# RISE Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise ## Summary - Total Value Secured: $23.42 M (+9.33% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $261.60 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $23.16 M; 98.8% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - Past day UOPS: 265.04 (-17.7% compared to seven days ago) - Gas token: ETH - Type: Other - Purpose: Universal - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 4153 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good) - State validation: Fraud proofs (1R, ZK) (sentiment: warning) - Data availability: External (sentiment: warning) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About RISE is a low-latency Optimium built on the OP Stack, using the OP Succinct Lite ZK fault proof system and posting data to EigenDA. It targets real-time trading applications through its RISEx exchange. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/rise) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/rise/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/rise) ## Onchain costs Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#onchain-costs). ## Data posted Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#data-posted). ## Liveness Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#liveness). ## Milestones & Incidents - 2026-05-01: [RISE public mainnet launch](https://blog.risechain.com/rise-launch-philosophy/). RISE opens its mainnet (genesis on January 5th 2026) to the public together with the RISEx exchange. ## Risk summary ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL) 2. the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly, 3. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires, (CRITICAL) 4. the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier. ### Funds can be lost if 5. the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root, (CRITICAL) 6. the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be frozen if 7. the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1. ### MEV can be extracted if 8. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation. ### State validation Fraud proofs (1R, ZK) (sentiment: warning) Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with a closed set of 1 whitelisted challenger. ### Data availability External (sentiment: warning) Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are checked against the DACert Verifier data roots, signed off by EigenDA operators. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. ## Stage RISE is not even a Stage 0 project. **Warning:** There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified. ### Stage 0 - [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium. - [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - [ ] No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer. ### Stage 1 - [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. - [ ] Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators. - [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. - [x] Prover source code is published. [View code](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1) - [x] The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated. ### Stage 2 - [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit. - [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs. ## Data availability ### Data is posted to EigenDA Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL). - Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL). **References** - [EigenDA Docs - Overview](https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview) - [Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission) - [BatchInbox - address](https://etherscan.io/address/0x00BB2BF8245E13498AF31FB3647e26694CdC9d4a#code) - [OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code) ## State validation ### Fraud proofs State roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.0 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge period of 1d during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.00000025 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 7d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly. - Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL). - Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier. - Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1. **References** - [OP Succinct Lite architecture](https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/fault_proofs/fault_proof_architecture.html) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rise#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. **References** - [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window) - [OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code) ## Withdrawals ### Regular exits The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 1d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof. **References** - [OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code) - [OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code) ### Forced messaging If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message. **References** - [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction) ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2. **References** - [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Addresses: [0x9196464e3F828A50233C20732fa6898F4317002c](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9196464e3F828A50233C20732fa6898F4317002c) A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * AnchorStateRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin] * DisputeGameFactory [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismPortal2 [via: ProxyAdmin] * SuperchainConfig [via: ProxyAdmin] * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin] * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin] * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin] * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with AddressManager * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin] * Can interact with AccessManager * Allowed to add or remove proposers and challengers, and transfer ownership of the AccessManager ##### Rise Guardian Multisig Addresses: [0x03B85FAa108C10F6EFfec1d91954DE99dA32FB46](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03B85FAa108C10F6EFfec1d91954DE99dA32FB46) A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. * Can interact with SuperchainConfig * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) * Can interact with SystemConfig * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system ##### SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig Addresses: [0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878) A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. * Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway * affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0x0aE4b35f7F5efeB4c651684e1BCa12993dcBb67d](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0aE4b35f7F5efeB4c651684e1BCa12993dcBb67d) * Can interact with SystemConfig * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 2 Addresses: [0xa069F839728264E2EADa60d98Bb303859de154bA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa069F839728264E2EADa60d98Bb303859de154bA) * Can interact with AccessManager * Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain ##### EOA 3 Addresses: [0xaC20430db63b066560FC41d383102B4F2e3bDbcF](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaC20430db63b066560FC41d383102B4F2e3bDbcF) * Can interact with AccessManager * Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### DisputeGameFactory Addresses: [0x6A4139810986CF13408330e14C4ac9Daf0511aA3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6A4139810986CF13408330e14C4ac9Daf0511aA3#code), [0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50](https://etherscan.io/address/0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### OptimismPortal2 Addresses: [0xad92Fa18EB74E46Db844240623124BF46589db4C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xad92Fa18EB74E46Db844240623124BF46589db4C#code), [0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### SystemConfig Addresses: [0xD3CAf2A473dBB5bc2E8FB7F328e01AB9B726a24f](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD3CAf2A473dBB5bc2E8FB7F328e01AB9B726a24f#code), [0x2dBFabA1D1d4172E0f8301671DED544C0079B961](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2dBFabA1D1d4172E0f8301671DED544C0079B961#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig * **batcherHash**: EOA 1 * **owner**: Rise Guardian Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### SuperchainConfig Addresses: [0xB786207A1EdfC724c1d507335f403F53fd9E79d6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB786207A1EdfC724c1d507335f403F53fd9E79d6#code), [0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x4ebc046b1cfc12659A19E124b0ea8a382777E542](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4ebc046b1cfc12659A19E124b0ea8a382777E542#code) (Admin) This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig * **guardian**: Rise Guardian Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### L1ERC721Bridge Addresses: [0x01A6274B9607ac024e8c191E491d0b25ad14c217](https://etherscan.io/address/0x01A6274B9607ac024e8c191E491d0b25ad14c217#code), [0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### L1StandardBridge Addresses: [0x553257678Dd11a6668a92934AAB005e420c6535A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x553257678Dd11a6668a92934AAB005e420c6535A#code), [0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### L1CrossDomainMessenger Addresses: [0xC0de1d9B1cD2Caf782355C66a6A8e5948e63c9c6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC0de1d9B1cD2Caf782355C66a6A8e5948e63c9c6#code), [0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### PreimageOracle Addresses: [0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3#code) The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. #### PermissionedDisputeGame Addresses: [0x2e7758aAD2B6D3D1Fd2C937D9B322378fC644633](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7758aAD2B6D3D1Fd2C937D9B322378fC644633#code) Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x4ebc046b1cfc12659A19E124b0ea8a382777E542](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4ebc046b1cfc12659A19E124b0ea8a382777E542#code), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) * Roles: * **owner**: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig #### AnchorStateRegistry Addresses: [0x551A672d703966D83C3EC3ea0e844f43c3373c91](https://etherscan.io/address/0x551A672d703966D83C3EC3ea0e844f43c3373c91#code), [0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E](https://etherscan.io/address/0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game). * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### MIPS Addresses: [0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908#code) The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. #### OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame Addresses: [0xBf60dBc272833cD25f0426983c3175C32C8E5A7a](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBf60dBc272833cD25f0426983c3175C32C8E5A7a#code) Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. #### OptimismMintableERC20Factory Addresses: [0xE2B9526277DcD2B27222Df760D6427213AC9dbb8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2B9526277DcD2B27222Df760D6427213AC9dbb8#code), [0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### DelayedWETH Addresses: [0xf758C3bf7a4E2ad513B371B40c4Bd9A0E9716CF1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf758C3bf7a4E2ad513B371B40c4Bd9A0E9716CF1#code), [0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998](https://etherscan.io/address/0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5#code) (Admin) Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig Can be upgraded by: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay #### AccessManager Addresses: [0xF90a72FC295DBEf2fD27629Fda4B98Fd3E842d17](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF90a72FC295DBEf2fD27629Fda4B98Fd3E842d17#code) Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct. * Roles: * **challengers**: EOA 3 * **owner**: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig * **proposers**: EOA 2 #### SP1Verifier Addresses: [0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459#code) Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0). #### SP1VerifierGateway Addresses: [0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e#code) This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. * Roles: * **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig #### SP1Verifier Addresses: [0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C#code) Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0). #### SP1Verifier Addresses: [0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A#code) Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0). The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).