# SX Network Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork ## Summary **Warning:** The SX token is being sunset and SX Network is planned to be deprecated. See the [announcement](https://blog.sx.bet/news/sunsetting-the-sx-token-and-new-infrastructure-plans/). **Warning:** Why is the project listed in others? There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges. Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds. There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability. Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds. Learn more about the [recategorisation](https://medium.com/l2beat/framework-update-l2-projects-recategorisation-5d43b0d1fe50). - Total Value Secured: $23.29 M (+1.96% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $23.29 M, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - **Warning:** The SX token associated with SX Network accounts for 51.6% of the TVS! (sentiment: warning) - TVS by asset: ETH & derivatives $325.67 (0.00%), Stablecoins $11.26 M (48.3%), Other $12.03 M (51.6%) - Associated tokens: SX: $12.03 M (51.6% of TVS) - Past day UOPS: 0.30 (+49.1% compared to seven days ago) - Gas token: SX - Type: Other - Purposes: Universal, Betting - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 4162 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (4d delay; sentiment: good) - State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (6d 8h challenge period; sentiment: bad) - Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Self propose (12d 17h delay; sentiment: good) ### About SX Network is an Orbit stack Optimium, built to scale the SX team's existing sports betting platform. ### Links - Website: https://sx.technology/ - Bridge: https://sx.bet/wallet/bridge, https://bridge.gelato.network/bridge/sx-rollup - Docs: https://docs.sx.technology/ - Explorer: https://explorerl2.sx.technology/ - Repository: https://github.com/sx-network - Social: https://x.com/SX_Network, https://discord.com/invite/sxnetwork - Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/sxnetwork ### Badges - EVM: This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language - Data Availability Committee: There is a Data Availability Committee that provides/attests to data availability - Built on Arbitrum Orbit: The project is built on Arbitrum Orbit - Caldera: This project was deployed via the rollup-as-a-service provider Caldera ## Value Secured The interactive TVS charts are shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork#tvs). Token by token: [TVS breakdown](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork/tvs-breakdown). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/sxnetwork) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/sxnetwork/breakdown) ## Activity The interactive activity chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/sxnetwork) ## Onchain costs The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum. The interactive costs chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork#onchain-costs). ### Tracked transactions #### Batch submissions - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0xe0bc9729; signature: `function addSequencerL2Batch(uint256 sequenceNumber,bytes calldata data,uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead,address gasRefunder,uint256 prevMessageCount,uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x8f111f3c; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromOrigin(uint256 sequenceNumber,bytes data,uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead,address gasRefunder,uint256 prevMessageCount,uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x69cacded; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromOriginDelayProof(uint256 sequenceNumber, bytes data, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount, tuple(bytes32 beforeDelayedAcc, tuple(uint8 kind, address sender, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp, uint256 inboxSeqNum, uint256 baseFeeL1, bytes32 messageDataHash) delayedMessage) delayProof)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x3e5aa082; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromBlobs(uint256 sequenceNumber, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x917cf8ac; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromBlobsDelayProof(uint256 sequenceNumber, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount, tuple(bytes32 beforeDelayedAcc, tuple(uint8 kind, address sender, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp, uint256 inboxSeqNum, uint256 baseFeeL1, bytes32 messageDataHash) delayedMessage) delayProof)` #### State updates - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d); selector: 0xa04cee60; signature: `function updateSendRoot(bytes32 root, bytes32 l2BlockHash) external` ## Liveness This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule. No ongoing anomalies detected. The interactive liveness chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork#liveness). ### Tracked transactions #### Batch submissions - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0xe0bc9729; signature: `function addSequencerL2Batch(uint256 sequenceNumber,bytes calldata data,uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead,address gasRefunder,uint256 prevMessageCount,uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x8f111f3c; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromOrigin(uint256 sequenceNumber,bytes data,uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead,address gasRefunder,uint256 prevMessageCount,uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x69cacded; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromOriginDelayProof(uint256 sequenceNumber, bytes data, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount, tuple(bytes32 beforeDelayedAcc, tuple(uint8 kind, address sender, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp, uint256 inboxSeqNum, uint256 baseFeeL1, bytes32 messageDataHash) delayedMessage) delayProof)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x3e5aa082; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromBlobs(uint256 sequenceNumber, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount)` - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C); selector: 0x917cf8ac; signature: `function addSequencerL2BatchFromBlobsDelayProof(uint256 sequenceNumber, uint256 afterDelayedMessagesRead, address gasRefunder, uint256 prevMessageCount, uint256 newMessageCount, tuple(bytes32 beforeDelayedAcc, tuple(uint8 kind, address sender, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp, uint256 inboxSeqNum, uint256 baseFeeL1, bytes32 messageDataHash) delayedMessage) delayProof)` #### State updates - functionCall: 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d); selector: 0xa04cee60; signature: `function updateSendRoot(bytes32 root, bytes32 l2BlockHash) external` ### Last 30 day anomalies All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues. - No state updates were performed for 50m 24s (from 2026-09-23 15:48 UTC until 2026-09-23 16:38 UTC). These typically occur every 54m 31s on average. - No state updates were performed for 48m 24s (from 2026-09-23 14:59 UTC until 2026-09-23 15:48 UTC). These typically occur every 54m 31s on average. ## Risk summary **Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted. ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL), 2. none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL), 3. validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be lost if 4. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL). ### Users can be censored if 5. the committee restricts their access to the external data. ### MEV can be extracted if 6. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis **Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted. ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (4d delay; sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation. ### State validation Fraud proofs (INT) (6d 8h challenge period; sentiment: bad) Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period. ### Data availability External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Self propose (12d 17h delay; sentiment: good) Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers. ## Stage SX Network is not even a Stage 0 project. **Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review. ### Stage 0 1 issue needs fixing. - Met: The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium. - Met: State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - Met: A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - Under review: A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. - Issue: Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized. ### Stage 1 3 issues need fixing. **Principle** - Issue: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. **Guidelines** - Met: Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible. - Met: The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated. - Issue: Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. - Issue: The Security Council is not properly set up. [Learn more about Stages](https://l2beat.com/stages). Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal. ## Data availability Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data. ### Risk analysis #### Economic security None (sentiment: bad) There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known. #### Fraud detection None (sentiment: bad) There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. #### Committee security 1/1 (sentiment: bad) The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability. #### Upgradeability No delay (sentiment: bad) There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. #### Relayer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. ### Technology #### Architecture ![Anytrust architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/anytrust/architecture1.png#center) The DAC uses a data availability solution built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components: - **Sequencer Inbox**: Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches. - **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of members responsible for storing and providing data on demand. - **Data Availability Certificate (DACert)**: A commitment ensuring that data blobs are available without needing full data posting on the L1 chain. Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs. The Sequencer API allows the rollup Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hash. When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it. Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox. If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain as calldata. A DACert includes a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature. L2 nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp. If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members. #### DA Bridge Architecture ![Anytrust bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/anytrust/architectureL2.png#center) The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the destination chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving destination chain transaction ordering finality in a single onchain transaction. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if a malicious committee attests to an invalid data availability certificate. - Funds can be lost if the bridge contract or its dependencies receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades. **References** - [Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum Docs](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-anytrust) ## State validation ![A diagram of the state validation](https://l2beat.com/static/images/state-validation/orbit.b691a319.png) Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals. ### State root proposals Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL). **References** - [How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ](https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction) ### Challenges A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints. **References** - [Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a) ### Fast confirmations Whitelisted validators can fast-confirm state-roots after the initial 15m minimum assertion period has passed on a state root and skip the 6d 8h challenge period. This finalizes the fast-confirmed state root an permits withdrawals based on it. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL). **References** - [Fast withdrawals for AnyTrust chains - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/launch-orbit-chain/how-tos/fast-withdrawals#fast-withdrawals-for-anytrust-chains) ### Program Hashes #### ArbOS wasmModuleRoot v61 A commitment to the exact WASM binary version used for Orbit stack optimistic dispute games. - Hash: `0xc10cd7ec6acaf1c441a3f6bd0900ad20f15855ba775a96f1939118cbc629dc97` - Repository: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/tree/consensus-v61/arbos - Verification: successful - Used in: [Arbitrum One](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/arbitrum), [Robinhood Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/robinhood), [SX Network](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork), [Arbitrum Nova](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/nova), [Edge Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/edgechain), [Earnm](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/earnm) ##### Verification steps Even though the program is compiled in docker for reproducibility reasons, it gives the correct results only on linux OS. Steps below were done on Ubuntu 22.04 OS. The steps below consume ~95 GiB disk space. 1. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/). 2. Checkout the correct branch in [nitro](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro) repo: `git checkout consensus-v61` . Commit hash should be `dfab1dea5c8d2c5089eb26d22ad6239bb78cfa5d`. 3. Update git submodules `git submodule update --init --recursive --force`. 4. Fix a dependency on a private repo in `Dockerfile`: replace line `RUN --mount=type=secret,id=gh_token,required=false ./download-machine.sh consensus-v60-rc.3 0xeadc910d36a0eab43a3dd7acb1a3513885e333785689c7cf750b9949c5bb7227 OffchainLabs/nitro-private` with `RUN ./download-machine.sh consensus-v60-rc.5 0x7a9e6a77354888257a9989ce0b6bb39df5fedf222d453932933fdf7a489cbb57`. 4. Generate wasm module root in docker: `docker buildx build --target nitro-node-dev -t nitro-node-dev .`. 5. Export the value from the docker: `docker run --rm --entrypoint cat nitro-node-dev /home/user/target/machines/latest/module-root.txt`. ## Upgrades & Governance ### Past upgrades The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included. - Count of upgrades: 5 - Last upgrade: 1y 6mo ago - Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo - 2025-03-24 16:55 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C#code): transaction [0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8), implementations: [0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A/eth:0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18)) - 2025-03-24 16:55 UTC, upgrade of [Inbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631#code): transaction [0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8), implementations: [0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2/eth:0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4)) - 2025-03-24 11:51 UTC, upgrade of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86#code): transaction [0x5837fef008eaaa8871086f7e53f38a95b768926562e2e82cae17ddc7ab61b070](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5837fef008eaaa8871086f7e53f38a95b768926562e2e82cae17ddc7ab61b070), implementations: [0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab/eth:0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751)) - 2024-10-29 07:32 UTC, upgrade of [RollupProxy](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F#code): transaction [0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0), implementations: [0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A/eth:0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D)), [0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1/eth:0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34)) - 2024-10-29 07:32 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882#code): transaction [0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0), implementations: [0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43/eth:0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B)) - 2024-07-05 16:03 UTC, deployment of [ERC20Gateway](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB4968C66BECc8fb4f73b50354301c1aDb2Abaa91#code): transaction [0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08), implementations: [0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848#code) - 2024-07-05 16:03 UTC, deployment of [GatewayRouter](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5F00446D785421d65B50c192D7129e3C3906438A#code): transaction [0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08), implementations: [0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [SequencerInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Inbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [RollupProxy](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A#code), [0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [ChallengeManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [UpgradeExecutor](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Outbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C#code) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [RollupEventInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f1045201f8b9D0b12f6d1e40e8B8e6c047A81E3#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0#code) ## Updates Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs. ### [2026-10-09 08:12 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=da86a7d5) (high severity, 8 changes) RollupProxy: ArbOS v40 → v61 wasm module root, executed by the Caldera multisig. ArbFilteredTransactionsManager: transaction-filtering precompile live with ArbOS 61, no filterers set. ### [2026-10-01 22:02 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=756ef11b) (1 change) SequencerInbox: since 2026-09-28 batches are posted as AnyTrust DAC certificates (`1 of 1` keyset) instead of calldata on Ethereum. ### [2026-03-09 12:32 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=d936d811) (3 changes) RaaS provider changed from Gelato to Caldera. The executor Safe (0xa4C325e...) is renamed to CalderaMultisig to reflect this. SxNetworkMultisig member at index 0 rotated from `0x2627...` to `0xC711...`. ### [2026-03-02 22:16 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=864793b3) (18 changes) SXNetwork transitioned from an AnyTrust Optimium (DAC) to a Calldata Rollup. The sequencerVersion changed from 0x88 (Celestia/AnyTrust) to 0x00 (standard calldata), meaning transaction data is now posted directly to Ethereum L1. This changes the project's stage from "Not applicable" to "Stage 0" and removes the DAC dependency entirely. Additionally, ownership transferred from Gelato Multisig (4 of 9, Safe v1.3.0) to a new Safe (3 of 5, Safe v1.4.1) with entirely new signers. Validator set updated: one validator removed, one added, stakerCount increased from 2 to 3. Batch poster rotation: one added, one removed. ### [2025-11-28 13:08 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=07957435) (high severity, 4 changes) EOA delegated to Calibur 7702 wallet. ### [2025-08-25 10:36 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=f400ed73) (2 changes) Upgrade to ArbOS v40 wasmModuleRoot. ### [2025-07-15 09:11 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=d58edca5) (3 changes) Gelato MS: one signer removed, one changed. ### [2025-07-14 12:46 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=df606dd3) (19 changes) Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes. ### [2025-03-25 08:41 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=fb778586) (high severity, 24 changes) Minor upgrade of Bridge, Inbox and SequencerInbox: - logic for tokens with custom decimals - 7702 adjustments - SequencerInbox upgraded to known implementation ### [2025-03-17 09:43 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=34f37bf3) (2 changes) Add erc20 gateway escrow. ### [2025-02-24 15:39 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=002353b0) (1 change) Config: added a single caldera multisig name. ### [2025-02-21 13:50 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=86c404b3) (31 changes) Add operator addresses. Config related: Set orbit stack contract categories. ### [2025-01-15 07:31 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=3460c387) (11 changes) Two signers added to Gelato MS, now 4/10. ### [2024-12-09 14:39 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=b2a4388e) (36 changes) Replace Upgrader EOA with Gelato Multisig. ### [2024-11-28 11:13 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=d96cdfa8) (15 changes) Gelato MS added as second executor. ### [2024-10-29 12:50 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=238bc4f7) (high severity, 38 changes) Upgrade to ArbOS 32, introduce fastWithdrawer (1/1 MS with 15min minimum delta between state roots). This project now uses discoveryDriven data. ### [2024-08-21 08:35 UTC](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork?update=65c6579f) (19 changes) Added initial discovery of the chain. ## Operator ### The system has a centralized sequencer While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer) ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 4d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering. **References** - [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18#code) - [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job) ## Sequencing ### Delayed forced transactions To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue "delayed" messages in the "delayed" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 4d. ## Withdrawals ### Regular messaging The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. **References** - [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle) - [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging) - [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e) ### Autonomous exit Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade. ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM. **References** - [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/) ## Permissions Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/sxnetwork ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### CalderaMultisig Addresses: [0xa4C325e25215C1fB2405EB28d81d2dFdbfC8D24C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa4C325e25215C1fB2405EB28d81d2dFdbfC8D24C) A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. - Can upgrade **with no delay** - RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor] - UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - GatewayRouter [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - ChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - ERC20Gateway [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] - Can interact with RollupProxy - Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor] Participants (5): [0x615682E7ae61a1458B2507Da1CD3BAC3eED7B7dF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x615682E7ae61a1458B2507Da1CD3BAC3eED7B7dF), [0x62ea938a30826c8794C8B8BbA775B91cAE3B849A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x62ea938a30826c8794C8B8BbA775B91cAE3B849A), [0xceB13236BA93f2a822Ea400EB2d6132E62bE9E84](https://etherscan.io/address/0xceB13236BA93f2a822Ea400EB2d6132E62bE9E84), [0x8C773CAF4adFCBB720404De9D6BB92ab3DFbF7a2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8C773CAF4adFCBB720404De9D6BB92ab3DFbF7a2), [0x86135362aAAf5C00E51b003fb00A34c72A88027A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x86135362aAAf5C00E51b003fb00A34c72A88027A) ##### SxNetworkMultisig Addresses: [0xddb901e4E9A2e659aa1d6476d5D7A2833E7c3dFa](https://etherscan.io/address/0xddb901e4E9A2e659aa1d6476d5D7A2833E7c3dFa) A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. Participants (1): [0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork#EOA-1) (EOA 1) ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c) Member of SxNetworkMultisig. - Can interact with RollupProxy - Can finalize a state root before the challenge period has passed. This allows withdrawing from the bridge based on the state root [via: SxNetworkMultisig] - Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain [via: SxNetworkMultisig - or - acting directly] ##### 5 EOAs Addresses: [0x0181F0f0260Ac4149CA7Abf6c53d3E8053f95715](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0181F0f0260Ac4149CA7Abf6c53d3E8053f95715) (EOA 2), [0x2EA9bb3d1022b8E63366aE3ea48Ada4E2Cd2ac46](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2EA9bb3d1022b8E63366aE3ea48Ada4E2Cd2ac46) (EOA 3), [0x7D9A25f61865D5A211a8be80a4Ef6bd201112717](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7D9A25f61865D5A211a8be80a4Ef6bd201112717) (EOA 6), [0xC410B8657FBB2CdbF0c5c5d5128576974467ba5e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xC410B8657FBB2CdbF0c5c5d5128576974467ba5e) (EOA 7), [0xCD795E6003Da105f4a1E11F73fb64b58B5C0f325](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCD795E6003Da105f4a1E11F73fb64b58B5C0f325) (EOA 8) - Can interact with SequencerInbox - Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain ##### 4 EOAs Addresses: [0x3648e2c562F00DeEA11B0b335Cf55C5EB2Df3A5F](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3648e2c562F00DeEA11B0b335Cf55C5EB2Df3A5F) (EOA 4), [0x75feC8Bb2d99076D776A5D46D1E3d42686520eF1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75feC8Bb2d99076D776A5D46D1E3d42686520eF1) (EOA 5), [0xD19ee3f6Bf22A3A23eCd25B5ED0C655a2a56F65E](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD19ee3f6Bf22A3A23eCd25B5ED0C655a2a56F65E) (EOA 9), [0xe778F5Bf5dDB8614a1ab6321Cc557EDbC90e615f](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe778F5Bf5dDB8614a1ab6321Cc557EDbC90e615f) (EOA 10) - Can interact with RollupProxy - Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain ## Smart contracts ![A diagram of the smart contract architecture](https://l2beat.com/static/images/architecture/orbit-optimium-fastconfirm.3f3e58f9.png) Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/sxnetwork ### Ethereum #### RollupProxy Addresses: [0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F#code), [0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 11mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo) - 2024-10-29 07:32 UTC, upgrade of [RollupProxy](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F#code): transaction [0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0), implementations: [0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A/eth:0x9B56A789fEDD5df27dBaB53b085F7157397cA17D)), [0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1/eth:0x5607Ea4b5F6e3F610bD346B36D3143FFf46d1C34)) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [RollupProxy](https://etherscan.io/address/0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A#code), [0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1#code) Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators). - Roles: - **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CalderaMultisig - **anyTrustFastConfirmer**: SxNetworkMultisig; ultimately EOA 1 - **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CalderaMultisig - **validators**: EOA 1, EOA 10, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 9, SxNetworkMultisig; ultimately EOA 1 Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### ChallengeManager Addresses: [0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882#code), [0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 11mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo) - 2024-10-29 07:32 UTC, upgrade of [ChallengeManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882#code): transaction [0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xaf5a9eeab9e5f6edb2409f9b41142e49d97ce9ca9d8785e8dbff7cc2835699c0), implementations: [0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43/eth:0x02E05A9245C5853f895daDcc3A8216C953C8736B)) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [ChallengeManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73cfa0F6ae141212115657ad91Ad918E5d34d882#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1D901DD7A5eFE421C3C437B147040E5AF22E6A43#code) Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### Bridge (escrow) Addresses: [0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86#code), [0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 6mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo) - 2025-03-24 11:51 UTC, upgrade of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86#code): transaction [0x5837fef008eaaa8871086f7e53f38a95b768926562e2e82cae17ddc7ab61b070](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5837fef008eaaa8871086f7e53f38a95b768926562e2e82cae17ddc7ab61b070), implementations: [0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab/eth:0xEfA1De858293593732a09c9dAA238BEC49595751)) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xa104C0426e95a5538e89131DbB4163d230C35f86#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7EfcB76D0e2E776A298aAa603d433336e5F8b6ab#code) Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation: SX Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### SequencerInbox Addresses: [0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C#code), [0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 6mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo) - 2025-03-24 16:55 UTC, upgrade of [SequencerInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C#code): transaction [0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8), implementations: [0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A/eth:0xaEd84B70Be8117112a5aa0d93a7fBff463A03b18)) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [SequencerInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x383f16fB2809a56fC639c1eE2c93Ad2aa7Ee130A#code) A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig - **batchPosters**: EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8 Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### UpgradeExecutor Addresses: [0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a#code), [0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [UpgradeExecutor](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b#code) Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig - **executors**: CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay Implementation used in: [AlienX](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/alienx#UpgradeExecutor), [Gravity](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/galxegravity#UpgradeExecutor), [Reya](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/reya#UpgradeExecutor) #### Outbox Addresses: [0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d#code), [0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Outbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB360b2f57c645E847148d7C479b7468AbF6F707d#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x19431dc37098877486532250FB3158140717C00C#code) Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### ERC20Gateway (escrow) Addresses: [0xB4968C66BECc8fb4f73b50354301c1aDb2Abaa91](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB4968C66BECc8fb4f73b50354301c1aDb2Abaa91#code), [0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2024-07-05 16:03 UTC, deployment of [ERC20Gateway](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB4968C66BECc8fb4f73b50354301c1aDb2Abaa91#code): transaction [0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08), implementations: [0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe80b4E0ed5e92d865F4708eeE0E1564287a7D848#code) Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation. Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay Implementation used in: [Plume Network](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#ERC20Gateway) #### Inbox Addresses: [0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631#code), [0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1y 6mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo) - 2025-03-24 16:55 UTC, upgrade of [Inbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631#code): transaction [0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2ecdabc185a5e5350c23c45cfbf746bd874b272e363729adcf975533d38790b8), implementations: [0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2/eth:0x6C051397fee2d79ccf92d1f3c5c6547fEBD838F4)) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [Inbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa83E8907C89Bc0D9517632f0ba081972E328631#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x31fAAAB44e74eB408d1FC69A14806B4b9cA09da2#code) Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### GatewayRouter Addresses: [0x5F00446D785421d65B50c192D7129e3C3906438A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5F00446D785421d65B50c192D7129e3C3906438A#code), [0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2024-07-05 16:03 UTC, deployment of [GatewayRouter](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5F00446D785421d65B50c192D7129e3C3906438A#code): transaction [0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7cc92a5a8726d4bfe4dc046ebe6bea0d89310a0897998f847cd74e130674cf08), implementations: [0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5Ff3feD7aad041ACe66E4ecDd7AfbCC43b6446b0#code) This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay Implementation used in: [Plume Network](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/plumenetwork#GatewayRouter) #### OneStepProverHostIo Addresses: [0x0003A96B27ce73505b43ea1b71a5aB06bec568C4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0003A96B27ce73505b43ea1b71a5aB06bec568C4#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### OneStepProverMemory Addresses: [0x1cD76B9C33b2e3b04D7B181399d492B3e49AD7fB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1cD76B9C33b2e3b04D7B181399d492B3e49AD7fB#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### ValidatorUtils Addresses: [0x2b0E04Dc90e3fA58165CB41E2834B44A56E766aF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2b0E04Dc90e3fA58165CB41E2834B44A56E766aF#code) This contract implements view only utilities for validators. Implementation used in: [AlienX](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/alienx#ValidatorUtils) #### OneStepProver0 Addresses: [0x2dCCAbE89cF76132619a9B18e9F9e48E837222b5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2dCCAbE89cF76132619a9B18e9F9e48E837222b5#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### OneStepProofEntry Addresses: [0x8Faa21891B0b928afEbd5314D1D313f8f7B34DaC](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8Faa21891B0b928afEbd5314D1D313f8f7B34DaC#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### RollupEventInbox Addresses: [0x9f1045201f8b9D0b12f6d1e40e8B8e6c047A81E3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f1045201f8b9D0b12f6d1e40e8B8e6c047A81E3#code), [0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2024-07-05 09:57 UTC, deployment of [RollupEventInbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9f1045201f8b9D0b12f6d1e40e8B8e6c047A81E3#code): transaction [0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe93b7e232ca2ff32a44ecb683683d9553409ab46eb90efa21a7bcfc111835074), implementations: [0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0#code) Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig Can be upgraded by: CalderaMultisig with no delay #### OneStepProverMath Addresses: [0xCf4b98cFF2976E4eb579B9498f398b5bd279A6eD](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCf4b98cFF2976E4eb579B9498f398b5bd279A6eD#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe8606A55d105EF857F187C32Ae0E9a168aF8F497#code) - Roles: - **owner**: UpgradeExecutor ### SX Network #### ArbFilteredTransactionsManager Addresses: [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074](https://explorerl2.sx.technology/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074#code) ArbOS transaction-filtering precompile (0x..74), available from ArbOS 60. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. With no filterers set, no transaction hashes can be added or removed; hashes added earlier stay filtered. **References** - [Source Code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/blob/v3.11.0/precompiles/ArbFilteredTransactionsManager.go) The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL). ### Program Hashes #### ArbOS wasmModuleRoot v61 A commitment to the exact WASM binary version used for Orbit stack optimistic dispute games. - Hash: `0xc10cd7ec6acaf1c441a3f6bd0900ad20f15855ba775a96f1939118cbc629dc97` - Repository: https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro/tree/consensus-v61/arbos - Verification: successful - Used in: [Arbitrum One](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/arbitrum), [Robinhood Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/robinhood), [SX Network](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/sxnetwork), [Arbitrum Nova](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/nova), [Edge Chain](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/edgechain), [Earnm](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/earnm) ##### Verification steps Even though the program is compiled in docker for reproducibility reasons, it gives the correct results only on linux OS. Steps below were done on Ubuntu 22.04 OS. The steps below consume ~95 GiB disk space. 1. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/). 2. Checkout the correct branch in [nitro](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro) repo: `git checkout consensus-v61` . Commit hash should be `dfab1dea5c8d2c5089eb26d22ad6239bb78cfa5d`. 3. Update git submodules `git submodule update --init --recursive --force`. 4. Fix a dependency on a private repo in `Dockerfile`: replace line `RUN --mount=type=secret,id=gh_token,required=false ./download-machine.sh consensus-v60-rc.3 0xeadc910d36a0eab43a3dd7acb1a3513885e333785689c7cf750b9949c5bb7227 OffchainLabs/nitro-private` with `RUN ./download-machine.sh consensus-v60-rc.5 0x7a9e6a77354888257a9989ce0b6bb39df5fedf222d453932933fdf7a489cbb57`. 4. Generate wasm module root in docker: `docker buildx build --target nitro-node-dev -t nitro-node-dev .`. 5. Export the value from the docker: `docker run --rm --entrypoint cat nitro-node-dev /home/user/target/machines/latest/module-root.txt`.