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Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack. However, there is indirect economic security derived by the committee members being publicly known, and their reputation is at stake should they behave maliciously.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.
Nova is a data availability solution for Arbitrum rollups built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components:
Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs. The Sequencer API allows the rollup Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hash. When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it. Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox. If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain. A DACert includes a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature. L2 nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp. If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members.
Arbitrum Nova DAC on Ethereum.
For regular updates, there is a 12d 8h delay before the bridge implementation update is completed. The Security Council can upgrade the DA bridge without delay.
The relayer role is permissioned, but the DA bridge has a Security Council or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge liveness can be restored by proposing a new relayer after a delay of 12d 8h via governance upgrade, or through a Security Council without delay.
In Nova architecture, the DA commitments are posted to the L1 through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the L1 chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving L2 transaction ordering finality in a single onchain transaction.
The Arbitrum DAO controls Arbitrum Nova through upgrades and modifications to their smart contracts on Layer 1 Ethereum and the Layer 2s.
Regular upgrades, Admin- and Owner actions originate from either the Arbitrum DAO or the non-emergency (proposer-) Security Council on Arbitrum One and pass through multiple delays and timelocks before being executed at their destination. Contrarily, the three Emergency Security Council multisigs (one on each chain: Arbitrum One, Ethereum, Arbitrum Nova) can skip delays and directly access all admin- and upgrade functions of all smart contracts. These two general paths have the same destination: the respective UpgradeExecutor smart contract.
Regular upgrades are scheduled in the L2 Timelock. The proposer Security Council can do this directly and the Arbitrum DAO (ARB token holders and delegates) must meet a CoreGovernor-enforced 5% threshold of the votable tokens. The L2 Timelock queues the transaction for a 3d delay and then sends it to the Outbox contract on Ethereum. This incurs another delay (the challenge period) of 6d 8h. When that has passed, the L1 Timelock delays for additional 3d. Both timelocks serve as delays during which the transparent transaction contents can be audited, and even cancelled by the Emergency Security Council. Finally, the transaction can be executed, calling Admin- or Owner functions of the respective destination smart contracts through the UpgradeExecutor on Ethereum. If the predefined transaction destination is Arbitrum One or -Nova, this last call is executed on L2 through the canonical bridge and the aliased address of the L1 Timelock.
Operator roles like the Sequencers and Validators are managed using the same paths. Sequencer changes can be delegated to a Batch Poster Manager.
Central actors allowed to submit transaction batches to the Sequencer Inbox.
A Gnosis Safe with 4 / 6 threshold. It can update whether an address is authorized to be a batch poster at the sequencer inbox. The UpgradeExecutor retains the ability to update the batch poster manager (along with any batch posters).
Those are the participants of the BatchPosterManagerMultisig.
A Gnosis Safe with 9 / 12 threshold. It uses the following modules: UpgradeExecutor (Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations). The admin of all contracts in the system, capable of issuing upgrades without notice and delay. This allows it to censor transactions, upgrade bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds stored in a bridge and change the sequencer or any other system component (unlimited upgrade power). It is also the admin of the special purpose smart contracts used by validators.
Those are the participants of the SecurityCouncil.
The UpgradeExecutor can change the Committee members by updating the valid keyset.
This contract can upgrade the system’s contracts. The upgrades can be done either by the Security Council or by the L1Timelock.
Upgrade delay: 12d 8h or 0 if overridden by Security Council.
Timelock contract for Arbitrum Governance transactions. Scheduled transactions from Arbitrum One L2 (by the DAO or the Security Council) are delayed here and can be canceled by the Security Council or executed to upgrade and change system contracts on Ethereum, Arbitrum One and -Nova.
Upgrade delay: 12d 8h or 0 if overridden by Security Council.