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Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent rollup on the Ethereum network. Taiko aims at combining based sequencing and a multi-proof system through SP1, RISC0 and TEEs.
Taiko Alethia is an Ethereum-equivalent rollup on the Ethereum network. Taiko aims at combining based sequencing and a multi-proof system through SP1, RISC0 and TEEs.
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2024 Sep 04 — 2025 Sep 03
2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02
This section shows the amount of data the project has posted to the Ethereum.
2024 Sep 03 — 2025 Sep 02
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2025 Aug 04 — Sep 03
Preconfs introduction
2025 Aug 11th
Taiko implements preconfs - whitelisted actors provide fast soft confirmations for L2 txs.
Plonky3 vulnerability patch
2025 Jun 4th
SP1 verifier is patched to fix critical vulnerability in Plonky3 proof system (SP1 dependency).
Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can’t force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.
A multi-proof system is used. There are four verifiers available: SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1 and RISC0. Two of them must be used to prove a block, and SGX (Geth) is mandatory. A block can be proved without providing a ZK proof as SGX (Geth) + SGX (Reth) is a valid combination.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge. Proofs can only be submitted for blocks sequenced by whitelisted operators. Provers are required to submit two valid proofs for blocks, one of which must be SGX (Geth), and the other can be either SGX (Reth), SP1, or RISC0. If the initial proposer fails to prove the block within the proving window, they forfeit half of their liveness bond.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of blobs. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
Taiko uses a multi-proof system to validate state transitions. The system requires two proofs among four available verifiers: SGX (Geth), SGX (Reth), SP1, and RISC0. The use of SGX (Geth) is mandatory, while the other three can be used interchangeably. This means that a block can be proven without providing a ZK proof if SGX (Geth) and SGX (Reth) are used together. Batch proposers are required to stake a liveness bond of 25.0 TAIKO, half of which is forfeited if they fail to prove the block within the proving window of 2h. The multi-proof system allows to detect bugs in the verifiers if they produce different results for the same block. If such a bug is detected, the system gets automatically paused.
Funds can be stolen if a malicious block is proven by compromised SGX instances.
The system uses a whitelist-based sequencing mechanism to allow for fast preconfirmations on the L2. On the L1, whitelisted preconfirmers (or the fallback operator) can sequence Taiko L2 blocks by proposing them on the TaikoL1 contract.
The whitelist is managed by the PreconfWhitelist
contract, which currently has 3 active operators registered.
The proposer of a block is assigned the designated prover role, and will be the only entity allowed to provide a proof for the block during the 2h proving window.
Currently, proving a block requires the block proposer to run a SGX instance with Geth, plus either SGX (Reth), SP1, or RISC0 to prove the block.
Unless the block proposer proves the block within the proving window, it will forfeit half of its liveness bond to the TaikoL1 smart contract.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can submit a blob containing a standalone transaction by calling the storeForcedInclusion()
function on the ForcedInclusionStore
contract.
This forced transaction mechanism allows users to submit a transaction without running a prover.
This mechanism ensures that at least one forced transaction from the queue is processed every 255 batches. However, if many transactions (k) are added to the queue, an individual transaction could experience a worst-case delay of up to k * 255 batches while waiting for its turn. Also, right now there is no mechanism that forces L2 Sequencer to include transactions from the queue in an L2 block, since L1 batches submission is permissioned behind a whitelist.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions.
Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
The main contract of the Aragon-based DAO governance framework.
Contract that maintains ownership DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum. Member of Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig.
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
Member of Taiko Foundation Treasury Multisig, Taiko Multisig.
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
Shared vault for Taiko chains for bridged ERC20 tokens.
Contract that maintains ownership DAO-controlled assets and contracts. Its token weight does not count towards the DAO quorum.
Contract that allows users to enqueue forced transactions via L1. The system guarantees that at least one pending forced transaction from the queue will be processed every 255 batches. Individual transactions may face longer delays if the queue is extensive.
A signer list for registering agents, similar to a Multisig.
Contract managing SGX attestation certificates.
ERC20 contract implementing the TAIKO token. It defines a list of addresses designated as non-voting.
Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing encrypted proposals (e.g. for Security Council emergency proposals).
A registry for signers (of the Security Council) to appoint agents to operate on their behalf. These agents can also register their encryption keys for encrypted emergency proposal support.
Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).
Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.
Entry contract to verify batches using RISC Zero.
Contract managing SGX attestation certificates.
Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.
Defines withdrawal limits per token.
An optimistic governance module. Proposals pass and can be executed unless 10% of votable TAIKO veto them within 7d.
Entry point for proposing blocks. It enforces the inclusion of forced transactions after their deadline.
Gateway contract for the multi-proof system. It redirects proof to the appropriate verifier based on the proof type.
Entry contract to verify batches using SP1.
Entry point for batch proposals under the pre-confirmation architecture. It allows batches to be proposed only by whitelisted addresses.
Shared bridge for Taiko chains for bridged ETH.
Modular Governance contract allowing for proposing, voting on and executing proposals (e.g. for Security Council standard proposals).
Maps contract names to contract addresses. Changes in this mapping effectively act as contract upgrades.
Contract that contains the whitelist for addresses allowed to propose (pre-confirmation) batches. There are currently 3 operators registered.
Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).