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SummaryValue LockedRisk summaryRisk analysisTechnologyOperatorWithdrawalsPermissionsSmart contracts

ZKSwap 1.0 logoZKSwap 1.0

This project is archived.

About

ZKSwap is a fork of ZKsync with added AMM functionality. Based on ZK Rollup technology, ZKSwap aims to execute the full functionality of Uniswap on Layer 2, but increase the TPS, and make transaction processing cheaper.

Value Locked
$4.82 M7.26%
Canonically Bridged
$4.82 M
Externally Bridged
$0.00
Natively Minted
$0.00
View TVL Breakdown
  • Tokens
  • Daily UOPS
    No data
  • 30D ops count
    No data
  • Type
    ZK Rollup
  • Purposes
    Payments, Exchange
    • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    About

    ZKSwap is a fork of ZKsync with added AMM functionality. Based on ZK Rollup technology, ZKSwap aims to execute the full functionality of Uniswap on Layer 2, but increase the TPS, and make transaction processing cheaper.

    Value Locked
    Canonical
    External
    Native
    Risk summary
    This project includes unverified contracts. (CRITICAL)
    Version 3 of the protocol called ZkSpace is available and users are encouraged to move their assets there.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the user is unable to generate the non-trivial ZK proof for exodus withdraw.

    Users can be censored if

    1. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    This project includes unverified contracts. (CRITICAL)
    Version 3 of the protocol called ZkSpace is available and users are encouraged to move their assets there.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

    State validation

    ZK proofs (SN)

    SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.

    Data availability

    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window

    Unknown

    Some contracts are not verified, so there is no way to assess the exit window.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.

    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.

    1. ZKSwap Introduces Practical ZK Rollups - Medium blog

    Zero knowledge SNARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSNARKs are still new and experimental cryptography. Cryptography has made a lot of advancements in the recent years but all cryptographic solutions rely on time to prove their security. In addition zkSNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.

    • Funds can be stolen if the cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.

    1. ZKSwap Whitepaper - Medium blog

    All data required for proofs is published onchain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published onchain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.

    1. ZKSwap Introduces Practical ZK Rollups - Medium blog
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. ZKSwap Validator - ZKSwap wiki

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    1. ZkSync.sol#L404 - ZKSwap source code
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction does not require a merkle proof.

    1. Make Transaction

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. ZkSync.sol#L404 - ZKSwap source code

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into Exodus Mode, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a zero knowledge proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    • Funds can be lost if the user is unable to generate the non-trivial ZK proof for exodus withdraw.

    1. ZkSyncCommitBlock.sol#L230-L246 - ZKSwap source code
    Permissions

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    zkSwap 1.0 Admin 0x7D1a…F037

    This address is the master of Upgrade Gatekeeper contract, which is allowed to perform upgrades for Governance, Verifier, VerifierExit, PairManager and ZkSync contracts.

    Active validator 0x0421…fDb3

    This actor is allowed to propose, revert and execute L2 blocks on L1. A list of active validators is kept inside Governance contract and can be updated by zkSwap 1.0 Admin.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):

    ZkSync 0x8ECa…97adImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main Rollup contract. Operator commits blocks, provides ZK proof which is validated by the Verifier contract and process withdrawals (executes blocks). Users deposit ETH and ERC20 tokens. This contract defines the upgrade delay in the UPGRADE_NOTICE_PERIOD constant that is currently set to 8 days. This contract can store any token.

    ZkSyncCommitBlock 0x2c54…e157

    Additional contract to store implementation details of the main ZkSync contract.

    ZkSyncExit 0x8A1D…81e5

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    Governance 0x02ec…4B04Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Keeps a list of block producers and whitelisted tokens.

    PairManager 0x6611…a9B3Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    Verifier 0x27C2…df56Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    VerifierExit 0x9613…521fImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    UpgradeGatekeeper 0x714B…89aB

    This is the contract that implements the upgrade mechanism for Governance, Verifier and ZkSync. It relies on the ZkSync contract to enforce upgrade delays.

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8 days delay on code upgrades.

    • Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).