Base Chain

Ongoing anomaly

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

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About

Base is an Optimistic Rollup built with the OP Stack. It offers a low-cost and builder-friendly way for anyone, anywhere, to build onchain.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$11.63 B3.89%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

151.6847.1%

Stage

Gas token

ETH

Type

Optimistic Rollup

Purpose

Universal

Chain ID

8453

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

38.2% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Interop protocols used

+19 more

Tokens transferred

+416 more

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

Badges

About

Base is an Optimistic Rollup built with the OP Stack. It offers a low-cost and builder-friendly way for anyone, anywhere, to build onchain.

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Volume and flows Explore Interop

15/18Chains

+10

Chain stats

Explore Interop

Activity

2025 May 27 — 2026 May 27

Past Day UOPS

151.6847.1%

Past Day Ops count

13.10 M

Max. UOPS

232.02

2026 Feb 05

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

1.02

Onchain costs

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

2025 May 27 — 2026 May 27

Total cost

$797.57 K

Avg cost per L2 UOP

$0.000201

Avg cost per day

$2.18 K

Data posted

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum.

2025 May 27 — 2026 May 27

Data posted

563.57 GiB

Avg size per day

1.54 GiB

Avg size per L2 UOP

152.87 B

Liveness

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

Ongoing anomaly

There are implementation changes to tracked contracts, anomaly data might be inaccurate.

No State updates have been performed for the past 36h 56m 54s (since 2026 May 26, 19:49 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 10s on average.

Avg. tx data subs. interval

Avg. state updates interval

Past 30 days anomalies

94% normal uptime

Last 30 day anomalies

All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

There are implementation changes to tracked contracts, anomaly data might be inaccurate.

No State updates have been performed for the past 36h 56m 54s (since 2026 May 26, 19:49 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 10s on average.

No Tx data submissions were performed for 38min 36s (from 2026 May 12, 16:42 UTC until 2026 May 12, 17:21 UTC). These typically occur every 45s on average.

No Tx data submissions were performed for 5min 12s (from 2026 May 02, 11:56 UTC until 2026 May 02, 12:01 UTC). These typically occur every 45s on average.

Milestones & Incidents

Base leaves the Superchain

2026 Mar 4th

Base decouples from Optimism Superchain governance with its own upgrade path.

Learn more

Base halts block production for 33mins

2025 Aug 5th

Learn more

Risk summary

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Upgrades must be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council. There is no delay on upgrades.

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.

Stage

Base Chain is a

Stage 1

Optimistic Rollup.

The project passes the walkaway test: users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even if the Security Council disappears.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State derivation

Node software

The rollup node is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensus related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

Compression scheme

Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

Genesis state

The genesis file can be found here.

Data format

The format specification of Sequencer’s data batches can be found here.

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.

OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game

Challenges

Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x033c...bb6e	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in

Upgrades & Governance

A diagram of the upgrades and governance

All contracts are upgradable by a ProxyAdmin contract controlled by a nested 2/2 Base Governance Multisig composed of the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council. Upgrades require approval from both parties. There is no delay on upgrades. The Guardian role for the SuperchainConfig is assigned to the Base Governance Multisig, which can pause and unpause withdrawals. Base Multisig 1 serves as Incident Responder and can pause withdrawals but cannot unpause or extend pauses. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended by the Guardian. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by Base Multisig 1 via the SystemConfig contract. The Base Governance multisig can also recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly.

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

2mo 15d ago

Avg upgrade interval

5mo 14d

Updates

2026 May 19, 13:53 UTC

8changes

Base Multisig 1: 4 signers swapped (4 added, 4 removed). Threshold unchanged at 3.

	contract Base Multisig 1 (eth:0x14536667Cd30e52C0b458BaACcB9faDA7046E056) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0xD56C6462DC3A943596c7a54d6B0Dba404490E206"
	values.$members.1:
+	"eth:0x8faB0B6b31A0b50A2c3d1FFBE6C0e1125699aE9d"
	values.$members.2:
+	"eth:0x0c1Ea3aCA9fc2cFa3640fec98a3214A849715b43"
	values.$members.3:
+	"eth:0x082Cc00d1031a57d53496aBf6dAD8A6247159452"
	values.$members.3:
-	"eth:0x4427683AA1f0ff25ccDC4a5Db83010c1DE9b5fF4"
	values.$members.4:
-	"eth:0xA31E1c38d5c37D8ECd0e94C80C0F7FD624d009A3"
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0x24c3AE1AeDB8142D32BB6d3B988f5910F272D53b"
	values.$members.9:
-	"eth:0x5468985B560D966dEDEa2DAF493f5756101137DC"
	}

2026 April 01, 07:35 UTC

8changes

Gas parameter changes: daFootprintGasScalar increased, eip1559Denominator lowered from 125 to 100 and eip1559Elasticity from 6 to 5 for quicker L2 fee adjustments.

	contract L1Block (base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) {
	+++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.
	values.daFootprintGasScalar:
-	139
+	148
	}

	contract SystemConfig (eth:0x73a79Fab69143498Ed3712e519A88a918e1f4072) {
	+++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
	values.daFootprintGasScalar:
-	139
+	148
	+++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2
	values.eip1559Denominator:
-	125
+	100
	values.eip1559Elasticity:
-	6
+	5
	}

2026 March 24, 21:27 UTC

High severity

11changes

FeeDisburser implementation upgraded (base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75 → base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6). The only code change is the version string from 1.0.0 to 1.0.0+fee-vault-withdraw-compat , indicating compatibility with a new FeeVault withdrawal interface. No functional changes to the contract logic. Diff

FeeDisburser implementation upgraded (base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75 → base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6). The only code change is the version string from 1.0.0 to 1.0.0+fee-vault-withdraw-compat, indicating compatibility with a new FeeVault withdrawal interface. No functional changes to the contract logic. Diff

	contract FeeDisburser (base:0x09C7bAD99688a55a2e83644BFAed09e62bDcCcBA) {
	+++ description: Contract used to disburse funds from system FeeVault contracts, shares revenue with Optimism and bridges the rest of funds to L1.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x9e4d8a31512b7aaafcbf23f817cbdc9bbe404a0fa262aaf98220120c52fde7cb"
+	"0x3191b674fc342aed9eded2ad3c79eead2fb38e8a2b0589a8ec5058dadfe2d5be"
	values.$implementation:
-	"base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75"
+	"base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-03-13T21:06:31.000Z","0x68c2a1b66361dcb9ec2f8b1fe26ae275021b6d78751d0577fc0bd410dfd47518",["base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	values.version:
-	"1.0.0"
+	"1.0.0+fee-vault-withdraw-compat"
	implementationNames.base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75:
-	"FeeDisburser"
	implementationNames.base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6:
+	"FeeDisburser"
	}

2026 March 04, 20:34 UTC

High severity

86changes

Base decouples from the shared Optimism SuperchainConfig ( 0x95703e... ) and deploys its own SuperchainConfig v2.5.0 at 0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c . Compared to the previous v2.4.0, the new version adds an immutable incident responder role (Base Multisig 1) and makes the guardian immutable in the constructor. All L1 contracts (OptimismPortal2, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge, L1CrossDomainMessenger, AnchorStateRegistry, DelayedWETH x2) now reference the new SuperchainConfig. Guardian changed from Optimism Guardian Multisig ( 0x09f7150D... ) to Base Governance Multisig ( 0x7bB41C3... ). All Optimism shared governance contracts removed from discovery scope (SuperchainProxyAdmin, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner, OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, OpFoundationOperationsSafe, Optimism Security Council, LivenessModule, LivenessGuard, DeputyPauseModule, SaferSafes). SystemConfig upgraded from v3.13.1 to v3.13.2 — implementation change is only a ReinitializableBase version bump from 3 to 4. The reinit sets new runtime values (guardian, superchainConfig now point to Base's own contracts). Diff FeeDisburser upgraded (impl 0x45969D... → 0xDa70b4... ), removing on-chain Optimism revenue sharing (previously 2.5% gross / 15% net to OPTIMISM WALLET). Now bridges 100% of collected fees to L1 WALLET. Revenue sharing likely moved off-chain or to a different mechanism. Diff Pause mechanics: the Incident Responder (Base Multisig 1, 3/13) can trigger a single pause lasting up to 3 months. It cannot unpause, extend, or re-pause after expiry — only the Guardian (Base Governance Multisig, 2/2) can do that. The Guardian can extend pauses indefinitely. This prevents the operator from permanently censoring withdrawals without Security Council approval. Base Security Council threshold increased from 7/10 to 8/11 (new member added). The upgrade path changed from 3 parties (Coordinator + SC + OP Foundation) to 2 parties (Coordinator 3/6 + SC 8/11), with an effective entity-level quorum of 9/12 (75%). The Coordinator Multisig absorbed the old Base Multisig 2 members directly (same 6 EOAs) and the OP Foundation was removed as a signer on the Governance Multisig.

Base decouples from the shared Optimism SuperchainConfig (0x95703e...) and deploys its own SuperchainConfig v2.5.0 at 0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c. Compared to the previous v2.4.0, the new version adds an immutable incident responder role (Base Multisig 1) and makes the guardian immutable in the constructor. All L1 contracts (OptimismPortal2, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge, L1CrossDomainMessenger, AnchorStateRegistry, DelayedWETH x2) now reference the new SuperchainConfig.

Guardian changed from Optimism Guardian Multisig (0x09f7150D...) to Base Governance Multisig (0x7bB41C3...). All Optimism shared governance contracts removed from discovery scope (SuperchainProxyAdmin, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner, OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, OpFoundationOperationsSafe, Optimism Security Council, LivenessModule, LivenessGuard, DeputyPauseModule, SaferSafes).

SystemConfig upgraded from v3.13.1 to v3.13.2 — implementation change is only a ReinitializableBase version bump from 3 to 4. The reinit sets new runtime values (guardian, superchainConfig now point to Base’s own contracts). Diff

FeeDisburser upgraded (impl 0x45969D... → 0xDa70b4...), removing on-chain Optimism revenue sharing (previously 2.5% gross / 15% net to OPTIMISM_WALLET). Now bridges 100% of collected fees to L1_WALLET. Revenue sharing likely moved off-chain or to a different mechanism. Diff

Pause mechanics: the Incident Responder (Base Multisig 1, 3/13) can trigger a single pause lasting up to 3 months. It cannot unpause, extend, or re-pause after expiry — only the Guardian (Base Governance Multisig, 2/2) can do that. The Guardian can extend pauses indefinitely. This prevents the operator from permanently censoring withdrawals without Security Council approval.

Base Security Council threshold increased from 7/10 to 8/11 (new member added). The upgrade path changed from 3 parties (Coordinator + SC + OP Foundation) to 2 parties (Coordinator 3/6 + SC 8/11), with an effective entity-level quorum of 9/12 (75%). The Coordinator Multisig absorbed the old Base Multisig 2 members directly (same 6 EOAs) and the OP Foundation was removed as a signer on the Governance Multisig.

	contract FeeDisburser (base:0x09C7bAD99688a55a2e83644BFAed09e62bDcCcBA) {
	+++ description: Contract used to disburse funds from system FeeVault contracts, shares revenue with Optimism and bridges the rest of funds to L1.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x62c0410a08a90b339fd9d345a563e2f93aa3afb72082cb32c23ab6dee23706ed"
+	"0x9e4d8a31512b7aaafcbf23f817cbdc9bbe404a0fa262aaf98220120c52fde7cb"
	values.$implementation:
-	"base:0x45969D00739d518f0Dde41920B67cE30395135A0"
+	"base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-03-03T17:36:17.000Z","0x055b31e8fb8689e5e72d9c41c1c38b5a165fd145aa76bf118194f86a066d0650",["base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.BASIS_POINT_SCALE:
-	10000
	values.OPTIMISM_GROSS_REVENUE_SHARE_BASIS_POINTS:
-	250
	values.OPTIMISM_NET_REVENUE_SHARE_BASIS_POINTS:
-	1500
	values.OPTIMISM_WALLET:
-	"base:0x9c3631dDE5c8316bE5B7554B0CcD2631C15a9A05"
	values.version:
+	"1.0.0"
	implementationNames.base:0x45969D00739d518f0Dde41920B67cE30395135A0:
-	"FeeDisburser"
	implementationNames.base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75:
+	"FeeDisburser"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract GnosisSafeL2 (base:0x9c3631dDE5c8316bE5B7554B0CcD2631C15a9A05)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract LivenessModule (eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748)
	+++ description: used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 takes ownership of the multisig

	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E) {
	+++ description: None
	directlyReceivedPermissions.11:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c","role":"admin"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Optimism Guardian Multisig (eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2)
	+++ description: None

	contract Base Multisig 1 (eth:0x14536667Cd30e52C0b458BaACcB9faDA7046E056) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"guard","from":"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c","role":".INCIDENT_RESPONDER"}
	}

	contract Base Security Council (eth:0x20AcF55A3DCfe07fC4cecaCFa1628F788EC8A4Dd) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0xbDE1845c879942fC326F247Ad708677733Dd5594"
	values.$threshold:
-	7
+	8
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"7 of 10 (70%)"
+	"8 of 11 (73%)"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract LivenessGuard (eth:0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25)
	+++ description: Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.

	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x2453c1216E49704d84eA98a4daCd95738F2fC8Ec) {
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
	values.config:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

	contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35) {
	+++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract GnosisSafe (eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64)
	+++ description: None

	contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e) {
	+++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.
	values.guardian:
-	"eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2"
+	"eth:0x7bB41C3008B3f03FE483B28b8DB90e19Cf07595c"
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract SuperchainProxyAdmin (eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A)
	+++ description: None

	contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x608d94945A64503E642E6370Ec598e519a2C1E53) {
	+++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x64AE5250958CdeB83f6b61f913B5Ac6Ebe8EFd4D) {
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
	values.config:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

	contract SystemConfig (eth:0x73a79Fab69143498Ed3712e519A88a918e1f4072) {
	+++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x86dc9ef5cbf4cc436d50678ad7b2abbf9cc1905641ebbeccddbf1adf9b724403"
+	"0xe6e96ed1643d7aa0bde96b58e278bd6716600479c36623c8cbca4da634304c97"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"
+	"eth:0x0507Aaa21c678976FCdC7e804836ACd6ebc17a44"
	values.$pastUpgrades.14:
+	["2026-03-03T17:30:59.000Z","0xa2dc938704977d2f3d0765832e79e1239d97aa6912efadc21a9705ef7dca42eb",["eth:0x0507Aaa21c678976FCdC7e804836ACd6ebc17a44"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	14
+	15
	values.guardian:
-	"eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2"
+	"eth:0x7bB41C3008B3f03FE483B28b8DB90e19Cf07595c"
	values.initVersion:
-	3
+	4
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	values.version:
-	"3.13.1"
+	"3.13.2"
	implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2:
-	"SystemConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0x0507Aaa21c678976FCdC7e804836ACd6ebc17a44:
+	"SystemConfig"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754)
	+++ description: Allows eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module.

	contract Base Governance Multisig (eth:0x7bB41C3008B3f03FE483B28b8DB90e19Cf07595c) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.1:
-	"eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A"
+	"eth:0x20AcF55A3DCfe07fC4cecaCFa1628F788EC8A4Dd"
	receivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"guard","from":"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c","role":".guardian"}
	receivedPermissions.12:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"}]}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92)
	+++ description: None

	contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x866E82a600A1414e583f7F13623F1aC5d58b0Afa) {
	+++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

	contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x909f6cf47ed12f010A796527f562bFc26C7F4E72) {
	+++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.
	values.superchainConfig:
-	"eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
+	"eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C)
	+++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.

	contract Base Coordinator Multisig (eth:0x9855054731540A48b28990B63DcF4f33d8AE46A1) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0xf9e320f3dA12E68af219d9E2A490Dd649f6B177c"
	values.$members.1:
+	"eth:0xB011a32ED8b4F70D9943A2199F539bbeCd7b62F7"
	values.$members.2:
+	"eth:0x3Dad2200849925Bb46d9bF05aFa5f7F213F4c18E"
	values.$members.3:
+	"eth:0x1c870776B168A9ffAE80c51f050C611eDd246741"
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x20AcF55A3DCfe07fC4cecaCFa1628F788EC8A4Dd"
+	"eth:0x3cd692eCE8b6573A2220ae00d0dEb98f0DfFA9a1"
	values.$members.1:
-	"eth:0x9C4a57Feb77e294Fd7BF5EBE9AB01CAA0a90A110"
+	"eth:0x6CD3850756b7894774Ab715D136F9dD02837De50"
	values.$threshold:
-	2
+	3
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"2 of 2 (100%)"
+	"3 of 6 (50%)"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Base Multisig 2 (eth:0x9C4a57Feb77e294Fd7BF5EBE9AB01CAA0a90A110)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract SaferSafes (eth:0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a)
	+++ description: A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract AddressManager (eth:0xdE1FCfB0851916CA5101820A69b13a4E276bd81F)
	+++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c)
	+++ description: Base's own SuperchainConfig, used to manage pause states for the Base chain. The guardian and incident responder roles are immutable and set at construction time. The guardian can pause, unpause, and extend pauses, while the incident responder can only pause. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months.

2026 February 27, 13:19 UTC

4changes

Optimism Security Council: 2 members replaced.

	contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x07dC0893cAfbF810e3E72505041f2865726Fd073"
+	"eth:0xE61F12136bA47De67D15a1D59fE2f383ec5176aE"
	values.$members.2:
-	"eth:0x1822b35B09f5ce1C78ecbC06AC0A4e17885b925e"
+	"eth:0x5c1f9E9384Ca9fE0499277F6a015a2ac0A317a81"
	}

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

Withdrawals

Regular exits

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

Introducing EVM Equivalence

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Roles:

SequencerEOA 1

Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.

There are impactful changes to the following permissions, and part of the information might be outdated.

GuardianBase Governance Multisig Base Multisig 1

Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).

Actors:

Base Multisig 10x1453…E056

A Multisig with 3/13 threshold.

Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
A Guardian - acting directly

Participants (13):

0xD56C…E206 0x8faB…aE9d 0x0c1E…5b43 0x082C…9452 0x1841…e937 0x5B15…8874 0x541a…8d1e 0xB37B…f236 0x644e…74dc 0x7Ad8…488E 0x26c7…177b 0xa3D3…202D 0x4924…3839

Base Security Council0x20Ac…A4Dd

A Multisig with 8/11 threshold. Member of Base Governance Multisig.

Participants (11):

0xbDE1…5594 0x5ff5…ACC6 0x82C8…E766 0xa8ee…fb06 0x1C56…2e2B 0xA565…CdFE 0x21C7…851F 0xa595…CB73 0x18e9…1b3E 0x99DB…71D2 0x0E8A…252f

Security Council members - Base Docs

Base Coordinator Multisig0x9855…46A1

A Multisig with 3/6 threshold. Member of Base Governance Multisig.

Participants (6):

0xf9e3…177c 0xB011…62F7 0x3Dad…c18E 0x1c87…6741 0x3cd6…A9a1 0x6CD3…De50

EOA 10x5050…76C9

A Sequencer - acting directly

There are impactful changes to the following permissions, and part of the information might be outdated.

Base Governance Multisig0x7bB4…595c

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
A Guardian - acting directly

Participants (2):

Base Coordinator Multisig Base Security Council

Base Chain

Actors:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias0x8cC5…6a6d

Can upgrade with no delay
- L2CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- L2StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- SequencerFeeVault ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- L1BlockNumber ProxyAdmin
- L2ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- L1Block ProxyAdmin
- L2ToL1MessagePasser ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC721Factory ProxyAdmin
- ProxyAdmin ProxyAdmin
- BaseFeeVault ProxyAdmin
- L1FeeVault ProxyAdmin
- SchemaRegistry ProxyAdmin
- EAS ProxyAdmin

EOA 20xaD5B…B221

Can upgrade with no delay
- FeeDisburser

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

SystemConfig0x73a7…4072 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: Base Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

SuperchainConfig0xb535…EE6c Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Base’s own SuperchainConfig, used to manage pause states for the Base chain. The guardian and incident responder roles are immutable and set at construction time. The guardian can pause, unpause, and extend pauses, while the incident responder can only pause. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig
- guardian: Base Governance Multisig
- incident_responder: Base Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

L1StandardBridge

Escrow

0x3154…2C35 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1ERC721Bridge0x608d…1E53 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1CrossDomainMessenger0x866E…0Afa Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

ProxyAdmin0x0475…059E

Roles:
- owner: Base Governance Multisig

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x05cc…1D84 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

Implementation used in:

DelayedWETH0x2453…C8Ec Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

PermissionedDisputeGame0x58bf…266A

Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

Implementation used in:

MIPS0x6463…B908

The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

Implementation used in:

DelayedWETH0x64AE…Fd4D Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

FaultDisputeGame0x6dDB…7499

Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

Implementation used in:

Escrow

Escrow

0x7F31…9Ef3

Simple escrow that accepts tokens and allows to configure permissioned addresses that can access the tokens.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

wstETHEscrow

Escrow

0x9de4…1e72 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

SkyLink Bridge0xA587…352A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Custom bridge for USDS and sUSDS managed by Sky governance.

There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.

DisputeGameFactory0x43ed…B40e Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

OptimismPortal2

Escrow

0x4904…E97e Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

AnchorStateRegistry0x909f…4E72 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

Base Chain

FeeDisburser0x09C7…CcBA Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract used to disburse funds from system FeeVault contracts, shares revenue with Optimism and bridges the rest of funds to L1.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 2 with no delay

L2CrossDomainMessenger0x4200…0007 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L2StandardBridge0x4200…0010 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

SequencerFeeVault0x4200…0011 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x4200…0012 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L1BlockNumber0x4200…0013 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns the latest L1 block number.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L2ERC721Bridge0x4200…0014 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L1Block0x4200…0015 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L2ToL1MessagePasser0x4200…0016 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

OptimismMintableERC721Factory0x4200…0017 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

ProxyAdmin0x4200…0018 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias
- owner: Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

BaseFeeVault0x4200…0019 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

L1FeeVault0x4200…001A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

SchemaRegistry0x4200…0020 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

EAS0x4200…0021 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias with no delay

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Upgrades must be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council. There is no delay on upgrades.

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x033c...bb6e	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in

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Base Chain

Ongoing anomaly

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About

Links: Website, Docs, etc.

Badges

About

Ongoing anomaly

Last 30 day anomalies

Funds can be stolen if

MEV can be extracted if

All data required for proofs is published on chain

Program Hashes

Projects used in

Past upgrades

The system has a centralized operator

Users can force any transaction

Regular exits

Forced messaging

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Ethereum

Roles:

Actors:

Base Chain

Actors:

Ethereum

Base Chain

Program Hashes

Projects used in