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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

RSS3 Value Sublayer logo
RSS3 Value Sublayer

This project is archived and no longer maintained.

RSS3 is retiring the Value Sublayer (VSL) and migrating to Ethereum. The L2 halted on April 24, 2026 and VSL bridge withdrawals have been paused. Previously-initiated withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration; $RSS3 on VSL will be migrated to Ethereum via a claim portal expected in the coming weeks ($POWER converts to $RSS3 at 23:1). See the official announcement.

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About

The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum ScalingProject built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $0.000.00%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    No data
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purposes
    Universal, AI, Information
  • Chain ID
    12553

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum ScalingProject built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2024 Mar 08 — 2026 Jun 24

    Past Day UOPS
    0.000.00%
    Past Day Ops count
    0
    Max. UOPS
    2.97
    2025 Feb 28
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    No data
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2024 Mar 08 — 2026 Jun 24

    Total cost
    $38.80 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.001916
    Avg cost per day
    $49.94
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    2024 Mar 08 — 2026 Jun 25

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    7 minutes
    Avg. state updates interval
    59 minutes
    Milestones & Incidents

    RSS3 VSL migration to Ethereum

    2026 Apr 24th

    RSS3 retires VSL: L2 halted, bridge withdrawals paused, $RSS3 migrates to Ethereum via portal.

    Learn more

    RSS3 starts using NearDA

    2024 May 7th

    RSS3 Network starts publishing data to NearDA.

    Learn more
    Risk summary
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL),
    2. the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be frozen if

    1. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    RSS3 is retiring the Value Sublayer (VSL) and migrating to Ethereum. The L2 halted on April 24, 2026 and VSL bridge withdrawals have been paused. Previously-initiated withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration; $RSS3 on VSL will be migrated to Ethereum via a claim portal expected in the coming weeks ($POWER converts to $RSS3 at 23:1). See the official announcement.
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    None

    Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage
    RSS3 Value Sublayer
    RSS3 Value Sublayer is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    Data required to compute fraud proof is not published on chain, and currently not publicly accessible

    Transaction data is submitted to a blob store contract on NearDA. Only hashes of blob data is published on an onchain inbox.

    • Funds can be lost if the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).

    1. REP-20 - Data Availability Layer Integration
    2. RSS3 NearDA blob store contract
    3. On-Chain Inbox
    4. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    5. BatchInbox - address
    6. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: NEAR DA logoNEAR DA
    State validation
    No state validation

    OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.

    • Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function
    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    2
    Last upgrade
    8mo 17d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    1y 1mo
    Updates
    2026 April 27, 14:37 UTC
    High severity
    16changes

    RSS3 has announced the retirement of VSL and is migrating to Ethereum. On 2026-04-24 the L2 stopped producing blocks (last VSL block at 08:59 UTC), the L1 sequencer inbox went silent (last batch at 05:24 UTC), and the batcher EOA was swept to the RSS3 Multisig. VSL bridge withdrawals are paused; pending withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration and $RSS3 on VSL will be claimable on Ethereum via a portal in the coming weeks. Added a redWarning and incident milestone on the project. L1StandardBridge — operator sweep added and used (on-chain upgrade, new implementation 0x12665984... deployed 2026-04-17 and activated before the halt). The new impl sets operator = RSS3Multisig (0x8AC80fa0) and exposes an operator-only sweep(token, to, amount) that transfers any ERC-20 held by the bridge to an arbitrary address with no withdrawal proof or delay. On 2026-04-22 06:29 UTC (block 24933678) the operator used this to move the full bridge escrow to the RSS3 Multisig in a single batched sweep: ~464,630,520 RSS3, 1,023 USDC, 284 USDT, and 0.84 WETH. Mirrors the pre-existing OptimismPortal operator = WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig (which can rewrite withdrawal calldata on finalization). SystemConfig modeling fix (no on-chain upgrade — same impl 0x164883d4... as before). With the L2 halted, the batcher's last 10 outgoing txs include 3 consolidation transfers into the RSS3 Multisig (one of 33.45 ETH), dropping its top-address ratio to 7/10 = 0.70. That trips the standard opStackSequencerInbox handler's 80% qualification threshold, which derives sequencerInbox from the batcher's tx pattern, so the field errored out. Fixed via a new opstack/SystemConfig rss3 template variant (scoped to RSS3's SystemConfig via validAddresses ) that hardcodes sequencerInbox to 0xfFFF...12553 — the pre-halt discovered value, matching RSS3's chainId 12553 under the standard OP Stack predeploy convention and consistent with 47/50 (94%) of the batcher's outgoing txs over a 50-tx window going to that address. L1StandardBridge: diff

    RSS3 has announced the retirement of VSL and is migrating to Ethereum. On 2026-04-24 the L2 stopped producing blocks (last VSL block at 08:59 UTC), the L1 sequencer inbox went silent (last batch at 05:24 UTC), and the batcher EOA was swept to the RSS3 Multisig. VSL bridge withdrawals are paused; pending withdrawals will be completed as part of the migration and $RSS3 on VSL will be claimable on Ethereum via a portal in the coming weeks. Added a redWarning and incident milestone on the project.

    L1StandardBridge — operator sweep added and used (on-chain upgrade, new implementation 0x12665984... deployed 2026-04-17 and activated before the halt). The new impl sets operator = RSS3Multisig (0x8AC80fa0) and exposes an operator-only sweep(token, to, amount) that transfers any ERC-20 held by the bridge to an arbitrary address with no withdrawal proof or delay. On 2026-04-22 06:29 UTC (block 24933678) the operator used this to move the full bridge escrow to the RSS3 Multisig in a single batched sweep: ~464,630,520 RSS3, 1,023 USDC, 284 USDT, and 0.84 WETH. Mirrors the pre-existing OptimismPortal operator = WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig (which can rewrite withdrawal calldata on finalization).

    SystemConfig modeling fix (no on-chain upgrade — same impl 0x164883d4... as before). With the L2 halted, the batcher’s last 10 outgoing txs include 3 consolidation transfers into the RSS3 Multisig (one of 33.45 ETH), dropping its top-address ratio to 7/10 = 0.70. That trips the standard opStackSequencerInbox handler’s 80% qualification threshold, which derives sequencerInbox from the batcher’s tx pattern, so the field errored out. Fixed via a new opstack/SystemConfig_rss3 template variant (scoped to RSS3’s SystemConfig via validAddresses) that hardcodes sequencerInbox to 0xfFFF...12553 — the pre-halt discovered value, matching RSS3’s chainId 12553 under the standard OP Stack predeploy convention and consistent with 47/50 (94%) of the batcher’s outgoing txs over a 50-tx window going to that address.

    L1StandardBridge: diff

    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904) {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.3.role:
    - ".$admin"
    + "admin"
    directlyReceivedPermissions.3.description:
    - "upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein."
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x4cbab69108Aa72151EDa5A3c164eA86845f18438) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. RSS3 is retiring VSL: this fork of the L1StandardBridge adds an operator-only sweep(token, to, amount) that transfers any ERC-20 held by the bridge to an arbitrary address, with no withdrawal proof or delay.
    template:
    - "opstack/L1StandardBridge"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x6799eb37a55a04ec21fc5819a2f479c30a69b3e79258d12ac41c10342b9f76b1"
    + "0x4940bd1f0459679a56c4724a92058ea37f085b3bd72df87063c6c3f5b4381f5d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xE27083804bFf17Ec05f4300a43b7c40F3E01e486"
    + "eth:0x12665984Ba38943C74D8504d4E8a41a96dE25E83"
    values.operator:
    + "eth:0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE27083804bFf17Ec05f4300a43b7c40F3E01e486:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x12665984Ba38943C74D8504d4E8a41a96dE25E83:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    category:
    - {"name":"Canonical Bridges","priority":2}
    }
    contract RSS3Multisig (eth:0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x4cbab69108Aa72151EDa5A3c164eA86845f18438","description":"can call sweep(token, to, amount) to transfer any ERC-20 held by the L1StandardBridge to an arbitrary address — the mechanism RSS3 is using to move bridge escrow during the VSL → Ethereum migration.","role":".operator"}
    receivedPermissions.3.role:
    - ".$admin"
    + "admin"
    receivedPermissions.3.description:
    - "upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein."
    }
    2025 October 12, 22:13 UTC
    High severity
    13changes

    Changed batcher and proposer. L2OutputOracle — same code, implementation upgraded to change PROPOSER https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x5Fe6BFbb2C2c78c0baF0bFbb86420903E2E9f8a5/eth:0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30

    Changed batcher and proposer.

    L2OutputOracle — same code, implementation upgraded to change PROPOSER
    https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x5Fe6BFbb2C2c78c0baF0bFbb86420903E2E9f8a5/eth:0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x80e73D6BfC73c567032304C3891a06c2d9954d09) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0x0244f7204b9c554306053Cc557e14D6Cbd40a33C"
    + "eth:0xC180574374b8FdE9C5b40E0d5D34946b228b7316"
    }
    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0xE6f24d2C32B3109B18ed33cF08eFb490b1e09C10) {
    +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x5Fe6BFbb2C2c78c0baF0bFbb86420903E2E9f8a5"
    + "eth:0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2025-10-09T08:59:47.000Z","0xef115941c77982c1142c03cdc3e41e8060a6c169d64deadd1d4eee73248cd353",["eth:0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.proposer:
    - "eth:0x0016b6bacD56a0D1DaFdA52d06B7eFe65AA0816a"
    + "eth:0xa5CB506D2de132006204183E2f1869575cA646Bd"
    values.PROPOSER:
    - "eth:0x0016b6bacD56a0D1DaFdA52d06B7eFe65AA0816a"
    + "eth:0xa5CB506D2de132006204183E2f1869575cA646Bd"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5Fe6BFbb2C2c78c0baF0bFbb86420903E2E9f8a5:
    - "L2OutputOracle"
    implementationNames.eth:0xc451292a72a4bA2B34c4295c7Df58cE7d45F5d30:
    + "L2OutputOracle"
    }
    2024 October 23, 09:07 UTC
    High severity
    20changes

    OptimismPortal upgrade: An 'operator' address is introduced that can call a new finalizeWithdrawalTransaction() with additional arbitrary calldata that then replaces the calldata of the transaction being finalized. This allows arbitrary rerouting of funds or using legitimate withdrawals to make arbitrary (malicious) calls.

    OptimismPortal upgrade: An ‘operator’ address is introduced that can call a new finalizeWithdrawalTransaction() with additional arbitrary calldata that then replaces the calldata of the transaction being finalized. This allows arbitrary rerouting of funds or using legitimate withdrawals to make arbitrary (malicious) calls.

    contract OptimismPortal (0x6A12432491bbbE8d3babf75F759766774C778Db4) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the OptimismPortal also allows an 'operator' address to overwrite the calldata of withdrawals on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts.
    template:
    - "opstack/OptimismPortal"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x347fa20f8dfc82ef7433b3eb7915a248528d908fc77907c0d879f96a00106732"
    + "0x84fc56b8558ed12594b26997990b30e8da2a496417a7d467aa0e31e5281f9168"
    issuedPermissions.2:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","target":"0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941","via":[{"address":"0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904","delay":0}]}
    issuedPermissions.1.permission:
    - "upgrade"
    + "guard"
    issuedPermissions.1.target:
    - "0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941"
    + "0x7ef00577fAAa44D0491970D6516eB7b90EC3c80E"
    issuedPermissions.1.via.0:
    - {"address":"0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904","delay":0}
    issuedPermissions.0.permission:
    - "guard"
    + "configure"
    issuedPermissions.0.target:
    - "0x7ef00577fAAa44D0491970D6516eB7b90EC3c80E"
    + "0xC4f81F990b47c12144e74A901162A2cFDf4b5a9d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "0xc5b17F1DF579D033DB17174B837fe4D2dF05b050"
    + "0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2024-10-22T16:54:35.000Z","0x8a4278f30ca52243ebf1afe80f5ec3edcb73f34f9e826f8523c30029bbd7fbd8",["0x491825c073DaE5b31b0AAE4c01f2EBEa254c838b"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.operator:
    + "0xC4f81F990b47c12144e74A901162A2cFDf4b5a9d"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig (0xC4f81F990b47c12144e74A901162A2cFDf4b5a9d)
    +++ description: None
    2024 March 28, 10:04 UTC
    11changes

    Provide description of changes. This section will be preserved.

    Provide description of changes. This section will be preserved.

    Initial discovery

    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (0x1075B29e5F7a911128C77F3989702E150C988904)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (0x1D89222C28C3ba471be822203998f27Df4727C0b)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SuperchainConfig (0x3e5FaB39eD4eFB4fc29A5201059AE819f2f0418A)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1StandardBridge (0x4cbab69108Aa72151EDa5A3c164eA86845f18438)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OptimismPortal (0x6A12432491bbbE8d3babf75F759766774C778Db4)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AddressManager (0x75D340E5BF2eAbC39A04AF4229Ce7875B4A73B03)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SystemConfig (0x80e73D6BfC73c567032304C3891a06c2d9954d09)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (0x892CAa506c86C5101f5eC11C6f09589c9dC8A85C)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RSS3Multisig (0x8AC80fa0993D95C9d6B8Cb494E561E6731038941)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (0x938D0Bb4B584d4F6f793fCB7808cA2Eea15B69A8)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L2OutputOracle (0xE6f24d2C32B3109B18ed33cF08eFb490b1e09C10)
    +++ description: None
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address
    2. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular messaging

    The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete.

    • Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    1. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function
    3. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    RSS3Multisig0x8AC8…8941

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • SuperchainConfig
      • L1StandardBridge
      • OptimismPortal
      • SystemConfig
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • L2OutputOracle
    • Can interact with L1StandardBridge
      • can call sweep(token, to, amount) to transfer any ERC-20 held by the L1StandardBridge to an arbitrary address — the mechanism RSS3 is using to move bridge escrow during the VSL → Ethereum migration
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings

    Participants (5):

    0xc06d…C3DD0xEE52…CbEF0x70f8…317f0xf877…D3100xF209…77A7
    WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig0xC4f8…5a9d

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with OptimismPortal
      • can overwrite the calldata of any withdrawals in the OptimismPortal on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts

    Participants (5):

    0xF209…77A70xf877…D3100xEE52…CbEF0x70f8…317f0xc06d…C3DD
    EOA 10xa5CB…46Bd
    • Can interact with L2OutputOracle
      • Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 20xB5C2…98a9
    • Can interact with L2OutputOracle
    EOA 30xC180…7316
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 40xC487…6272
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
    EOA 50x7ef0…c80E
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
    • Can interact with OptimismPortal
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    SystemConfig0x80e7…4d09Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
      • batcherHash: EOA 3
      • owner: EOA 4
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    L2OutputOracle0xE6f2…9C10Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
      • challenger: EOA 2
      • proposer: EOA 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    SuperchainConfig0x3e5F…418AImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
      • guardian: EOA 5
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0x892C…A85CImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    L1ERC721Bridge0x938D…69A8Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0x1075…8904
    • Roles:
      • owner: RSS3Multisig
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x1D89…7C0bImplementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x4cba…8438Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. RSS3 is retiring VSL: this fork of the L1StandardBridge adds an operator-only sweep(token, to, amount) that transfers any ERC-20 held by the bridge to an arbitrary address, with no withdrawal proof or delay.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
      • operator: RSS3Multisig

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay
    OptimismPortal
    Escrow
    0x6A12…8Db4Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the OptimismPortal also allows an ‘operator’ address to overwrite the calldata of withdrawals on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RSS3Multisig
      • guardian: EOA 5
      • operator: WithdrawalOverwriterMultisig
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    RSS3Multisig with no delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).