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STRK-20

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About

A shielded ledger on Starknet for any ERC-20 token, with private transfers and DeFi, where one auditor key can decrypt every user's history.


  • Total Value Locked
    $1.15 M17.5%
    across 7 assets and 7 buckets
  • TVL
    $1.15 M17.5%
  • Assets tracked
    7
  • Buckets tracked
    7
  • Deposits 7D
    2.73 K>1K%
  • Deposits 30D
    3.30 K
  • Deposits Total
    20.42 K

  • Privacy
    Link privacy
  • Trusted setup
  • Exit window
  • Reproducibility

  • Tracked on
    Starknet logo
  • Attributes
    ZKTransfersDeFiAny amount
  • Public observerChain analystNetwork observerPrivileged insiderFuture adversary

    About

    A shielded ledger on Starknet for any ERC-20 token, with private transfers and DeFi, where one auditor key can decrypt every user's history.

    STRK-20 lets the user shield any ERC-20 token on Starknet, send it privately to other users, use it in DeFi and withdraw it to any address. Senders, amounts and which deposit funds which withdrawal stay hidden inside the pool. Deposits, withdrawals, the first payment to each new contact and DeFi calls are public.

    Users trust the holder of the auditor key, which can decrypt every user’s history, and the holder of the screener key, which approves deposits. Multisigs can upgrade the pool and the contract that owns every shadow account without delay. Leaving needs StarkWare’s sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs., which alone checks proofs and includes pool transactions.

    Architecture

    Each user registers a viewing key, which the pool stores encrypted to the auditor key. Payments travel over channels: the first payment to a contact opens one and names the recipient, later ones only add encrypted notes. A private transfer needs a registered recipient, and registering takes a transaction and fee from the recipient’s own account. A note holds an amount of one token, and spending it publishes a nullifier. DeFi actions use open notes, whose amount a helper contract fills after the swap or loan.

    Flow

    1. Register. The wallet publishes your viewing key, encrypted to the auditor key.
    2. Deposit. The holder of the screener key signs off on your address, and the pool takes the tokens and creates a note. Address, token and amount are public.
    3. Transfer. The wallet proves offchain that you may spend your notes and creates notes for the recipient. A paymaster submits the transaction and takes its fee from your notes.
    4. Withdraw. The pool pays out to any address. Recipient, token and amount are public, and the withdrawing user is encrypted to the auditor key.

    Shadow accounts

    A shadow account is a contract the pool deploys for one user, app and index. The pool withdraws tokens to it, runs the app’s calls through it and moves the results back into the user’s notes. Shadow account addresses derive from the user’s viewing key, so whoever holds that key can find them. The anonymizer owns every shadow account and can move what it holds.

    Keys

    The user’s Starknet account signs every action, and their viewing key decrypts their notes. Ready’s servers create the viewing key for most accounts, while Xverse derives it from a wallet signature. Registration cannot be changed, so a leaked viewing key exposes the user’s history for good.

    App

    StarkWare lists Ready and Xverse as wallets, and both are closed source. Both send the user’s viewing key to their own servers, which run note discovery and proving and relay pool transactions. The SDK is open, and a custom clientSometimes labelled interchangeably as a “node”, they are tasked with processing transactions and managing the blockchains's state. They run the computations for each transaction according to the rollup's virtual machine and protocol rules. If comparing to Ethereum clients, these would be execution clients such as Geth, as opposed to consensus clients. on it can use its own prover (high hardware requirements), its own note discovery and an oblivious relay. Deposits still need the screening signature.

    Compliance

    Every deposit from a Starknet address needs a fresh signature from the pool’s screener key. The wallet’s proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. requests it from a screening service, which checks the address with Elliptic and serves only its credentialed partners. Governance sets a screening policy per helper contract. Five helpers are exempt, among them the CCTP bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge., so USDC bridged in from other chains skips screening. The auditor key is one public key in the pool’s storage. Who holds the screener and auditor private keys is not visible onchain, and governance can replace either key at once.

    Fees

    Every pool transaction pays a fixed STRK fee, which governance can change at any time, plus gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources.. Paymasters take their cost from the user’s notes.

    Anonymity setIn privacy protocols, anonymity set denotes all users, to which a particular withdrawal could be plausibly attributed. Anonymity set depends on a particular withdrawal, the size of the anonymity set is a metric for level of user's privacy.

    One pool holds every token, but each token forms its own set. Registered users are the upper bound.

    What the protocol promises: Hides amounts, senders and the link between deposit and withdrawal inside the pool. The first payment to each new contact is public.

    Ethereum is public by default. Each protocol is rated on its main privacy promise, like hiding who paid, who received, how much, or which deposit became which withdrawal. Against each adversary, the colour says whether it holds for a careful user with the app's own settings: green yes, yellow only with significant extra work, red no. Fields marked at risk stay private only under the condition in their note.

    Public observerChain analystNetwork observerPrivileged insiderFuture adversary
    Public observer
    At risk

    Transfers inside the pool are encrypted, but the first payment to each new contact writes the recipient’s address in cleartext. Deposits and withdrawals show address, token and amount. The fee payment names the token the user pays it in. DeFi actions name their target contract, and a shadow account shows its funding, calls and positions. A new account must be funded publicly before it can receive privately.

    Advice: Submit every pool action through a paymaster and pay its fee in the most common token. Treat the first payment to a new contact, and any DeFi action, as public.

    InsideSenderprivateRecipientexposedAmountprivateAssetat riskLinkprivate
    Chain analyst
    At risk

    The set of active users is small and split further by token and by fee token. A channel opened in the same transaction as a deposit ties the two together, and most withdrawal addresses have also deposited. Paying gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. from the user’s wallet instead of a paymaster exposes its fingerprint, account implementation and fee habits, even from a fresh address.

    Advice: Open channels in a transaction without a deposit, pay fees in the most common token, and withdraw uneven amounts that match no deposit. Wait before exiting and pick a different time of day than the deposit. Exit to a fresh address every time and spend from it with a different wallet than the one that deposited.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderat riskRecipientexposedAssetat riskLinkat risk
    Network observer
    At risk

    Ready’s analytics, on by default, report each shield and unshield under the user’s id, while no other third party gets the account or viewing key. Both wallets send the account and viewing key only to their makers’ servers, which run note discovery and relay pool transactions. Ready works over Tor, while Xverse’s privacy endpoints refuse it.

    Advice: In Ready, switch off "Share anonymous data".

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderunverifiableRecipientunverifiableAmountunverifiableAssetat riskLinkat risk
    Privileged insider
    Exposed

    Every user’s viewing key is escrowed onchain, encrypted to one auditor key that a role holder can replace at any time with no delay. The wallets’ servers receive the user’s viewing key for note discovery and proving, and Ready’s servers create it for every new account. Apps that drive a shadow account or a swap through the pool get the user’s main address from the wallet connection. The holder of the screener key can blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. any screened depositor.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderexposedRecipientexposedAmountexposedAssetexposedLinkexposed
    Future adversary
    Exposed

    The proofs rest only on hashes, the encryption on elliptic curves. Channel keys, note contents and the auditor escrow all use this encryption. Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography recovers the auditor key from its onchain public key, and with it every escrowed viewing key and the whole history.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderexposedRecipientexposedAmountexposedAssetexposedLinkexposed

    30 day historic anonymity set

    How many unique depositors you could have blended in with if you withdrew on a particular day after depositing during the previous 30 days. This metric is a proxy for the historic anonymity set and shows how it developed over time.

    The metric looks backwards: it counts deposits that already happened, including from addresses that have since withdrawn. Your real anonymity also depends on deposits made after yours, which cannot be known in advance.

    Estimated anonymity set by holding duration

    An estimate of how many unique depositors you blend in with, depending on how long you leave your deposit in the pool. It is based on historic data of past deposits: each point counts depositors from the preceding period, so holding for up to 30 days effectively means blending in with everyone who deposited during the last 30 days.

    Asset
    Deposits 7D
    Deposits 30D
    Deposits Total
    Value Locked
    XSTRKXSTRK
    1
    $7.80 K
    3
    $7.80 K
    16
    $74.42 K
    $573.52 K
    USDCUSDC
    358
    $12.33 K
    542
    $110.58 K
    6.74 K
    $928.49 K
    $226.50 K
    STRKSTRK
    2.19 K
    $173.56 K
    2.43 K
    $335.19 K
    11.78 K
    $1.54 M
    $219.07 K
    WBTCWBTC
    1
    $12.57
    7
    $29.29 K
    81
    $106.43 K
    $57.93 K
    ETHETH
    175
    $4.94 K
    208
    $14.17 K
    406
    $207.68 K
    $48.15 K
    strkBTCstrkBTC
    4
    $17.58
    96
    $56.37 K
    1.37 K
    $512.82 K
    $16.90 K
    USDTUSDT
    1
    $299.66
    6
    $1.30 K
    16
    $16.45 K
    $11.04 K
    Total
    2.73 K
    $198.97 K
    3.30 K
    $554.73 K
    20.42 K
    $3.39 M
    $1.15 M

    Shadow accounts launch

    2026 Oct 13th

    StarkWare opens per-app shadow accounts, which let apps act for pool users without naming them.

    Learn more

    Privacy live on Starknet

    2026 Jun 9th

    StarkWare opens the pool to users through the Ready and Xverse wallets.

    Learn more

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. the proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. or virtual Starknet execution model is broken, allowing invalid actions.
    2. the Starknet sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. includes a transaction with fabricated proof facts.
    3. a multisig deploys a malicious pool upgrade, which takes effect without delay.
    4. an external DeFi helper or target protocol invoked by the user mishandles assets.
    5. a multisig upgrades the anonymizer, which takes effect without delay and can move everything shadow accounts hold (see upgrades and governance).

    Funds can be lost if

    1. a user loses the Starknet account key or viewing key required to spend their notes.
    2. the pool is paused or upgraded so that valid actions fail.

    Privacy can be lost if

    1. the holder of the auditor key decrypts users’ viewing keys, which exposes their whole history (see privileged insider).
    2. the wallet’s proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. or note discovery service, which receives the viewing key, leaks or keeps it (see privileged insider).
    3. an app driving a shadow account or a swap through the pool links it to the user’s main address (see privileged insider).
    4. a first payment to a new contact, a channel opened beside a deposit or a unique amount links activity (see public observer and chain analyst).
    5. a Ready user keeps its default analytics, which report each shield and unshield under one id (see networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. observer).
    6. elliptic-curve cryptography is broken, which opens the auditor key and with it every user’s history (see future adversary).

    A 7/12 multisig holds the pool’s governance, security and upgrade roles and can replace the pool’s code at once. It and a 2/4 multisig both hold the app role, which sets the fee, the fee collector, the proof validity window and which DeFi helpers need screening. The 2/4 also owns a delayed executor that holds the upgrade role behind a one-day delay. The security governor role, held by the 7/12, can replace the auditor and screener keys at once. Pausing needs a role nobody holds today, which the 7/12 can grant.

    The anonymizer has no upgrade delay. A 1/3 multisig holds its governance and upgrade roles, and the 7/12 can upgrade it too.

    Transparent setup

    Stwo

    Detailed description

    Transparent proving systems require no trusted setups and have no additional setup-related trust assumptions.