RSS3 Value Sublayer
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About
The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum Layer2 built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.
Badges
About
The RSS3 Value Sublayer (VSL) as part of the RSS3 Network, is an Ethereum Layer2 built with OP Stack, handling the value and ownership of AI and Open Information.
Recategorisation
The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.
The project will move to Others because:
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceState validation
NoneCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Data availability
ExternalProof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Proposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Fraud proofs are not enabled
OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
Data required to compute fraud proof is not published on chain, and currently not publicly accessible
Transaction data is submitted to a blob store contract on NearDA. Only hashes of blob data is published on an onchain inbox.
Funds can be lost if the data is not made available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable or malicious transaction root (CRITICAL).
- REP-20 - Data Availability Layer Integration
- RSS3 NearDA blob store contract
- On-Chain Inbox
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
NEAR DAThe system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular messaging
The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Roles:
Challenger is an actor allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Guardian is an actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
Proposer is an actor allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.
Actors:
- A Multisig with 3 / 5 threshold.
- Can act on behalf of ProxyAdmin.
- Can change the configuration of AddressManager - set and change address mappings - acting via ProxyAdmin.
- Can upgrade the implementation of OptimismMintableERC20Factory, SuperchainConfig, OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L1ERC721Bridge, L2OutputOracle - acting via ProxyAdmin.
- Can upgrade the implementation of L1StandardBridge - upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein - acting via ProxyAdmin.
- A Multisig with 3 / 5 threshold.
- Can change the configuration of OptimismPortal - can overwrite the calldata of any withdrawals in the OptimismPortal on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts.
A Proposer.
A Sequencer.
A Guardian.
A Challenger.
Ethereum
- Can be used to configure AddressManager - set and change address mappings.
- Can be used to upgrade implementation of OptimismMintableERC20Factory, SuperchainConfig, OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L1ERC721Bridge, L2OutputOracle.
- Can be used to upgrade implementation of L1StandardBridge - upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.
Upgrade delay: No delay
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. This contract can store any token.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the OptimismPortal also allows an ‘operator’ address to overwrite the calldata of withdrawals on finalization, potentially stealing the withdrawn funds or calling arbitrary contracts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.
