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SummaryValue SecuredRisk summaryRisk analysisData availabilityState validationOperatorWithdrawalsSmart contracts

OMG Network logoOMG Network

This project is archived.

About

OMG Network claims to be the leading value transfer network for ETH and ERC20 tokens. The Network scales by centralizing transaction processing and remains safe by decentralizing security.

Value secured
$64.60 K16.1%
Canonically Bridged
$64.60 K
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$0.00
View TVS Breakdown
  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    No data
  • Type
    Plasma
  • Purpose
    Payments
    • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
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    About

    OMG Network claims to be the leading value transfer network for ETH and ERC20 tokens. The Network scales by centralizing transaction processing and remains safe by decentralizing security.

    Value Secured

    2024 Jul 14 — 2025 Jul 14

    Total value securedTotal
    $64.60 K16.1%
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    $64.60 K16.1%
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    $0.000.00%
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    $0.000.00%
    View TVS breakdown
    Risk summary
    This project includes unverified contracts. (CRITICAL)

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    Users can be censored if

    1. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    This project includes unverified contracts. (CRITICAL)
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

    State validation
    Exits only

    Exits from the network are subject to a period when they can be challenged. The internal network state is left unchecked.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. The details are unknown.

    Data availability

    Data is not stored on chain

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The transaction data is stored on a plasma chain and is not recorded on the Ethereum main chain.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    State validation
    Fraud proofs
    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The internal system state is not subject to any checks. Only exits from the system can be challenged. This places a much higher burden on potential validators, as they have to monitor all user activity and not only the single state.

    • Funds can be stolen if there are fraudulent exits which nobody reported. Fraud proofs assume that every exit is checked by at least one honest and able party (CRITICAL).

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can independently exit the system

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    Independent exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to withdraw their funds by submitting a transaction directly to the contract onchain.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    The user executes the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L1 that requires a merkle proof of funds.

    The mass exit problem is unsolved

    Note: This section requires more research and might not present accurate information.

    In case the operator is malicious all users need to exit within a predetermined time frame. Users that do not manage to do this will lose their funds.

    • Funds can be stolen if users are unable to withdraw in a mass exit event.

    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    Ethereum

    EthVault 0x3Eed…2ce0

    This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Erc20Vault 0x070c…430B

    This contract can store any token.

    ETHDepositVerifier 0x649f…70Be

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    ERC20DepositVerifier 0xD876…CD82

    The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    PlasmaFramework 0x0D4C…72ac
    PaymentExitGame 0x48d7…Aad3

    The source code of the PaymentStartStandardExit library used by this contract is not verified on Etherscan.

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).