Base
$5.37 B
0.31%
- The proof system is still under development.
- Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
| Website | base.org |
|---|---|
| App | bridge.base.org |
| Docs | docs.base.orgstack.optimism.io |
| Explorer | basescan.orgbase.superscan.networkbase.blockscout.combase.l2scan.co |
| Repository | github.com/base-org |
| Social | @BuildOnBaseDiscordbase.mirror.xyz |
| rollup.codes | rollup.codes/base |
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USD Coin (USDC)
Aerodrome (AERO)
Brett (BRETT)
Degen (DEGEN)
Toshi (TOSHI)
Seamless (SEAM)
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Base God (TYBG)
SmarDex (SDEX)
Ether (ETH)USD Coin (USDbC)
Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETH (cbETH)
Dola USD Stablecoin (DOLA)
Wrapped liquid staked Ether 2.0 (wstETH)
Rocket Pool ETH (rETH)
Dai Stablecoin (DAI)
Thales DAO Token (THALES)
Reserve Rights (RSR)
Synthetix Network Token (SNX)
LUSD Stablecoin (LUSD)
Balancer (BAL)
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Curve DAO Token (CRV)
yearn.finance (YFI)...
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Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
State validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Data availability
On chainAll of the data needed for proof construction is published on chain.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceIn the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There is a 12h delay on this operation.
Proposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Base is a Fraud proofs are in development
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1ERC721Bridge, OptimismMintableERC20Factory, L1StandardBridge.
Central actor allowed to commit L2 transactions to L1.
Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.
Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
This address is the owner of the ProxyAdmin. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Those are the participants of the AdminMultisig.
Address designated as a Guardian of the OptimismPortal, meaning it can halt withdrawals. It’s the owner of SystemConfig, which allows to update the sequencer address. Moreover, it can challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 8 threshold.
Those are the participants of the GuardianMultisig.
Core multisig of the Base team, it’s a member of the AdminMultisig, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the BaseMultisig.
Core multisig of the Optimism team, it can challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. It’s also a member of the AdminMultisig, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Those are the participants of the OptimismMultisig.
The system consists of the following smart contracts:
The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
It contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, the L2 gas limit and the unsafe block signer address.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from L1 to L2. This contract can store any token.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit ERC721 tokens from L1 to L2.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
This contract is the permissioned challenger of the system. It can delete non finalized roots without going through the fault proof process. It is functionally equivalent to a 1/2 multisig where neither party can remove the other’s permission to execute a Challenger call. It is controlled by the GuardianMultisig and the OptimismMultisig.
Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
