# RSS3 Value Sublayer

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

**Warning:** RSS3 is retiring the Value Sublayer (VSL) and migrating to Ethereum. The L2 halted on April 24, 2026 and VSL bridge withdrawals have been paused. Previously-initiated withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration; $RSS3 on VSL will be migrated to Ethereum via a claim portal expected in the coming weeks ($POWER converts to $RSS3 at 23:1). See [the official announcement](https://rss3.io/blog/the-next-stage-of-rss3.html).

- Total Value Secured: $0.00 (0.00% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $0.00, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
- Gas token: ETH
- Type: Other
- Purposes: Universal, AI, Information
- Host chain: Ethereum
- Chain ID: 12553

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: None (sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: External (sentiment: bad)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

### About

The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL), part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum scaling project built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/rss3)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/rss3/breakdown)

## Activity

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/rss3)

## Onchain costs

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3#onchain-costs).

## Liveness

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3#liveness).

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2026-04-24 (incident): [RSS3 VSL migration to Ethereum](https://rss3.io/blog/the-next-stage-of-rss3.html). RSS3 retires VSL: L2 halted, bridge withdrawals paused, $RSS3 migrates to Ethereum via portal.
- 2024-05-07: [RSS3 starts using NearDA](https://x.com/rss3_/status/1788183577219436985). RSS3 Network starts publishing data to NearDA.
- 2024-03-12: [RSS3 Mainnet Alpha Launch](https://x.com/rss3_/status/1767370007275851789). RSS3 Network Mainnet Alpha is live.

## Risk summary

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL)
2. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

### Funds can be lost if

3. the data is not made available on the external provider, (CRITICAL)
4. the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).

### Funds can be frozen if

5. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

### MEV can be extracted if

6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

**Warning:** RSS3 is retiring the Value Sublayer (VSL) and migrating to Ethereum. The L2 halted on April 24, 2026 and VSL bridge withdrawals have been paused. Previously-initiated withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration; $RSS3 on VSL will be migrated to Ethereum via a claim portal expected in the coming weeks ($POWER converts to $RSS3 at 23:1). See [the official announcement](https://rss3.io/blog/the-next-stage-of-rss3.html).

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

### State validation

None (sentiment: bad)

Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

### Data availability

External (sentiment: bad)

Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain.

### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

### Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

## Stage

RSS3 Value Sublayer is not even a Stage 0 project.

**Warning:** There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified.

### Stage 0

- [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium.
- [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [ ] The proof system is still under development.
- [ ] No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer.

### Stage 1

- [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely.
- [ ] Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.

### Stage 2

- [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit.

## Data availability

### Data required to compute fraud proof is not published on chain, and currently not publicly accessible

Transaction data is submitted to a blob store contract on NearDA. Only hashes of blob data is published on an onchain inbox.

**Risks**

- Funds can be lost if the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
- Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [REP-20 - Data Availability Layer Integration](https://github.com/RSS3-Network/REPs/blob/main/REPs/REP-20.md)
- [RSS3 NearDA blob store contract](https://nearblocks.io/address/vsl-da.near)
- [On-Chain Inbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xfFFF000000000000000000000000000000012553)
- [Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission)
- [BatchInbox - address](https://etherscan.io/address/0xfFFF000000000000000000000000000000012553#code)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b#code)

## State validation

### No state validation

OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30#code)

## Upgrades & Governance

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/rss3#updates).

## Operator

### The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30#code)
- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30#code)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

**References**

- [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b#code)

## Withdrawals

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete.

**Risks**

- Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b#code)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b#code)
- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30#code)

### Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

**References**

- [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction)

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

**References**

- [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306)

## Permissions

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### RSS3Multisig

Addresses: [0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941)

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. 
* Can upgrade **with no delay**
  * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * SuperchainConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * OptimismPortal [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin]
  * L2OutputOracle [via: ProxyAdmin]
* Can interact with L1StandardBridge
  * can call sweep(token, to, amount) to transfer any ERC-20 held by the L1StandardBridge to an arbitrary address — the mechanism RSS3 is using to move bridge escrow during the VSL → Ethereum migration 
* Can interact with AddressManager
  * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]

##### WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig

Addresses: [0xC4f81F990b47c12144e74A901162A2cFDf4b5a9d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC4f81F990b47c12144e74A901162A2cFDf4b5a9d)

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. 
* Can interact with OptimismPortal
  * can overwrite the calldata of any withdrawals in the OptimismPortal on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts 

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0xa5CB506D2de132006204183E2f1869575cA646Bd](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa5CB506D2de132006204183E2f1869575cA646Bd)

* Can interact with L2OutputOracle
  * Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain 

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0xB5C248B428f9b2D8E8a03eE016760145b84098a9](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB5C248B428f9b2D8E8a03eE016760145b84098a9)

* Can interact with L2OutputOracle
  * Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer 

##### EOA 3

Addresses: [0xC180574374b8FdE9C5b40E0d5D34946b228b7316](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC180574374b8FdE9C5b40E0d5D34946b228b7316)

* Can interact with SystemConfig
  * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain 

##### EOA 4

Addresses: [0xC4878516C198a919566773797e24af20DfdE6272](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC4878516C198a919566773797e24af20DfdE6272)

* Can interact with SystemConfig
  * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system 

##### EOA 5

Addresses: [0x7ef00577fAAa44D0491970D6516eB7b90EC3c80E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7ef00577fAAa44D0491970D6516eB7b90EC3c80E)

* Can interact with SuperchainConfig
  * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) 
* Can interact with OptimismPortal
  * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) 

## Smart contracts

### Ethereum

#### SystemConfig

Addresses: [0x80e73D6BfC73c567032304C3891a06c2d9954d09](https://etherscan.io/address/0x80e73D6BfC73c567032304C3891a06c2d9954d09#code), [0x164883d49DaEe18b3D621A24560D9bcD19Ad5407](https://etherscan.io/address/0x164883d49DaEe18b3D621A24560D9bcD19Ad5407#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
  * **batcherHash**: EOA 3
  * **owner**: EOA 4

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### L2OutputOracle

Addresses: [0xE6f24d2C32B3109B18ed33cF08eFb490b1e09C10](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE6f24d2C32B3109B18ed33cF08eFb490b1e09C10#code), [0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
  * **challenger**: EOA 2
  * **proposer**: EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### SuperchainConfig

Addresses: [0x3e5FaB39eD4eFB4fc29A5201059AE819f2f0418A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3e5FaB39eD4eFB4fc29A5201059AE819f2f0418A#code), [0x314774a6Cfc3838E5a5a1DE3723EEa995aAD4e8f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x314774a6Cfc3838E5a5a1DE3723EEa995aAD4e8f#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
  * **guardian**: EOA 5

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### L1CrossDomainMessenger

Addresses: [0x892CAa506c86C5101f5eC11C6f09589c9dC8A85C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x892CAa506c86C5101f5eC11C6f09589c9dC8A85C#code), [0x4795EaC1a2581F2Db6419203D063711C5a90aD50](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4795EaC1a2581F2Db6419203D063711C5a90aD50#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### L1ERC721Bridge

Addresses: [0x938D0Bb4B584d4F6f793fCB7808cA2Eea15B69A8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x938D0Bb4B584d4F6f793fCB7808cA2Eea15B69A8#code), [0xf3EF9B6eE32366A625d84910c53eB20024043A70](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf3EF9B6eE32366A625d84910c53eB20024043A70#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code)

* Roles:
  * **owner**: RSS3Multisig

#### OptimismMintableERC20Factory

Addresses: [0x1D89222C28C3ba471be822203998f27Df4727C0b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1D89222C28C3ba471be822203998f27Df4727C0b#code), [0xa5a46DAaDAF1b2ae96F6FE85Ae81470126967A0E](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa5a46DAaDAF1b2ae96F6FE85Ae81470126967A0E#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### L1StandardBridge

Addresses: [0x4cbab69108Aa72151EDa5A3c164eA86845f18438](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4cbab69108Aa72151EDa5A3c164eA86845f18438#code), [0x12665984Ba38943C74D8504d4E8a41a96dE25E83](https://etherscan.io/address/0x12665984Ba38943C74D8504d4E8a41a96dE25E83#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. RSS3 is retiring VSL: this fork of the L1StandardBridge adds an operator-only sweep(token, to, amount) that transfers any ERC-20 held by the bridge to an arbitrary address, with no withdrawal proof or delay.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
  * **operator**: RSS3Multisig

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

#### OptimismPortal

Addresses: [0x6A12432491bbbE8d3babf75F759766774C778Db4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6A12432491bbbE8d3babf75F759766774C778Db4#code), [0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904#code) (Admin)

The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the OptimismPortal also allows an 'operator' address to overwrite the calldata of withdrawals on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
  * **guardian**: EOA 5
  * **operator**: WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig

Can be upgraded by: RSS3Multisig with no delay

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).