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Taiko Alethia logoTaiko Alethia

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Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent rollup on the Ethereum network. Taiko aims at combining based sequencing and a multi-proof system through SP1, RISC0 and TEEs.


  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $46.02 M2.28%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    6.340.71%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other

  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    167000

  • Tokens breakdown

    Value secured breakdown

    View TVS breakdown
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent rollup on the Ethereum network. Taiko aims at combining based sequencing and a multi-proof system through SP1, RISC0 and TEEs.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    2024 Sep 04 — 2025 Sep 03


    Total
    $46.02 M2.28%
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    $45.47 M2.31%
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    $0.000.00%
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    $553.42 K0.17%

    ETH & derivatives
    $12.14 M4.09%
    Stablecoins
    $1.80 M0.20%
    BTC & derivatives
    $191.73 K0.28%
    Other
    $31.88 M1.71%

    2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.


    2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02


    1 year total cost
    $8.03 M
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.010474
    Avg cost per day
    $21.95 K

    This section shows the amount of data the project has posted to the EthereumEthereum.


    2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02


    1 year data posted
    99.04 GiB
    Avg size per day
    277.09 MiB
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    139.04 B

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2025 Aug 04 — Sep 03

    30D avg. tx data subs. interval
    1 minute
    30D avg. state updates interval
    8 minutes
    Past 30 days anomalies

    Preconfs introduction

    2025 Aug 11th

    Taiko implements preconfs - whitelisted actors provide fast soft confirmations for L2 txs.

    Learn more

    Plonky3 vulnerability patch

    2025 Jun 4th

    SP1 verifier is patched to fix critical vulnerability in Plonky3 proof system (SP1 dependency).

    Learn more
    This project includes unverified contracts.
    (CRITICAL)
    This project includes unverified contracts.
    (CRITICAL)
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Enqueue via L1

    Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can’t force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.

    State validation
    Multi-proofs

    A multi-proof system is used. There are four verifiers available: SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1 and RISC0. Two of them must be used to prove a block, and SGX (Geth) is mandatory. A block can be proved without providing a ZK proof as SGX (Geth) + SGX (Reth) is a valid combination.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Self propose

    Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge. Proofs can only be submitted for blocks sequenced by whitelisted operators. Provers are required to submit two valid proofs for blocks, one of which must be SGX (Geth), and the other can be either SGX (Reth), SP1, or RISC0. If the initial proposer fails to prove the block within the proving window, they forfeit half of their liveness bond.

    Taiko AlethiaTaiko Alethia is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.

    Learn more about Rollup stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect rollup security, this is an opinionated assessment of rollup maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of blobs. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum
    Validity proofs

    Taiko uses a multi-proof system to validate state transitions. The system requires two proofs among four available verifiers: SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1, and RISC0. The use of SGX (Geth) is mandatory, while the other three can be used interchangeably. This means that a block can be proven without providing a ZK proof if SGX (Geth) and SGX (Reth) are used together. Batch proposers are required to stake a liveness bond of 25.0 TAIKO, half of which is forfeited if they fail to prove the block within the proving window of 2h. The multi-proof system allows to detect bugs in the verifiers if they produce different results for the same block. If such a bug is detected, the system gets automatically paused.

    • Funds can be stolen if a malicious block is proven by compromised SGX instances.

    1. TaikoL1.sol - Etherscan source code, liveness bond

    The system uses whitelist-based rotating operators

    The system uses a whitelist-based sequencing mechanism to allow for fast preconfirmations on the L2. On the L1, whitelisted preconfirmers (or the fallback operator) can sequence Taiko L2 blocks by proposing them on the TaikoL1 contract. The whitelist is managed by the PreconfWhitelist contract, which currently has 3 active operators registered. The proposer of a block is assigned the designated prover role, and will be the only entity allowed to provide a proof for the block during the 2h proving window. Currently, proving a block requires the block proposer to run a SGX instance with Geth, plus either SGX (Reth), SP1, or RISC0 to prove the block. Unless the block proposer proves the block within the proving window, it will forfeit half of its liveness bond to the TaikoL1 smart contract.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. TaikoL1.sol - Etherscan source code, proposeBatch function
    2. PreconfWhitelist.sol - Etherscan source code

    Users can force any transaction via L1

    Users can submit a blob containing a standalone transaction by calling the storeForcedInclusion() function on the ForcedInclusionStore contract. This forced transaction mechanism allows users to submit a transaction without running a prover. This mechanism ensures that at least one forced transaction from the queue is processed every 255 batches. However, if many transactions (k) are added to the queue, an individual transaction could experience a worst-case delay of up to k * 255 batches while waiting for its turn. Also, right now there is no mechanism that forces L2 Sequencer to include transactions from the queue in an L2 block, since L1 batches submission is permissioned behind a whitelist.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions.

    1. ForcedInclusionStore.sol - Etherscan source code, storeForcedInclusion function

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner

    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.

    Actors:

    The main contract of the Aragon-based DAO governance framework.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • TaikoDAOController
      • TaikoDAOController
    TaikoDAOController 0x75Ba…CD0a

    Contract that maintains ownership DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum. Member of Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • ForcedInclusionStore
      • TaikoL1
      • AutomataDcapV3Attestation
      • Taiko Token
      • DefaultResolver
      • Risc0VerifierGateway
      • SgxVerifier
      • AutomataDcapV3Attestation
      • DefaultResolver
      • QuotaManager
      • MainnetERC20Vault
      • MainnetSignalService
      • SgxVerifier
      • TaikoWrapper
      • VerifierGateway
      • SP1VerifierGateway
      • PreconfRouter
      • MainnetBridge
      • L1SharedAddressManager
    • Can interact with AutomataDcapV3Attestation
      • can update the program being verified
    • Can interact with DefaultResolver
      • can update the contract address for a given name
    • Can interact with Risc0VerifierGateway
      • can update the program being verified
    • Can interact with SgxVerifier
      • can add new instances without a DCAP attestation
    • Can interact with AutomataDcapV3Attestation
      • can update the program being verified
    • Can interact with DefaultResolver
      • can update the contract address for a given name
    • Can interact with SgxVerifier
      • can add new instances without a DCAP attestation
    • Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway
      • can update the program being verified
    • Can interact with L1SharedAddressManager
      • can update the contract address for a given name
    Taiko Multisig 0x9CBe…9C7F

    A Multisig with 5/7 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • PreconfWhitelist
    Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig 0x363e…B3Da

    A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.

    Member of Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig, Taiko Multisig.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • ProverSet

    Taiko Alethia

    Actors:

    Taiko L2 Multisig 0xCa5b…3DE8

    A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • L2AddressManager
      • TaikoAnchor
      • DefaultResolver
    • Can interact with L2AddressManager
      • can update the contract address for a given name
    • Can interact with DefaultResolver
      • can update the contract address for a given name
    DelegateController 0xfA06…8C7C
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • Bridge
      • SignalService
      • DelegateController
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    Shared vault for Taiko chains for bridged ERC20 tokens.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
    • This contract can store any token.

    Contract that maintains ownership DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum.

    • Roles:
      • admin: DAO
    Can be upgraded by:

    Contract that allows users to enqueue forced transactions via L1. The system guarantees that at least one pending forced transaction from the queue will be processed every 255 batches. Individual transactions may face longer delays if the queue is extensive.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    Main contract implementing the logic for proposing and proving Taiko blocks on L1.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    A signer list for registering agents, similar to a Multisig.

    Contract managing SGX attestation certificates.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    ERC20 contract implementing the TAIKO token. It defines a list of addresses designated as non-voting.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing encrypted proposals (e.g. for Security Council emergency proposals).

    EncryptionRegistry 0x2eFD…42d1

    A registry for signers (of the Security Council) to appoint agents to operate on their behalf. These agents can also register their encryption keys for encrypted emergency proposal support.

    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier 0x34Ed…641c

    Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).

    Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    An operator proxy used by the Taiko team for operating (proposing, proving) the based rollup from permissioned addresses.

    • Roles:
      • admin: EOA 1
    Can be upgraded by:

    Entry contract to verify batches using RISC Zero.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Verifier contract for SGX proven blocks.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Contract managing SGX attestation certificates.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Defines withdrawal limits per token.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    An optimistic governance module. Proposals pass and can be executed unless 10% of votable TAIKO veto them within 7d.

    Verifier contract for SGX proven blocks.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Entry point for proposing blocks. It enforces the inclusion of forced transactions after their deadline.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    Gateway contract for the multi-proof system. It redirects proof to the appropriate verifier based on the proof type.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    Entry contract to verify batches using SP1.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Entry point for batch proposals under the pre-confirmation architecture. It allows batches to be proposed only by whitelisted addresses.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController

    Shared bridge for Taiko chains for bridged ETH.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
    • This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing proposals (e.g. for Security Council standard proposals).

    Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.

    • Roles:
      • admin: TaikoDAOController
      • owner: TaikoDAOController

    Contract that contains the whitelist for addresses allowed to propose (pre-confirmation) batches. There are currently 3 operators registered.

    • Roles:
      • admin: Taiko Multisig
      • getOperatorCandidatesForCurrentEpoch: EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4
    Can be upgraded by:
    SP1Verifier 0xFF5A…216B

    Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).

    Taiko Alethia

    • Roles:
      • admin: DelegateController
    • Roles:
      • admin: DelegateController

    Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.

    • Roles:
      • admin: Taiko L2 Multisig
      • owner: Taiko L2 Multisig

    Handles cross-layer message verification and manages EIP-1559 gas pricing for L2 operations. Anchors L1 block details to L2 for cross-layer communication.

    • Roles:
      • admin: Taiko L2 Multisig

    Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.

    • Roles:
      • admin: Taiko L2 Multisig
      • owner: Taiko L2 Multisig

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).