# Tornado Cash

Markdown version of https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash

## Summary

- Total Value Locked: $635.50 M (-2.21% compared to seven days ago)
- Assets tracked: 6
- Buckets tracked: 19
- Deposits 7D: 2.25 K (+7.49% compared to the previous seven days)
- Deposits 30D: 9.70 K
- Deposits Total: 313.58 K
- Active Relayers 30D: 29
- Tracked on: Ethereum
- Attributes: ZK, Fixed amounts

### Risks

- Privacy: Link privacy. Public observer: Link private (sentiment: good); Chain analyst: Link private (sentiment: good); Network observer: Link private (sentiment: good); Privileged insider: Link private (sentiment: good); Future adversary: Link at risk (sentiment: warning).
- Trusted setup: 30 participants (sentiment: warning). Tornado Cash: Circuit-specific trusted setup for Groth16 Tornado Cash circuits. It was built on top of 30 phase 1 contributions, and reached 1114 phase 2 participants. Proving system could be broken if either phase 1 or 2 is compromised.
- Exit window: Infinite (sentiment: good). The core Tornado Cash contracts are immutable and have no admin upgrade path, so users can always withdraw with a valid note and proof. This protocol passes the walkaway test: users can still fully use it if every centralized participant disappears.
- Reproducibility: Reproducible (sentiment: good). The circuits, contracts, app and relayer are open source. Each app release names its commit and a build recipe for its IPFS hash, and rebuilding the current release reproduces it.

### About

An unconditional privacy pool of fixed amounts with immutable contracts, and an app pinned on ENS by token governance.

### Links

- Website: https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth?tab=records
- Repository: https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core, https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui
- Social: https://t.me/TornadoCashOfficialDAO
- Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/tornado-cash

## Protocol description

Tornado Cash lets the user withdraw a deposit of ETH or a token to an address with no visible link to it. Each pool takes one amount, like 0.1 ETH, so amounts reveal nothing within a pool. Depositors, recipients and timing stay public.

No one can pause, upgrade or block the pools. TORN token holders govern the app pinned on tornadocash.eth, the router's list of pools and the relayer registry. Leaving needs no one: anyone can prove a withdrawal directly to a pool.

### Flow

1. **Deposit.** The app creates a secret note and sends its commitment to the pool through the router. Your address is public.
2. **Withdraw.** You paste the note into the app, which proves that it belongs to an unspent deposit without revealing which. A relayer submits the proof and pays the gas for a fee from the withdrawal.

### Keys

Each deposit has its own note, which the app shows once for the user to save. Whoever holds the note can withdraw, and losing it loses the funds. An optional note account backs notes up onchain, encrypted to a key from the user's wallet.

### App

The ratings assume the classic app pinned on [tornadocash.eth](https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth?tab=records). Each proposal that changes it names the [source commit](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui) and a [build recipe](https://github.com/tornado-dao/tornado-ipfs-ui) that recomputes its IPFS hash, currently `bafybeigduniojgqrz7e4vntsgmovdli3oi7a2pnzzvz2gfxlvj3yqwk75a`. Gateways like eth.limo serve it, and the user's own IPFS node takes the gateway out of the trust path. The app lists relayers from the registry, accepts the user's own RPC endpoint and withdraws through a relayer without a wallet. In 2024 a pinned version [sent users' notes to an attacker](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2024/02/26/tornado-cash-reportedly-suffers-backend-exploit-user-deposits-at-risk) ([code analysis here](https://github.com/sekuba/tornadocash-pwned)).

### Compliance

Tornado Cash has no screening or approval list. The app's [compliance page](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/blob/17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4/pages/compliance.vue) builds a report that links one of the user's withdrawals to its deposit, for the user to share. The US sanctions on the pools were lifted in March 2025.

### Fees

The pools charge no fee. Relayers take their fee from the withdrawal. Registered relayers also burn part of their TORN stake on each withdrawal, at a rate governance sets.

### Anonymity set

Each pool has its own set: the deposits of that token and amount not yet withdrawn. Pools differ widely in size, and the ETH pools on Ethereum are by far the largest.

## Privacy

**What the protocol promises:** Hides which deposit funds which withdrawal. Everything else is public.

Ethereum is public by default. Each protocol is rated on its main privacy promise, like hiding who paid, who received, how much, or which deposit became which withdrawal. Against each adversary, the colour says whether it holds for a careful user with the app's own settings: green yes, yellow only with significant extra work, red no. Fields marked at risk stay private only under the condition in their note.

### Public observer

Link private (sentiment: good)

**Who:** Everyone with a block explorer and some basic tools. Sees every public onchain event, but does no correlation beyond following links. Examples: A curious counterparty, an employer, a journalist.

Each pool has one fixed amount and no in-pool transfers, so every withdrawal spends exactly one deposit.

**Advice:** Exit through a relayer, so none of the user's wallets pay gas for the receiving address.

**Sources**

- [1 ETH pool](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#Pool_1_ETH)
- [Withdrawal circuit](https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/blob/a533ad9ffb62163a42d4fa9a09984c5dd4e5c41d/circuits/withdraw.circom)

### Chain analyst

Link private (sentiment: good)

**Who:** Scrapes all public data and correlates it: timing, amounts, gas and wallet fingerprints, address clusters. Examples: Chain analytics firms, ZachXBT, data brokers.

A relayed withdrawal hides among all unspent deposits of its pool, the anonymity set, which differs sharply between pools. Timing, address reuse and relayer choice narrow it further. Paying gas from the user's wallet instead of a relayer exposes its fingerprint, account implementation and fee habits, even from a fresh address.

**Advice:** Use a pool with a large anonymity set. Deposit and withdraw several notes at different times, not in batches. Wait before exiting and pick a different time of day than the deposit. Exit to a fresh address every time and spend from it with a different wallet than the one that deposited.

**Sources**

- [withdraw: any relayer, paid from the withdrawn amount](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#Pool_1_ETH)
- [Tutela (arXiv:2201.06811)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06811)
- [Blockchain is Watching You (arXiv:2005.14051)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14051)

### Network observer

Link private (sentiment: good)

**Who:** Sits between the user and the services and sees traffic only: ISPs, VPNs, Tor exits, public RPCs and relayers. Learns IP addresses, timing, fingerprints and ciphertext. Services the operator runs count as the insider. Examples: Infura or Alchemy, a Tornado relayer, a wallet vendor selling telemetry, Google captcha or analytics in the dapp frontend.

The app works in Tor Browser and downloads every deposit of a pool, so its services learn the pool but never the user's note. Every listed relayer gets a status request, and the chosen one receives the finished withdrawal.

**Advice:** Read the chain from the user's own node, send through a public RPC over Tor, and use a popular relayer. If using a VPN instead of Tor, choose a trusted provider: it hides the user's IP from the relayer but sees it itself. Withdraw without connecting a wallet.

**Sources**

- [Deposits fetched per pool and matched locally](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/blob/17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4/services/events.js#L90-L115)
- [The relayer receives only the finished withdrawal](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/blob/17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4/store/relayer.js#L430-L460)
- [Custom RPC setting](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/blob/17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4/components/Settings.vue#L8-L50)
- [Only withdrawals without a relayer need a wallet](https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/blob/17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4/components/withdraw/Withdraw.vue#L224-L226)

### Privileged insider

Link private (sentiment: good)

**Who:** Holds an operator role, custodies funds, receives keys or plaintext by design, or delivers the client: upgrade admin, custodian, view key holder, enclave operator, association set provider, hosted prover, registry, frontend host. Examples: A compliance backdoor key, a DAO with an upgrade key, a KMS committee, an ASP operator, a custodial bridge.

The pools cannot be paused, upgraded or made to reveal anything. Token governance controls the app pinned on tornadocash.eth, the router's pool list and the relayer list. Every change waits at least 7 days from proposal to execution.

**Advice:** Load the app from the IPFS hash on tornadocash.eth through the user's own IPFS node. Run an inspected local build of the client instead of the hosted frontend.

**Sources**

- [0.1 ETH pool (no operator)](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#Pool_0.1_ETH)
- [Upgrades & Governance](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#upgrades-and-governance)
- [Build recipe that recomputes the pinned app's IPFS hash](https://github.com/tornado-dao/tornado-ipfs-ui)

### Future adversary

Link at risk (sentiment: warning)

**Who:** Harvest now, decrypt later. Holds every byte ever published and runs the known quantum attacks: elliptic curves, pairings and RSA fall. Hashes, symmetric ciphers and post-quantum schemes stand until an attack on them is known. Examples: An intelligence agency archiving chain data today, then anyone once a break is public.

Commitments use a Pedersen hash on an elliptic curve. Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography could test whether a given deposit can fund a withdrawal, shrinking the candidate set without singling out one deposit. Notes backed up onchain are encrypted with elliptic-curve keys and become readable.

**Advice:** Keep the note on the user's device and leave the onchain backup off.

**Sources**

- [Pedersen hash circuit (pinned circomlib fork)](https://github.com/tornadocash/circomlib/blob/c372f14d324d57339c88451834bf2824e73bbdbc/circuits/pedersen.circom)
- [Commitment and nullifier hashing](https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/blob/a533ad9ffb62163a42d4fa9a09984c5dd4e5c41d/circuits/withdraw.circom)
- [Onchain note backups](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#TornadoRouter)

## Value Locked

The interactive value chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#privacy-tvl).

## Anonymity sets

### 30 day historic anonymity set

How many unique depositors you could have blended in with if you withdrew on a particular day after depositing during the previous 30 days. This metric is a proxy for the historic anonymity set and shows how it developed over time.

The metric looks backwards: it counts deposits that already happened, including from addresses that have since withdrawn. Your real anonymity also depends on deposits made after yours, which cannot be known in advance.

### Estimated anonymity set by holding duration

An estimate of how many unique depositors you blend in with, depending on how long you leave your deposit in the pool. It is based on historic data of past deposits: each point counts depositors from the preceding period, so holding for up to 30 days effectively means blending in with everyone who deposited during the last 30 days.

The interactive charts are shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#privacy-anonymity-set).

## Flows

The interactive flows chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#privacy-flows).

## Assets Breakdown

| Asset | Buckets | Deposits 7D | Deposits 30D | Deposits Total | Value Locked |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ETH | 4 | 2.21 K ($72.29 M) | 9.47 K ($157.59 M) | 296.76 K ($13.48 B) | $621.73 M |
| ETH: ETH 0.1 bucket |  | 601 ($149.73 K) | 5.06 K ($1.31 M) | 74.20 K ($16.82 M) | — |
| ETH: ETH 1 bucket |  | 772 ($1.92 M) | 2.62 K ($6.80 M) | 95.66 K ($227.66 M) | — |
| ETH: ETH 10 bucket |  | 623 ($15.53 M) | 1.32 K ($34.17 M) | 78.11 K ($1.87 B) | — |
| ETH: ETH 100 bucket |  | 221 ($54.68 M) | 452 ($115.30 M) | 48.78 K ($11.36 B) | — |
| DAI | 4 | 21 ($22.79 K) | 54 ($914.39 K) | 9.67 K ($474.84 M) | $7.83 M |
| DAI: DAI 100 bucket |  | 8 ($799.92) | 14 ($1.39 K) | 470 ($47.06 K) | — |
| DAI: DAI 1000 bucket |  | 12 ($11.99 K) | 23 ($22.99 K) | 1.37 K ($1.37 M) | — |
| DAI: DAI 10000 bucket |  | 1 ($9.99 K) | 9 ($89.98 K) | 3.44 K ($34.48 M) | — |
| DAI: DAI 100000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 8 ($800.01 K) | 4.38 K ($438.94 M) | — |
| WBTC | 3 | 0 ($0.00) | 2 ($17.06 K) | 2.40 K ($535.43 M) | $6.83 M |
| WBTC: WBTC 0.1 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 2 ($17.06 K) | 156 ($712.38 K) | — |
| WBTC: WBTC 1 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 1.04 K ($40.85 M) | — |
| WBTC: WBTC 10 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 1.20 K ($493.86 M) | — |
| USDT | 2 | 11 ($9.19 K) | 169 ($149.18 K) | 3.09 K ($2.21 M) | $45.26 K |
| USDT: USDT 100 bucket |  | 2 ($199.83) | 22 ($2.19 K) | 978 ($97.81 K) | — |
| USDT: USDT 1000 bucket |  | 9 ($8.99 K) | 147 ($146.98 K) | 2.12 K ($2.12 M) | — |
| USDC | 2 | 3 ($299.90) | 9 ($5.39 K) | 1.32 K ($974.01 K) | $30.59 K |
| USDC: USDC 100 bucket |  | 3 ($299.90) | 4 ($399.88) | 395 ($39.50 K) | — |
| USDC: USDC 1000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 5 ($4.99 K) | 934 ($934.50 K) | — |
| cDAI | 4 | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 324 ($13.31 M) | $25.33 K |
| cDAI: cDAI 5000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 5 ($505.50) | — |
| cDAI: cDAI 50000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 118 ($126.17 K) | — |
| cDAI: cDAI 500000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 87 ($934.26 K) | — |
| cDAI: cDAI 5000000 bucket |  | 0 ($0.00) | 0 ($0.00) | 114 ($12.25 M) | — |
| Total |  | 2.25 K ($72.32 M) | 9.70 K ($158.68 M) | 313.58 K ($14.50 B) | $636.49 M |

## Milestones & Incidents

- 2025-03-21: [Removed from the OFAC sanctions list](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0057). OFAC removes Tornado Cash and the pools' addresses from its sanctions list.
- 2024-01-02 (incident): [Pinned app leaks deposit notes](https://forklog.com/en/backdoor-discovered-in-ipfs-version-of-tornado-cash/). The app pinned by proposal 44 sends deposit notes to an outside server until proposal 52.
- 2023-05-20 (incident): [Governance taken over by a malicious proposal](https://www.theblock.co/post/231637/attacker-uses-malicious-proposal-to-take-over-tornado-cash-governance). Proposal 20 hands the attacker control of governance until proposal 21 reverts it.
- 2022-08-08 (incident): [Added to the OFAC sanctions list](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916). OFAC adds Tornado Cash and the pools' addresses to its sanctions list.
- 2020-05-18: [Pools become immutable](https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2020/05/18/developers-of-ethereum-privacy-tool-tornado-cash-smash-their-keys). The developers set the operator of every pool to zero, so no one can change the pools.

## Risk summary

### Funds can be stolen if
1. the zk proof system is broken, allowing invalid withdrawals.
2. the [trusted setup](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#trusted-setups) is compromised or all ceremony participants collude, allowing invalid withdrawals.
3. governance pins a malicious app on tornadocash.eth, which can steal the notes, and with them the funds, of users who load it (see privileged insider).

### Funds can be lost if
1. a user loses the note required to withdraw.

### Privacy can be lost if
1. elliptic-curve cryptography is broken, which lets an attacker test candidate deposits for each withdrawal and read notes backed up onchain (see future adversary).

## Upgrades & Governance

TORN holders govern through the Governance contract, after a vote and a timelock. They cannot change the pools. They control the InstanceRegistry the router reads its pool list from, the RelayerRegistry, the FeeManager, the TORN token and the IPFS hash of the app on tornadocash.eth. A malicious registry upgrade could steal tokens users approved to the router. A malicious app could steal the notes of users who load it. Removing relayers from the registry hides them from the app, while the pools still accept any relayer.

### Governance profile

#### Upgrades

| Property | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Normal upgrade path | Lock and optionally delegate TORN in the [Governance contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce) → submit a proposal with at least **1.00 K TORN** → wait 1m 15s → vote for 5d (extended by 6h if the outcome changes during the last 1h) → pass with a simple majority and **100.00 K TORN** quorum → wait 2d → permissionless execution within 3d. The DAO controls protocol and periphery components, but cannot upgrade or modify existing pools. |
| Exit window | **2d** for DAO-controlled changes — an accepted proposal remains timelocked for this period before it can be executed. Existing Tornado Cash pools are immutable and cannot be upgraded by the DAO. |

#### Token governance

| Property | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Governance token | `TORN`, 1 token = 1 vote, delegated. Total supply: **9.99 M TORN**, DAO-owned TORN (unavailable for voting): **4.73 M TORN**, staked for voting: **2.57 M TORN**, the rest is circulating supply. |
| Stake lock | After voting or proposing, staked tokens are locked for **5d 6h** after proposal ends, preventing governance hopping. |
| Voting venue | [Governance contract](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce) on Ethereum. Proposals are viewable on the governance page of the app, see the App section above. |
| Proposal threshold | **1.00 K TORN** locked in governance. |
| Quorum | **100.00 K TORN**, with a simple majority required for acceptance. |
| Execution model | **Permissionless execution after an onchain vote and timelock.** An accepted proposal waits 2d and can then be executed by anyone within 3d. Proposal executable payload is committed in the `propose()` transaction. |

## Trusted setup

Risk levels follow the [Trusted Setups Risk Framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381). Yellow (medium risk): all contributions are published and the final output can be verified, the ceremony client is open source, there were at least 30 contributions, participation was open to the public and announced, and participants are publicly identified. Green (lowest risk): everything required for yellow, with at least 150 contributions. Red (highest risk): at least one requirement for yellow is not met. N/A: the proof system needs no trusted setup.

### Tornado Cash

- Risk: yellow (medium risk)
- Proof systems: websnark (Groth16)

Circuit-specific trusted setup for Groth16 Tornado Cash circuits. It was publicly announced as a Phase 2 ceremony
built on top of the [30th contribution to the Perpetual Powers of Tau ceremony](https://tornado-cash.medium.com/tornado-cash-trusted-setup-ceremony-b846e1e00be1), and completed in May 2020. It
collected 1114 contributions over 10 days, with 450 identified contributors and 664 anonymous ones. Tornado Cash
published the participant list, archive of contributions and artifacts, and the generated verifier contract.

- Phase 1 ceremony (first 30 contributions are used): <https://github.com/privacy-ethereum/perpetualpowersoftau>.
- Ceremony completion announcement: [https://tornado-cash.medium.com/the-biggest-trusted-setup-ceremony-in-the-world-3c6ab9c8fffa](https://tornado-cash.medium.com/the-biggest-trusted-setup-ceremony-in-the-world-3c6ab9c8fffa)
- Ceremony page with participant list and archive download: [https://ceremony.tornado.cash/](https://ceremony.tornado.cash/)
- Initial ceremony announcement: [https://tornado-cash.medium.com/tornado-cash-trusted-setup-ceremony-b846e1e00be1](https://tornado-cash.medium.com/tornado-cash-trusted-setup-ceremony-b846e1e00be1)
- Ceremony code repository: [https://github.com/tornadocash/phase2-bn254](https://github.com/tornadocash/phase2-bn254)

## Verifier IDs

### Tornado Cash verifier v2.1

- Verifier ID: `Tornado Cash verifier 03.07.2026`
- Source: https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/tree/v2.1/circuits
- Verification: successful (verified by [L2BEAT](https://l2beat.com))
- Used in: [Tornado Cash](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash)

**Known deployments**

- [0xce172ce1F20EC0B3728c9965470eaf994A03557A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xce172ce1F20EC0B3728c9965470eaf994A03557A#code) on Ethereum, used in: [Tornado Cash](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash)

#### Verification steps

This regeneration attests that the verifier smart contract verification keys correspond to circuits published in Tornado Cash release.

Generally, to regenerate Tornado Cash verifier, the following has to be done:

1. Checkout the correct branch of the sources: `https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/tree/v2.1`.
2. Compile the `.circom` circuit sources into `.json`.
3. Fetch published prover keys for `tornado.params`. This file contains the circuit information and Groth16 phase 2 trusted setup information (final evaluation keys for all 1114 contributions). It does not contain phase 1 trusted setup data, which must be fetched separately.
4. Check that `tornado.params` was generated with the same compiled circuit as was obtained in step 2. This step will implicitly check the integrity of phase 2 trusted setup, and it will rely on the separately fetched phase 1 trusted setup files.
5. Generate verification keys from the prover key and make sure that it is identical to the one in the solidity smart contract.

Helper scripts that implement the flow above and more detailed explanations could be found in this [script .zip archive](https://trusted-setup-hosting.l2beat.com/privacy/tornado-cash/verification_tornado_cash.zip). This .zip must be extracted in `tornado-core` dir checked out on tag `v2.1` (commit hash `a533ad9ffb62163a42d4fa9a09984c5dd4e5c41d`) before the execution.

## Ossification & Updates

Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs.

### [2026-10-08 10:12 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=ce95ad25) (high severity, 22 changes)

Created two new proposals. Both deploy new pools.

- Proposal 71: deploy five new classic ETH pools (0.01, 0.03, 0.3, 3, 30 ETH) with protocol fee 0 for the three small pools and 0.3% for 3 and 30 ETH.
- Proposal 72: deploy one 0.01 ETH pool of a new type, `FeeEnforcedTornado_eth` (https://github.com/frogheadtornado/tc-new-pool-design-proposal). It has a 0.3% withdrawal fee. Direct withdrwals (not by registered routers) pay additional fee, governance can raise withdrawal fees up to 5% total.

Also, several anonymity mining legacy contract sources are verified now, they were templatized.

### [2026-10-01 10:49 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=6b9ec1ab) (1 change)

Proposal 69 (1,000 TORN to Mr Anon) was defeated (~163k for vs ~458k TORN against). The same proposer resubmitted it as proposal 70 (voting active, ends 2026-10-06) with a new verified Proposal contract (eth:0x04C2eb6Df3bF6032b8e07a03Fc9a5Ca424414483): 1,000 TORN split into 500 TORN to abusedotch and 500 TORN to JJ (Mr Anon's share, redirected as repayment). It only transfers TORN from governance, no protocol parameters or contracts are changed.

### [2026-09-28 10:54 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=8e20f4e4) (1 change)

New proposal on DAO to reward Mr Anon with 1000 TORN for taking down fradulent `tornado.cash` frontend. This is a legit proposal that originates from Tornado Cash DAO tg channel.

### [2026-08-21 10:25 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=24f9ce54) (1 change)

New proposal to update DAO-controled tornado cash frontend: https://github.com/tornado-dao/classic-ui/compare/e312df5a4f6caaa7e93f1b5960c603d8dd7ec67a...17c54dae9ad91bb3c6d62a7860df6cd365ab76d4. It replaces RPC queries with Graph queries, sources proposal states from the onchain data, changes source link from Codeberg to GitHub and adds a phishing website notice board for tornado.cash.

Sol verified that the published CID matches the changes.

### [2026-07-03 08:56 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=e912d5f9) (4 changes)

Manually verified the Tornado Cash MiMC hasher against the pinned Tornado circomlib MiMC sponge generator and deployment bytecode.

### [2026-06-25 12:44 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=36401cab) (1 change)

New proposal, (yet) unverified and malicious, see https://x.com/pcaversaccio/status/2070125180261896246 .

### [2026-04-30 11:24 UTC](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash?update=901152f6) (45 changes)

Config: use the new flattener implementation. Also cleaned up spammy disco

## Permissions

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/tornado-cash

### Ethereum

#### Actors

##### GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Addresses: [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce)

Upgradeable Tornado Cash governance contract that manages proposals, voting, execution, and treasury-connected governance modules. If you trust this contract, you trust its upgrade path and proposal rules to change protocol governance behavior.
Member of GnosisSafe.
- Can upgrade **with no delay**
  - TornadoTreesV2
  - RelayerRegistry
  - TornadoStakingRewards
  - GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - FeeManager
  - InstanceRegistry
- Can interact with TornadoTreesV2
  - replace the proxy allowed to enqueue deposit and withdrawal leaves
  - replace the verifier used for batched tree updates
- Can interact with RelayerRegistry
  - change the router address allowed to burn relayer stake during withdrawals
  - nullify a registered relayer's staked balance
  - set the minimum TORN stake required to become a relayer
- Can interact with TornadoStakingRewards
  - update user reward accounting when locked balances change
  - withdraw TORN held by the staking rewards contract
- Can interact with FeeManager
  - change how long cached per-instance fees remain valid before they must be recomputed
  - change the TWAP lookback period used to price Tornado instances
  - change the Uniswap fee tier used for the TORN price source
- Can interact with TornadoProxyV2
  - add or update supported pool instances
  - replace the connected Tornado Trees contract
  - rescue tokens sent to the proxy
- Can interact with Miner
  - change the reward-swap pool weight used when distributing TORN rewards
  - replace the connected Tornado Trees contract
  - replace the reward, withdrawal, and tree-update verifiers
  - set mining reward rates
- Can interact with TORN
  - manage the allowlist of addresses that can transfer while TORN is paused
  - pause or unpause TORN transfers after the initial pause period expires
  - rescue arbitrary tokens held by the TORN contract
- Can interact with TornadoProxyV1
  - enable or disable supported pool instances
  - rescue tokens sent to the proxy
- Can interact with InstanceRegistry
  - add or update supported Tornado instances and their enabled/disabled state
  - change the router contract allowed to interact with registered instances
  - remove supported instances from the registry
  - set per-instance protocol fees charged to relayers
- Can interact with TornadoRouter
  - rescue tokens sent to the router

##### GnosisSafe

Addresses: [0xb04E030140b30C27bcdfaafFFA98C57d80eDa7B4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xb04E030140b30C27bcdfaafFFA98C57d80eDa7B4)

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold.

Participants (1): [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://l2beat.com/privacy/projects/tornado-cash#GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade) (GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade)

## Smart contracts

![A diagram of the smart contract architecture](https://l2beat.com/static/images/architecture/tornado-cash.0f3217b0.png)

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, L2BEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.l2beat.com/ui/p/tornado-cash

### Ethereum

#### Pool_50K_cDAI

Addresses: [0x03893a7c7463AE47D46bc7f091665f1893656003](https://etherscan.io/address/0x03893a7c7463AE47D46bc7f091665f1893656003#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 50K cDAI deposits.

#### Pool_10K_DAI

Addresses: [0x07687e702b410Fa43f4cB4Af7FA097918ffD2730](https://etherscan.io/address/0x07687e702b410Fa43f4cB4Af7FA097918ffD2730#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 10K DAI deposits.

#### Pool_1000_USDT

Addresses: [0x0836222F2B2B24A3F36f98668Ed8F0B38D1a872f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x0836222F2B2B24A3F36f98668Ed8F0B38D1a872f#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 1000 USDT deposits.

#### Pool_0.1_ETH

Addresses: [0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8Fc](https://etherscan.io/address/0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8Fc#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 0.1 ETH deposits.

#### Pool_100_USDT

Addresses: [0x169AD27A470D064DEDE56a2D3ff727986b15D52B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x169AD27A470D064DEDE56a2D3ff727986b15D52B#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 100 USDT deposits.

#### Pool_0.1_WBTC

Addresses: [0x178169B423a011fff22B9e3F3abeA13414dDD0F1](https://etherscan.io/address/0x178169B423a011fff22B9e3F3abeA13414dDD0F1#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 0.1 WBTC deposits.

#### Pool_5K_cDAI

Addresses: [0x22aaA7720ddd5388A3c0A3333430953C68f1849b](https://etherscan.io/address/0x22aaA7720ddd5388A3c0A3333430953C68f1849b#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 5K cDAI deposits.

#### Pool_100K_DAI

Addresses: [0x23773E65ed146A459791799d01336DB287f25334](https://etherscan.io/address/0x23773E65ed146A459791799d01336DB287f25334#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 100K DAI deposits.

#### Pool_500K_cDAI

Addresses: [0x2717c5e28cf931547B621a5dddb772Ab6A35B701](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2717c5e28cf931547B621a5dddb772Ab6A35B701#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 500K cDAI deposits.

#### Pool_1000_USDC

Addresses: [0x4736dCf1b7A3d580672CcE6E7c65cd5cc9cFBa9D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4736dCf1b7A3d580672CcE6E7c65cd5cc9cFBa9D#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 1000 USDC deposits.

#### Pool_1_ETH

Addresses: [0x47CE0C6eD5B0Ce3d3A51fdb1C52DC66a7c3c2936](https://etherscan.io/address/0x47CE0C6eD5B0Ce3d3A51fdb1C52DC66a7c3c2936#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 1 ETH deposits.

#### RelayerRegistry

Addresses: [0x58E8dCC13BE9780fC42E8723D8EaD4CF46943dF2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x58E8dCC13BE9780fC42E8723D8EaD4CF46943dF2#code), [0x84b0c75c1F6211450FEC7289c32D717AdaDD702A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x84b0c75c1F6211450FEC7289c32D717AdaDD702A#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 2, Last upgrade: 2y 11mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 1mo)

- 2023-11-18 14:09 UTC, upgrade of [RelayerRegistry](https://etherscan.io/address/0x58E8dCC13BE9780fC42E8723D8EaD4CF46943dF2#code): transaction [0x9b8cc0ca7bf2019b408eead6d2db8046957134183dd882007be41822082ab319](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x9b8cc0ca7bf2019b408eead6d2db8046957134183dd882007be41822082ab319), implementations: [0x84b0c75c1F6211450FEC7289c32D717AdaDD702A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x84b0c75c1F6211450FEC7289c32D717AdaDD702A#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xA3b821A2C6C9a52533178a1f2B9Ff4AedbA880e6/eth:0x84b0c75c1F6211450FEC7289c32D717AdaDD702A))
- 2023-11-02 13:58 UTC, upgrade of [RelayerRegistry](https://etherscan.io/address/0x58E8dCC13BE9780fC42E8723D8EaD4CF46943dF2#code): transaction [0x3d11319e48b756e50c873bebe3a34d2e8f536436d70f99bfd6da03e4ea5642e4](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3d11319e48b756e50c873bebe3a34d2e8f536436d70f99bfd6da03e4ea5642e4), implementations: [0xA3b821A2C6C9a52533178a1f2B9Ff4AedbA880e6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA3b821A2C6C9a52533178a1f2B9Ff4AedbA880e6#code) ([diff](https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe27B91724C55E950F68b394f33FA3B86693179C0/eth:0xA3b821A2C6C9a52533178a1f2B9Ff4AedbA880e6))
- 2023-06-04 13:50 UTC, deployment of [RelayerRegistry](https://etherscan.io/address/0x58E8dCC13BE9780fC42E8723D8EaD4CF46943dF2#code): transaction [0x98125b78ef0dc7fd040764f37ee24e40ae5352b8551ba671aa7bd8e8320dcef9](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x98125b78ef0dc7fd040764f37ee24e40ae5352b8551ba671aa7bd8e8320dcef9), implementations: [0xe27B91724C55E950F68b394f33FA3B86693179C0](https://etherscan.io/address/0xe27B91724C55E950F68b394f33FA3B86693179C0#code)

Upgradeable registry of relayers, their worker addresses and their staked TORN. The app lists the relayers registered here, while the pools pay any relayer a withdrawal names.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Can be upgraded by: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade with no delay

#### FeeManager

Addresses: [0x5f6c97C6AD7bdd0AE7E0Dd4ca33A4ED3fDabD4D7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f6c97C6AD7bdd0AE7E0Dd4ca33A4ED3fDabD4D7#code), [0xf4B067dD14e95Bab89Be928c07Cb22E3c94E0DAA](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf4B067dD14e95Bab89Be928c07Cb22E3c94E0DAA#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce#code) (Admin)

Upgradeable fee manager that derives relayer burn fees for each Tornado instance from registry settings and Uniswap TWAP data.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Can be upgraded by: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade with no delay

#### Pool_1_WBTC

Addresses: [0x610B717796ad172B316836AC95a2ffad065CeaB4](https://etherscan.io/address/0x610B717796ad172B316836AC95a2ffad065CeaB4#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 1 WBTC deposits.

#### MiMCHasher

Addresses: [0x83584f83f26aF4eDDA9CBe8C730bc87C364b28fe](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83584f83f26aF4eDDA9CBe8C730bc87C364b28fe#code)

MiMC hasher used by every Tornado pool for commitment-tree operations (linked library in the 2019 pools, constructor argument in the 2021 pools), manually verified against the pinned Tornado circomlib generator.

**References**

- [Tornado Cash hasher build script](https://github.com/tornadocash/tornado-core/blob/master/scripts/compileHasher.js)
- [Source Code](https://github.com/tornadocash/circomlib/blob/c372f14d324d57339c88451834bf2824e73bbdbc/src/mimcsponge_gencontract.js)

#### Pool_10_ETH

Addresses: [0x910Cbd523D972eb0a6f4cAe4618aD62622b39DbF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x910Cbd523D972eb0a6f4cAe4618aD62622b39DbF#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 10 ETH deposits.

#### Pool_100_ETH

Addresses: [0xA160cdAB225685dA1d56aa342Ad8841c3b53f291](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA160cdAB225685dA1d56aa342Ad8841c3b53f291#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 100 ETH deposits.

#### InstanceRegistry

Addresses: [0xB20c66C4DE72433F3cE747b58B86830c459CA911](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB20c66C4DE72433F3cE747b58B86830c459CA911#code), [0x2573BAc39EBe2901B4389CD468F2872cF7767FAF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2573BAc39EBe2901B4389CD468F2872cF7767FAF#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce#code) (Admin)

Upgradeable registry of supported Tornado Cash pool instances and their mutable per-instance fee and routing configuration.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Can be upgraded by: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade with no delay

#### Pool_10_WBTC

Addresses: [0xbB93e510BbCD0B7beb5A853875f9eC60275CF498](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbB93e510BbCD0B7beb5A853875f9eC60275CF498#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 10 WBTC deposits.

#### Pool_5M_cDAI

Addresses: [0xD21be7248e0197Ee08E0c20D4a96DEBdaC3D20Af](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD21be7248e0197Ee08E0c20D4a96DEBdaC3D20Af#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 5M cDAI deposits.

#### Pool_100_DAI

Addresses: [0xD4B88Df4D29F5CedD6857912842cff3b20C8Cfa3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD4B88Df4D29F5CedD6857912842cff3b20C8Cfa3#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 100 DAI deposits.

#### TornadoRouter

Addresses: [0xd90e2f925DA726b50C4Ed8D0Fb90Ad053324F31b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd90e2f925DA726b50C4Ed8D0Fb90Ad053324F31b#code)

Router contract that validates supported instances, forwards deposits and withdrawals, and subtracts from relayer stake through the relayer registry during withdrawals.
- Roles:
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

#### Pool_100_USDC

Addresses: [0xd96f2B1c14Db8458374d9Aca76E26c3D18364307](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd96f2B1c14Db8458374d9Aca76E26c3D18364307#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 100 USDC deposits.

#### Pool_1000_DAI

Addresses: [0xFD8610d20aA15b7B2E3Be39B396a1bC3516c7144](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFD8610d20aA15b7B2E3Be39B396a1bC3516c7144#code)

Fixed-denomination Tornado Cash pool for 1000 DAI deposits.

#### TornadoStakingRewards

Addresses: [0x5B3f656C80E8ddb9ec01Dd9018815576E9238c29](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B3f656C80E8ddb9ec01Dd9018815576E9238c29#code), [0x9c97be37840f0e754bb7aDB1b16fD0954A2BA248](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9c97be37840f0e754bb7aDB1b16fD0954A2BA248#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2023-06-24 01:32 UTC, deployment of [TornadoStakingRewards](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B3f656C80E8ddb9ec01Dd9018815576E9238c29#code): transaction [0xf89acb4c80df2c46d8907bcd4152fb044ae0ffb398fc13a6213b49b3135047eb](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf89acb4c80df2c46d8907bcd4152fb044ae0ffb398fc13a6213b49b3135047eb), implementations: [0x9c97be37840f0e754bb7aDB1b16fD0954A2BA248](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9c97be37840f0e754bb7aDB1b16fD0954A2BA248#code)

Staking contract that escrows TORN staked by relayers. With time, their stake is subtracted from for being officially registered as relayers and receiving fees from each withdrawal, and is redirected as TORN rewards for governance participants who are locking their TORN for voting/staking.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Can be upgraded by: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade with no delay

#### TORN

Addresses: [0x77777FeDdddFfC19Ff86DB637967013e6C6A116C](https://etherscan.io/address/0x77777FeDdddFfC19Ff86DB637967013e6C6A116C#code)

TORN governance token contract. Transfers start paused and can later be toggled by governance, which also controls the paused-transfer allowlist and token rescue functions.
- Roles:
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

#### WithdrawVerifier

Addresses: [0x09193888b3f38C82dEdfda55259A82C0E7De875E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x09193888b3f38C82dEdfda55259A82C0E7De875E#code)

Anonymity Mining - Verifier contract for Tornado anonymity-mining withdrawal proofs.

#### TornadoTreesV1

Addresses: [0x43a3bE4Ae954d9869836702AFd10393D3a7Ea417](https://etherscan.io/address/0x43a3bE4Ae954d9869836702AFd10393D3a7Ea417#code)

Anonymity Mining - Legacy Tornado Trees contract that records deposit and withdrawal leaves from TornadoProxyV1 and maintains the roots later consumed by migration and mining logic.

#### TornadoTreesV2

Addresses: [0x527653eA119F3E6a1F5BD18fbF4714081D7B31ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x527653eA119F3E6a1F5BD18fbF4714081D7B31ce#code), [0x200a79068d8141924B511bC78CB55Dca89cF5C2E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x200a79068d8141924B511bC78CB55Dca89cF5C2E#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce#code) (Admin)

Anonymity Mining - Upgradeable batch-based Tornado Trees contract that reuses legacy tree state, queues new leaves from the newer proxy, and accepts batched root updates proven by a verifier.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

Can be upgraded by: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade with no delay

#### RewardSwap

Addresses: [0x5cab7692D4E94096462119ab7bF57319726Eed2A](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5cab7692D4E94096462119ab7bF57319726Eed2A#code)

Anonymity Mining - Liquidity schedule that pays out TORN rewards for anonymity mining. Only the Miner contract can draw from it or adjust the reward weight.

#### DepositTree

Addresses: [0x6234c4C2734D2B246AE074492F402D8f58ff3226](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6234c4C2734D2B246AE074492F402D8f58ff3226#code)

Anonymity Mining - Legacy Poseidon merkle tree that stores deposit or withdrawal leaves for TornadoTreesV1. Only its owner can insert leaves.

#### TreeUpdateVerifier

Addresses: [0x653477c392c16b0765603074f157314Cc4f40c32](https://etherscan.io/address/0x653477c392c16b0765603074f157314Cc4f40c32#code)

Anonymity Mining - Verifier contract for Tornado mining account-tree update proofs.

#### TornadoProxyV2

Addresses: [0x722122dF12D4e14e13Ac3b6895a86e84145b6967](https://etherscan.io/address/0x722122dF12D4e14e13Ac3b6895a86e84145b6967#code)

Anonymity Mining - Newer immutable Tornado proxy that routes deposits and withdrawals to supported pool instances and records them in the upgraded Tornado Trees contract.
- Roles:
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

#### Miner

Addresses: [0x746Aebc06D2aE31B71ac51429A19D54E797878E9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x746Aebc06D2aE31B71ac51429A19D54E797878E9#code)

Anonymity Mining - Mining and reward-distribution contract for Tornado anonymity mining. It verifies reward and withdrawal proofs, maintains account roots, and routes TORN rewards through the swap contract.
- Roles:
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

#### RewardVerifier

Addresses: [0x88fd245fEdeC4A936e700f9173454D1931B4C307](https://etherscan.io/address/0x88fd245fEdeC4A936e700f9173454D1931B4C307#code)

Anonymity Mining - Verifier contract for Tornado anonymity-mining reward proofs.

#### TornadoProxyV1

Addresses: [0x905b63Fff465B9fFBF41DeA908CEb12478ec7601](https://etherscan.io/address/0x905b63Fff465B9fFBF41DeA908CEb12478ec7601#code)

Anonymity Mining - Legacy immutable Tornado proxy that routes deposits and withdrawals to pool instances and records them in the legacy Tornado Trees contract.
- Roles:
  - **governance**: GovernanceProposalStateUpgrade

#### PoseidonHasher2

Addresses: [0x94C92F096437ab9958fC0A37F09348f30389Ae79](https://etherscan.io/address/0x94C92F096437ab9958fC0A37F09348f30389Ae79#code) (unverified)

Anonymity Mining - Unverified Poseidon hasher used by the legacy DepositTree and WithdrawalTree to hash tree nodes.
The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

#### WithdrawalTree

Addresses: [0xbFA347D89Ac54F7C2De2433458cb98A85fc03CEd](https://etherscan.io/address/0xbFA347D89Ac54F7C2De2433458cb98A85fc03CEd#code)

Anonymity Mining - Legacy Poseidon merkle tree that stores deposit or withdrawal leaves for TornadoTreesV1. Only its owner can insert leaves.

#### PoseidonHasher

Addresses: [0xD82ed8786D7c69DC7e052F7A542AB047971E73d2](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD82ed8786D7c69DC7e052F7A542AB047971E73d2#code) (unverified)

Anonymity Mining - Unverified Poseidon hasher used by TornadoTreesV1 to hash deposit and withdrawal leaves.
The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

#### BatchTreeUpdateVerifier

Addresses: [0xEd3B00B651c4c7AF77c2fDdce4a388de84b507C6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xEd3B00B651c4c7AF77c2fDdce4a388de84b507C6#code)

Anonymity Mining - Verifier contract for batched Tornado Trees root updates.

#### TornadoVault

Addresses: [0x2F50508a8a3D323B91336FA3eA6ae50E55f32185](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2F50508a8a3D323B91336FA3eA6ae50E55f32185#code)

Vault that escrows locked TORN of governance participants who wish to receive voting rights.

#### Verifier

Addresses: [0xce172ce1F20EC0B3728c9965470eaf994A03557A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xce172ce1F20EC0B3728c9965470eaf994A03557A#code)

Groth16 verifier contract used by Tornado Cash pool withdrawal proofs.

#### GasCompensationVault

Addresses: [0xFA4C1f3f7D5dd7c12a9Adb82Cd7dDA542E3d59ef](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFA4C1f3f7D5dd7c12a9Adb82Cd7dDA542E3d59ef#code)

Vault that escrows ETH for governance gas-compensation payouts and can return unused funds to governance.

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).