zkLink Nova logozkLink Nova

Badges

About

zkLink Nova is a Layer 3 zkEVM Validium network leveraging ZK Stack that allows for scattered assets across Ethereum Layer 2s to be aggregated for interoperable trade and transactions.


Value Locked

$90.09 M

39.89%

Canonically Bridged
$72.85 M
Externally Bridged
$17.24 M
Natively Minted
$0.00

  • Tokens
  • Daily TPS
    0.392.43%
  • 30D tx count
    975.03 K

  • Type
    Validium
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    zkLink Nova is a Layer 3 zkEVM Validium network leveraging ZK Stack that allows for scattered assets across Ethereum Layer 2s to be aggregated for interoperable trade and transactions.


    Value Locked
    Activity
    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.
    SEQUENCER
    FAILURE
    STATE
    VALIDATION
    DATA
    AVAILABILITY
    EXIT WINDOWPROPOSER
    FAILURE
    Linea
    L2
    No mechanismZK proofs (SN)OnchainNoneCannot withdraw
    zkLink Nova
    L3 • Individual
    Enqueue via L2ZK proofsExternalNoneCannot withdraw
    zkLink Nova
    L3 • Combined
    No mechanismZK proofsExternalNoneCannot withdraw
    L3 combined risks
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    L2 & L3 individual risks
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    L3 combined risks

    Sequencer failure

    No mechanism

    There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.

    State validation

    ZK proofs

    Zero knowledge cryptography is used to ensure state correctness. Proofs are first verified on Linea and finally on Ethereum.

    Data availability

    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is ultimately NOT published on Ethereum.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Technology

    Zero knowledge STARK and SNARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs and zkSNARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace. In addition zkSNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    Data is not stored on chain

    The transaction data is not recorded on the Ethereum main chain.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The validators are the only entities that can propose blocks and process transactions. Moreover, they are trusted to only relay valid messages using the fast path. Fast path messages are eventually checked against the slow path, and if they are invalid, the system halts.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    • Funds can be lost if the operator relays invalid messages using the fast path (CRITICAL).

    Users can force any transaction via L2

    If a user is censored by L3 Sequencer, they can try to force transaction via L2 queue. Right now there is no mechanism that forces L3 Sequencer to include transactions from L2 queue in an L3 block.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions.

    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages from L1, including all forced withdrawals and deposits. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    Other considerations

    Bridging from multiple chains

    zkLink allows users to bridge assets from multiple chains, not just the base chain Linea. To do this, messages are sent through the canonical bridges of each respective chain to the main zkLink contract on Linea. To withdraw, state updates are relayed back to each chain with the respective canonical bridges. Since deposits in this way are processed quite slowly, the system allows validators to relay messages directly to the main zkLink contract in a trusted way. These messages are then checked against the slow path, and if they are invalid, the system eventually halts.

    • Funds can be lost if the canonical bridges of the secondary chains are compromised.

    Permissions

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    LineaOwner 0x0Bff…5391

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the main zkLink contract, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the LineaOwner.

    Permissioned actors that can commit, prove and execute blocks. It can also “fast” relay messages to zkLink Nova without going through the canonical bridges, meaning it can potentially relay invalid messages and mint tokens out of thin air. In that case, since the system checks such messages against the slow path, after some time the system would halt.

    The system consists of the following permissions on OP Mainnet:

    OptimismProxyAdmin 0xA688…50a4

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on OP Mainnet.

    OptimismOwner 0x2c3F…3dB9

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on OP Mainnet and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the OptimismOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Arbitrum One:

    ArbitrumProxyAdmin 0x4869…2917

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Arbitrum One.

    ArbitrumOwner 0xa29f…F60F

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Arbitrum One and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the ArbitrumOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Base:

    BaseProxyAdmin 0x85F0…22AE

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Base.

    BaseOwner 0xEf1c…162C

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Base and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the BaseOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Manta Pacific:

    MantaProxyAdmin 0x01aF…fE05

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Manta Pacific.

    MantaOwner 0x6ed8…2dE3

    Admin of the zkLink contract on Manta Pacific and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gaining access to all funds.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Mantle:

    MantleProxyAdmin 0xeAe8…1b82

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Mantle.

    MantleOwner 0x1aB4…BB60

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Mantle and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the MantleOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Scroll:

    ScrollProxyAdmin 0xC467…102f

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Scroll.

    AdminMultisig 0xeCa8…0c77

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Scroll and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the AdminMultisig.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Blast:

    BlastProxyAdmin 0xB511…4c19

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Blast.

    BlastOwner 0x7302…D50E

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 6 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Blast and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the BlastOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on ZKsync Era:

    EraProxyAdmin 0xe818…Dc98

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on ZKsync Era.

    EraOwner 0x3334…46ca

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on ZKsync Era and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the EraOwner.

    The system consists of the following permissions on Ethereum:

    EthereumProxyAdmin 0x3152…60b2

    Owner of the L1ERC20Bridge on Ethereum.

    EthereumOwner 0xdb4D…1E2D

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 8 threshold. Admin of the zkLink contract on Ethereum and the ProxyAdmin, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation and potentially gain access to all funds.

    Those are the participants of the EthereumOwner.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Linea):

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Linea to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main contract of the system where blocks are committed, proven and executed. It syncs messages from secondary chains (“slow” path) and accepts “fast” forwarded requests from permissioned validators that are later cross-checked with the slow path. ETH coming from secondary chains are transferred and escrowed here. State roots are then synced back to the secondary chains. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the main zkLink contract and Linea’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    ValidatorTimelock 0x509f…7e01

    Intermediary contract between the one of the validators and the ZKsync Era diamond that can delay block execution (ie withdrawals and other L3 --> L2 messages). Currently, the delay is set to 0s.

    Verifier 0x902C…0458

    Implements ZK proof verification logic.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Governance 0xeF52…54ec

    Intermediary governance contract with two roles and a customizable delay. This delay is only mandatory for transactions scheduled by the Owner role and can be set by the SecurityCouncil role. The SecurityCouncil role can execute arbitrary upgrade transactions immediately. Currently the delay is set to 0s and the SecurityCouncil role is not used.

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Ethereum:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Ethereum to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Ethereum and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the EthereumL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Ethereum’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Ethereum’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Contract storing the mapping between secondary chain bridges and acts as an intermediary to receive and relay messages to and from the main zkLink contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the LineaL2Gateway on Linea. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the MantaL2Gateway on Manta Pacific. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the MantleL2Gateway on Mantle. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the EraL2Gateway on ZKsync Era. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the ArbitrumL2Gateway on Arbitrum One. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the BlastL2Gateway on Blast. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the OptimismL2Gateway on OP Mainnet. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the BaseL2Gateway on Base. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    L1 counterpart receiving messages from the ScrollL2Gateway on Scroll. It redirects them to the Arbitrator contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on OP Mainnet:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from OP Mainnet to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on OP Mainnet and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the OptimismL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of OP Mainnet’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and OP’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Arbitrum One:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Arbitrum One to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Arbitrum One and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the ArbitrumL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Arbitrum One’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Arbitrum’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Base:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Base to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Base and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the BaseL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Base’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Base’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Manta Pacific:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Manta Pacific to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Manta Pacific and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the MantaPacificL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Manta Pacific’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Manta Pacific’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Mantle:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Mantle to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Mantle and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the MantleL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Mantle’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Mantle’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Scroll:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Scroll to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Scroll and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the ScrollL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Scroll’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Scroll’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on Blast:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from Blast to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on Blast and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the BlastL2Gateway which ultimately makes use of Blast’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    High level interface between the local zkLink contract and Blast’s message service.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on ZKsync Era:

    Main entry point for depositing ERC20 tokens from ZKsync Era to zkLink Nova. Outgoing messages and incoming withdrawal validation is delegated to the zkLink contract. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Main messaging contract on ZKsync Era and ETH escrow. Outgoing messages (like deposits) are sent through the ZKsync2L2Gateway which ultimately makes use of ZKsync Era’s canonical messaging bridge to reach the Arbitrator on L1. Only whitelisted validators can sync messages with zkLink Nova, which also transfer the ETH to it via the respective canonical bridges. Incoming messages (like withdrawals) are validated on Linea first and then sent to this contract through the same path. Whitelisted validators can also relay messages to zkLink without going through the canonical bridge (fast path), which are later cross-checked with the slow path. If the check fails, the system halts. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).