Summary Value Secured Activity Onchain costs Data posted Liveness Milestones & Incidents Risk summary Risk analysis Stage Data availability State validation Upgrades & Governance Updates Operator Withdrawals Other considerations Permissions Smart contracts

RISE

1 recent update

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About

RISE is a low-latency Optimium built on the OP Stack, using the OP Succinct Lite ZK fault proof system and posting data to EigenDA. It targets real-time trading applications through its RISEx exchange.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$15.00 M11.7%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

No data

Gas token

ETH

Type

Other

Purpose

Universal

Chain ID

4153

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

99.2% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

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About

Why is the project listed in others?

There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

Learn more about the recategorisation here.

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Activity

2026 Jan 05 — Jul 22

Past Day UOPS

<0.010.00%

Past Day Ops count

Total Ops

since 2026 Jan 05

Max. UOPS

<0.01

2026 Jan 05

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

No data

Onchain costs

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

2026 Jan 05 — Jul 22

Total cost

$8.30 K

Avg cost per L2 UOP

$8.305990 K

Avg cost per day

$41.94

Data posted

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEigenDA.

Data source: API provided by EigenLayer

2026 Jan 08 — Jul 22

Data posted

413.43 GiB

Avg size per day

2.12 GiB

Avg size per L2 UOP

No data

Liveness

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

2026 Jun 22 — Jul 22

Avg. tx data subs. interval

6 minutes

Avg. state updates interval

59 minutes

Past 30 days anomalies

96% normal uptime

Last 30 day anomalies

All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

No Tx data submissions were performed for 45min (from 2026 Jul 20, 19:56 UTC until 2026 Jul 20, 20:41 UTC). These typically occur every 6min 8s on average.

No Tx data submissions were performed for 1h 24m 24s (from 2026 Jul 20, 17:31 UTC until 2026 Jul 20, 18:55 UTC). These typically occur every 6min 8s on average.

No State updates were performed for 8h 17m 48s (from 2026 Jul 07, 04:00 UTC until 2026 Jul 07, 12:18 UTC). These typically occur every 59min 39s on average.

No State updates were performed for 11h 25m 24s (from 2026 Jul 06, 13:56 UTC until 2026 Jul 07, 01:21 UTC). These typically occur every 59min 39s on average.

Milestones & Incidents

RISE public mainnet launch

2026 May 1st

RISE opens its mainnet (genesis on January 5th 2026) to the public together with the RISEx exchange.

Learn more

Risk summary

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)

Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with a closed set of 1 whitelisted challenger.

Data availability

External

Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are checked against the DACert Verifier data roots, signed off by EigenDA operators.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

Stage

RISE is not even a

Stage 0

project.

There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

Data is posted to EigenDA

Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.

Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

Learn more about the DA layer here:

EigenDA

State validation

Fraud proofs

State roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.0 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge period of 1d during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.00000025 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 7d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.

Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1.

OP Succinct Lite architecture

PROVER

SP1 Hypercube

Trusted Setups

Onchain verifier

SP1Verifier

Used in

Onchain verifier

SP1Verifier

Used in

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x0061...7bda	Github
	0x0285...e162	Github

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

6mo 18d ago

Avg upgrade interval

2mo 6d

Updates

2026 July 20, 08:52 UTC

25changes

Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

Initial discovery

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x01A6274B9607ac024e8c191E491d0b25ad14c217) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge]
	+++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Rise Guardian Multisig (eth:0x03B85FAa108C10F6EFfec1d91954DE99dA32FB46) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
	+++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).

+	Status: CREATED
	contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
	+++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x2e7758aAD2B6D3D1Fd2C937D9B322378fC644633) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e) [succinct/SP1VerifierGateway]
	+++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x4ebc046b1cfc12659A19E124b0ea8a382777E542) [global/ProxyAdmin]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x551A672d703966D83C3EC3ea0e844f43c3373c91) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13_opsuccinct]
	+++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game).

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x553257678Dd11a6668a92934AAB005e420c6535A) [opstack/L1StandardBridge]
	+++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
	+++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6A4139810986CF13408330e14C4ac9Daf0511aA3) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory]
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
	+++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0).

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig (eth:0x9196464e3F828A50233C20732fa6898F4317002c) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xad92Fa18EB74E46Db844240623124BF46589db4C) [opstack/OptimismPortal2]
	+++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xB786207A1EdfC724c1d507335f403F53fd9E79d6) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry]
	+++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0xBf60dBc272833cD25f0426983c3175C32C8E5A7a) [succinct/OPSuccinct/OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xC0de1d9B1cD2Caf782355C66a6A8e5948e63c9c6) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger]
	+++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1Verifier (eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A) [shared-sp1/SP1Verifier]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig (eth:0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xCf32d8c4Be30cA330c1150916A71A651bADd70d5) [global/ProxyAdmin]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SystemConfig (eth:0xD3CAf2A473dBB5bc2E8FB7F328e01AB9B726a24f) [opstack/SystemConfig]
	+++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract AddressManager (eth:0xdE3a0F0122f702e018e04C6D0824B724E8Be8e16) [opstack/AddressManager]
	+++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xE2B9526277DcD2B27222Df760D6427213AC9dbb8) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory]
	+++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xf758C3bf7a4E2ad513B371B40c4Bd9A0E9716CF1) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract AccessManager (eth:0xF90a72FC295DBEf2fD27629Fda4B98Fd3E842d17) [succinct/OPSuccinct/AccessManager]
	+++ description: Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

Withdrawals

Regular exits

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 1d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

Introducing EVM Equivalence

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig0x9196…002c

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
Can interact with AccessManager
- Allowed to add or remove proposers and challengers, and transfer ownership of the AccessManager

Participants (5):

0x9b40…7744 0x6555…358f 0xaE06…44f5 0xaf44…da66 0x8249…3ad8

Rise Guardian Multisig0x03B8…FB46

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system

Participants (5):

0x9b40…7744 0x6555…358f 0xaE06…44f5 0xaf44…da66 0x8249…3ad8

SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig0xCafE…6878

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.

Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway
- affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes

Participants (3):

0xBaB2…1126 0x72Ff…4f54 0x9395…8885

Used in:

EOA 10x499a…8A41

Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

EOA 20xa069…54bA

Can interact with AccessManager
- Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain

EOA 30xaC20…DbcF

Can interact with AccessManager
- Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

DisputeGameFactory0x6A41…1aA3 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

OptimismPortal2

Escrow

0xad92…db4C Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

SystemConfig0xD3CA…a24f Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: Rise Guardian Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

SuperchainConfig0xB786…79d6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig
- guardian: Rise Guardian Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1ERC721Bridge0x01A6…c217 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1StandardBridge

Escrow

0x5532…535A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1CrossDomainMessenger0xC0de…c9c6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

SP1Verifier0x0459…C459

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).

Implementation used in:

PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

Implementation used in:

PermissionedDisputeGame0x2e77…4633

Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

SP1VerifierGateway0x3B60…185e

This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.

Roles:
- owner: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig

Implementation used in:

ProxyAdmin

2 instances

0x4ebc…E542 0xCf32…70d5

Roles:
- owner: Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

AnchorStateRegistry0x551A…3c91 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game).

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

MIPS0x6463…B908

The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

Implementation used in:

SP1Verifier0x8a0f…Fc5C

Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0).

Implementation used in:

OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame0xBf60…5A7a

Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

SP1Verifier0xc3c6…AF2A

Implementation used in:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0xE2B9…dbb8 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Rise ProxyAdminOwner Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

DelayedWETH0xf758…6CF1 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.