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Zircuit is a universal Rollup that aims to use zk proofs in the future. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.
Zircuit is a universal Rollup that aims to use zk proofs in the future. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.
The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.
The project will move to Others because:
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
2024 Jul 03 — 2025 Feb 21
2024 Jul 02 — 2025 Feb 20
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2024 Feb 21 — 2025 Feb 20
Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. Currently proofs are optional and state (by default) is considered optimistically to be valid. Moreover, the system doesn’t check that the transactions applied to the state are the ones published by the sequencer.
Funds can be stolen if the published state is invalid and the Challenger does not react during the 4h finalization window.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 4h to complete.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.
Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. This contract can store any token.
This contract verifies ZK proofs (if provided). There is an intentional dummy backdoor allowing to call this contract without a proof.
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT
, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and access control for configuring actors who can pause and unpause the system.
Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally. This contract stores the following tokens: wstETH.
Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintablERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
custom wstETH Vault controlled by Lido governance, using the canonical bridge for messaging.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).