# R0ar Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar ## Summary **Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained. **Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds. - Total Value Secured: $43.24 K (+0.33% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $43.24 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - Past day UOPS: 0.00 (0.00% compared to seven days ago) - Gas token: ETH - Type: Other - Purpose: Universal - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 193939 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good) - State validation: None (sentiment: bad) - Data availability: Onchain (sentiment: good) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About R0ar is an Optimistic Rollup utilizing the OP Stack focusing on DeFi. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/r0ar) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/r0ar/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/r0ar) ## Onchain costs Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#onchain-costs). ## Data posted Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#data-posted). ## Liveness Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#liveness). ## Risk summary **Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots. ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL) 2. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be frozen if 3. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL). ### MEV can be extracted if 4. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis **Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds. **Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots. ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation. ### State validation None (sentiment: bad) Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview. ### Data availability Onchain (sentiment: good) All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. ## Stage R0ar is not even a Stage 0 project. **Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review ### Stage 0 - [ ] The proof system is still under development. - [x] The project calls itself a rollup. - [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - [x] Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1. - [ ] (under review) A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. ### Stage 1 - [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window. - [ ] Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators. - [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. ### Stage 2 - [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit. ## Data availability ### All data required for proofs is published on chain All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time. **References** - [Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission) - [BatchInbox - address](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFF00000000000000000000000000000000193939#code) - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98#code) ## State validation ### No state validation OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL). **References** - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd#code) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/r0ar#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd#code) - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd#code) ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. **References** - [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window) - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98#code) ## Withdrawals ### Regular messaging The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. **Risks** - Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL). **References** - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98#code) - [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98#code) - [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check](https://etherscan.io/address/0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd#code) ### Forced messaging If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message. **References** - [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction) ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2. **References** - [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### GnosisSafe Addresses: [0xf758e2272FCe1330d8a1De38D5128A47B4041752](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf758e2272FCe1330d8a1De38D5128A47B4041752) A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0xdaf66a37Fddc1095Aa916C6fF9347958DCa35395](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdaf66a37Fddc1095Aa916C6fF9347958DCa35395) Member of GnosisSafe. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * OptimismPortal [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * DelayedWETH [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * L1StandardBridge [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * SystemConfig [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * SuperchainConfig [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * L2OutputOracle [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * AnchorStateRegistry [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * DisputeGameFactory [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * L1ERC721Bridge [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with DelayedWETH * can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency [via: GnosisSafe] * Can interact with AddressManager * set and change address mappings [via: GnosisSafe → ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with SystemConfig * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system * Can interact with DisputeGameFactory * set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type [via: GnosisSafe] ##### EOA 2 Addresses: [0x79DdF0745D14783cDC2a05624c585Ddce07F4A02](https://etherscan.io/address/0x79DdF0745D14783cDC2a05624c585Ddce07F4A02) * Can interact with L2OutputOracle * Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer * Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame * Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer ##### EOA 3 Addresses: [0x8B72aB0D35F87e0f56D9805031D7CDfA13D1C71F](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8B72aB0D35F87e0f56D9805031D7CDfA13D1C71F) * Can interact with L2OutputOracle * Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 4 Addresses: [0x87aab081Ac9F8ce80fb048f23280DF019036BA1d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x87aab081Ac9F8ce80fb048f23280DF019036BA1d) * Can interact with OptimismPortal * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) ##### EOA 5 Addresses: [0xF263a0AA8aFEaA7d516B596d49d7BA6C0FeB102c](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF263a0AA8aFEaA7d516B596d49d7BA6C0FeB102c) * Can interact with SystemConfig * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 6 Addresses: [0x0F7A7ca8f7673D9D219766a962856371e1Ed27FF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0F7A7ca8f7673D9D219766a962856371e1Ed27FF) * Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame * Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### OptimismPortal Addresses: [0x2c6AF306F8D0Cd6d9E76D43b2DC9a4E60a7f446e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2c6AF306F8D0Cd6d9E76D43b2DC9a4E60a7f446e#code), [0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C766cBbCeb166a6Bfc72A365100D153dF9A3B98#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **guardian**: EOA 4 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### SystemConfig Addresses: [0x689db31D7C367ed2c264994c0838a82EdD6Bc9AA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x689db31D7C367ed2c264994c0838a82EdD6Bc9AA#code), [0xae9fC3cFD19b751c893105c43A8ed8af6F9e1719](https://etherscan.io/address/0xae9fC3cFD19b751c893105c43A8ed8af6F9e1719#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **batcherHash**: EOA 5 * **owner**: EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### L2OutputOracle Addresses: [0xb7850CFa577332EB839840e1411962AC3Dd2f183](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb7850CFa577332EB839840e1411962AC3Dd2f183#code), [0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd](https://etherscan.io/address/0x503733C3d5AA487B88fA1FB475694da51744e4Cd#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **challenger**: EOA 2 * **proposer**: EOA 3 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### DisputeGameFactory Addresses: [0xF014d8028A7028352baD6226A4894Ae596e2846c](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF014d8028A7028352baD6226A4894Ae596e2846c#code), [0x5cd233B95e4799444567873902bf9f9f20D3F640](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5cd233B95e4799444567873902bf9f9f20D3F640#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **owner**: GnosisSafe; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### SuperchainConfig Addresses: [0x9bB00Bc6388Ec810d79cD0e8D5C33edFD4Fd1fa8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9bB00Bc6388Ec810d79cD0e8D5C33edFD4Fd1fa8#code), [0x13a9A075D8Aa2D93c3d32F1C61aB671108fedE6E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x13a9A075D8Aa2D93c3d32F1C61aB671108fedE6E#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **guardian**: EOA 4 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### L1CrossDomainMessenger Addresses: [0x5b0e75a52862881b4077C865B244CC17cD2b531b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5b0e75a52862881b4077C865B244CC17cD2b531b#code), [0x8bA829f040EB57668BDfb010472AEb0a16B2399C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8bA829f040EB57668BDfb010472AEb0a16B2399C#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### L1StandardBridge Addresses: [0x683ca289a8418Cb090E42929A73a263d7b81DfC2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x683ca289a8418Cb090E42929A73a263d7b81DfC2#code), [0xBab69f0A56Aea1117C0298341ddE52F3DbAfe4D1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBab69f0A56Aea1117C0298341ddE52F3DbAfe4D1#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### L1ERC721Bridge Addresses: [0xF24e68552ED9F4024E1cEBa8ECB8715F62Bb9259](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF24e68552ED9F4024E1cEBa8ECB8715F62Bb9259#code), [0xff57b96E6F426f9dEC14f083dE0D3aD9B95887b6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xff57b96E6F426f9dEC14f083dE0D3aD9B95887b6#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### PreimageOracle Addresses: [0x192668f6b57DeB9D46e6DE87caD7065a052fe1b4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x192668f6b57DeB9D46e6DE87caD7065a052fe1b4#code) The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. #### DelayedWETH Addresses: [0x465833609d9ff2Cb9A070b0d71b700F318C97293](https://etherscan.io/address/0x465833609d9ff2Cb9A070b0d71b700F318C97293#code), [0x9Dc689620a87803378b3304776dd5AE9070730A8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9Dc689620a87803378b3304776dd5AE9070730A8#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 * **owner**: GnosisSafe; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### OptimismMintableERC20Factory Addresses: [0x73bD898CD5b1dE0Ad1ED5Bf51aaEb52129F697d8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73bD898CD5b1dE0Ad1ED5Bf51aaEb52129F697d8#code), [0x1561Fb12A6eFc3C63b881dE403A76B5F7Cd6a6CF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1561Fb12A6eFc3C63b881dE403A76B5F7Cd6a6CF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### MIPS Addresses: [0x82e66E285aeAd8C06D8b5d6f2a46fd6fAb9097e6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x82e66E285aeAd8C06D8b5d6f2a46fd6fAb9097e6#code) #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) * Roles: * **owner**: GnosisSafe #### PermissionedDisputeGame Addresses: [0xC5D5B6fCD5FdBdA41Ae640aC9881dC949aEd36d0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC5D5B6fCD5FdBdA41Ae640aC9881dC949aEd36d0#code) Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. * Roles: * **challenger**: EOA 2 * **proposer**: EOA 6 #### AnchorStateRegistry Addresses: [0xe7C8a3Dd5A03E01e92bD019bBd89bd67aCeC036F](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe7C8a3Dd5A03E01e92bD019bBd89bd67aCeC036F#code), [0x57923d2b2A4B32b0F1001022Fd81b9F0655F3AD5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x57923d2b2A4B32b0F1001022Fd81b9F0655F3AD5#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA#code) (Admin) Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay #### FaultDisputeGame Addresses: [0xFED2F84E3e18e24EE6aa5f375edBA79782FDA6D2](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFED2F84E3e18e24EE6aa5f375edBA79782FDA6D2#code) Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).