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Arbitrum One logoArbitrum One

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About

Arbitrum One is a general-purpose Optimistic Rollup built by Offchain Labs and governed by the Arbitrum DAO.


Value secured
$14.49 B2.05%
Canonically Bridged
$4.87 B
Externally Bridged
$2.60 B
Natively Minted
$7.01 B

  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    18.112.38%
  • 30D ops count
    53.31 M

  • Stage
  • Type
    Optimistic Rollup
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Arbitrum One is a general-purpose Optimistic Rollup built by Offchain Labs and governed by the Arbitrum DAO.

    Value Secured

    2024 Feb 22 — 2025 Feb 21

    Activity

    2024 Feb 22 — 2025 Feb 20

    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.


    2024 Feb 21 — 2025 Feb 20


    Milestones & Incidents

    BoLD, permissionless proof system, deployed

    2025 Feb 15th

    Exit window extension to 7 days

    2024 Oct 25th

    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.

    State validation

    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.

    Data availability

    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window

    10d
    The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.

    Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.

    Proposer failure

    Self propose

    Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.

    Rollup stageArbitrum OneArbitrum One is a
    Stage 1
    Optimistic Rollup.

    Learn more about Rollup stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect rollup security, this is an opinionated assessment of rollup maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Technology

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Sequencing followed by deterministic execution - Arbitrum documentation
    2. SequencerInbox.sol - source code, addSequencerL2BatchFromOrigin function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum
    State derivation
    Node software

    The rollup node (Arbitrum Nitro) consists of four parts. The base layer is the core Geth server (with minor modifications to add hooks) that emulates the execution of EVM contracts and maintains Ethereum’s state and a fork of wasmer that is used for native WASM execution. The middle layer, ArbOS, provides additional Layer 2 functionalities such as decompressing data batches, accounting for Layer 1 gas costs, and supporting cross-chain bridge functionalities. The top layer consists of node software, primarily from Geth, that handles client connections (i.e., regular RPC node). View Code

    Compression scheme

    The Sequencer’s batches are compressed using a general-purpose data compression algorithm known as Brotli, configured to its highest compression setting.

    Genesis state

    They performed a regenesis from Classic to Nitro, and that file represents the last Classic state. To sync from the initial Classic state, instructions can be found here.

    Data format

    Nitro supports Ethereum’s data structures and formats by incorporating the core code of the popular go-ethereum (“Geth”) Ethereum node software. The batch is composed of a header and a compressed blob, which results from compressing concatenated RLP-encoded transactions using the standard RLP encoding.

    State validation
    Under Review

    The information in the section might be incomplete or outdated.
    The L2BEAT Team is working to research & validate the content before publishing.

    A diagram of the state validation
    A diagram of the state validation

    .


    Operator

    The system has a centralized sequencer

    While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

    1. SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function
    2. Sequencer Isn’t Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular messaging

    The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

    1. Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation
    2. L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation
    3. Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog

    Autonomous exit

    Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

    Other considerations

    EVM compatible and Stylus smart contracts are supported

    Arbitrum One supports smart contracts written in Solidity and other programming languages (Rust, C++) that compile to WASM. Such smart contracts are executed by nodes using either a geth fork or a fork of wasmer inside the Nitro node, and can be proven with the onchain WASM VM.

    • Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex Nitro and WASM one-step prover implementation.

    1. Inside Arbitrum Nitro
    2. A gentle introduction: Stylus

    Arbitrum DAO is in charge of upgrades

    Arbitrum DAO allows $ARB token holders to propose and vote on changes to the organization and the technologies it governs. The governance smart contracts are implemented on Arbitrum One rollup chain. The DAO can upgrade the Arbitrum One contracts on L2 with 8d delay and - using L2 --> L1 Governance Relay, update contracts on L1 with additional 3d delay + 6d 8h delay for all L2 --> L1 messages (in total a delay of 17d 8h). The Security Council can upgrade the contracts without any delay. It can also cancel any upgrades initiated by the DAO.

    1. Arbitrum DAO
    Upgrades & Governance
    A diagram of the upgrades and governance
    A diagram of the upgrades and governance

    All critical system smart contracts are upgradeable (can be arbitrarily changed). This permission is governed by the Arbitrum Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) and their elected Security Council. The Arbitrum DAO controls Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova through upgrades and modifications to their smart contracts on Layer 1 Ethereum and the Layer 2s. While the DAO governs through token-weighted governance in their associated ARB token, the Security Council can directly act through multisigs on all three chains. Although they are technically separate and connect to different target permissions, their member- and threshold configuration is kept in sync by a manager contract on Arbitrum One sending crosschain transactions.

    Regular upgrades, Admin- and Owner actions originate from either the Arbitrum DAO or the non-emergency (Proposer-) Security Council on Arbitrum One and pass through multiple delays and timelocks before being executed at their destination. Contrarily, the three Emergency Security Council multisigs (one on each chain: Arbitrum One, Ethereum, Arbitrum Nova) can skip delays and directly access all admin- and upgrade functions of all smart contracts. These two general paths have the same destination: the respective UpgradeExecutor smart contract.

    Regular upgrades are scheduled in the L2 Timelock. The proposer Security Council can do this directly and the Arbitrum DAO (ARB token holders and delegates) must meet a CoreGovernor-enforced 5% threshold of the votable tokens. The L2 Timelock queues the transaction for a 8d delay and then sends it to the Outbox contract on Ethereum. This incurs another delay (the challenge period) of 6d 8h. When that has passed, the L1 Timelock delays for additional 3d. Both timelocks serve as delays during which the transparent transaction contents can be audited, and, in the case of the final L1 timelock, cancelled by the Emergency Security Council. Finally, the transaction can be executed, calling Admin- or Owner restricted functions of the respective destination smart contracts through the UpgradeExecutor on Ethereum. If the predefined transaction destination is Arbitrum One or -Nova, this last call is executed on L2 through the canonical bridge and the aliased address of the L1 Timelock.

    Operator roles like the Sequencers and Validators are managed using the same paths. Sequencer changes can be delegated to a Batch Poster Manager role.

    Transactions targeting the Arbitrum DAO Treasury can be scheduled in the 3d Treasury Timelock by meeting a TreasuryGovernor-enforced 3% threshold of votable ARB tokens. The Security Council cannot regularly cancel these transactions or schedule different ones but can overwrite them anyway by having upgrade permissions for all the underlying smart contracts.

    Permissions

    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain.

    Actors:

    • Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1. Is also used to relay governance action messages from Arbitrum One to Ethereum, allowing the L2Timelock and its Governance actors on L2 to act as this address and inherit all its listed permissions.
    • Can act on behalf of Bridge.
    • Is allowed to interact with RollupProxy - Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes - acting via UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Is allowed to interact with L1Timelock - cancel queued transactions - acting via UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Is allowed to interact with L1Timelock - propose transactions - acting via Bridge.
    • Is allowed to interact with L1Timelock - update the minimum delay of the timelock - acting via UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of Outbox, SequencerInbox, Inbox, RollupEventInbox, OutboxV0, OutboxV1, Bridge, EdgeChallengeManager - acting via ArbitrumProxyAdmin, UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock - acting via UpgradeExecutorAdmin, UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of RollupProxy - acting via UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L1GatewayRouter, L1ERC20Gateway, L1CustomGateway - acting via GatewaysAdmin, UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock with 3d delay, Bridge.
    SecurityCouncil 0xF06E…3F85
    • A Multisig with 9 / 12 threshold. It uses the following modules: UpgradeExecutor (Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations).
    • Can act on behalf of UpgradeExecutor.
    • Is allowed to interact with RollupProxy - Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes - acting via UpgradeExecutor.
    • Is allowed to interact with L1Timelock - cancel queued transactions - acting via UpgradeExecutor.
    • Is allowed to interact with L1Timelock - update the minimum delay of the timelock - acting via UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of Outbox, SequencerInbox, Inbox, RollupEventInbox, OutboxV0, OutboxV1, Bridge, EdgeChallengeManager - acting via ArbitrumProxyAdmin, UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of UpgradeExecutor, L1Timelock - acting via UpgradeExecutorAdmin, UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of RollupProxy - acting via UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L1GatewayRouter, L1ERC20Gateway, L1CustomGateway - acting via GatewaysAdmin, UpgradeExecutor.

    Used in:

    1. Security Council members - Arbitrum Foundation Docs
    BatchPosterManagerMultisig 0xd0FD…679B
    • A Multisig with 4 / 6 threshold.
    • Is allowed to interact with SequencerInbox - Add/remove batchPosters (Sequencers).

    Used in:

    Arbitrum One

    Actors:

    L2SecurityCouncilEmergency 0x4235…1641
    • A Multisig with 9 / 12 threshold. It uses the following modules: L2UpgradeExecutor (This contract can upgrade the L2 system’s contracts through the L2ProxyAdmin. The upgrades can be done either by the Security Council or by the L1Timelock (via its alias on L2)).
    • Can act on behalf of L2UpgradeExecutor.
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - update the minimum delay of the timelock - acting via L2UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L2ERC20Gateway, L2GatewayRouter, L2WethGateway - acting via L2GatewaysProxyAdmin, L2UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L2Timelock, TreasuryGovernor, L2ArbitrumToken, TreasuryTimelock, L2ARBGateway, L2UpgradeExecutor, SecurityCouncilManager, CoreGovernor - acting via L2ProxyAdmin, L2UpgradeExecutor.
    L2SecurityCouncilPropose 0xADd6…a941
    • A Multisig with 9 / 12 threshold. It uses the following modules: L2UpgradeExecutor (This contract can upgrade the L2 system’s contracts through the L2ProxyAdmin. The upgrades can be done either by the Security Council or by the L1Timelock (via its alias on L2)).
    • Can act on behalf of L2Timelock with 8d delay.
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - propose transactions.
    SecurityCouncilManager 0xD509…eDFC
    • This contract enforces the rules for changing members and cohorts of the SecurityCouncil and creates crosschain messages to Ethereum and Arbitrum Nova to keep the configuration in sync.
    • Can act on behalf of L2Timelock with 8d delay.
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - propose transactions.
    CoreGovernor 0xf07D…95B9
    • Governance contract accepting and managing constitutional Arbitrum Improvement Proposals (AIPs, core proposals) and, among other formal parameters, enforcing the 5% quorum for proposals.
    • Can act on behalf of L2Timelock with 8d delay.
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - cancel queued transactions.
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - propose transactions.
    L1Timelock_l2alias 0xf795…905a
    • Is allowed to interact with L2Timelock - update the minimum delay of the timelock - acting via L2UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L2ERC20Gateway, L2GatewayRouter, L2WethGateway - acting via L2GatewaysProxyAdmin, L2UpgradeExecutor.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of L2Timelock, TreasuryGovernor, L2ArbitrumToken, TreasuryTimelock, L2ARBGateway, L2UpgradeExecutor, SecurityCouncilManager, CoreGovernor - acting via L2ProxyAdmin, L2UpgradeExecutor.
    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

    Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hash (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called Validators).

    • Escrow contract for the project’s gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.
    • Can act on behalf of L1Timelock with 3d delay.
    • Can be used to interact with L1Timelock - propose transactions. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Proxy used in:

    Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof system.

    • A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by the anyone.
    • Can act on behalf of UpgradeExecutor.

    Proxy used in:

    Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

    Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract. This contract can store any token.

    Implementation used in:

    This contract stores the following tokens: wstETH.

    LPTL1Escrow 0x6A23…210A

    This contract stores the following tokens: LPT.

    This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

    Implementation used in:

    L1Escrow 0xA10c…9400

    This contract stores the following tokens: DAI.

    Escrows deposited assets for the canonical bridge that are externally governed or need custom token contracts with e.g. minting rights or upgradeability. This contract can store any token.

    Implementation used in:

    L1DaiGateway 0xD3B5…3011

    Counterpart of the L2DaiGateway. Allows for bridging DAI from L1 to L2.

    OneStepProver0 0x35FB…F731

    One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

    ParentToChildRewardRouter 0x40Cd…C999

    Collects the excess stake when rival nodes are created and allows to send them to the L2 treasury.

    OneStepProofEntry 0x4397…42d6

    One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

    Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.

    OneStepProverHostIo 0xa07c…71Cf

    One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

    OneStepProverMath 0xaB95…F921

    One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

    OneStepProverMemory 0xe0ba…C48b

    One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

    Arbitrum One

    Counterpart to the L1ERC20Gateway. Can mint (deposit to L2) and burn (withdraw to L1) ERC20 tokens on L2.

    ConstitutionHash 0x1D62…0417

    Keeps the current hash of the ArbitrumDAO Constitution. Settable by the L2UpgradeExecutor.

    L2SurplusFee 0x32e7…6b1d

    This contract receives all SurplusFees: Transaction fee component that covers the cost beyond that covered by the L2 Base Fee during chain congestion. They are withdrawable to a configurable set of recipients.

    Delays constitutional AIPs from the CoreGovernor by 8d.

    StandardArbERC20 0x3f77…aD46
    BeaconProxyFactory 0x3fE3…000f
    L2DAIGateway 0x4671…6C65

    Counterpart to the L1DaiGateway. Can mint (deposit to L2) and burn (withdraw to L1) DAI tokens on L2.

    Implementation used in:

    Router managing token <–> gateway mapping on L2.

    L2LPTGateway 0x6D24…D318

    Counterpart to the L1LPTGateway. Can mint (deposit to L2) and burn (withdraw to L1) LPT on L2.

    UpgradeExecRouteBuilder 0x7481…4C0a

    Governance contract used for creating non-constitutional AIPs, or “treasury proposals”, e.g., transferring founds out of the DAO Treasury. Also enforces the 3% quorum for proposals.

    The ARB token contract. Supply can be increased by the owner once per year by a maximum of 2%.

    SecurityCouncilMemberSyncAction 0x9BF7…297a

    Contract used by the security council management system to sync SecurityCouncil members between the L1 and the L2.

    L2BaseFee 0xbF50…b649

    This contract receives all BaseFees: The transaction fee component that covers the minimum cost of Arbitrum transaction execution. They are withdrawable to a configurable set of recipients.

    Delays treasury proposals from the TreasuryGovernor by 259200 seconds. Is used as the main recipient for the ETH from L2SurplusFee and L2BaseFee contracts.

    ARB sent from L2 to L1 is escrowed in this contract and minted on L1.

    L2GatewaysProxyAdmin 0xd570…2a86

    Can be used to upgrade implementation of L2ERC20Gateway, L2GatewayRouter, L2WethGateway.

    L2ProxyAdmin 0xdb21…961e

    Can be used to upgrade implementation of L2Timelock, TreasuryGovernor, L2ArbitrumToken, TreasuryTimelock, L2ARBGateway, L2UpgradeExecutor, SecurityCouncilManager, CoreGovernor.

    UpgradeableBeacon 0xE72b…7333

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 tokens that require minting custom tokens on L2.

    Implementation used in:

    Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 tokens. Upon depositing, on L2 a generic, “wrapped” token will be minted.

    Implementation used in:

    Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows ETH sent to L2.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Proxy used in:

    Escrow for DAI 0xA10c…9400

    DAI Vault for custom DAI Gateway. Fully controlled by MakerDAO governance.

    wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.

    Escrow for LPT 0x6A23…210A

    LPT Vault for custom Livepeer Token Gateway.

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 17d 8h delay on code upgrades unless upgrade is initiated by the Security Council in which case there is no delay.

    Knowledge nuggets