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15hrs
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SummaryValue SecuredActivityLivenessRisk summaryRisk analysisData availabilityState validationOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

Fraxtal logoFraxtal

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Fraxtal is an EVM equivalent Optimium utilizing the OP stack as its smart contract platform and execution environment.

Value secured
$234.56 M2.21%
Canonically Bridged
$231.86 M
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$2.70 M
View TVS Breakdown
  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    0.1930.4%
  • Gas token
    FRAX
  • Type
    Optimium
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    252
    • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Fraxtal is an EVM equivalent Optimium utilizing the OP stack as its smart contract platform and execution environment.

    Recategorisation

    07d
    15h
    28m
    53s

    The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.

    The project will move to Others because:

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation
    Value Secured

    2024 Jun 11 — 2025 Jun 11

    Total value securedTotal
    $234.56 M2.21%
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    $231.86 M2.13%
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    $0.000.00%
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    $2.70 M9.56%
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2024 Jun 11 — 2025 Jun 10

    Liveness

    The chart illustrates how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type and if these intervals deviate from their typical schedule.

    2025 May 12 — Jun 11

    30D avg. tx data subs. interval
    8 minutes
    30D avg. state updates interval
    1 hour
    Past 30 days anomalies
    Risk summary

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL),
    2. the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be frozen if

    1. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    None

    Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain. Fraxtal uses a separate data availability module developed by the Frax Core Team, and data availability attestations are not published on chain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Data availability

    FraxtalDA is a custom data availability solution built by the Fraxtal team.

    Risk analysis
    Economic security
    None

    There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

    Fraud detection
    None

    There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

    Technology

    Architecture

    FraxtalDA is a custom data availability solution built by the Fraxtal team. The data is posted by the OP batcher to three separate locations: AWS, IPFS, and Cloudfare R2. The IPFS hash is then submitted to the onchain inbox contract on Ethereum. FraxtalDA relies on a single DA endpoint to manage data posting between the three different locations.

    FraxtalDA

    The sequencer attests to data availability by posting an IPFS hash to an onchain inbox contract on Ethereum. L2 nodes derive the L2 chain from the L1 by reading transactions commitments from this sequencer inbox. When reading from the inbox, the op-node verifies that the commitment hash is a valid IPFS CID. If the data corresponding to the hash is missing from IPFS, the op-node will halt, preventing further derivation of the L2 chain.

    DA Bridge

    The SequencerInbox only stores IPFS hash commitments posted by the sequencer. It is not possible to verify blob inclusion against the data commitments onchain. Projects not integrating with a functional DA bridge rely only on the data availability attestation of the sequencer.There is no committee attesting to the availability of the data. For L2 chain derivation, the system relies on sequencer commitments to an L1 onchain inbox. See DA layer technology section for more details.

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an invalid data availability commitment.

    1. FraxtalDA Documentation
    2. Fraxtal DA Follower - Source Code
    State validation
    No state validation

    OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.

    • Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address
    2. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular messaging

    The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete.

    • Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    1. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function
    3. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
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    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Challenger Fraxtal Multisig 1

    Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.

    Guardian Fraxtal Multisig 1

    Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).

    Proposer 0xFb90…bc50

    Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.

    Sequencer 0x6017…d1f2

    Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.

    Actors:

    Fraxtal Multisig 1 0xe0d7…0508
    • A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • SystemConfig
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • L1StandardBridge
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • OptimismPortal
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • SuperchainConfig
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • L2OutputOracle
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
      • L1ERC721Bridge
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings
        via - acting via ProxyAdmin
    • A Challenger - acting directly
    • A Guardian - acting directly

    Participants (5):

    0x8da4…C2C00x6e74…c4D20x6933…A4F20x17e0…c96e0xcbc6…0928
    frxETH Minter 0x7Bc6…0cA3

    Accepts user-supplied ETH to convert it to frxETH using auxiliary contracts like the EtherRouter.

    • Can interact with Frax Ether Token
      • can mint frxETH tokens
    Frax Multisig 0x8306…A81C
    • A Multisig with 4/7 threshold.
    • Can interact with EtherRouter
      • set the default AMO and lending pool contracts among the registered ones and trigger the predefined rebalancing functions of the router
      • withdraw all escrowed ETH and ERC-20s and configure important addresses like the operator, AMO(s) or the lending pool(s)
    • Can interact with frxETH Minter
      • configure important addresses like the operator or the EtherRouter and withdraw ETH and ERC-20s from the contract (usually not escrowed here)
      • pause ETH deposits / frxETH mints and withdraw ETH and ERC-20s from the contract (usually not escrowed here)

    Participants (7):

    0x381e…4b400xc8dE…22280xcbc6…09280xc283…F2240x6933…A4F20x8da4…C2C00x6e74…c4D2
    Fraxtal Multisig 2 0xB174…3f27
    • A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
    • Can interact with Frax Ether Token
      • can add and remove frxETH minters and set a new timelock address with 2d delay
        via - acting via FrxEthTimelock with 2d delay
    • Can interact with frxETH Minter
      • can withdraw all escrowed ETH, pause the contract and set user fees for minting frxETH (submit()) with 2d delay
        via - acting via FrxEthTimelock with 2d delay

    Participants (5):

    0x6933…A4F20xcbc6…09280x17e0…c96e0xc8dE…22280x6e74…c4D2
    Used in:
    frxETH Minter 0xbAFA…1138

    Accepts user-supplied ETH and converts it to frxETH.

    • Can interact with Frax Ether Token
      • can mint frxETH tokens
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    SystemConfig 0x34a9…f8b2Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
      • batcherHash: EOA 2
      • owner: Fraxtal Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    OptimismPortal 0x36cb…6f6DImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
      • guardian: Fraxtal Multisig 1
    • This contract stores the following tokens: ETH, frxETH, FRAX.
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    L2OutputOracle 0x66CC…71e4Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
      • challenger: Fraxtal Multisig 1
      • proposer: EOA 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    SuperchainConfig 0x61ca…Ccc4Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
      • guardian: Fraxtal Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    L1CrossDomainMessenger 0x126b…42EdImplementation (Upgradable)

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    L1StandardBridge 0x34C0…BDE2Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
    • This contract can store any token.
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    L1ERC721Bridge 0xa9B5…0eC5Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory 0x11FE…76ccImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintablERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Fraxtal Multisig 1 with no delay
    ProxyAdmin 0x13Fe…ABcA
    • Roles:
      • owner: Fraxtal Multisig 1
    EtherRouter 0x5acA…007C

    ETH deposited by users via the FraxEtherMinter is forwarded to this contract and then routed further to either lending pools or AMOs.

    • Roles:
      • operatorAddress: Frax Multisig
      • timelockAddress: Frax Multisig
    Frax Ether Token 0x5E84…Aa1f

    frxETH token contract. Fraxtal uses Frax Ether as the designated gas token, allowing users to pay for blockspace with frxETH.

    • Roles:
      • minters_array: frxETH Minter
      • timelock_address: FrxEthTimelock; ultimately Fraxtal Multisig 2
    FrxEthTimelock 0x8412…39CA

    Allows for time-delayed execution of transactions. Current delay is 2d.

    • Roles:
      • admin: Fraxtal Multisig 2
    Staked Frax Ether Token 0xac3E…e38F

    Vault token contract (ERC-4626) for staked frxETH. The smart contract receives frxETH tokens and mints sfrxETH tokens.

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    Generic escrow 0x34C0…BDE2Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.

    Can be upgraded by:
    ProxyAdmin with no delay
    Escrow for ETH, frxETH, FRAX 0x36cb…6f6DImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Main entry point for users depositing ETH, frxETH, FRAX.

    Can be upgraded by:
    ProxyAdmin with no delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).