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Risk Analysis
Public DA layers are data availability solutions designed for broad, general use across multiple scaling projects. These solutions aim to be flexible, scalable, and accessible to a wide range of users without significant modifications or integration efforts.
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| Da Layer Risks | Bridge Risks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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# | DA Layer | Economic
security | Fraud
detection | Bridge | Committee
security | Upgradeability | Relayer
failure | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Da Layer Risks | Bridge Risks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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# | DA Layer | Economic
security | Fraud
detection | Bridge | Committee
security | Upgradeability | Relayer
failure | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Da Layer Risks | Bridge Risks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
# | DA Layer | Economic
security | Fraud
detection | Bridge | Committee
security | Upgradeability | Relayer
failure | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1 |  | EigenDA EigenDA | Node operators are required to stake a minimum of 32 ETH (first quorum) or 1 EIGEN (second quorum) to become members of the DA network. Although slashing is enabled at EigenLayer protocol level, individual AVSs like EigenDA need to activate it by migrating to Operators Sets and defining slashing conditions. Currently, there is no slashing condition in place for misbehaving nodes. The EIGEN token social forking protocol for intersubjective attributable faults is under active development. | There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. | No Bridge | N/A | N/A | N/A | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| DACert Verifier (EigenDA V2) | The committee requires an honest minority (less than 1/3) of members (or the network stake) to prevent the DA bridge from accepting an unavailable data commitment. There are 71 operators currently registered in the committee, but entry or exit of members is partially controlled by a centralized entity. | There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. | Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 |  | Celestia Celestia | There are staked assets on the DA layer that can be slashed in case of a data withholding attack. A dishonest supermajority of validators must collude to finalize a block with missing or invalid data. The invalid block would be added to the chain but rejected by honest full nodes. | The DA layer uses data availability sampling (DAS) to protect against data withholding attacks. However, the block reconstruction protocol, which enables the minimum number of light nodes to collectively reconstruct the block, is still under development. | No Bridge | N/A | N/A | N/A | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Blobstream | The committee requires an honest minority (less than 1/3) of members (or the network stake) to prevent the DA bridge from accepting an unavailable data commitment. Participation in the committee is permissionless, based only on stake requirements and an honest majority of validators processing the new operator's request to join the active set. | There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. | The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3 |  | Avail Avail | There are staked assets on the DA layer that can be slashed in case of a data withholding attack. A dishonest supermajority of validators must collude to finalize a block with missing or invalid data. The invalid block would be added to the chain but rejected by honest full nodes. | The DA layer uses data availability sampling (DAS) to protect against data withholding attacks. However, the block reconstruction protocol, which enables the minimum number of light nodes to collectively reconstruct the block, is still under development. | Vector | The committee requires an honest minority (less than 1/3) of members (or the network stake) to prevent the DA bridge from accepting an unavailable data commitment. Participation in the committee is permissionless, based only on stake requirements and an honest majority of validators processing the new operator's request to join the active set. | There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. | The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4 |  | Espresso DA Espresso DA | Although node operators are required to stake ESP tokens to become members of the DA network, there is no slashing mechanism in place for misbehaving nodes. | There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer. | No Bridge | N/A | N/A | N/A | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| HotShot Light Client | The committee requires an honest minority (less than 1/3) of members (or the network stake) to prevent the DA bridge from accepting an unavailable data commitment. Participation in the committee is permissionless, based only on stake requirements and an honest majority of validators processing the new operator's request to join the active set. | There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. | The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| TEE Bridge | The committee security is based on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) with on-chain key registration and verification. TEE attestation keys are registered on-chain, providing transparency and governance control over valid TEE configurations. However, compromised TEE keys can still sign false availability attestations before governance can revoke them, creating a timing window for attacks. The system also has infrastructure dependencies on the TEE provider (e.g., Intel's Attestation Service) and requires coordinated responses to TCB recovery events when new vulnerabilities are discovered. | There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed. | The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridge does not have a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||