Summary Value Secured Activity Milestones & Incidents Risk summary Risk analysis Stage Data availability State validation Upgrades & Governance Updates Operator Sequencing Withdrawals Other considerations Permissions Smart contracts

ApeChain

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

ApeChain is an Optimium built on the Arbitrum Orbit stack utilizing $APE as its native gas token. It fuels culture by being the chain for digital and IRL communities, builders, creators, collectors, gamers and beyond.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$18.46 M6.06%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

1.0511.0%

Gas token

APE

Type

Other

Purpose

Universal

Host chain

Arbitrum One

Chain ID

33139

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

100% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

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About

Why is the project listed in others?

There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

Learn more about the recategorisation here.

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Activity

2025 Jul 22 — 2026 Jul 22

Past Day UOPS

1.0511.0%

Past Day Ops count

91.32 K

Total Ops

92.16 M

since 2024 Aug 28

Max. UOPS

62.10

2025 Nov 06

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

<1.01

Milestones & Incidents

ApeChain switches from DAC to Ethereum calldata

2026 Jul 1st

ApeChain stops posting data via the AnyTrust DAC and starts posting batches directly to Arbitrum as calldata.

Learn more

Mainnet Launch

2024 Oct 19th

ApeChain launches its Mainnet.

Learn more

Risk summary

There are 3 additional risks coming from the host chain

Arbitrum One

The project relies on program hashes that could not be successfully reproduced from their published sources.

(CRITICAL)

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

	SEQUENCER FAILURE	STATE VALIDATION	DATA AVAILABILITY	EXIT WINDOW	PROPOSER FAILURE
Arbitrum One L2	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose
ApeChain L3 • Individual	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose
ApeChain L3 • Combined	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose

L2 & L3 individual risks

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

L3 combined risks

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

L3 combined risks

The information below reflects combined L2 & L3 risks.

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Stage

ApeChain is not even a

Stage 0

project.

The requirement for available node software is under review

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All transaction data is recorded on chain

All executed transactions are submitted to an on chain smart contract. The execution of the rollup is based entirely on the submitted transactions, so anyone monitoring the contract can know the correct state of the rollup chain.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode or stakeOnNewNode. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.

Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ

Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.

Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification

	0x2dc8...3e83	Code unknown
Apechain TEE Enclave hash	0x025b...2373	Code unknown	None
	0x0064...28e1	Github
	0x0029...0b3e	Github

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

9mo 11d ago

Avg upgrade interval

9mo 7d

Updates

2026 July 03, 10:11 UTC

5changes

SequencerInbox sequencerVersion flipped 0x88 → 0x00 : latest batch posted as Ethereum calldata instead of a DAC certificate (AnyTrust fall-back). ApeChainMultisig dropped one signer; threshold 3/7 → 3/6.

SequencerInbox sequencerVersion flipped 0x88 → 0x00: latest batch posted as Ethereum calldata instead of a DAC certificate (AnyTrust fall-back). ApeChainMultisig dropped one signer; threshold 3/7 → 3/6.

	contract ApeChainMultisig (arb1:0x2B1FbeE3c7D278bFD9E179893FF304fE49FA7DDF) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.3:
-	"arb1:0x83F58bBB1a940E364ED2dE775D1FD5218135cCE3"
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"3 of 7 (43%)"
+	"3 of 6 (50%)"
	}

	contract SequencerInbox (arb1:0xE6a92Ae29E24C343eE66A2B3D3ECB783d65E4a3C) [orbitstack/SequencerInbox_Espresso] {
	+++ description: The Espresso TEE sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
	values.sequencerVersion:
-	"0x88"
+	"0x00"
	}

2026 June 26, 08:39 UTC

38changes

Removed SGX TEE verifier flow from tee attestation verification, leaving only Nitro. Registered new wasm module root (ArbOS commitment) and valid TEE enclave hash. Both are not known from other depoloyments and are not verified. Also, rotated one Apechain ms member and added two more.

Removed SGX TEE verifier flow from tee attestation verification, leaving only Nitro.

Registered new wasm module root (ArbOS commitment) and valid TEE enclave hash. Both are not known from other depoloyments and are not verified.

Also, rotated one Apechain ms member and added two more.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract EspressoSGXTEEVerifier (arb1:0x05A16513BF74629b834878731f07b075Cca33f55) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoSGXTEEVerifier]
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an Intel SGX TEE.

	contract ApeChainMultisig (arb1:0x2B1FbeE3c7D278bFD9E179893FF304fE49FA7DDF) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"arb1:0xe2d8761a2a87b06413e39D08C31b683cDD4dF4a4"
	values.$members.1:
+	"arb1:0x6c447467FED500eEa91309c0b0c302Aa9763412d"
	values.$members.2:
-	"arb1:0x651cF50272Ffa8f6D954080DF743410Bb0aa7AFa"
+	"arb1:0xbc1Cb7133f080eB61262dafB77788B95e208B77F"
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"3 of 5 (60%)"
+	"3 of 7 (43%)"
	}

	contract RollupProxy (arb1:0x374de579AE15aD59eD0519aeAf1A23F348Df259c) [orbitstack/RollupProxy_fastConfirm] {
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
	+++ description: ArbOS version derived from known wasmModuleRoots.
	values.arbOsFromWmRoot:
-	"0x5b82aa008989d331bf6f3cf75b85a04c9ee809447c19b85fecaf3b7d749a6576"
+	"0x2dc824fed99dcdf659f2523ad68d1ec70bd5f08e3c533996be3a2d2b19813e83"
	+++ description: Root hash of the WASM module used for execution, like a fingerprint of the L2 logic. Can be associated with ArbOS versions.
	values.wasmModuleRoot:
-	"0x5b82aa008989d331bf6f3cf75b85a04c9ee809447c19b85fecaf3b7d749a6576"
+	"0x2dc824fed99dcdf659f2523ad68d1ec70bd5f08e3c533996be3a2d2b19813e83"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract EspressoTEEVerifier (arb1:0x4fd6D0995B3016726D5674992c1Ec1bDe0989cF5) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoTEEVerifier_gateway]
	+++ description: TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports both Intel SGX and AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract QuoteVerifier (arb1:0x69523d25E25e5c78d828Df90459b75F189D40Cf7) [espresso/Sequencing/QuoteVerifier]
	+++ description: The QuoteVerifier contract is used by the EspressoTEEVerifier to verify the validity of the TEE quote. It references a PCCSRouter (arb1:0x0d089B3fA00CBAD0a5098025519e9e4620622acF), an access point for Intel SGX 'collateral', crucial references of which some modular contracts are unverified.

	contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave's code and initial data) and delete all registered signers."
+	"add, remove or disable supported enclave hashes."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"arb1:0x05A16513BF74629b834878731f07b075Cca33f55"
+	"arb1:0x9440e52851706A261965c128A6CB3b5C455177Fb"
	receivedPermissions.1.description:
-	"change the modular TEE verifier contracts."
+	"change the TEE verifier contract."
	receivedPermissions.1.from:
-	"arb1:0x4fd6D0995B3016726D5674992c1Ec1bDe0989cF5"
+	"arb1:0x9440e52851706A261965c128A6CB3b5C455177Fb"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract EspressoNitroTEEVerifier (arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029) [apechain/EspressoNitroTEEVerifier_modifiableVerifier]
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE.
	Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.

	contract SequencerInbox (arb1:0xE6a92Ae29E24C343eE66A2B3D3ECB783d65E4a3C) [orbitstack/SequencerInbox_Espresso] {
	+++ description: The Espresso TEE sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
	values.espressoTEEVerifier:
-	"arb1:0x4fd6D0995B3016726D5674992c1Ec1bDe0989cF5"
+	"arb1:0x9440e52851706A261965c128A6CB3b5C455177Fb"
	}

	EOA (arb1:0xFb259F30199B4f4AB9c9a26019f83b195837075E) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029","description":"set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave's code and initial data) and delete all registered signers.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.1.via:
+	[{"address":"arb1:0x927dCF5D08795eEFd7C2bEC89777CFCD67950870"}]
	receivedPermissions.1.role:
-	".owner"
+	"admin"
	receivedPermissions.1.description:
-	"set the nitro enclave verifier that checks the TEE attestations."
	receivedPermissions.1.from:
-	"arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029"
+	"arb1:0x9440e52851706A261965c128A6CB3b5C455177Fb"
	receivedPermissions.1.permission:
-	"interact"
+	"upgrade"
	eoaWithUpgradePermissions:
+	true
	directlyReceivedPermissions:
+	[{"permission":"act","from":"arb1:0x927dCF5D08795eEFd7C2bEC89777CFCD67950870","role":".owner"}]
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (arb1:0x927dCF5D08795eEFd7C2bEC89777CFCD67950870) [global/ProxyAdmin]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EspressoTEEVerifier (arb1:0x9440e52851706A261965c128A6CB3b5C455177Fb) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoTEEVerifier_onlyNitro]
	+++ description: TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EspressoNitroTEEVerifier (arb1:0xBA7E3C18A16FfD8062047422c63027459105BB35) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoNitroTEEVerifier_WithServices]
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE.
	Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.

2026 June 05, 10:09 UTC

High severity

8changes

Switched to checking TEE attestations with zk in the style of Appchain. Appchain contracts resued (a slightly older version though): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x9E490ce0203d191Cae0ABF5614D561cC6fdc771f/arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029, the only difference is that owner can change the TEE verifier contact.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract CertManager (arb1:0x27CA506AC6567Ef79d364b56cf4dE9C4141d803A) [espresso/Sequencing]
	+++ description: The CertManager is used for anchoring TEE attestation keys to a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).

	contract EspressoTEEVerifier (arb1:0x4fd6D0995B3016726D5674992c1Ec1bDe0989cF5) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoTEEVerifier_gateway] {
	+++ description: TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports both Intel SGX and AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.espressoNitroTEEVerifier:
-	"arb1:0xC17cd192bd0aF90a0a5c6021ee038E9223bf390C"
+	"arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029"
	}

	contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.2:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"arb1:0xC17cd192bd0aF90a0a5c6021ee038E9223bf390C","description":"set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave's code and initial data) and delete all registered signers.","role":".owner"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract EspressoNitroTEEVerifier (arb1:0xC17cd192bd0aF90a0a5c6021ee038E9223bf390C) [espresso/Sequencing/EspressoNitroTEEVerifier]
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE.
	Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract NitroEnclaveVerifier (arb1:0x1b467761E7a125381c4f654e11B397023Fc53DD8) [espresso/Sequencing/NitroEnclaveVerifier]
	+++ description: ZK-backed verifier for AWS Nitro enclave attestations. Verifies ZK proofs (RiscZero, Succinct SP1 or Pico) that attest AWS Nitro cert chain validation was executed correctly off-chain.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EspressoNitroTEEVerifier (arb1:0x9bE8dA826D2C6E6708372f0d056f57B97e6dB029) [apechain/EspressoNitroTEEVerifier_modifiableVerifier]
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE.
	Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SP1Verifier (arb1:0xD9d5C8456a168Dd25561064F47bF116111131B1D) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
	+++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).

2026 May 08, 09:35 UTC

3changes

Shared SafeL2 ( 0x6Dc61D9E... ) — signer 0x5582a8A4 removed. Threshold unchanged at 2; total signers 4 → 3 (50% → 67%). Same shared multisig change observed on appchain (same address on Ethereum), molten , rari .

Shared SafeL2 (0x6Dc61D9E...) — signer 0x5582a8A4 removed. Threshold unchanged at 2; total signers 4 → 3 (50% → 67%). Same shared multisig change observed on appchain (same address on Ethereum), molten, rari.

	contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.1:
-	"arb1:0x5582a8A4f2B04341697cEA4Cf4289a01814C26e6"
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"2 of 4 (50%)"
+	"2 of 3 (67%)"
	}

2026 February 10, 15:07 UTC

High severity

7changes

Ownership of Espresso TEE verifier contracts (EspressoSGXTEEVerifier, EspressoTEEVerifier, EspressoNitroTEEVerifier) transferred from EOA to new SafeL2 multisig.

	contract EspressoSGXTEEVerifier (arb1:0x05A16513BF74629b834878731f07b075Cca33f55) {
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an Intel SGX TEE.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.owner:
-	"arb1:0xFb259F30199B4f4AB9c9a26019f83b195837075E"
+	"arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5"
	}

	contract EspressoTEEVerifier (arb1:0x4fd6D0995B3016726D5674992c1Ec1bDe0989cF5) {
	+++ description: TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports both Intel SGX and AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.owner:
-	"arb1:0xFb259F30199B4f4AB9c9a26019f83b195837075E"
+	"arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5"
	}

	contract EspressoNitroTEEVerifier (arb1:0xC17cd192bd0aF90a0a5c6021ee038E9223bf390C) {
	+++ description: Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.owner:
-	"arb1:0xFb259F30199B4f4AB9c9a26019f83b195837075E"
+	"arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5"
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x6Dc61D9E366697979f69D89a154f2F8cd2F11dA5)
	+++ description: None

Operator

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to

Arbitrum One

The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 3d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

Sequencing

Delayed forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 3d.

Withdrawals

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to

Arbitrum One

Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

Inside Arbitrum Nitro

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Arbitrum One

Actors:

ApeChainMultisig0x2B1F…7DDF

A Multisig with 3/6 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Bridge UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor

Participants (6):

0xe2d8…F4a4 0x6c44…412d 0xd125…d33c 0xbc1C…B77F 0x8765…0E2a 0x65c1…2eD1

SafeL20x6Dc6…1dA5

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.

Can interact with EspressoTEEVerifier
- add, remove or disable supported enclave hashes
- change the TEE verifier contract

Participants (3):

0xb9e4…9b63 0x5E76…EEAC 0x00B9…930f

EspressoTEEVerifier0x9440…77Fb

TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.

Can interact with EspressoNitroTEEVerifier
- set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave’s code and initial data) and delete all registered signers

EOA 10x3918…8f6B

Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Add/remove batchPosters (Sequencers)
- Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain

EOA 20xAcB7…D10a

Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain

EOA 30xba1E…2C1a

Can interact with NitroEnclaveVerifier
- set the root certificate, add/remove ZK verifier routes, update verifier and aggregator program IDs, and change the ZK coprocessor configuration

EOA 40xFb25…075E

Can upgrade with no delay
- EspressoTEEVerifier ProxyAdmin

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Arbitrum One

RollupProxy0x374d…259c Implementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hash (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).

Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately ApeChainMultisig
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately ApeChainMultisig
- validators: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

Bridge

Escrow

0x6B71…34b8 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow contract for the project’s gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

ChallengeManager0xAB21…3ee1 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

SequencerInbox0xE6a9…4a3C Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The Espresso TEE sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig
- batchPosterManager: EOA 1
- batchPosters: EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

UpgradeExecutor0xe032…7d72 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig
- executors: ApeChainMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

Inbox0x1B98…4D15 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

Outbox0x4F40…c2aF Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately ApeChainMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

ApeChainMultisig with no delay

NitroEnclaveVerifier0x1b46…3DD8

ZK-backed verifier for AWS Nitro enclave attestations. Verifies ZK proofs (RiscZero, Succinct SP1 or Pico) that attest AWS Nitro cert chain validation was executed correctly off-chain.