Degen Chain logoDegen Chain


Degen Chain is an ultra-low-cost L3 for the Degen community built with Arbitrum Orbit, Base for settlement, and AnyTrust for data availability. DEGEN is the native gas token.

Value Locked

$2.60 M


Canonically Bridged
$2.60 M
Externally Bridged
Natively Minted
  • Tokens
  • Daily TPS
  • 30D tx count
    560.48 K
  • Type
  • Purposes
    Social, DeFi, Universal
  • Host Chain
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    Canonically Bridged Tokens (Top 15)

    Degen (DEGEN)


    Risk summary
    Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.
    Risk analysis
    Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    State validation

    Fraud proofs (INT)

    No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks.

    Data availability

    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published on chain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window


    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Sequencer failure

    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There is a 1000d delay on this operation.

    Proposer failure

    Self propose

    Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.


    Fraud proofs ensure state correctness

    After some period of time, the published state root is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, one of the whitelisted actors can submit a fraud proof that shows that the state was incorrect. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks.

    • Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

    1. How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ
    2. Arbitrum Glossary: Challenge Period
    3. RollupUser.sol - Etherscan source code, onlyValidator modifier
    4. Solutions to Delay Attacks on Rollups

    Data is not stored on chain

    Users transactions are not published on-chain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will “fall back to rollup” mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 1 out of 1.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation

    The system has a centralized sequencer

    While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly. Anyone can become a Proposer after approximately 6d 8h (45818 blocks) of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

    1. SequencerInbox.sol - Etherscan source code, forceInclusion function
    2. Sequencer Isn’t Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation
    2. L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation
    3. Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog

    Tradeable Bridge Exit

    When a user initiates a regular withdrawal a third party verifying the chain can offer to buy this withdrawal by paying the user on L1. The user will get the funds immediately, however the third party has to wait for the block to be finalized. This is implemented as a first party functionality inside Arbitrum’s token bridge.

    1. Tradeable Bridge Exits - Arbitrum documentation

    Autonomous exit

    Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

    • Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex Nitro and WASM one-step prover implementation.

    1. Inside Arbitrum Nitro

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    Sequencers 0xa358…f205

    Central actors allowed to submit transaction batches to L1.

    Validators/Proposers 0x1BCd…57Ca

    They can submit new state roots and challenge state roots. Some of the operators perform their duties through special purpose smart contracts.

    RollupOwnerMultisig 0x7dCe…c104

    Has the executor role of the UpgradeExecutor and indirectly owns the ProxyAdmin (can upgrade the whole system). This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 5 threshold.

    Used in:

    Project icon

    Those are the participants of the RollupOwnerMultisig.

    UTBAdmin 0x690f…6f4c

    The UTBAdmin directly controls the UTB contracts critical functions like updating all roles and modules.

    Smart contracts

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Base):

    UTBDecent 0x4301…2de2

    The UTB contract serves as an L2<->L3 gateway by integrating with Decent (LayerZero app) to allow bridging and swapping in- and out of Degen L3. This is achieved using external modules (smart contracts) like swappers and bridgers that can be registered in the UTB contract.

    Main contract implementing Arbitrum One Rollup. Manages other Rollup components, list of Stakers and Validators. Entry point for Validators creating new Rollup Nodes (state commits) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs.

    Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows the native token used for gas on the chain. This contract stores the following tokens: DEGEN.

    Main entry point for the Sequencer submitting transaction batches.

    Entry point for users depositing ETH and sending L1 -> L2 messages.

    Contract that allows L2->L1 calls, i.e. messages initiated on L2 which eventually resolve in execution on L1.

    Contract allowed to upgrade the system.

    Contract that allows challenging invalid state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy.

    OneStepProofEntry 0xC17A…eaeb

    Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.

    OneStepProverMemory 0x2Bb7…5a8f

    Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.

    OneStepProverMath 0x764c…206D

    Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.

    OneStepProverHostIo 0xF4AA…E9b0

    Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.

    OneStepProver0 0xBa04…7428

    Contract used to perform the last step of a fraud proof.

    Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows DEGEN sent to L2.

    Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).