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Cloaked

About

A wallet service with a closed-source hosted frontend that keeps spending keys client-side and gives recipients a fresh stealth address for every payment through reusable ENS names.


  • Metrics
    Not trackedData tracking is not available for this project.

  • Trusted setup
  • Exit window
  • Privacy
    Recipient privacy
  • Reproducibility

  • Tracked on
    Ethereum logo
  • Attributes
    Stealth addressesAny amount

  • About

    A wallet service with a closed-source hosted frontend that keeps spending keys client-side and gives recipients a fresh stealth address for every payment through reusable ENS names.

    Cloaked is a wallet service that separates incoming payments across fresh Ethereum addresses while presenting them as one account. Whether requested through an ENS name, the app, or the API, each address is controlled by a private key that the recipient can derive locally.

    Stealth address generation

    Under Cloaked’s published key model, the clientSometimes labelled interchangeably as a “node”, they are tasked with processing transactions and managing the blockchains's state. They run the computations for each transaction according to the rollup's virtual machine and protocol rules. If comparing to Ethereum clients, these would be execution clients such as Geth, as opposed to consensus clients. deterministically derives separate viewing and spending keys from a passkey secret or a wallet signature combined with a PIN. It shares the viewing key and public spending key with Cloaked so the service can generate and monitor payment addresses, but keeps the private spending key locally.

    For each payment nonce, the service derives an ephemeral private key, combines it with the recipient’s public spending key, and returns the resulting one-time address. The client can recreate the same ephemeral key and combine its public key with the private spending key to derive the private key controlling that address. Under this model, only the client can derive the private key needed to spend from a correctly generated address.

    The derivation SDK, API schema, and standalone recovery client are published. The recovery client can derive exportable stealth private keys without using the Cloaked API.

    The production web wallet itself is closed source, has no published reproducible build, and cannot be self-hosted. Users who rely on it must trust the remotely served application to preserve the client-side spending-key boundary. The API, ENS gateway, indexer, and relay are also hosted and closed source, so the complete wallet service cannot be self-hosted.

    The hosted frontend is not required to hold or use spending keys. A locally run client can create an account and perform payment-address, quote, local derivation and signing, and submission flows against the hosted API. In this setup, the spending key and derived stealth private keys remain local; Cloaked receives the scoped viewing capability and signed authorizations. Assuming the client verifies the data it signs, bypassing the hosted frontend removes it as a spending-key exfiltration risk.

    This differs from the usual sender-driven ERC-5564 flow. The payer does not derive the address from public recipient metadata and publish an announcement. Cloaked’s service performs the derivation, keeps the address-to-account mapping, and indexes the resulting balances.

    When a user spends, the service selects one or more stealth addresses and prepares the transaction. The client re-derives the corresponding private keys and authorizes execution. Cloaked uses EIP-7702 account delegation for actions such as combining balances, paying fees in tokens, swaps, and bridging.

    ENS resolution

    Cloaked supports both the free username.clkd.eth subdomain created during registration and custom .eth names or subnames owned by the user. Linking a custom name sets Cloaked’s resolver for that name but does not transfer ownership, and the user can unlink it by changing the resolver again. Both kinds of name use the same ENS CCIP-Read flow.

    A lookup is redirected to api.clkd.xyz, which creates a fresh payment address and returns a signed ENS answer. The onchain resolver checks the answer’s expiry and signature against its configurable signer. For custom names, Cloaked stores the linked name only in encrypted form, although the name and its resolver configuration remain public on Ethereum.

    The signature authenticates the answer as one accepted by Cloaked, but it is not a proof that the returned address was correctly derived for the named recipient. An external sender cannot independently verify recipient control from the ENS answer alone. The resolver owner can immediately replace both the gateway URLs and accepted signer.

    Privacy considerations

    Cloaked’s fresh addresses do not hide the sender, token, amount, or receiving address of an individual payment. They prevent separate receives from automatically accumulating under one reused public address. Later transactions can still link addresses when they consolidate balances, use a recognizable destination, or correlate by timing and amount.

    The hosted service has the viewing capability and address index needed to link an account’s stealth addresses and activity. Cloaked also integrates Privacy Pools for an Incognito balance that can break the public onchain link between a deposit and withdrawal, but Cloaked states that its relay sees both sides. The underlying pools are tracked separately because their public transactions cannot be attributed specifically to Cloaked users.

    What the protocol promises: Hides which account a receiving address belongs to. The payer knows the address it was given; sender, asset, amount and where the funds go next are public.

    On public blockchains like Ethereum, all actions transparent by default. A privacy protocol can at best cut the link between addresses or offer privacy while deposited. The colour says whether a careful user can keep the link, amount or recipient private against that adversary: green yes, yellow only outside supported options or by accepting another leak, red no. Fields marked at risk stay private only under the condition in their note.

    Recipient private

    A fresh receiving address has no public derivation linking it to the recipient account, but its funds can be followed through later sends and change outputs. Combining addresses exposes their joint use, and EIP-7702 delegation reveals the account implementation without proving who owns the address.

    Advice: Generate a fresh address for each receive, spend address-held balances separately with Advanced Control, and send to destinations with no public link to you.

    Recipient at risk

    Spending through shared execution infrastructure makes service use recognizable, which narrows the anonymity set to Cloaked users. No registry or announcement maps accounts to addresses, but timing, distinctive amounts, recurring counterparties and consolidation can identify or cluster recipients. A send draws from several addresses by default and leaves a change output that links them.

    Advice: Space out related payments and check whether amounts or recurring patterns identify you. Follow your own change outputs to see what a counterparty can trace.

    Recipient at risk

    Every spend from the hosted client goes to a third-party relay, Porto, with the stealth address, destination and amount, which clusters your addresses per session even over Tor. The client is closed source, so what else reaches the RPC, hosting and analytics providers named in the privacy policy cannot be verified. Only the recovery tool runs without any server.

    Advice: Derive your address keys with the recovery tool, which makes no network calls, and spend them from a wallet on your own node over Tor. Fund gas for token transfers from a fresh wallet, since sponsored execution is only available through the hosted client.

    Recipient exposed

    Cloaked holds the viewing key, so it can regenerate every address and tie its activity to your account. Its Incognito relay states that it retains deposit-to-withdrawal associations, and the hosted wallet code handles your spending secrets.

    Advice: Verify address derivations and transactions with an inspected local client. This protects your spending keys but does not remove Cloaked's view.

    Recipient at risk

    No announcement is published, so a quantum computer cannot replay address derivations from the chain alone. The viewing key held by Cloaked exposes the history regardless. Accounts created from a wallet signature reduce to that wallet's key plus a four-digit PIN. Passkey PRF secrets do not follow from breaking the passkey.

    Advice: Create your account with the passkey PRF setup, not from a wallet signature. Treat the address history shared with Cloaked as permanently disclosed.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a user relies on the hosted wallet and it is malicious or compromised and exfiltrates derived spending keys. The production wallet is closed source and has no published reproducible build, so users cannot inspect its source or verify the code being served.
    2. the accepted ENS signer returns an attacker-controlled payment address for a Cloaked name. The resolver authenticates the answer but does not prove that the intended recipient controls it.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. a user loses the passkey and encrypted backup, or the wallet and PIN, needed to re-derive their private spending keys.
    2. the service and clientSometimes labelled interchangeably as a “node”, they are tasked with processing transactions and managing the blockchains's state. They run the computations for each transaction according to the rollup's virtual machine and protocol rules. If comparing to Ethereum clients, these would be execution clients such as Geth, as opposed to consensus clients. derive different address data and a payment is sent to an address for which the user cannot recreate the private key.

    Privacy can be lost if

    1. Cloaked, or an attacker who obtains its viewing data, uses the service’s viewing capability and index to link an account’s stealth addresses and onchain activity.
    2. spending from several stealth addresses together, reusing destinations, or recognizable timing and amounts links otherwise separate payments onchain.
    3. a user relies on the Incognito balance, because Cloaked’s relay observes the association between Privacy Pools deposits and withdrawals even though it is hidden from public onchain observers.

    Cloaked has no public onchain governance process for its hosted wallet, API, indexer, ENS gateway, or relay. These components can change without an onchain notice period. The production wallet is closed source and has no published reproducible build, so users who rely on it cannot inspect its source, verify which clientSometimes labelled interchangeably as a “node”, they are tasked with processing transactions and managing the blockchains's state. They run the computations for each transaction according to the rollup's virtual machine and protocol rules. If comparing to Ethereum clients, these would be execution clients such as Geth, as opposed to consensus clients. code is deployed, or determine whether an update preserves the client-side spending-key boundary. Users can bypass the hosted frontend with an inspected local client, but this does not reproduce the other hosted components or prevent them from changing.

    The deployed ENS OffchainResolver code is immutable, but its owner can immediately replace the gateway URLs and accepted signer or transfer ownership. The accepted signer can authenticate any offchain ENS answer, including a payment address. The resolver callback verifies only the signature and expiry; it does not verify stealth-address derivation or recipient control. The resolver owner and signer are currently the same EOA.

    These powers affect new address generation and ENS lookups. They do not let the owner or signer spend from an existing, correctly derived stealth address because its private spending key remains with the user. Existing balances can be recovered independently with the published recovery client, but the full Cloaked experience does not remain available if the hosted service disappears.

    2026 August 21, 11:41 UTC
    1change

    Initial discovery of Cloaked's ENS CCIP-Read OffchainResolver and the EOA that controls its gateway and signer.

    Initial discovery

    + Status: CREATED
    contract OffchainResolver (eth:0x77fEF66b77d6a44AeCcCCf911f9864c7b7ca392C) [N/A]
    +++ description: Immutable ENS CCIP-Read resolver used by Cloaked. Every query redirects to a configurable API gateway and accepts the returned ENS record if it is unexpired and signed by the configurable signer. It does not verify that a returned payment address was derived for the named recipient.
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Cloaked Resolver Owner0xDFc6…7940
    • Can interact with OffchainResolver
      • change the accepted signer and gateway URLs immediately, or transfer resolver ownership
      • sign arbitrary offchain ENS answers, including payment addresses accepted by the resolver
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    OffchainResolver0x77fE…392C

    Immutable ENS CCIP-Read resolver used by Cloaked. Every query redirects to a configurable API gateway and accepts the returned ENS record if it is unexpired and signed by the configurable signer. It does not verify that a returned payment address was derived for the named recipient.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Cloaked Resolver Owner
      • signer: Cloaked Resolver Owner