rhino.fi

Data Availability Committee (DAC)A set of members whose task is attesting and ensuring that the data is available for the public. An onchain DAC verifier checks that a threshold of signatures from the DAC members is reached before considering a data commitment as available and therefore valid to be used in the system. contract verifying and storing data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium. claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 4.

Central ValidiumAn off-chain solution that uses validity proofs for settlement and publishes the data offchain, therefore requiring an additional trust assumption. contract. Receives (verified) state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. from the OperatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades., allows users to consume L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. -> L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.

• Roles:
  • admin: RhinofiAdminMultisig
  • operators: EOA 1
  • tokenAdmins: EOA 2, EOA 3

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Stores the complete compiled Cairo outer bootloader used as the top-level program of a SHARP proof. The SHARP verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. copies these words into public memory, pinning this exact executable onchain independently of the separately committed simple, applicative, and recursive-verifier programs.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

PermissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants. commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. failure instead.

Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.

• Roles:
  • admin: SHARP Multisig
  • appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
  • appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
  • governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig

Immutable GPS statement verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.

Immutable GPS statement verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Immutable GPS statement verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

PermissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants. commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. failure instead.

Immutable GPS statement verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.

Immutable Solidity verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARKShort for "scalable transparent argument of knowledge", a STARK is a type of zero-knowledge proof that resolves one of the primary weaknesses of ZK-SNARKs, its reliance on a "trusted setup”. STARKs also come with much simpler cryptographic assumptions, avoiding the need for elliptic curves, pairings, and the knowledge-of-exponent assumption and instead relying purely on hashes and information theory. This means that they are secure even against attackers with quantum computers. proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRIA proximity test method that is used to determine whether a set of points is mostly on a polynomial with a degree less than a specified value. It resembles the FFT but the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic., and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957).

Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..