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Canvas Connect
Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
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About
Canvas Connect is a Layer 2 solution based on StarkEx technology, specifically designed to provide centralized investment and trading services to financial institutions.
About
Canvas Connect is a Layer 2 solution based on StarkEx technology, specifically designed to provide centralized investment and trading services to financial institutions.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Users can be censored if
MEV can be extracted if
STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.
Data is not stored on chain
The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.
Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).
Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2025 July 14, 12:44 UTC4changesDiscovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
New and verified contracts
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (0x5339AB7557b3152b91A57D10B0Caf5da88Db5143) | |
| +++ description: Adapter between the core contract and the eth:0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60. Stores the Cairo programHash (`16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513`). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract StarkExchange (0x7A7f9c8fe871cd50f6Ce935d7c7caD2e89987f9d) | |
| +++ description: Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OrderRegistry (0x806d435a82B0381bD884540c2235147c13B97fe6) | |
| +++ description: Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DACommittee (0x8B3A6662809195453645e37C2005d655f57ca818) | |
| +++ description: Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 1. |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force exit the system
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
Emergency exit
If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can upgrade with 8d delay
- SHARPVerifierCallProxy - acting directly with 8d delay
- Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
- Administer the CallProxy’s
GOVERNANCE_ADMINand role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades - Grant and revoke application roles, including the
APP_GOVERNORrole that controls caller-specific fallback routes - Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier’s reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy’s explicit
isValidentry point always queries the default target
- Administer the CallProxy’s
- Can upgrade with no delay
- StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Permissioned to regularly update the state roots of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains commitments to the data that is itself kept offchain
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can regsiter new tokens for deposits and withdrawals
Ethereum
Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- operators: EOA 2, EOA 4
- tokenAdmins: EOA 3
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 1.
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.
- Roles:
- admin: SHARP Multisig
- appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
- appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
- governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513).
Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).