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Immutable zkEVM logo
Immutable zkEVM

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About

Immutable zkEVM is a sidechain focused on gaming and powered by Polygon stack. It plans to eventually transition to a ZK Rollup.


  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $27.69 M1.59%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.506.39%
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal

  • Chain ID
    13371

  • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Immutable zkEVM is a sidechain focused on gaming and powered by Polygon stack. It plans to eventually transition to a ZK Rollup.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.


    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    Compare with other projects
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    No mechanism

    There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is down or censoring.

    State validation
    None

    Currently the system permits invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. More details in project overview.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    No state validation

    Immutable zkEVM bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. makes use of Axelar networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. (a Cosmos chain) to transfer assets between Ethereum and Immutable zkEVM. As in any standard Cosmos chain, validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier are bonded by staking tokens and can be slashed by social consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. for misbehaviour.

    A deposit starts by a user depositing tokens on the Bridge contract and then the tokens are minted on the destination chain.

    Withdrawals to Ethereum can be delayed by a predefined time with a flow rate mechanism that controls outflows of the bridge escrow. The ProxyAdmin or an address with the rate_control role can define so-called buckets for each token: Each bucket has a capacity and a refill rate. All withdrawals that exceed the tokens bucket capacity trigger the withdrawal queue, which delays subsequent withdrawals of any of the bridges’ assets for a time defined in withdrawalDelay (currently 1d).

    • Users can be censored if validators on Axelar decide to not mint tokens after observing an event on Ethereum.

    • Funds can be stolen if validators decide to mint more tokens than there are locked on Ethereum thus preventing some existing holders from being able to bring their funds back to Ethereum.

    • Funds can be stolen if validators relay a withdraw request that wasn't originated on the source chain.

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    No upgrades
    Last upgrade
    N/A
    Avg upgrade interval
    N/A
    2026 March 04, 09:00 UTC
    1change

    ms member change.

    contract OwnerMultisig (eth:0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.5:
    - "eth:0xb3538EDB1cD74AE43e0aD25eac6F03553657E3fB"
    + "eth:0x94e97260182B9537822687Dd3c301225c6f87a5e"
    }
    2025 July 14, 12:45 UTC
    6changes

    Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

    New and verified contracts

    + Status: CREATED
    contract AxelarGatewayProxyMultisig (0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor (0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ChildERC20 (0x8804A8aA1F18f23aE8A456dD73806FdA3219FaD1)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Bridge (0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OwnerMultisig (0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8)
    +++ description: None
    2025 March 07, 13:49 UTC
    1change

    MS: single member change.

    contract OwnerMultisig (0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.5:
    - "0xbD8Dc294478ec4dAd9f1b4596bf275f4d0309817"
    + "0xb3538EDB1cD74AE43e0aD25eac6F03553657E3fB"
    }
    2024 October 16, 09:51 UTC
    1change

    Signer change.

    contract OwnerMultisig (0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "0xB3669C058ddF26171Fd131D80C801AaEeb1519b8"
    + "0xA28A84676E3Cec39e6F1D06CD0EEF6cAAa2F7f7b"
    }
    2024 September 06, 11:30 UTC
    6changes

    One signer removed.

    contract OwnerMultisig (0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.6:
    - "0xbD8Dc294478ec4dAd9f1b4596bf275f4d0309817"
    values.$members.5:
    - "0x296A19A4e87F5824DBE8DEd53415A4704538bB30"
    + "0xbD8Dc294478ec4dAd9f1b4596bf275f4d0309817"
    values.$members.4:
    - "0xB3669C058ddF26171Fd131D80C801AaEeb1519b8"
    + "0x296A19A4e87F5824DBE8DEd53415A4704538bB30"
    values.$members.3:
    - "0xdb6c271060571A96A62E3947E373395C89f765Ba"
    + "0xB3669C058ddF26171Fd131D80C801AaEeb1519b8"
    values.$members.2:
    - "0x5F1A23A3baB949D7264AfA4E6fbfEB245685E6B5"
    + "0xdb6c271060571A96A62E3947E373395C89f765Ba"
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "4 of 7 (57%)"
    + "4 of 6 (67%)"
    }
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    OwnerMultisig0xD2C3…D192

    A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. Multisig controlling the ProxyAdmin, potentially stealing all locked funds.

    ProxyAdmin0xdE2B…1Ec8

    Contract allowed to upgrade the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge., its flow rate control and the Axelar adaptor.

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    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    Main escrow for tokens.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Axelar adaptor contract used by the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

    Can be upgraded by:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).