Fraxtal
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About
Fraxtal is an EVM equivalent Optimium utilizing the OP stack as its smart contract platform and execution environment.
$144.14 M
5.63%
Badges
About
Fraxtal is an EVM equivalent Optimium utilizing the OP stack as its smart contract platform and execution environment.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceState validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Data availability
ExternalProof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain. Fraxtal uses a separate data availability module developed by the Frax Core Team, and data availability attestations are not published on chain.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Proposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Fraud proofs are in development
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
Data required to compute fraud proof is not published on chain, and currently not publicly accessible
Fraxtal uses a separate data availability module developed by the Frax Core Team. Data is posted off chain, and only hashes of blob data is published on an on chain inbox.
Funds can be lost if the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).
The system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1ERC721Bridge, L1StandardBridge.
Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.
Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 5 threshold. This address is the owner of the following contracts: ProxyAdmin, SystemConfig. It is also designated as a Guardian of the FraxchainPortal, meaning it can halt withdrawals. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds, and change the sequencer, state root proposer or any other system component (unlimited upgrade power). This address is also the permissioned challenger of the system. It can delete non finalized roots without going through the fault proof process.
Those are the participants of the FraxtalMultisig.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 7 threshold. This address is the owner of the frxETHMinter contract. It can pause and unpause ETH deposits, change how much ETH is withheld from each submit() transaction and withdraw arbitrary amounts of assets from the minter contract.
Those are the participants of the frxETHMultisig.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 5 threshold. This address is the owner of the timelock smart contract. It can queue, cancel, and execute transactions in the timelock (e.g., adding and removing frxETH whitelisted minters).
Those are the participants of the TimelockMultisig.
The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):
The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Upgrade delay: No delay
Fraxtal uses Frax Ether (frxETH) as the designated gas token, allowing users to utilize frxETH to pay for blockspace.
Authorized minter contract for frxETH, accepts user-supplied ETH and converts it to frxETH.
Vault token contract (ERC-4626) for staked frxETH. The smart contract receives frxETH tokens and mints sfrxETH tokens.
Allows for time-delayed execution of transactions in the FrxETH smart contract, such as adding and removing whitelisted minters. Delay is set to 2d.
Upgradable contract that manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the Superchain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. The address of the guardian can only be modified by the ProxyAdmin by upgrading the SuperchainConfig contract. This contract is a fork of Optimism’s superchainConfig contract and may not be utilized by other chains.
Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Main entry point for users depositing ETH, frxETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
