Experimental Stats (7 days)
|Inflows||$2.34 M (excl. ETH)|
|Outflows||$733 K (excl. ETH)|
ZKSwap claims to be a Layer 2 AMM decentralized transaction protocol. Based on ZK-Rollup technology, ZKSwap aims to execute the full functionality of Uniswap on Layer 2, while ensuring the core value of decentralized exchange. ZKSwap aims to increase the TPS by multiple orders of magnitude compared to Uniswap, and make transaction processing hardly consume any gas fees.
Funds can be stolen if…
Funds can be lost if…
Users can be censored if…
MEV can be extracted if…
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK Proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. Once the proof is processed on the Ethereum blockchain the L2 block is instantly finalized.
Despite their production use ZK-SNARKs are still new and experimental cryptography. Cryptography has made a lot of advancements in the recent years but all cryptographic solutions rely on time to prove their security. In addition ZK-SNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.
- Funds can be stolen if the cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract on-chain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
- Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. They can still exit the system.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L2. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction does not require a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted if the request is serviced the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
If enough time passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into Exodus Mode, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a zero knowledge proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
- Funds can be lost if the user is unable to generate the non-trivial zk proof for exodus withdraw.
The system consists of the following smart contracts:
- UpgradeGatekeeper 0x0DCC…02C7This is most likely the contract that implements the upgrade mechanism for Governance and ZkSync. It relies on the ZkSync contract to enforce upgrade delays. The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.
- This contract defines the upgrade delay. Unfortunately this information is stored in an internal constant and not exposed as a public view method. The UPGRADE_NOTICE_PERIOD constant is currently set to 691200 seconds which equals 8 days. Every time the contract upgrades this information has to be verified again. This contract stores the following tokens: 1INCH, AAVE, ETH, GT, LRC, OKB, SNX, SUSHI, UNI, USDC, USDT, WBTC, ZKS.
- Verifier 0x94b9…c829
- The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8 days delay on code upgrades.
- Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).