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SummaryValue SecuredRisk summaryRisk analysisData availabilityState validationOperatorWithdrawalsSmart contracts

Gluon logoGluon

This project is archived.

About

Gluon aims to be a Layer 2 scalable trading engine built on top of Ethereum, unlocking low fees and high frequency trading.

Value secured
$30.09 K3.72%
Canonically Bridged
$30.09 K
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$0.00
View TVS Breakdown
  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    No data
  • Type
    Plasma
  • Purpose
    Exchange
    • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    About

    Gluon aims to be a Layer 2 scalable trading engine built on top of Ethereum, unlocking low fees and high frequency trading.

    Value Secured

    2024 Jul 04 — 2025 Jul 04

    Total value securedTotal
    $30.09 K3.72%
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    $30.09 K3.72%
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    $0.000.00%
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    $0.000.00%
    View TVS breakdown
    Risk summary
    LeverJ trading platform appears to be in a maintenance mode as the team moved to build NFT trading platform. Social medias associated with the project are silent since mid 2021.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    Users can be censored if

    1. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    LeverJ trading platform appears to be in a maintenance mode as the team moved to build NFT trading platform. Social medias associated with the project are silent since mid 2021.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (!)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Because the data is not present on chain the security of fraud proofs is severely weakened.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.

    Data availability

    Data is not stored on chain

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The transaction data is stored on a plasma chain and is not recorded on the Ethereum main chain.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    State validation
    Fraud proofs
    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    After some period of time, the published state root is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, usually one week, anyone can submit a fraud proof that shows that the state was incorrect.

    • Funds can be stolen if there is no one that checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator.

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can independently exit the system

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    Independent exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to withdraw their funds by submitting a transaction directly to the contract onchain.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The user executes the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L1 that requires a merkle proof of funds.

    The mass exit problem is unsolved

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    In case the operator is malicious all users need to exit within a predetermined time frame. Users that do not manage to do this will lose their funds.

    • Funds can be stolen if users are unable to withdraw in a mass exit event.

    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Gluon 0x75AC…67cB

    This contract stores the following tokens: ETH, DAI.

    RegistryLogic 0x3858…Bb0C
    RegistryData 0x0fC2…3C41
    StakeLogic 0x84e3…a1F4

    This contract stores the following tokens: DAI, USDT.

    StakeData 0xaB3A…bc77
    SpotLogic 0x2D62…ef2D
    SpotData 0x0d28…F9EC
    DerivativesLogic 0xDfBF…9caC
    DerivativesData 0x5630…50Cc
    LegacyTokensExtension 0xDA88…2082

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).