Mantle logoMantle

About

Mantle is an under development EVM compatible Optimium, based on the OP Stack.

Value Locked

$1.16 B

5.05%

Canonically Bridged
$1.00 B
Externally Bridged
$153.28 M
Natively Minted
$0.00
  • Tokens
  • Daily TPS
    4.5728.86%
  • 30D tx count
    15.70 M
  • Type
    Optimium
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • ...

    Tokens

    Choose token

    Externally Bridged Tokens

    USDe (USDe)
    Staked USDe (sUSDe)
    Canonically Bridged Tokens (Top 15)

    mETH (mETH)
    Ether (ETH)
    Mantle (MNT)
    Tether USD (USDT)
    Puff (Puff)
    USD Coin (USDC)
    Wrapped BTC (WBTC)
    Pendle (PENDLE)
    ApeX Token (APEX)
    LUSD Stablecoin (LUSD)
    Bella (BEL)
    Wrapped liquid staked Ether 2.0 (wstETH)
    SHIBA INU (SHIB)
    Pepe (PEPE)
    BitDAO (BIT)

    ...

    Milestones

    Mainnet v2 Tectonic Upgrade

    2024 Mar 15th

    Mantle completes Mainnet v2 Tectonic Upgrade.

    Learn more

    Mainnet launch

    2023 Jul 14th

    Mantle is live on mainnet.

    Learn more

    MNT token migration begins

    2023 Jul 11th

    User can exchange their BIT tokens to MNT tokens.

    Learn more
    Risk summary
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.
    Risk analysis
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    State validation

    In development

    Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

    Data availability

    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain. MantleDA contracts are forked from EigenDA with significant modifications, most importantly removal of slashing conditions. DA fraud proof mechanism is not live yet.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Sequencer failure

    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There is a 12h delay on this operation.

    Proposer failure

    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Technology

    Fraud proofs are in development

    Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.

    • Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - Etherscan source code, deleteL2Outputs function

    Data is not stored on chain

    The transaction data is not recorded on the Ethereum main chain. The sequencer posts the transactions data batch root, and then propagates the data to off-chain permissioned nodes to sign. It subsequently posts the nodes signatures on chain to verify they belong to the specified members of the quorum, and that the minimum stake threshold is met.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    1. DataLayrServiceManager.sol#L389 - Etherscan source code, confirmDataStore function
    2. DataLayrServiceManager.sol#L404 - Etherscan source code, signature verification check
    3. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    4. BatchInbox - Etherscan address
    5. OptimismPortal.sol - Etherscan source code, depositTransaction function
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - Etherscan source code, CHALLENGER address
    2. L2OutputOracle.sol - Etherscan source code, PROPOSER address
    3. Decentralizing the sequencer - OP Stack docs

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - Etherscan source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    • Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    1. OptimismPortal.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function
    3. L2OutputOracle.sol - Etherscan source code, PROPOSER check

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    Permissions

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    ProxyAdmin 0xca35…7794

    Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1StandardBridge.

    Sequencer 0x2f40…d749

    Central actor allowed to commit L2 transactions to L1.

    Proposer 0x6667…d77D

    Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.

    Challenger 0x2F44…daC9

    Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.

    Guardian 0x2F44…daC9

    Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.

    OwnerMultisig 0x4e59…D40f

    This address can upgrade the following contracts: L1CrossDomainMessenger, L1StandardBridge, AddressManager, L1MantleToken, EigenDataLayerChain, SystemConfig. This is a Gnosis Safe with 6 / 13 threshold.

    Owner2Multisig 0x2F44…daC9

    This address is the owner of the following contracts: EigenDataLayerChain, DataLayrServiceManager, BLSRegistry, Delegation. It is also designated as a Challenger and Guardian of the OptimismPortal, meaning it can halt withdrawals and change incorrect state roots. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 7 threshold.

    Those are the participants of the Owner2Multisig.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):

    The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH, MNT.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    It contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, the L2 gas limit and the unsafe block signer address.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The L1StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from L1 to L2. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    This contract is the main entry point for data availability. It is responsible for storing transaction data headers and confirming the data store by verifying operators signatures.

    This contract stores the number of Mantle DA operators and their public keys. It also store the quorum threshold and the minimum stake required to be part of the quorum.

    Contract managing different investment strategies, forked from EigenLayer StrategyManager.

    Basic do-nothing investment strategy.

    Basic do-nothing investment strategy.

    AddressManager 0x6968…5a42

    This is a library that stores the mappings between names and their addresses. Changing the values effectively upgrades the system. It is controlled by the OwnerMultisig.

    Can be upgraded by: OwnerMultisig

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    PauserRegistry 0x075a…A86f
    PauserRegistry2 0x4ca7…92D0

    Mantle uses Mantle (MNT) as the designated gas token, allowing users to utilize MNT to pay for blockspace.

    Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main entry point for users depositing ETH, MNT.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Knowledge nuggets