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Zircuit
There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.
Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
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About
Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.
Badges
About
Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2025 Aug 30 — 2026 Aug 30
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Aug 30 — 2026 Aug 30
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted to
Ethereum.
2025 Aug 30 — 2026 Aug 30
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 Jul 31 — Aug 30
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 35s on average.
No Proof submissions were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 18m on average.
No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 35s on average.
No Proof submissions were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 18m on average.
No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 03:14 UTC until 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 35s on average.
Migrated to Conduit fault proofs
2026 Aug 4th
Zircuit migrates to a standard OP Stack PermissionedDisputeGame deployment via Conduit.
Proof system migrated to SP1
2025 Aug 25th
Zircuit deprecates its in-house proof system in favor of SP1.
Funds can be stolen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EthereumUpdates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 August 26, 12:26 UTC22changesOP-stack storage surgery performed on L1StandardBridge: https://tools.l2beat.com/decoder-new/?hash=0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23&data=AwA that manually overwritten bridge storage slots. Until Aug 4, 2026, Zircuit ran a modified bridge implementation that never maintained the OP-stack deposits accounting, after the migration to standard OP-stack contracts correct escrow balances had to be set for the following 12 tokens: ZRC, WETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, weETH, weETHs, mETH, LsETH, FBTC, LBTC, GUD. This was verifeid by reproducing corresponding storage slots and comparing with the values in the transaction above. Also, updated conduit ms and verified sources for L1Block contract on zircuit.
OP-stack storage surgery performed on L1StandardBridge: https://tools.l2beat.com/decoder-new/?hash=0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23&data=AwA that manually overwritten bridge storage slots.
Until Aug 4, 2026, Zircuit ran a modified bridge implementation that never maintained the OP-stack deposits accounting, after the migration to standard OP-stack contracts correct escrow balances had to be set for the following 12 tokens: ZRC, WETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, weETH, weETHs, mETH, LsETH, FBTC, LBTC, GUD. This was verifeid by reproducing corresponding storage slots and comparing with the values in the transaction above.
Also, updated conduit ms and verified sources for L1Block contract on zircuit.
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.16: | |
| + | ["2026-08-22T11:12:35.000Z","0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.17: | |
| + | ["2026-08-22T11:12:35.000Z","0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23",["eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 16 |
| + | 18 |
| } |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 10 (40%)" |
| + | "4 of 11 (36%)" |
| } |
New and verified contracts
| contract L1Block (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] { | |
| +++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. | |
| unverified: | |
| - | true |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| - | ["2025-05-12T16:00:01.000Z","0xe992e00998b34075506d2726a274db07a62af6cdd9d527bfda9128114603cfbd",["zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 1 |
| values.baseFeeScalar: | |
| + | 7600 |
| values.batcherHash: | |
| + | "0x000000000000000000000000cf8225801df6ef90ad3bc86808f574403a309de8" |
| values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT: | |
| + | "zircuit:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001" |
| values.gasPayingToken: | |
| + | {"addr_":"zircuit:0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE","decimals_":18} |
| values.gasPayingTokenName: | |
| + | "Ether" |
| values.gasPayingTokenSymbol: | |
| + | "ETH" |
| values.isCustomGasToken: | |
| + | false |
| values.l1FeeOverhead: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.l1FeeScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.version: | |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| implementationNames.zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66: | |
| - | "" |
| + | "L1Block" |
| template: | |
| + | "opstack/Layer2/L1Block" |
| sourceHashes: | |
| + | ["0x58e0fa3818df29fbb7de4e09a8c62f8952335a4ac32e30256ae72fd9681d7b50","0xba1197cf8ad03c23a68877c7bad92c7d43c0348aa7b03d38f36a17acb35a942e"] |
| description: | |
| + | "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain." |
| } |
2026 August 19, 09:58 UTCHigh severity8changesSuperchainConfig implementation upgraded v2.4.0 → v2.4.2 (diff) via a StorageSetter step in one transaction. Guardian unchanged (Conduit Multisig 1).
SuperchainConfig implementation upgraded v2.4.0 → v2.4.2 (diff) via a StorageSetter step in one transaction. Guardian unchanged (Conduit Multisig 1).
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28" |
| + | "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| + | "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 10 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.4.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } |
2026 August 12, 10:29 UTCHigh severity198changesHIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit's custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit's public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism's shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx. Admin control moved from Zircuit's own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit's shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit's shared SuperchainConfigFake expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects). Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d). Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 - 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 - 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 - 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 - 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 - 2.9.0. L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit's block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit's native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit's own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake. Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED
HIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit’s custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit’s public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism’s shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx.
Admin control moved from Zircuit’s own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit’s shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit’s shared SuperchainConfigFake_expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects).
Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d).
Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 -> 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 -> 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 -> 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 -> 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 -> 2.9.0.
L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit’s block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit’s native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit’s own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake.
Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459) [succinct/SP1Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0). |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| name: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal" |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/zircuit/OptimismPortal" |
| + | "opstack/OptimismPortal2" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x75b3a40d24df23769d05a5f3bb0461a19038ca999e7d7a3bb9e1ea2579b405d6" |
| + | "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d" |
| description: | |
| - | "The main entry point to deposit funds from the host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a time defined by the eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4." |
| + | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be" |
| + | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.13: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.14: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.15: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 16 |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.l2Oracle: | |
| - | "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4" |
| values.resolverRegistry: | |
| - | "eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.2.0" |
| + | "5.1.1" |
| values.anchorStateRegistry: | |
| + | "eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051" |
| values.disputeGameFactory: | |
| + | "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90" |
| values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| + | 302400 |
| values.ethLockbox: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds: | |
| + | 604800 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| + | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt: | |
| + | 1785852695 |
| implementationNames.eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| fieldMeta: | |
| + | {"respectedGameType":{"severity":"HIGH"},"paused":{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused."}} |
| usedTypes: | |
| + | [{"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"FaultDisputeGame","1":"PermissionedDisputeGame","8":"FaultDisputeGame","621":"AggregateVerifier","1337":"KailuaGame"}}] |
| } |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xe784f0244cc07b370089b601090cc4c3c7469c9fdd2a281bfa13b438c1b88e0d" |
| + | "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F" |
| + | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 10 |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.11.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3773dd699ed2a94c92b617c9e76c0191f58b9de68e2605999d076e287869e165" |
| + | "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xba2492e52F45651B60B8B38d4Ea5E2390C64Ffb1"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 13 |
| values.basefeeScalar: | |
| - | 1368 |
| + | 7600 |
| values.batcherHash: | |
| - | "eth:0xAF1E4f6a47af647F87C0Ec814d8032C4a4bFF145" |
| + | "eth:0xCf8225801DF6Ef90aD3bc86808F574403A309de8" |
| values.blobbasefeeScalar: | |
| - | 810949 |
| + | 862000 |
| +++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2 | |
| values.eip1559Denominator: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 50 |
| values.eip1559Elasticity: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 6 |
| values.L2_OUTPUT_ORACLE_SLOT: | |
| - | "0xe52a667f71ec761b9b381c7b76ca9b852adf7e8905da0e0ad49986a0a6871815" |
| values.l2OutputOracle: | |
| - | "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4" |
| values.minimumGasLimit: | |
| - | 7000000 |
| + | 21000000 |
| values.operatorFeeConstant: | |
| - | 360000000000 |
| + | 0 |
| values.operatorFeeScalar: | |
| - | 4200000000 |
| + | 0 |
| values.OSAKA_TX_MAX_GAS: | |
| - | 16777216 |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.resourceConfig.maxResourceLimit: | |
| - | 6000000 |
| + | 20000000 |
| values.resourceConfig._spacer: | |
| - | 8 |
| values.unsafeBlockSigner: | |
| - | "eth:0xAE8f771E297AAbfDE7ff35a33FB6D558f4E0a679" |
| + | "eth:0x0037e8264020bF2B3e6f57B529e07347f76F2D55" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.12.0" |
| + | "3.11.0" |
| values.daFootprintGasScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.disputeGameFactory: | |
| + | "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90" |
| values.getAddresses: | |
| + | {"l1CrossDomainMessenger":"eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091","l1ERC721Bridge":"eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244","l1StandardBridge":"eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8","optimismPortal":"eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1","optimismMintableERC20Factory":"eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932"} |
| values.guardian: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2ChainId: | |
| + | 48900 |
| values.maximumGasLimit: | |
| + | 500000000 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.paused: | |
| + | false |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/zircuit/L1StandardBridge" |
| + | "opstack/L1StandardBridge" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x2324f7b9f352cb131178a3853eb2383e5c82923461c55e76d14c23fd231664f9" |
| + | "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d" |
| description: | |
| - | "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from the host chain to this chain. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a configurable time." |
| + | "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98" |
| + | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.13: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.14: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.15: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 16 |
| values.accessController: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2TokenBridge: | |
| + | "eth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5) [succinct/SP1Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0). |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.4: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.5.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| + | "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90" |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.6.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4" |
| + | "eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract ResolverRegistry (eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E) [opstack/zircuit/ResolverRegistry] | |
| +++ description: Registers 'resolvers' which are allowed to supply authoritative data for blockchain balances to support escapes without merkle proofs from e.g. DeFi smart contracts on L2. A resolver can either be registered directly by the respective contract on L2 or by its deployer from L1, using deterministic deployment derivation. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract ZircuitSuperchainConfig (eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0) [opstack/zircuit/SuperchainConfig] | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and access control for configuring actors who can pause and unpause the system. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4) [opstack/zircuit/L2OutputOracle_SP1_nokeepalive] | |
| +++ description: Entrypoint for permissioned proposers to propose new L2 outputs (state roots). New proposals have to be accompanied by a zk-SNARK proof of a correct state transition. Users can 'escape' their funds after 1mo of no state updates by supplying merkle proofs or using a resolver. |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xeebc391f228960e573a84b61884f39e3f4d64ad3a105cb7974f641c4a737954e" |
| + | "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb" |
| + | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 10 |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.2.0" |
| + | "2.9.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SP1MockVerifierWithHash (eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8fa0103a7f0708fce3badff106e2d615501b3405658422802ee59b7d9f9e5472" |
| + | "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0" |
| + | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.9.0" |
| + | "1.10.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0xf35A4088eA0231C44B9DB52D25c0E9E2fEe31f67) [succinct/SP1VerifierGateway] | |
| +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. |
| contract L1Block (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/Layer2/L1Block_depositExclusions" |
| sourceHashes: | |
| - | ["0x58e0fa3818df29fbb7de4e09a8c62f8952335a4ac32e30256ae72fd9681d7b50","0xbb69c5830d6e822e4bf9c51ad08b5ade53450cf808a5cabc8665f40e5c6d7c1a"] |
| description: | |
| - | "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. This version though also contains a storage slot for `depositExclusions`." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12" |
| + | "zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-08-04T14:50:01.000Z","0xd89e381f4e17d7226144ae90c4efef010f4f085afb76b191add65dcf51aef089",["zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.basefee: | |
| - | 129016686 |
| values.baseFeeScalar: | |
| - | 1368 |
| values.batcherHash: | |
| - | "0x000000000000000000000000af1e4f6a47af647f87c0ec814d8032c4a4bff145" |
| values.blobBaseFee: | |
| - | 6234620 |
| values.blobBaseFeeScalar: | |
| - | 810949 |
| values.depositExclusions: | |
| - | "0x" |
| values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT: | |
| - | "zircuit:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001" |
| values.hash: | |
| - | "0x1cfd2189d2e946c9d3da809f0e22666602b7d2b84dcf08793f293371c9ad5f6a" |
| values.l1FeeOverhead: | |
| - | 0 |
| values.l1FeeScalar: | |
| - | 0 |
| values.number: | |
| - | 25645265 |
| values.operatorFeeConstant: | |
| - | 360000000000 |
| values.operatorFeeScalar: | |
| - | 4200000000 |
| values.sequenceNumber: | |
| - | 5 |
| values.timestamp: | |
| - | 1785409595 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.3.0" |
| implementationNames.zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12: | |
| - | "L1Block" |
| implementationNames.zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66: | |
| + | "" |
| unverified: | |
| + | true |
| } |
| contract ProxyAdmin (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38" |
| + | "zircuit:0x5b5A62275DF8c60A80D3a25FAeC5aA7De116b857" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x4F80B390aF3b49dda96134DA1ac905b05e816496) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5) [global/ProxyAdmin] | |
| +++ description: None |
2026 July 30, 11:07 UTC1changeZircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer ( 0x3880...8679 - 0xf5B2...c1ae ); threshold remains 2/5.
Zircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer (0x3880...8679 -> 0xf5B2...c1ae); threshold remains 2/5.
| contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679" |
| + | "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae" |
| } |
2026 June 02, 11:15 UTC4changesZircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ( $members[0] and $members[5] ).
Zircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ($members[0] and $members[5]).
| contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e" |
| + | "eth:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419" |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679" |
| + | "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae" |
| } |
| contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "zircuit:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e" |
| + | "zircuit:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419" |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "zircuit:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679" |
| + | "zircuit:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae" |
| } |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame
- Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer
Participants (11):
0x9402…53F20xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame
- Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
Zircuit
Actors:
- Can upgrade with no delay
- L1Block ProxyAdmin
- ProxyAdmin ProxyAdmin
Ethereum
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
- guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
- Roles:
- owner: Conduit Multisig 1
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
Zircuit
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 3
- owner: EOA 3
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).