Metis Andromeda
$68.10 M
5.38%
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Mainnet launch
2021 Nov 19th
Public launch of Metis Layer 2 Andromeda, based on the Optimism codebase.
Description
Metis is an EVM-equivalent Scaling Solution originally forked from Optimism. It provides support for multiple, interconnected chains with main focus on supporting easy creation of DACs (Decentralized Autonomous Companies). The risk analysis below relates to the default chain with chainId=1088 called Andromeda. Since April 2022 Andromeda uses “optimistic data availability” scheme in which transaction data is kept off-chain in MEMO while Validators can request tx data from Sequencer via L1 challenge mechanism if it does not make it available for validation off-chain.
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Risk Analysis
State validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Data availability
Optimistic (MEMO)Transaction data is kept in MEMO decentralized storage. Validators can force Sequencer to make data available on-chain via L1 contract call if they find that Sequencer did not push tx data to MEMO. Challenge mechanizm is not yet fully implemented.
Upgradeability
YesThe code that secures the system can be changed arbitrarily and without notice.
Sequencer failure
Enqueue via L1Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can’t force them. The sequencer cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencer censors or is down, it is so for everyone.
Proposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Technology
No automatic on-chain fraud proof system
For additional security, any staked Validator can challenge invalid state root submitted by the Sequencer. Other Validators will then act as referees in an interactive challenge game. Dishonest Validator majority can push invalid state root on-chain, and potentially slash honest Sequencer.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
Data is recorded off-chain in MEMO
Transaction data is not stored on-chain, rather it is recorded in off-chain decentralized storage MEMO from MemoLabs. If Validators find that data is unavailable, they can request that Sequencer posts data on-chain via L1 contract.
Funds can be stolen if sequencer withholds data for more than seven days while at the same time submits fraudulent state root (CRITICAL).
Operator
The system has a centralized sequencer
While proposing blocks is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can enqueue transactions
Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can’t force them. The sequencer cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencer censors or is down, it is so for everyone.
Users can be censored if the operator is offline or refuses to process the queue.
Withdrawals
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Other considerations
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
Metis uses the Optimistic Virtual Machine (OVM) 2.0 to execute transactions. This is similar to the EVM, but is independent from it and allows fraud proofs to be executed.
Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex OVM implementation.
Permissions
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
This address is the owner of the following contracts: MVM_L1CrossDomainMessenger, L1StandardBridge, LibAddressManager. This allows it to censor messages or pause message bridge altogether, upgrade bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds stored in a bridge and change the sequencer, state root proposer or any other system component (unlimited upgrade power). This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the Metis Multisig.
Central actor allowed to commit transactions to L1.
Central actor to post new state roots to L1.
Those addresses can try to force the sequencer to post data on chain.
Those addresses can challenge the state roots submitted by the state root proposer.
Smart Contracts
The system consists of the following smart contracts:
MVM CanonicalTransaction is a wrapper of Canonical Transaction Chain that implements optimistic data availability scheme L1. If Sequencer is not malicious, it simply forwards appendSequencerBatch() calls to CanonicalTransactionChain.
The Canonical Transaction Chain (CTC) contract is an append-only log of transactions which must be applied to the OVM state. It defines the ordering of transactions by writing them to the CTC:batches instance of the Chain Storage Container. CTC batches can only be submitted by OVM_Sequencer. The CTC also allows any account to enqueue() a transaction, which the Sequencer must eventually append to the rollup state.
The State Commitment Chain (SCC) contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of each transaction in the Canonical Transaction Chain (CTC). Elements here have a 1:1 correspondence with transactions in the CTC, and should be the unique state root calculated off-chain by applying the canonical transactions one by one. Currently only OVM_Proposer can submit new state roots.
The Bond Manager contract will handle deposits in the form of an ERC20 token from bonded Proposers. It will also handle the accounting of gas costs spent by a Verifier during the course of a challenge. In the event of a successful challenge, the faulty Proposer’s bond will be slashed, and the Verifier’s gas costs will be refunded. Current mock implementation allows only OVM_Proposer to propose new state roots. No slashing is implemented.
The L1 Cross Domain Messenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to Metis, and relays messages from Metis onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to Metis is rejected for exceeding the Metis epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Oracle specifying user fees for sending L1 -> Metis messages and other parameters for cross-chain communication.
This is a library that stores the mappings between names such as OVM_Sequencer, OVM_Proposer and other contracts and their addresses.
This contract implements a voting scheme with which the majority of Verifiers can challenge malicious Sequencer.
Contract that allows METIS_MANAGER to switch Sequencer.
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 tokens and ETH that do not require custom gateway. This contract can store any token.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).