# Xai Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/xai ## Summary **Warning:** There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated. - Total Value Secured: $683.43 K (+8.76% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $683.43 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - **Warning:** The XAI token associated with Xai accounts for 90.8% of the TVS! (sentiment: bad) - Past day UOPS: 1.00 (+6.91% compared to seven days ago) - Gas token: XAI - Type: Other - Purposes: Universal, Gaming - Host chain: Arbitrum One - Chain ID: 660279 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good) - State validation: Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) - Data availability: External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Self propose (sentiment: good) ### About Xai is an Ethereum Layer-3 that leverages Arbitrum AnyTrust to enable open trade in the next generation of video games. ## Value Secured Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/xai#tvs). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/xai) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/tvs/xai/breakdown) ## Activity Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/xai#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://l2beat.com/api/scaling/activity/xai) ## Milestones & Incidents - 2024-01-09: [Mainnet Launch](https://x.com/XAI_GAMES/status/1744815749410242568). XAI launches on Arbitrum One. ## Risk summary **Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted. ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades, (CRITICAL) 2. none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be lost if 3. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL). ### Users can be censored if 4. the committee restricts their access to the external data. ### MEV can be extracted if 5. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ## Risk analysis The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined. **Warning:** Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted. The risks below reflect combined L2 & L3 risks. ### Sequencer failure Self sequence (sentiment: good) In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation. ### State validation Fraud proofs (INT) (sentiment: bad) Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period. ### Data availability External (DAC) (sentiment: bad) Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Self propose (sentiment: good) Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers. ## Stage Xai is not even a Stage 0 project. **Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review. ### Stage 0 - [x] The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium. - [x] State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - [x] A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - [ ] (under review) A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. - [ ] Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized. ### Stage 1 - [ ] Principle: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. - [x] Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible. - [ ] Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. - [ ] The Security Council is not properly set up. - [x] The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated. ### Stage 2 - [ ] Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors. - [ ] Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit. - [ ] The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs. ## Data availability Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data. ### Risk analysis #### Economic security Public committee (sentiment: warning) There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack. However, there is indirect economic security derived by the committee members being publicly known, and their reputation is at stake should they behave maliciously. #### Fraud detection None (sentiment: bad) There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. #### Committee security 3/5 (sentiment: bad) The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability. #### Upgradeability No delay (sentiment: bad) There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. #### Relayer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. ### Technology #### Architecture ![Anytrust architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-layer-technology/anytrust/architecture5.png#center) The DAC uses a data availability solution built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components: - **Sequencer Inbox**: Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches. - **Data Availability Committee (DAC)**: A group of members responsible for storing and providing data on demand. - **Data Availability Certificate (DACert)**: A commitment ensuring that data blobs are available without needing full data posting on the L1 chain. Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs. The Sequencer API allows the rollup Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hash. When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it. Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox. If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain as calldata. A DACert includes a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature. L2 nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp. If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members. #### DA Bridge Architecture ![Anytrust bridge architecture](https://l2beat.com/images/da-bridge-technology/anytrust/architectureL3.png#center) The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the destination chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving destination chain transaction ordering finality in a single onchain transaction. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if a malicious committee attests to an invalid data availability certificate. - Funds can be lost if the bridge contract or its dependencies receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades. **References** - [Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum Docs](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-anytrust) ## State validation ### Fraud proofs After some period of time, the published state root is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, one of the whitelisted actors can submit a fraud proof that shows that the state was incorrect. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. After the state root is published, there is also a trusted entity, called Challenger, that signs it and submits the signature to a Referee smart contract. The signatures submitted to the referee are used then verified by sentry nodes. The role of sentry nodes is to verify (assert) the submitted state root after it has been submitted. There is no integrated way to flag an invalid state root, sentry nodes will have to raise the alarm by external means, making them just observation nodes. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL). **References** - [How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/intro/#q-and-how-exactly-is-fraud-proven-sounds-complicated) - [Arbitrum Glossary: Challenge Period](https://developer.arbitrum.io/intro/glossary#challenge-period) - [RollupUser.sol - Etherscan source code, onlyValidator modifier](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A#code) - [Referee.sol - Etherscan source code, submitChallenge function](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x254954e3f6bd7443444036bea2d8fe88fdf496c1#code#F53#L337) - [Referee.sol - Etherscan source code, submitAssertionToChallenge function](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x254954e3f6bd7443444036bea2d8fe88fdf496c1#code#F53#L428) - [Solutions to Delay Attacks on Rollups](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a) ## Upgrades & Governance ## Updates Shown as an interactive chart or widget on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/layer2s/projects/xai#updates). ## Operator ### The system has a centralized sequencer While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. **References** - [Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer) ### Users can force any transaction Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering. **References** - [SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10#code) - [Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job) ## Sequencing ### Delayed forced transactions To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue "delayed" messages in the "delayed" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d. ## Withdrawals ### Regular messaging The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. **References** - [Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle) - [L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation](https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging) - [Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog](https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e) ### Autonomous exit Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade. ## Other considerations ### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM. **References** - [Inside Arbitrum Nitro](https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/) ## Permissions ### Arbitrum One #### Actors ##### XaiMultisig Addresses: [0x4972A8EF186Ee42A14Cdd3c47f52ec06a6dc495E](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x4972A8EF186Ee42A14Cdd3c47f52ec06a6dc495E) A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * UpgradeExecutor [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * Outbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * GatewayRouter [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * RollupEventInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * ChallengeManager [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * Bridge [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * SequencerInbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * Inbox [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * ERC20Gateway [via: UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin] * RollupProxy [via: UpgradeExecutor] * Can interact with RollupProxy * Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes [via: UpgradeExecutor] ##### SafeL2 Addresses: [0x754286508D57Fae1256bC288461E075552175CBa](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x754286508D57Fae1256bC288461E075552175CBa) A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. * Can upgrade **with no delay** * PoolProxyDeployer [via: ProxyAdmin] * GasSubsidy [via: ProxyAdmin] * NodeLicenseRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin] * RefereeCalculations [via: ProxyAdmin] * PoolFactory [via: ProxyAdmin] * SentryReferee [via: ProxyAdmin] ##### XaiMultisig2 Addresses: [0x000d8C5A70B8805DF02f409F2715d05B9A63E871](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x000d8C5A70B8805DF02f409F2715d05B9A63E871) A Multisig with 1/3 threshold. Member of XaiMultisig. ##### SafeL2 Addresses: [0x194654c631686077d3C34a0e7c1856E4BE2E2705](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x194654c631686077d3C34a0e7c1856E4BE2E2705) A Multisig with 1/3 threshold. Member of SafeL2, XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig. ##### XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig Addresses: [0xFCF7248C495d6fd3641eE43F861c48Ebe402c878](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xFCF7248C495d6fd3641eE43F861c48Ebe402c878) A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. The designated fundsReceiver in the NodeLicenseRegistry. Receives all ETH from 'Sentry Node License' mints. ##### 2 EOAs Addresses: [0x0C2EbD821c68EC405Fb425596486F5b0f6dFff53](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0C2EbD821c68EC405Fb425596486F5b0f6dFff53) (EOA 1), [0x25EA41f0bDa921a0eBf48291961B1F10b59BC6b8](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x25EA41f0bDa921a0eBf48291961B1F10b59BC6b8) (EOA 2) * Can interact with RollupProxy * Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain ##### 3 EOAs Addresses: [0x2B95cdD1adD34461Fe737800c0D5A68d556B51b4](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x2B95cdD1adD34461Fe737800c0D5A68d556B51b4) (EOA 3), [0x7f910C718bAF6698FBF9b56e047ECd52d157bAD6](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7f910C718bAF6698FBF9b56e047ECd52d157bAD6) (EOA 5), [0xc7185e37A4aB4Af0E77bC08249CD2590AE3E1b51](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xc7185e37A4aB4Af0E77bC08249CD2590AE3E1b51) (EOA 6) Member of XaiMultisig2. * Can interact with SequencerInbox * Add/remove batchPosters (Sequencers) [via: XaiMultisig2] ##### EOA 4 Addresses: [0x7F68dba68E72a250004812fe04F1123Fca89aBa9](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7F68dba68E72a250004812fe04F1123Fca89aBa9) * Can interact with SequencerInbox * Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain ## Smart contracts ### Arbitrum One #### ChallengeManager Addresses: [0x3a3f62034a42a35eA1686B199bB73006aa525eE4](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x3a3f62034a42a35eA1686B199bB73006aa525eE4#code), [0x5AA806015FEC88669bF7DAd746BB4ADC1E79BcED](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x5AA806015FEC88669bF7DAd746BB4ADC1E79BcED#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### Bridge Addresses: [0x7dd8A76bdAeBE3BBBaCD7Aa87f1D4FDa1E60f94f](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7dd8A76bdAeBE3BBBaCD7Aa87f1D4FDa1E60f94f#code), [0xdF0eaCC3F37356DF320e5B5db16C7eD7A6b596dd](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xdF0eaCC3F37356DF320e5B5db16C7eD7A6b596dd#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### SequencerInbox Addresses: [0x995a9d3ca121D48d21087eDE20bc8acb2398c8B1](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x995a9d3ca121D48d21087eDE20bc8acb2398c8B1#code), [0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig * **batchPosterManager**: XaiMultisig2; ultimately EOA 3, EOA 5, EOA 6 * **batchPosters**: EOA 4 Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### RollupProxy Addresses: [0xC47DacFbAa80Bd9D8112F4e8069482c2A3221336](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xC47DacFbAa80Bd9D8112F4e8069482c2A3221336#code), [0xdD91f6e88576fEc4A38A518DA39C92e13CBB6446](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xdD91f6e88576fEc4A38A518DA39C92e13CBB6446#code) (Implementation #1 (Upgradable)), [0x1BeD37FeDFE8B2721a69A559313D2b58d16Ecd77](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x1BeD37FeDFE8B2721a69A559313D2b58d16Ecd77#code) (Implementation #2 (Upgradable)), [0x0EE7AD3Cc291343C9952fFd8844e86d294fa513F](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0EE7AD3Cc291343C9952fFd8844e86d294fa513F#code) (Admin) Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators). * Roles: * **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately XaiMultisig * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately XaiMultisig * **validators**: EOA 1, EOA 2 Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### UpgradeExecutor Addresses: [0x0EE7AD3Cc291343C9952fFd8844e86d294fa513F](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x0EE7AD3Cc291343C9952fFd8844e86d294fa513F#code), [0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x660ea1675F7323dC3Ba0c8dDFB593225Eb01E3C1#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig * **executors**: XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### Outbox Addresses: [0x1E400568AD4840dbE50FB32f306B842e9ddeF726](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x1E400568AD4840dbE50FB32f306B842e9ddeF726#code), [0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x302275067251F5FcdB9359Bda735fD8f7A4A54c0#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### Inbox Addresses: [0xaE21fDA3de92dE2FDAF606233b2863782Ba046F9](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xaE21fDA3de92dE2FDAF606233b2863782Ba046F9#code), [0xD87f160f8c414d834cBDd9477c3D8c3ad1802255](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD87f160f8c414d834cBDd9477c3D8c3ad1802255#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### ERC20Gateway Addresses: [0xb591cE747CF19cF30e11d656EB94134F523A9e77](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xb591cE747CF19cF30e11d656EB94134F523A9e77#code), [0x8b73Ef238ADaB31EBC7c05423d243c345241a22f](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x8b73Ef238ADaB31EBC7c05423d243c345241a22f#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### GatewayRouter Addresses: [0x22CCA5Dc96a4Ac1EC32c9c7C5ad4D66254a24C35](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x22CCA5Dc96a4Ac1EC32c9c7C5ad4D66254a24C35#code), [0xd106EC93D2c1adaA65C4B17ffc7bB166Ce30DDAe](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xd106EC93D2c1adaA65C4B17ffc7bB166Ce30DDAe#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) * Roles: * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor #### OneStepProverHostIo Addresses: [0x33c1514Bf90e202d242C299b37C60f908aa206D4](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x33c1514Bf90e202d242C299b37C60f908aa206D4#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### RollupEventInbox Addresses: [0x36aDe24988E4C47602e38BD9a0Bd89031eF807a8](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x36aDe24988E4C47602e38BD9a0Bd89031eF807a8#code), [0x18FD37A4FB9E1F06d9383958aFd236771F15A8cb](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x18FD37A4FB9E1F06d9383958aFd236771F15A8cb#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x041F85dD87c46B941dc9b15c6628B19ee5358485#code) (Admin) Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately XaiMultisig Can be upgraded by: XaiMultisig with no delay #### OneStepProver0 Addresses: [0x54E0923782b701044444De5d8c3A45aC890b0881](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x54E0923782b701044444De5d8c3A45aC890b0881#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### PoolProxyDeployer Addresses: [0x68D78D1E81379EfD9C61f8E9131D52CE571AF4fD](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x68D78D1E81379EfD9C61f8E9131D52CE571AF4fD#code), [0xb6773d5bF5b908B58ff5B7Bd36A7F06Da2EeeEc7](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xb6773d5bF5b908B58ff5B7Bd36A7F06Da2EeeEc7#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) Manages beacon addresses for the v2 staking pools. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay #### ValidatorUtils Addresses: [0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b#code) This contract implements view only utilities for validators. #### GasSubsidy Addresses: [0x94F4aBC83eae00b693286B6eDCa09e1D76183C97](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x94F4aBC83eae00b693286B6eDCa09e1D76183C97#code), [0xF208798482F0b12c8767Bc03cC0F145D18BeCe6A](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xF208798482F0b12c8767Bc03cC0F145D18BeCe6A#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay #### NodeLicenseRegistry Addresses: [0xbc14d8563b248B79689ECbc43bBa53290e0b6b66](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xbc14d8563b248B79689ECbc43bBa53290e0b6b66#code), [0x249b8A8AF9152A08Ba3cF3E106962566E8343fB6](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x249b8A8AF9152A08Ba3cF3E106962566E8343fB6#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) This is the contract where Xai Sentry Keys for running a sentry node are minted. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay #### RefereeCalculations Addresses: [0xCd62360854aecf6285Fa310D69C5EBaf4Cd5e95F](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xCd62360854aecf6285Fa310D69C5EBaf4Cd5e95F#code), [0x1488598b22Cc196Aa547894493BC2313a8A00C1e](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x1488598b22Cc196Aa547894493BC2313a8A00C1e#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay #### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) * Roles: * **owner**: SafeL2 #### OneStepProofEntry Addresses: [0xD89d54007079071cBA859127318b9F34eeB78049](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD89d54007079071cBA859127318b9F34eeB78049#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### OneStepProverMath Addresses: [0xE58a2dEb5718F9aAF2C1DdD0E366ED076D204cc4](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xE58a2dEb5718F9aAF2C1DdD0E366ED076D204cc4#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### OneStepProverMemory Addresses: [0xf8E5e5562c2c12d8690786f5C9FA65F20F6bD881](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf8E5e5562c2c12d8690786f5C9FA65F20F6bD881#code) One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. #### PoolFactory Addresses: [0xF9E08660223E2dbb1c0b28c82942aB6B5E38b8E5](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xF9E08660223E2dbb1c0b28c82942aB6B5E38b8E5#code), [0xf7f1F9d67a46452da30d4125Ff39ED216e975E24](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xf7f1F9d67a46452da30d4125Ff39ED216e975E24#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) The PoolFactory allows creating and managing staking pools for V2 staking. Users can stake esXAI (and / or Sentry Keys) in pools. This contract's address is whitelisted in the esXAI token contract, which allows it to initiate arbitrary esXAI token transfers. V2 staking through this contract is currently set to true. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay #### SentryReferee Addresses: [0xfD41041180571C5D371BEA3D9550E55653671198](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xfD41041180571C5D371BEA3D9550E55653671198#code), [0x9e3e14576EBd9595eFB0d71aA9Ff51a6DC621bAF](https://arbiscan.io/address/0x9e3e14576EBd9595eFB0d71aA9Ff51a6DC621bAF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723](https://arbiscan.io/address/0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723#code) (Admin) The referee contract manages the Xai Sentry protocol. Sentry nodes that are tasked to watch the state transitions on Xai receive esXAI rewards for their service. These watchers participate in a game with a central 'challenger' by posting their assertions to make sure they are actually watching. In case of a malicious state transition, sentries are supposed to raise an alarm offchain. The referee contract is also a whitelisted address in the esXAI token contract, which allows it to initiate arbitrary esXAI token transfers. New staking through this contract is disabled in favor of the new v2 staking. V1 Stakers can continue to get staking rewards here or withdraw/migrate their assets. * Roles: * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SafeL2 Can be upgraded by: SafeL2 with no delay The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).