV can be extracted if

6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.

### State validation

Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad)

No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.

### Data availability

External (DAC) (sentiment: bad)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

### Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

## Stage

Plume Network is not even a Stage 0 project.

### Stage 0

- [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium.
- [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed.
- [x] A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro)
- [ ] Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized.

### Stage 1

- [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely.
- [x] Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible.
- [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up.
- [x] The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.

### Stage 2

- [ ] Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors.
- [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit.
- [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.

## Data availability

### Data is not stored on chain

Users transactions are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will "fall back to rollup" mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 1 out of 1.

**Risks**

- Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).
- Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

**References**

- [Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-anytrust)

## State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

### State root proposals

Validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. State roots are referred to as "assertions" within the contracts. Each chain of assertions only requires one stake, and validators staked on assertions with a child are considered inactive and can either move their stake to a new node or withdraw it. The function used to propose a new assertion is the `stakeOnNewAssertion` function. The stake is currently set to 0.1 ETH, and it can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. The protocol allows such funds to be trustlessly pooled together if necessary. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period, currently set to 15m. An assertion without "rivals" can be confirmed after the challenge period has passed, currently set to 5d 14h. If a rival is present, then it is checked that the assertion is the winner in the challenge protocol.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [BoLD paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.10491)

### Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `createLayerZeroEdge` function in the `ChallengeManager` contract. Edges represent assertions, or bisected assertions, within the challenge protocol. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserters and challengers play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner. An edge can only be bisected when rivaled. The bisection process requires no new stake as their validity is checked against a parent "history root" that contains all intermediate states. An edge can also be confirmed if itself or its descendants spend enough time being unrivaled. Such time is set to 5d 14h. If both actors play as slow as possible, the maximum time to confirm an edge is double such value, i.e. 11d 4h. Due to the complexities of maintaining the history root, the challenge protocol is divided into 3 levels, where the lowest level represents assertions over blocks, the highest level represents assertions over single WASM instructions, and intermediate levels represent assertions over chunks of WASM instructions. When moving between levels, a new stake is required. Level 0 (block level) requires a stake of 0.0 ETH, level 1 requires a stake of 0.1 ETH, level 2 requires a stake of 0.1 ETH. The ratio between such stakes can be exploited to perform resource exhaustion attacks.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.

**References**

- [Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum BoLD](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a)

## Upgrades & Governance

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#updates).

## Operator

### The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

**References**

- [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324#code)
- [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job)

## Sequencing

### Buffered forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue "delayed" messages in the "delayed" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is defined to be the minimum between 1d and the time left in the delay buffer. The delay buffer mechanism is present in the code but is effectively disabled due to buffer parameters being set to extreme values.

**References**

- [Sequencer and censorship resistance - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer)

## Withdrawals

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

**References**

- [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle)
- [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging)
- [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e)

### Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

**References**

- [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/)

## Permissions

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### Conduit Multisig 1

Addresses: [0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746)

A Multisig with 4/11 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * EdgeChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * GatewayRouter [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor]
  * Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * ERC20Gateway [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
  * RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin]
* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor]

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0x11f563dDbF266484Dd910A401A7e44299d80b1d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x11f563dDbF266484Dd910A401A7e44299d80b1d5)

* Can interact with RollupProxy
  * Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain 

##### 9 EOAs

Addresses: [0x17F187D978664C96ffD655996a45e085c403AD8b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x17F187D978664C96ffD655996a45e085c403AD8b) (EOA 2), [0x2E8C0869C173cC07c58186E9DeEA74314635b1E2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2E8C0869C173cC07c58186E9DeEA74314635b1E2) (EOA 3), [0x4ed0f98FB4c331e672653E832c55E0f9F402C228](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4ed0f98FB4c331e672653E832c55E0f9F402C228) (EOA 4), [0x74a0d46BA4F69cAB77A459f8B12dc531c7DaBf3C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x74a0d46BA4F69cAB77A459f8B12dc531c7DaBf3C) (EOA 5), [0x85e70D857F6Fad7AD4ffc3fC95FD0fd8C396A09D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x85e70D857F6Fad7AD4ffc3fC95FD0fd8C396A09D) (EOA 6), [0xA4f98Ac0E083C79BAB53A3895082e8a4fbf12CDe](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA4f98Ac0E083C79BAB53A3895082e8a4fbf12CDe) (EOA 7), [0xb9B2AeAe8D160a5bF9cb7FE7B2c8B58c0293FD5e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb9B2AeAe8D160a5bF9cb7FE7B2c8B58c0293FD5e) (EOA 8), [0xc7ef93FE91D4658bb422B11C5f8Ae17ae3B86D36](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc7ef93FE91D4658bb422B11C5f8Ae17ae3B86D36) (EOA 9), [0xCEEAEC6b7e010fE1Ac253Ebd6f93eEBF9249Cd7e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCEEAEC6b7e010fE1Ac253Ebd6f93eEBF9249Cd7e) (EOA 10)

* Can interact with SequencerInbox
  * Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain 

## Smart contracts

### Ethereum

#### EdgeChallengeManager

Addresses: [0x0AFA44077796B9F14ecDAE817403ACb255B5983e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0AFA44077796B9F14ecDAE817403ACb255B5983e#code), [0x93069fFd7730733eCfd57A0D2D528CF686248524](https://etherscan.io/address/0x93069fFd7730733eCfd57A0D2D528CF686248524#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof system.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Bridge

Addresses: [0x35381f63091926750F43b2A7401B083263aDEF83](https://etherscan.io/address/0x35381f63091926750F43b2A7401B083263aDEF83#code), [0x81be1Bf06cB9B23e8EEDa3145c3366A912DAD9D6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x81be1Bf06cB9B23e8EEDa3145c3366A912DAD9D6#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### RollupProxy

Addresses: [0x4eD3F488a5a4417839BbC39712EB76D8Aaee6eE8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4eD3F488a5a4417839BbC39712EB76D8Aaee6eE8#code), [0x16aD566aaa05fe6977A033DE2472c05C84CAB724](https://etherscan.io/address/0x16aD566aaa05fe6977A033DE2472c05C84CAB724#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0xA4892FFE3Deab25337D7D1A5b94b35dABa255451](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA4892FFE3Deab25337D7D1A5b94b35dABa255451#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0xd688dabDBb14D673898689135a23a174560c8C04](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd688dabDBb14D673898689135a23a174560c8C04#code) (Admin)

Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called Validators).
* Roles:
  * **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
  * **getValidators**: EOA 1
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### SequencerInbox

Addresses: [0x85eC1b9138a8b9659A51e2b51bb0861901040b59](https://etherscan.io/address/0x85eC1b9138a8b9659A51e2b51bb0861901040b59#code), [0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6F2E7F9B5Db5e4e9B5B1181D2Eb0e4972500C324#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
  * **batchPosters**: EOA 10, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### UpgradeExecutor

Addresses: [0xd688dabDBb14D673898689135a23a174560c8C04](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd688dabDBb14D673898689135a23a174560c8C04#code), [0x011d8F10fbC20C14B453768253CdFF7EB5B96917](https://etherscan.io/address/0x011d8F10fbC20C14B453768253CdFF7EB5B96917#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
  * **executors**: Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Outbox

Addresses: [0x7e4627bC114Fcd12ba912103279FD2858E644E71](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7e4627bC114Fcd12ba912103279FD2858E644E71#code), [0x17E0C5fE0dFF2AE4cfC9E96d9Ccd112DaF5c0386](https://etherscan.io/address/0x17E0C5fE0dFF2AE4cfC9E96d9Ccd112DaF5c0386#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### Inbox

Addresses: [0x943fc691242291B74B105e8D19bd9E5DC2fcBa1D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x943fc691242291B74B105e8D19bd9E5DC2fcBa1D#code), [0xD210b64eD9D47Ef8Acf1A3284722FcC7Fc6A1f4e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD210b64eD9D47Ef8Acf1A3284722FcC7Fc6A1f4e#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### ERC20Gateway

Addresses: [0xE2C902BC61296531e556962ffC81A082b82f5F28](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2C902BC61296531e556962ffC81A082b82f5F28#code), [0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### GatewayRouter

Addresses: [0x17551CBD1ed02768b00D5Bd198c2D86a4c7ee43d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x17551CBD1ed02768b00D5Bd198c2D86a4c7ee43d#code), [0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

#### OneStepProverMemory

Addresses: [0x29efff3EfE3E01A3F69011a054C33410edFc2283](https://etherscan.io/address/0x29efff3EfE3E01A3F69011a054C33410edFc2283#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProver0

Addresses: [0x7368F782E109518fD3914e8b315eE45E51C15835](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7368F782E109518fD3914e8b315eE45E51C15835#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProofEntry

Addresses: [0x91cB57F200Bd5F897E41C164425Ab4DB0991A64f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x91cB57F200Bd5F897E41C164425Ab4DB0991A64f#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code)

* Roles:
  * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor

#### OneStepProverMath

Addresses: [0xD1D75248ed95450B793d80F9fb418C2eD4c5F5e4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD1D75248ed95450B793d80F9fb418C2eD4c5F5e4#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### OneStepProverHostIo

Addresses: [0xDdaD5E59D056078A4E67a9d42e21Ce8057F22D60](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDdaD5E59D056078A4E67a9d42e21Ce8057F22D60#code)

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.


#### RollupEventInbox

Addresses: [0xf576102530749344D2f4C04D15C2B8609c7897ea](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf576102530749344D2f4C04D15C2B8609c7897ea#code), [0x0d079b22B0B4083b9b0bDc62Bf1a4EAF4a95bDEe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0d079b22B0B4083b9b0bDc62Bf1a4EAF4a95bDEe#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb90fe445014e74eA5aA7681291212bfEa37031CC#code) (Admin)

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by: Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).