DeGate V1 logoDeGate V1

DeGate is a ZK Rollup enabling a decentralized order book exchange. DeGate smart contracts are forked from Loopring V3.
Value Locked

$62.11 M

2.03%

Canonically Bridged
$62.11 M
Externally Bridged
$0.00
Natively Minted
$0.00
  • Tokens
  • Daily TPS
    0.0640.03%
  • 30D tx count
    152.89 K
  • Stage
    Stage 2
  • Type
    ZK Rollup
  • Purpose
    Exchange
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    Milestones

    DeGate Mainnet Beta Redeploy

    2023 Oct 27th

    DeGate redeploy Mainnet Beta with the ability to upgrade the smart contracts, with a time delay.

    Learn more
    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    State validation

    ZK proofs (SN)

    zkSNARKS are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.

    Data availability

    On chain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window

    30d

    Users have 30d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 45d delay before an upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 15d to be processed.

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1 with a 0.01 ETH fee. If the sequencer is down for more than 15d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. The sequencer can censor individual deposits, but in such case after 15d users can get their funds back.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.

    Rollup stage
    DeGate V1DeGate V1 is a
    Stage 2
    ZK Rollup.
    Stage 0
    4 requirements met
    Stage 1
    2 requirements met
    Stage 2
    1 requirement met
    Learn more about Rollup stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect rollup security, this is an opinionated assessment of rollup maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.

    1. Operator - DeGate design doc

    Zero knowledge SNARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSNARKs are still new and experimental cryptography. Cryptography has made a lot of advancements in the recent years but all cryptographic solutions rely on time to prove their security. In addition zkSNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.

    • Funds can be stolen if the cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.

    1. Operator - DeGate design doc

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.

    1. Introduction - DeGate design doc
    State derivation
    Node software

    Node software source code can be found here.

    Compression scheme

    No compression is used.

    Genesis state

    The system does not begin with a genesis state; instead, it initiates from a zero state, as referenced in CreateEmptyState.

    Data format

    DeGate bundles off-chain transactions into zkBlocks and submits them to the blockchain. zkBlock data definition is documented here.

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. ExchangeV3.sol#L341-L348 - DeGate source code
    2. LoopringIOExchangeOwner.sol#L98-L101 - DeGate source code

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract on-chain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    1. Forced Withdrawals - DeGate design doc
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction does not require a merkle proof.

    1. Withdraw - DeGate design doc

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Request Handling - DeGate design doc
    2. ExchangeV3.sol#L392 - DeGate source code, forceWithdraw function

    Emergency exit

    If the 15d deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into Withdrawal Mode, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Request Handling - DeGate design doc
    2. ExchangeV3.sol#L420 - DeGate source code, withdrawFromMerkleTree function
    Permissions

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    BlockVerifier Owner 0xacD3…7F82

    This address is the owner of the BlockVerifier contract.

    Used in:

    Project icon
    Block Submitters 0x4e3F…3b8a

    Actors who can submit new blocks, updating the L2 state on L1.

    Used in:

    Project icon
    Degate HomeDAO2 Multisig 0x2028…da52

    Actor allowed to upgrade the ExchangeV3 and DefaultDepositContract contracts. This address is the owner of the following contracts: LoopringIOExchangeOwner, LoopringV3, DefaultDepositContract. Can add or remove block submitters. Can change the forced withdrawal fee up to 0.25 ETH. Can change a way that balance is calculated per contract during the deposit, allowing the support of non-standard tokens.

    Used in:

    Project icon
    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    The system consists of the following smart contracts:

    Main ExchangeV3 contract.

    Can be upgraded by: Degate HomeDAO2 Multisig

    Upgrade delay: 45d

    LoopringIOExchangeOwner 0x9b93…E5eD

    Contract used by the Prover to submit exchange blocks with zkSNARK proofs that are later processed and verified by the BlockVerifier contract.

    ERC 20 token basic deposit contract. Handles user deposits and withdrawals. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by: Degate HomeDAO2 Multisig

    Upgrade delay: 45d

    LoopringV3 0x9385…7EDC

    Contract for setting exchange fee parameters.

    BlockVerifier 0xE3B7…E4d6

    zkSNARK Verifier based on ethsnarks library.

    TimeLock1 0x0D2e…1d9d

    This timelock contract is set as the proxyOwner of the ExchangeV3 contract. There is a 45d time delay for upgrading the contract.

    TimeLock2 0xf299…13A5

    This timelock contract is set as the proxyOwner of the DefaultDepositContract contract. There is a 45d time delay for upgrading the contract.

    Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens: