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Layer 2s
SummaryRisksValueActivityLivenessCostsArchivedCompare

Summary

Value SecuredView details
Details
$0.00

— / 1 year

0.00 UOPS
Value SecuredView details
Details
$0.00

— / 1 year

Infrastructure

Rollups are L2s that periodically post state commitments to Ethereum. These commitments are validated by either Validity Proofs or are accepted optimistically and can be challenged via Fraud Proof mechanism within a certain fraud proof window. Additionally L2 data is also posted to Ethereum, hence there are no additional trust assumptions introduced.

#
name
Risks
Proof system
stage
Total value secured
7D%
Past day UOPS
7D%
1
ZKsync Era logo
ZKsync Era
ZKsync Era
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 4d 3h
Proposer Failure
Replace proposer
ValidityThis project is based on ZK Stack's code base.
Boojum
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.

    While the Security Council is properly set up and is able to recover from a misbehaving operator, the majority is required, meaning that a compromised quorum-blocking minority can prevent users from exiting. Recovery actions are not straightforward and require complex protocol upgrades.

Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$259.67 M3.24%
4.69% with additional trust assumptions
0.1712.5%
2
Abstract logo
Abstract
Abstract
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 4d 3h
Proposer Failure
Replace proposer
ValidityThis project is based on ZK Stack's code base.
Boojum
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.

    While the Security Council is properly set up and is able to recover from a misbehaving operator, the majority is required, meaning that a compromised quorum-blocking minority can prevent users from exiting. Recovery actions are not straightforward and require complex protocol upgrades.

Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$34.95 M37.7%
46.5% with additional trust assumptions
2.9211.4%