# Taiko Alethia

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko

## Summary

- Total Value Secured: $13.64 M (-2.82% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $13.42 M, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $216.77 K; 1.58% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
  - **Warning:** The TAIKO token associated with Taiko Alethia accounts for 77.6% of the TVS! (sentiment: warning)
- Past day UOPS: 0.53 (-2.97% compared to seven days ago)
- Stage: Stage 0
- Gas token: ETH
- Type: ZK Rollup
- Purpose: Universal
- Host chain: Ethereum
- Chain ID: 167000

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Enqueue via L1 (sentiment: warning)
- State validation: Validity proofs (sentiment: good)
- Data availability: Onchain (sentiment: good)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

### About

Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent rollup on the Ethereum network. Taiko combines a preconfirmation-based sequencing mechanism with a multi-proof system using SP1, RISC0 and TEEs.

## Value Secured

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#tvs).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/taiko)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/taiko/breakdown)

## Activity

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/taiko)

## Onchain costs

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#onchain-costs).

## Data posted

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#data-posted).

## Liveness

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#liveness).

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2026-08-03: [Unzen upgrade: validity rollup](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x64875b5b84b41b520551854696c0ce408fb3e0aa2ede604cc95a5919b6140ea7). Every proven proposal range now requires at least one SP1 or RISC0 validity proof.
- 2026-06-22 (incident): [Proof system exploit](https://x.com/taikoxyz/status/2068857506718515320). An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the SGX proof system and steals USD ~1.7M.
- 2025-08-11: [Preconfs introduction](https://taiko.mirror.xyz/rbgD_KM06QkDe1t0Gw1wI_MLvwobTS1PqEIfstZRo48). Taiko implements preconfs - whitelisted actors provide fast soft confirmations for L2 txs.
- 2025-06-04 (incident): [Plonky3 vulnerability patch](https://x.com/SuccinctLabs/status/1929773028034204121). SP1 verifier is patched to fix critical vulnerability in Plonky3 proof system (SP1 dependency).
- 2025-05-21: [Taiko Pacaya Hardfork](https://taiko.mirror.xyz/pIchmo0E-DfSySCzL52BFbus54Z3XJEO0k0Ptqqpm_I). Taiko Pacaya hardfork replaces the contestable rollup design with a batch based protocol.
- 2024-11-01: [Taiko enabled SP1 and Risc0 proving](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x13ea4d044a313cf667d16514465e6b96227ef7198bda7b19c70eefee44e9bccd). TaikoL1 smart contract upgraded to verify SP1 and Risc0 proofs of Taiko L2 blocks.
- 2024-06-06: [Taiko Based Sequencing Upgrade](https://taiko.mirror.xyz/_oKlnpzKSOxGILyy4WlvpUmYEqD7BFxzmRo3XETlJqE). Proposing blocks on Taiko is now permissionless.
- 2024-06-05: [TAIKO Token Airdrop](https://taiko.mirror.xyz/VSOtILX2DQsc_6IMt5hBT1fEYSH8243pZ8IA_pBfHks). TAIKO token launches.
- 2024-05-27: [Mainnet Launch](https://taiko.mirror.xyz/Pizjv30FvjsZUwEG-Da7Gs6F8qeDLc4CKKEBqy3pTt8). Taiko is deployed on Ethereum mainnet.

## Risk summary

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

### Users can be censored if

2. the operator is offline or refuses to process the queue.

### MEV can be extracted if

3. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

### Sequencer failure

Enqueue via L1 (sentiment: warning)

Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone. An inclusion becomes due after 9m 36s. From then on, a whitelisted proposer cannot publish another proposal without processing up to ten due inclusions.

### State validation

Validity proofs (sentiment: good)

Every proposal range is verified by exactly two proofs chosen from SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1 and RISC0, with at least one SP1 or RISC0 proof required. Proof submission is gated by ProverWhitelist, which has 2 whitelisted provers. This can affect liveness but does not allow finalizing invalid state.

### Data availability

Onchain (sentiment: good)

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

### Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. Proposing is gated by PreconfWhitelist, which selects a single active operator for the current epoch and has no permissionless fallback.

## Stage

Taiko Alethia is a Stage 0 ZK Rollup.

### Stage 0

- [x] A complete and functional proof system is deployed.
- [x] The project calls itself a rollup.
- [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1.
- [x] A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/taikoxyz/simple-taiko-node)

### Stage 1

- [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
- [ ] Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up.
- [x] The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).
- [x] Prover source code is published.
- [ ] Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.

### Stage 2

- [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
- [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.

## Data availability

### All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of blobs. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

## State validation

### Validity proofs

Taiko uses a multi-proof system to validate state transitions. Exactly two proofs are required from four available verifiers: SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1, and RISC0. At least one proof must come from SP1 or RISC0: accepted combinations are either SGX verifier plus either ZK verifier, or SP1 plus RISC0. An SGX-only pair is not accepted. New proposals target a proof submission cadence of 4h. Proving is currently centralized behind ProverWhitelist with 2 whitelisted provers. While the whitelist is non-empty, non-whitelisted actors cannot submit proofs, and the configured permissionless proving delay is not used to open proving. MainnetInbox currently sets minBond=0 and livenessBond=0.

**References**

- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, getConfig function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)
- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, prove function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)
- [ProverWhitelist.sol - Etherscan source code](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa798547d97e345395dA071a0D7ED8144CD612Ae#code)
- [ZkRequiredVerifier.sol - Etherscan source code](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7284aaC05555Ae6559bdAd8B4221eC9584254Eec#code)

## Upgrades & Governance

Taiko Alethia has a governance structure relying primarily on a 4/5 Security Council, checked by a token DAO that is limited to veto permissions. The closed operator whitelists are managed by the 4/6 Taiko Multisig and related EOAs. Governance proposals (both paths) hold all important upgrade and config permissions in the system.
### Standard proposals
A threshold of 3 approving Security Council members is required to forward a Standard proposal to the OptimisticTokenVotingPlugin contract. It can be vetoed by 10% of votable TAIKO tokens during a 10d public veto period. If not vetoed, a further 7d timelock applies before the proposal can be executed.
### Emergency proposals
Emergency proposals are encrypted at proposal time and can only be read by Security Council members. If approved by 4 Security Council members, they can be immediately decrypted and executed.

### Proof system and operators
The proof system currently does not require zk proofs to validate state transitions and state can be finalized with SGX proofs only. The optional zk verifier contracts can be upgraded by Multisigs. Operator roles (sequencer, proposer) are closed and the whitelist is managed by the Taiko Multisig and related EOAs.

## Updates

Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/taiko#updates).

## Operator

### The system uses whitelist-based sequencing and proving

The system uses a whitelist-based sequencing mechanism to allow for fast preconfirmations on the L2. On the L1, batch proposing is permissioned through the `PreconfWhitelist` contract, which currently has 1 active operators registered.
For each epoch, `PreconfWhitelist` selects a single active operator that can propose to MainnetInbox. There is no fallback proposer path, and non-selected operators cannot propose for the current epoch.
Proving is controlled separately by `ProverWhitelist`, which currently has 2 whitelisted provers.
While the prover whitelist is non-empty, non-whitelisted actors cannot submit proofs. MainnetInbox currently sets minBond=0 and livenessBond=0.
Proving a proposal range requires exactly two proofs and at least one of them must be a ZK proof. Accepted combinations are SGX (Geth or Reth) plus SP1 or RISC0, or SP1 plus RISC0.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, propose function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)
- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, prove function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)
- [PreconfWhitelist.sol - Etherscan source code](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDBae46E35C18719E6c78aaBF9c8869c4eC84c149#code)
- [ProverWhitelist.sol - Etherscan source code](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa798547d97e345395dA071a0D7ED8144CD612Ae#code)

### Users can enqueue transactions

Users can submit a forced inclusion directly to `MainnetInbox` on L1 by publishing a blob containing one L2 block manifest and calling `saveForcedInclusion()`.
Requests are stored in a FIFO queue and cost a dynamic fee that starts at 0.001 ETH. The fee increases linearly with the queue size and doubles when 50 requests are pending.
After 9m 36s, a request is due. Every subsequent proposal must process the due requests at the head of the queue, up to ten per proposal, before the proposer's own derivation source. This prevents an active proposer from advancing the chain while selectively skipping a due request.
However, `propose()` still unconditionally checks `PreconfWhitelist`. The configured 1d 1h 36m permissionless inclusion threshold is not used, so users and other unpermissioned actors cannot process the queue themselves. If all whitelisted proposers stop, the queue and the whole chain stop progressing.

**Risks**

- Users can be censored if the operator is offline or refuses to process the queue.

**References**

- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, saveForcedInclusion function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)
- [MainnetInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, propose function](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code)

## Withdrawals

### Regular exit

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

## Permissions

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### SignerList (Security Council)

Addresses: [0x0F95E6968EC1B28c794CF1aD99609431de5179c2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0F95E6968EC1B28c794CF1aD99609431de5179c2)

A Multisig with 4/5 threshold. 
A signer list for storing multisig members and their agents, stores the addresses of the Multisigs that use this signer list. Each signer delegates their permissions to their agent address that they can configure here.
* Can upgrade **with 7d delay**
  * AutomataDcapV3Attestation [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * Taiko Token [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * MainnetInbox [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * TaikoDAOController [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
  * AutomataDcapV3Attestation [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * DefaultResolver [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * MainnetERC20Vault [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * DAO [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
  * SignalService [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * MainnetBridge [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * ProverWhitelist [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * TaikoDAOController [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
  * PreconfWhitelist [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
  * Bridge [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
  * ERC20Vault [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
  * SignalService [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
  * L2AddressManager [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
  * Anchor [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
  * DelegateController [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
* Can interact with TaikoRisc0Verifier
  * manage trusted RISC Zero image IDs **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with SignerList (Security Council)
  * add/remove members from the Security Council and change its minimum size **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
* Can interact with AutomataDcapV3Attestation
  * manage trusted SGX measurements, revoked certificate serial numbers, TCB info, QE identity, and local report checks **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with EmergencyMultisig
  * manage critical settings (e.g. threshold and multisig settings) for the emergency proposal governance path **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
* Can interact with SecureSgxVerifier
  * add SGX instances without DCAP attestation and delete registered instances **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with MainnetInbox
  * pause and unpause the rollup system, activate the inbox, and execute the one-time state recovery path **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with TaikoSP1Verifier
  * manage trusted SP1 program verification keys **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with AutomataDcapV3Attestation
  * manage trusted SGX measurements, revoked certificate serial numbers, TCB info, QE identity, and local report checks **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with DefaultResolver
  * update the contract address registered for any chainId-name pair **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with OptimisticTokenVotingPlugin
  * manage critical settings (e.g. thresholds, delays and proposal acceptance criteria) for all governance proposals **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
* Can interact with MainnetERC20Vault
  * pause and unpause token bridge flows and change the bridged token implementation for a canonical token after the migration delay **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with DAO
  * define all permissions of the central DAO smart contract **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
* Can interact with SecureSgxVerifier
  * add SGX instances without DCAP attestation and delete registered instances **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with SignalService
  * pause and unpause signal proof verification **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with MainnetBridge
  * pause and unpause bridge message flows and execute one-time bridge recovery initializers **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with Multisig
  * manage critical settings (e.g. threshold and multisig settings) for the standard proposal governance path **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay)]
* Can interact with ProverWhitelist
  * manage the prover whitelist **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with PreconfWhitelist
  * pause/unpause, add or remove operators, and manage ejecter roles **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController]
* Can interact with SignalService
  * pause and unpause signal proof verification **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]
* Can interact with L2AddressManager
  * can update the contract address for a given name **with 7d delay** [via: DAO with 7d delay (emergency proposals bypass the delay) → TaikoDAOController → DelegateController]

##### Taiko Multisig

Addresses: [0x9CBeE534B5D8a6280e01a14844Ee8aF350399C7F](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9CBeE534B5D8a6280e01a14844Ee8aF350399C7F)

A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. 
* Can interact with SecureSgxVerifier
  * register SGX instances after DCAP attestation verification 
* Can interact with SecureSgxVerifier
  * register SGX instances after DCAP attestation verification 
* Can interact with SignalService
  * pause and unpause signal proof verification 
* Can interact with QuotaManager
  * update token withdrawal quotas and the quota refill period 
* Can interact with MainnetBridge
  * pause and unpause bridge message flows and fund the bridge through direct ETH transfers 
* Can interact with ProverWhitelist
  * manage the prover whitelist 
* Can interact with PreconfWhitelist
  * manage the ejecter role 

##### MainnetERC20Vault

Addresses: [0x996282cA11E5DEb6B5D122CC3B9A1FcAAD4415Ab](https://etherscan.io/address/0x996282cA11E5DEb6B5D122CC3B9A1FcAAD4415Ab)

Shared vault for Taiko chains for bridged ERC20 tokens. Pausing stops token sends, message-triggered releases, and recalls. Released or minted tokens are subject to the configured quota manager.
* Can interact with QuotaManager
  * consume ERC20 withdrawal quota when tokens leave the vault 

##### MainnetBridge

Addresses: [0xd60247c6848B7Ca29eDdF63AA924E53dB6Ddd8EC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd60247c6848B7Ca29eDdF63AA924E53dB6Ddd8EC)

Shared bridge escrow for Taiko chains for bridged ETH and arbitrary bridge messages. Pausing stops sending, processing, recalling, retrying, and failing messages. ETH released from the bridge is subject to the configured quota manager.
* Can interact with QuotaManager
  * consume ETH withdrawal quota when ETH leaves the bridge 

##### Safe

Addresses: [0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609)

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. 
* Can interact with TimelockController
  * cancel queued transactions 
  * execute transactions that are ready 
  * manage all access control roles **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]
  * propose transactions 
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
  * add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 
* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 

##### SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig

Addresses: [0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878)

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. 
* Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway
  * affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes 

##### Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig

Addresses: [0x363e846B91AF677Fb82f709b6c35BD1AaFc6B3Da](https://etherscan.io/address/0x363e846B91AF677Fb82f709b6c35BD1AaFc6B3Da)

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. 

##### Safe

Addresses: [0xF28C8D6b44361255FA7C116d09ccD5F914398C10](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF28C8D6b44361255FA7C116d09ccD5F914398C10)

A Multisig with 1/2 threshold. 
Member of Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig, Taiko Multisig, Taiko Labs.


##### 2 EOAs

Addresses: [0x0F026a3efE44E0Fe34B87375EFe69b16c05D0438](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0F026a3efE44E0Fe34B87375EFe69b16c05D0438) (EOA 1), [0x45D4403351Bc34283CE6450D91c099f40D06dA4e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x45D4403351Bc34283CE6450D91c099f40D06dA4e) (EOA 3)

* Can interact with PreconfWhitelist
  * add operators after a two-epoch activation delay and remove existing operators immediately 

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0x3D4997AAC0834BEb5ede861c424807Aa3F29b5bB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3D4997AAC0834BEb5ede861c424807Aa3F29b5bB)

Member of Sebastian Kugler.
* Can interact with SignerList (Security Council)
  * configure an agent address that represents this entity in the Security Council [via: Sebastian Kugler]

##### EOA 4

Addresses: [0x5F62d006C10C009ff50C878Cd6157aC861C99990](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5F62d006C10C009ff50C878Cd6157aC861C99990)

* Can interact with PreconfWhitelist
  * eligible to propose batches on L1; only the selected current-epoch operator can successfully propose 

##### 2 EOAs

Addresses: [0xe63E61BbB3aa1b82d44471AbcAb490102C17c986](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe63E61BbB3aa1b82d44471AbcAb490102C17c986) (Gustavo Gonzalez), [0xF74F2bBaEd41e3e4AbAcbA24563a5Ce5aB071C8A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF74F2bBaEd41e3e4AbAcbA24563a5Ce5aB071C8A) (Daniel Wang)

Member of SignerList (Security Council).
* Can interact with SignerList (Security Council)
  * configure an agent address that represents this entity in the Security Council 

##### EOA 5

Addresses: [0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412)

* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
  * pause the verifier 

## Smart contracts

### Ethereum

#### TaikoRisc0Verifier

Addresses: [0x059dAF31F571da48Ab4e74Ae12F64f907681Cd8b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x059dAF31F571da48Ab4e74Ae12F64f907681Cd8b#code)

Gating router contract to verify batches using RISC Zero.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

#### RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Addresses: [0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97](https://etherscan.io/address/0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97#code)

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).


#### RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Addresses: [0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D#code)

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).


#### RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Addresses: [0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF#code)

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.3).


#### MainnetInbox

Addresses: [0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f#code), [0x5253D4C91e80b880DdB54B78E74082Abe066F6b9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5253D4C91e80b880DdB54B78E74082Abe066F6b9#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

The core Layer 1 entrypoint for the Taiko rollup where L2 block batches are proposed and their corresponding state transitions are proven. Users can enqueue forced inclusions by publishing an L1 blob. Once an inclusion is due, subsequent proposals must process it, but proposing remains restricted by the configured proposer checker. If the configured prover whitelist is non-empty, proofs from non-whitelisted provers revert.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### ZkRequiredVerifier

Addresses: [0x7284aaC05555Ae6559bdAd8B4221eC9584254Eec](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7284aaC05555Ae6559bdAd8B4221eC9584254Eec#code)

Immutable verifier policy contract for Taiko mainnet. Every accepted proof contains exactly two ordered sub-proofs and at least one must be a ZK proof. Accepted pairs are SGX-GETH or SGX-RETH with RISC0-RETH or SP1-RETH, and RISC0-RETH with SP1-RETH. The SGX-GETH plus SGX-RETH pair is not accepted.


#### TaikoSP1Verifier

Addresses: [0x73A0Db393ef87ce781ac7957bE10D6628432100F](https://etherscan.io/address/0x73A0Db393ef87ce781ac7957bE10D6628432100F#code)

Gating router contract to verify batches using SP1.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

#### RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Addresses: [0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9](https://etherscan.io/address/0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9#code)

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).


#### ProverWhitelist

Addresses: [0xEa798547d97e345395dA071a0D7ED8144CD612Ae](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEa798547d97e345395dA071a0D7ED8144CD612Ae#code), [0xebb393746A4Eee84Ad14EDFf3764c3F839D1034b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xebb393746A4Eee84Ad14EDFf3764c3F839D1034b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Defines the prover whitelist queried by the inbox before accepting proofs. If the inbox is configured with this contract and the whitelist is non-empty, only whitelisted provers can prove proposals.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **proverManager**: Taiko Multisig

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Addresses: [0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C#code)

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.


#### QuotaManager

Addresses: [0xBaCb003f0B13CeAF09Eb9Baf5915A640BD4Bc6cC](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBaCb003f0B13CeAF09Eb9Baf5915A640BD4Bc6cC#code)

Defines withdrawal quotas for ETH and ERC20 releases from the shared bridge. A token quota of zero means unlimited withdrawals for that token.
* Roles:
  * **bridge**: MainnetBridge
  * **erc20Vault**: MainnetERC20Vault
  * **owner**: Taiko Multisig

#### TaikoDAOController

Addresses: [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code), [0x4347df63bdC82b8835fC9FF47bC5a71a12cC0f06](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4347df63bdC82b8835fC9FF47bC5a71a12cC0f06#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261#code) (Admin)

Middleware contract that maintains ownership of DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: DAO

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### DAO

Addresses: [0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261#code), [0x52Af16664155608b845BE18aa29620EbF6eA2D3a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x52Af16664155608b845BE18aa29620EbF6eA2D3a#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

The main contract and entrypoint of the Aragon-based DAO governance framework. Fine-grained DAO permissions, proposals, voting and thresholds are configured here.
* Roles:
  * **currentSignerListPermissions**: SignerList (Security Council) (emergency proposals bypass the delay)
  * **daoPermissions**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### TaikoDAOController

Addresses: [0xfC3C4ca95a8C4e5a587373f1718CD91301d6b2D3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xfC3C4ca95a8C4e5a587373f1718CD91301d6b2D3#code), [0xd1934807041B168f383870A0d8F565aDe2DF9D7D](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd1934807041B168f383870A0d8F565aDe2DF9D7D#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9CDf589C941ee81D75F34d3755671d614f7cf261#code) (Admin)

Middleware contract that maintains ownership of DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: DAO

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### TimelockController

Addresses: [0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711#code)

A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
* Roles:
  * **canceller**: Safe
  * **defaultAdmin**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
  * **executor**: Safe
  * **proposer**: Safe

#### AutomataDcapV3Attestation

Addresses: [0x0ffa4A625ED9DB32B70F99180FD00759fc3e9261](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0ffa4A625ED9DB32B70F99180FD00759fc3e9261#code), [0x5e46443bd131eB6d4c6Fb4849bAD29af9596dd72](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5e46443bd131eB6d4c6Fb4849bAD29af9596dd72#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Contract managing SGX DCAP attestation policy, trusted measurements, and certificate revocation data.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### Taiko Token

Addresses: [0x10dea67478c5F8C5E2D90e5E9B26dBe60c54d800](https://etherscan.io/address/0x10dea67478c5F8C5E2D90e5E9B26dBe60c54d800#code), [0x5C96Ff5B7F61b9E3436Ef04DA1377C8388dfC106](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5C96Ff5B7F61b9E3436Ef04DA1377C8388dfC106#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

ERC20 contract implementing the TAIKO token. It defines a list of addresses designated as non-voting.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop

Addresses: [0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698#code), [0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3#code), [0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696#code), [0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1#code)

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: Safe

#### EmergencyMultisig

Addresses: [0x2AffADEb2ef5e1F2a7F58964ee191F1e88317ECd](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2AffADEb2ef5e1F2a7F58964ee191F1e88317ECd#code), [0x437E450452E8Bc142bd5317199296EcB187c514b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x437E450452E8Bc142bd5317199296EcB187c514b#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing encrypted proposals (e.g. for Security Council emergency proposals).
* Roles:
  * **dao**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

#### SecureSgxVerifier

Addresses: [0x41e79EB4F03aBB5DF8716B759528dc5d8f6a84Ee](https://etherscan.io/address/0x41e79EB4F03aBB5DF8716B759528dc5d8f6a84Ee#code), [0x9D3C595BFf6Ff7D2b2CbdEcF94aD917eB2fCFFd8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9D3C595BFf6Ff7D2b2CbdEcF94aD917eB2fCFFd8#code)

Verifier contract for SGX proven blocks. Registered SGX instances can sign accepted proofs until their instance expiry.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **registrar**: Taiko Multisig

#### RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop

Addresses: [0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7#code)

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: EOA 5

#### RiscZeroSetVerifier

Addresses: [0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85#code)

Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.


#### RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop

Addresses: [0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782](https://etherscan.io/address/0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782#code)

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: Safe

#### AutomataDcapV3Attestation

Addresses: [0x8d7C954960a36a7596d7eA4945dDf891967ca8A3](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8d7C954960a36a7596d7eA4945dDf891967ca8A3#code), [0x5f73f0AdC7dAA6134Fe751C4a78d524f9384e0B5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f73f0AdC7dAA6134Fe751C4a78d524f9384e0B5#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Contract managing SGX DCAP attestation policy, trusted measurements, and certificate revocation data.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### RiscZeroVerifierRouter

Addresses: [0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319#code)

A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).
* Roles:
  * **owner**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe

#### DefaultResolver

Addresses: [0x8Efa01564425692d0a0838DC10E300BD310Cb43e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8Efa01564425692d0a0838DC10E300BD310Cb43e#code), [0xFca4F0Ab7B95EEf2e3A60EF2Bc0c42DdAA62E66D](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFca4F0Ab7B95EEf2e3A60EF2Bc0c42DdAA62E66D#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Maps chainId-name pairs to contract addresses. Bridge and vault contracts resolve their counterparties through this registry, so changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades. The pause function is intentionally disabled in this implementation.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### OptimisticTokenVotingPlugin

Addresses: [0x989E348275b659d36f8751ea1c10D146211650BE](https://etherscan.io/address/0x989E348275b659d36f8751ea1c10D146211650BE#code), [0x5B0Da2FB08754a5dDf32e28887D2F5437485f085](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B0Da2FB08754a5dDf32e28887D2F5437485f085#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

An optimistic governance module. Standard proposals pass and can be executed unless 10% of votable TAIKO veto them within 7d. Emergency proposals can be executed without delay.
* Roles:
  * **dao**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

#### SignalService

Addresses: [0x9e0a24964e5397B566c1ed39258e21aB5E35C77C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9e0a24964e5397B566c1ed39258e21aB5E35C77C#code), [0x1A06832992785766a105838C95c1E13a0045AC85](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1A06832992785766a105838C95c1E13a0045AC85#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Facilitates secure cross-chain message passing by storing signals and state-root checkpoints. Bridge escrows and other applications use it to prove that a specific L1<->L2 signal or checkpointed state transition occurred via Merkle proofs. Pausing disables signal proof verification.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **pauser**: Taiko Multisig

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### Multisig

Addresses: [0xD7dA1C25E915438720692bC55eb3a7170cA90321](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD7dA1C25E915438720692bC55eb3a7170cA90321#code), [0x8510d389236d7213eE9B9C38CAaBc0aD24853C25](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8510d389236d7213eE9B9C38CAaBc0aD24853C25#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000#code) (Admin)

Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing proposals (e.g. for Security Council standard proposals).
* Roles:
  * **dao**: DAO; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

#### PreconfWhitelist

Addresses: [0xFD019460881e6EeC632258222393d5821029b2ac](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFD019460881e6EeC632258222393d5821029b2ac#code), [0xDBae46E35C18719E6c78aaBF9c8869c4eC84c149](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDBae46E35C18719E6c78aaBF9c8869c4eC84c149#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x75Ba76403b13b26AD1beC70D6eE937314eeaCD0a#code) (Admin)

Contains the whitelist of addresses eligible to propose batches on L1 and issue preconfirmations. It dynamically selects a single active operator for each epoch using a delayed Ethereum beacon block root as randomness. There is no fallback proposer path in this contract: non-selected operators cannot propose for the current epoch.
* Roles:
  * **_ejectorManager**: Taiko Multisig
  * **admin**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **ejecters**: EOA 1, EOA 3
  * **operatorMapping**: EOA 4
  * **owner**: TaikoDAOController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).


#### SP1VerifierGateway

Addresses: [0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e#code)

This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
* Roles:
  * **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig

#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0).


#### SP1Verifier

Addresses: [0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A#code)

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).


### Taiko Alethia

#### Anchor

Addresses: [0x1670000000000000000000000000000000010001](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x1670000000000000000000000000000000010001#code), [0x7e83Af941FDcf90EB44ED7dc8754a201B156E0BA](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x7e83Af941FDcf90EB44ED7dc8754a201B156E0BA#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Stores L1 block details on L2 as a cross-layer oracle and manages EIP-1559 gas pricing for L2 operations.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### DelegateController

Addresses: [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code), [0x6900f893Fb1dcf2868c7799Ac9a2dAf1c046c6bF](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x6900f893Fb1dcf2868c7799Ac9a2dAf1c046c6bF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Middleware contract that can maintain ownership of DAO-controlled assets and contracts. It can only be invoked by the TaikoDAOController on L1 through the L2 bridge.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **daoController**: TaikoDAOController

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### Bridge

Addresses: [0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000001](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000001#code), [0x95ae2918dcbc6aFF8B4c1F1BCC1bf819b6e08B83](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x95ae2918dcbc6aFF8B4c1F1BCC1bf819b6e08B83#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Bridge escrow holding preminted ETH on Taiko.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### ERC20Vault

Addresses: [0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000002](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000002#code), [0xb96AbB41b01E3ad519D00E80355a1c3801910F62](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xb96AbB41b01E3ad519D00E80355a1c3801910F62#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Escrow for L2-native tokens sent to L1 via the canonical bridge.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### SignalService

Addresses: [0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000005](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000005#code), [0x18B27428cce679DFf84D09D6b07DF1E9EBb6fE28](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x18B27428cce679DFf84D09D6b07DF1E9EBb6fE28#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Facilitates secure cross-chain message passing by storing signals and state-root checkpoints. Bridge escrows and other applications use it to prove that a specific L1<->L2 signal or checkpointed state transition occurred via Merkle proofs. Pausing disables signal proof verification.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

#### L2AddressManager

Addresses: [0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000006](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x1670000000000000000000000000000000000006#code), [0x0167000000000000000000000000000000000006](https://taikoscan.io/address/0x0167000000000000000000000000000000000006#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C](https://taikoscan.io/address/0xfA06E15B8b4c5BF3FC5d9cfD083d45c53Cbe8C7C#code) (Admin)

Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.
* Roles:
  * **admin**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)
  * **owner**: DelegateController; ultimately SignerList (Security Council)

Can be upgraded by: SignerList (Security Council) with 7d delay

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).