RSS3 Value Sublayer
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About
The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum Layer2 built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.
$61.28 M
6.57%
Badges
About
The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum Layer2 built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceState validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Data availability
ExternalProof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Proposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Fraud proofs are in development
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
Data required to compute fraud proof is not published on chain, and currently not publicly accessible
Transaction data is submitted to a blob store contract on NearDA. Only hashes of blob data is published on an onchain inbox.
Funds can be lost if the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).
The system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1ERC721Bridge, OptimismMintableERC20Factory, L1StandardBridge.
Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.
Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 5 threshold. This address is the owner of the following contracts: ProxyAdmin. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds, and change the sequencer, state root proposer or any other system component (unlimited upgrade power).
Those are the participants of the RSS3Multisig.
The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):
The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Upgrade delay: No delay
Upgrade delay: No delay
Contract that stores the Guardian address and allows it to pause the system.
Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
