# Sorare Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sorare ## Summary **Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained. **Warning:** Sorare froze its StarkEx rollup on June 1st, 2026. The core rollup contract is currently frozen. **Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds. - Total Value Secured: $4.71 M (-3.34% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $4.71 M, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - Stage: Stage 0 - Type: Validium - Purposes: NFT, Exchange - Host chain: Ethereum ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Force via L1 (sentiment: good) - State validation: Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good) - Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Use escape hatch (sentiment: good) ### About Sorare is a global fantasy football game where you can play with officially licensed digital cards. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sorare#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/sorare) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/sorare/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sorare#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/sorare) ## Milestones & Incidents - 2026-06-01: [Sorare StarkEx deprecation](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe289078d3ad6f8f306b2b2938036bb7de8829ba4e897ebcf69af3004240d9d63). Sorare finalizes its migration to Solana by sunsetting its StarkEx L2 contract. - 2021-07-26: [Mainnet Launch](https://medium.com/sorare/were-live-on-our-scaling-solution-starkware-62438abee9a8). Layer 2 scaling solution powered by Starkware, is live on Ethereum. ## Risk summary ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be lost if 2. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL). ### Users can be censored if 3. the committee restricts their access to the external data, 4. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system. ### MEV can be extracted if 5. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis **Warning:** Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds. ### Sequencer failure Force via L1 (sentiment: good) Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. ### State validation Validity proofs (ST) (sentiment: good) STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. ### Data availability External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/4 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Use escape hatch (sentiment: good) Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit. ## Stage Sorare is a Stage 0 Validium. ### Stage 0 - [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium. - [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - [x] DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer. - [x] A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/starkware-libs/starkex-contracts) ### Stage 1 - [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. - [ ] (under review) Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible. - [ ] (under review) In case of an unwanted upgrade by actors more centralized than a Security Council, users have at least 7d to exit. - [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up. - [x] A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs. - [ ] (under review) The DA verifier is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 7d independent exit window. - [ ] The DA layer does not meet minimum decentralization requirements (DAC <5 external members, or no attestation verifier for an external DA chain). - [ ] (under review) The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381). - [ ] (under review) Prover source code is published. - [ ] (under review) Onchain verifiers' smart contracts (including the DA verifier) can be independently regenerated from the verifier source code. - [ ] (under review) The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated. ### Stage 2 - [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit. - [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs. - [ ] (under review) The DA verifier (and related contracts) is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 30d independent exit window. - [ ] The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS. ## Data availability Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data. ### Risk analysis #### Economic security None (sentiment: bad) There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known. #### Fraud detection None (sentiment: bad) There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. #### Committee security 2/4 (sentiment: bad) The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability. #### Upgradeability Immutable (sentiment: bad) The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved. #### Relayer failure Self propose (sentiment: good) Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge. ### Technology #### Architecture ![starkex architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/starkex/architecture.png#center) The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components: - **Availability Gateway**: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims. - **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims. - **Data Batches**: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state. Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root. When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application's configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent. Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2. #### DA Bridge Architecture ![starkex bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/starkex/architectureL2.png#center) The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories. The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch. **References** - [StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code](https://github.com/starkware-libs/starkex-data-availability-committee) ## State validation ### Validity proofs Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots. **References** - [Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-off-chain-state.html#enforcing_consistency_in_the_on_chain_state_spot) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sorare#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [Operator - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/perpetual/shared/contract-management.html#operator_perpetual) ### Users can force exit the system Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. **Risks** - Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system. **References** - [Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/architecture/solution-architecture.html#8-censorship-prevention) ## Withdrawals ### Regular exit The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1. **References** - [Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/withdrawal.html) ### Forced exit If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit. **References** - [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-forced-operations.html) - [Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/spot-trading-full-withdrawals.html) ### Emergency exit If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction. **References** - [Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/shared/README-forced-operations.html) - [Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation](https://docs.starkware.co/starkex/spot/spot-trading-full-withdrawals.html) ## Permissions ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### SHARP Multisig Addresses: [0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4) A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. * Can upgrade **with 8d delay** * SHARPVerifierCallProxy [via: - acting directly with 8d delay] * Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy * Administer the CallProxy's `GOVERNANCE_ADMIN` and role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades * Grant and revoke application roles, including the `APP_GOVERNOR` role that controls caller-specific fallback routes * Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier's reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy's explicit `isValid` entry point always queries the default target ##### SorareAdminMultisig Addresses: [0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B) A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * StarkExchange * Can interact with StarkExchange * manage the token admin role * Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), set the default vault withdrawal lock, unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0x5918481F777dBe437De249492B90AffB4e655de4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5918481F777dBe437De249492B90AffB4e655de4) * Can upgrade **with no delay** * StarkExchange * Can interact with StarkExchange * manage the token admin role * Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), set the default vault withdrawal lock, unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set ##### 2 EOAs Addresses: [0x3DE55343499f59CEB3f1dE47F2Cd7Eab28F2F5C6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3DE55343499f59CEB3f1dE47F2Cd7Eab28F2F5C6) (EOA 2), [0x63881ac44293E22F3c3183a0C4113586ABb3e653](https://etherscan.io/address/0x63881ac44293E22F3c3183a0C4113586ABb3e653) (EOA 3) * Can interact with StarkExchange * Permissioned to regularly update the state roots of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains commitments to the data that is itself kept offchain ## Smart contracts ### Ethereum #### DACommittee Addresses: [0x879cD57975d596004863D30c59d579ef78BBbe32](https://etherscan.io/address/0x879cD57975d596004863D30c59d579ef78BBbe32#code) Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 2. #### StarkExchange Addresses: [0xF5C9F957705bea56a7e806943f98F7777B995826](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF5C9F957705bea56a7e806943f98F7777B995826#code), [0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98#code) (Implementation #3 (Upgradable)), [0x67e198743BC19fa4757720eDd0e769f8291e1F1D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x67e198743BC19fa4757720eDd0e769f8291e1F1D#code) (Implementation #4 (Upgradable)), [0x613ee54C54D5548627064B4D648942bF3648f376](https://etherscan.io/address/0x613ee54C54D5548627064B4D648942bF3648f376#code) (Implementation #5 (Upgradable)), [0xb2ED005D0278179001a49a9969BB22BA8e98f31F](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb2ED005D0278179001a49a9969BB22BA8e98f31F#code) (Implementation #6 (Upgradable)), [0xB5353268d8d4D711a92cb838F8fEDFC2A66E50Db](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB5353268d8d4D711a92cb838F8fEDFC2A66E50Db#code) (Implementation #7 (Upgradable)), [0x5918481F777dBe437De249492B90AffB4e655de4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5918481F777dBe437De249492B90AffB4e655de4#code) (Admin), [0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B#code) (Admin) Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. * Roles: * **admin**: EOA 1, SorareAdminMultisig * **operators**: EOA 2, EOA 3 Can be upgraded by: EOA 1 with no delay, SorareAdminMultisig with no delay #### CpuVerifierAllSolidity_2026_13 Addresses: [0x015381651F240Ed6C44122dCba6Cf807c9442CD6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x015381651F240Ed6C44122dCba6Cf807c9442CD6#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### CpuVerifierDex_2026_13 Addresses: [0x0cD0cDf0132c566db61B691BCEEBA2c4D8cA5CdC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0cD0cDf0132c566db61B691BCEEBA2c4D8cA5CdC#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### CairoBootloaderProgram Addresses: [0x24105e6697AdD9B4B1BDE04079a91BDFCCa24A47](https://etherscan.io/address/0x24105e6697AdD9B4B1BDE04079a91BDFCCa24A47#code) Stores the complete compiled Cairo outer bootloader used as the top-level program of a SHARP proof. The SHARP verifier copies these words into public memory, pinning this exact executable onchain independently of the separately committed simple, applicative, and recursive-verifier programs. #### CpuVerifierRecursive_2026_13 Addresses: [0x2867A4509B0969531641A42a3D4A9B0A07109B6B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2867A4509B0969531641A42a3D4A9B0A07109B6B#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### CpuVerifierSmall_2026_13 Addresses: [0x30F3AB988Cb00fe3Fb5ab891F50c13684770419b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x30F3AB988Cb00fe3Fb5ab891F50c13684770419b#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### MemoryPageFactRegistry_2023_9 Addresses: [0x40864568f679c10aC9e72211500096a5130770fA](https://etherscan.io/address/0x40864568f679c10aC9e72211500096a5130770fA#code) Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead. #### SHARPVerifierCallProxy Addresses: [0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60](https://etherscan.io/address/0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60#code), [0x3597c5CBCbCB30079a0bD2A68cDE5f98272f9feb](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3597c5CBCbCB30079a0bD2A68cDE5f98272f9feb#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4#code) (Admin) Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses `call`, not `delegatecall`, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit `isValid` entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target's reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d. * Roles: * **admin**: SHARP Multisig * **appGovernor**: SHARP Multisig * **appRoleAdmin**: SHARP Multisig * **governanceAdmin**: SHARP Multisig Can be upgraded by: SHARP Multisig with 8d delay #### SHARPVerifier Addresses: [0x4956bda1d23F75B988644329c5B06BD1494a72b6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4956bda1d23F75B988644329c5B06BD1494a72b6#code) Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry. #### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_1 Addresses: [0x5C1Ce45534A9c5f7F3E6683Cd79a8ad57EE3a9fe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5C1Ce45534A9c5f7F3E6683Cd79a8ad57EE3a9fe#code) Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry. #### CpuVerifierDexWithBitwise_2026_13 Addresses: [0x6a67796ee97700B5B5f5aFBCFFDCbc5F80803F11](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6a67796ee97700B5B5f5aFBCFFDCbc5F80803F11#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### CpuVerifierStarknet_2026_13 Addresses: [0x71574057D12541ccDa98643aC56441838353A26D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x71574057D12541ccDa98643aC56441838353A26D#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_2 Addresses: [0x7Da1225C752ab37E610a242D9D8a0548262E3fF7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Da1225C752ab37E610a242D9D8a0548262E3fF7#code) Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry. #### CpuVerifierRecursiveLargeOutput_2026_13 Addresses: [0xbe0F8F150Fd10798524B4de80eD75751658CAEF3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbe0F8F150Fd10798524B4de80eD75751658CAEF3#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### MemoryPageFactRegistry Addresses: [0xe583BcDE0160b637330b27a3ea1F3c02ba2eC460](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe583BcDE0160b637330b27a3ea1F3c02ba2eC460#code) Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead. #### SHARPVerifier_2026_13_3 Addresses: [0xE67515a751291445B85b2F176c1eCdf08e86b406](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE67515a751291445B85b2F176c1eCdf08e86b406#code) Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry. #### CpuVerifierPerpetual_2026_13 Addresses: [0xFFC7974cd74b95f631f454cd787AAc28F0476b44](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFFC7974cd74b95f631f454cd787AAc28F0476b44#code) Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by `cairoVerifierId`. #### GpsFactRegistryAdapter Addresses: [0xbcc17446B99465fF01E6816d9bcb2d8b1D7cEdB1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbcc17446B99465fF01E6816d9bcb2d8b1D7cEdB1#code) Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (`3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957`). #### CpuFrilessVerifier Addresses: [0x03Fa911dfCa026D9C8Edb508851b390accF912e8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03Fa911dfCa026D9C8Edb508851b390accF912e8#code), [0x217750c27bE9147f9e358D9FF26a8224F8aCC214](https://etherscan.io/address/0x217750c27bE9147f9e358D9FF26a8224F8aCC214#code), [0x630A97901Ac29590DF83f4A64B8D490D54caf239](https://etherscan.io/address/0x630A97901Ac29590DF83f4A64B8D490D54caf239#code), [0x78Af2BFB12Db15d35f7dE8DD77f29C299C78c590](https://etherscan.io/address/0x78Af2BFB12Db15d35f7dE8DD77f29C299C78c590#code), [0x8488e8f4e26eBa40faE229AB653d98E341cbE57B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8488e8f4e26eBa40faE229AB653d98E341cbE57B#code), [0x9E614a417f8309575fC11b175A51599661f2Bd21](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9E614a417f8309575fC11b175A51599661f2Bd21#code), [0xC879aF7D5eD80e4676C203FD300E640C297F31e3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC879aF7D5eD80e4676C203FD300E640C297F31e3#code), [0xe9664D230490d5A515ef7Ef30033d8075a8D0E24](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe9664D230490d5A515ef7Ef30033d8075a8D0E24#code) #### CairoBootloaderProgram_2022_7 Addresses: [0x5d07afFAfc8721Ef3dEe4D11A2D1484CBf6A9dDf](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5d07afFAfc8721Ef3dEe4D11A2D1484CBf6A9dDf#code) #### MemoryPageFactRegistry_2022_7 Addresses: [0xFD14567eaf9ba941cB8c8a94eEC14831ca7fD1b4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFD14567eaf9ba941cB8c8a94eEC14831ca7fD1b4#code) The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).