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Zama Confidential Tokens
About
Zama Confidential Tokens is an app that wraps ERC-20 assets into confidential tokens and hides balances and transfer amounts using Zama FHEVM on Ethereum.
About
Zama Confidential Tokens is an app that wraps ERC-20 assets into confidential tokens and hides balances and transfer amounts using Zama FHEVM on Ethereum.
Zama Confidential Tokens is an account-based confidential token system on Ethereum, using the Zama FHE protocol. It is based on ERC-7984. Users deposit regular ERC-20 tokens into asset-specific escrows and receive confidential tokens whose balances and internal transfer amounts are represented as encrypted handles.
‘Confidential’ here means from: and to: addresses and transfer timestamps always remain public. Only balances and transfer amounts are hidden. Each confidential token aggregates encrypted balances for a single underlying asset, so the hidden state is the amount and balance data, not the public address graph.
Architecture
The Zama FHE protocol uses fully homomorphic encryption to let smart contracts operate on encrypted values. Balances are stored as encrypted handles instead of plaintext balances, and FHEVM system contracts are called for encrypted arithmetic, comparisons, transfers, minting, or burning, but most of the actual FHE execution happens offchain.
The FHE coprocessor is an offchain service that performs FHE-related work the EVM cannot execute directly. Encrypted user inputs are accepted onchain only after the InputVerifier checks signatures from the coprocessor signer set (currently 1/1). The coprocessor is constrained on what it can commit onchain by the smart contract, but it is not trustless and can affect validity if compromised.
The ACL is the onchain access-control registry for encrypted handles. It records which accounts or contracts are allowed to use a ciphertext handle, which prevents arbitrary users from reusing encrypted values they do not control.
The (T)KMS is the threshold key-management service used for private and public decryptions. It holds the FHE secret key and functions like a multisig; the current Ethereum verifier context (KMS signer set) has a threshold of 7/13. Each context can be different but retains its full permissions until explicitly invalidated onchain. A malicious new Ethereum verifier context, or the threshold of any retained Ethereum verifier context, can attest an inflated amount for an attacker’s real unwrap handle and drain pooled backing deposited by other users. The KMS Signers are operated by Zama, Dfns, Figment, Fireblocks, InfStones, Unit410, LayerZero, Ledger, Omakase, Stake Capital, OpenZeppelin, Etherscan, and Conduit.
The onchain KMS signer addresses are ECDSA credentials used to attest KMS outputs; they are not the FHE key shares. Zama states that KMS MPC nodes run inside AWS Nitro Enclaves, and its offchain software maps node signing keys to MPC parties, but the contracts do not verify Nitro attestations or prove that a configured signer runs inside a TEE, holds an FHE key share, or participated in the threshold computation. Changing an onchain KMS context only changes which signatures are accepted; it neither triggers nor verifies redistribution or destruction of FHE key shares.
There are many moving parts and offchain components in the Zama FHE protocol on which Zama Confidential Tokens is built. The Zama Gateway, an L3 on Arbitrum, is currently used for coordination/aggregation, ciphertext-metadata, and key-lifecycles. Ethereum does not trust its state directly and independently verifies operator signatures before accepting inputs or withdrawals, but current relayer and operator workflows depend on Gateway availability to produce those proofs.
Privacy considerations
Deposits and withdrawals are public privacy boundaries. A wrap emits the confidential-token recipient and the rounded clear underlying-token amount. The recipient can be different from the depositor, but that relationship is still visible in the deposit event. Withdrawals then reveal the recipient and amount.
Within a confidential token, holders can make confidential transfers between transparent EVM addresses. These transfers reveal the parties and encrypted ciphertext handles, but not the clear amount or resulting balances. The confidential balances and transfer amounts of users can be decrypted retroactively if enough KMS key shares are combined.
The smart contracts do not fully validate FHE offchain work, which makes the KMS and coprocessor each trusted for security, privacy and liveness. Encrypted user inputs are accepted through the InputVerifier, which requires 1/1 coprocessor signatures. Public decryptions are accepted through the KMSVerifier, which requires the threshold of any selected non-invalidated context (signer set), not necessarily the displayed current 7/13 context. Decentralization of the critical offchain services is announced in the docs but not implemented onchain (e.g. coprocessors, fraud proofs, slashing, zk proofs).
Practical privacy also depends on timing, amounts, address reuse, wallet/RPC providers, and any frontend or service used to create encrypted inputs. Users are advised to research OPSEC best practice.
Fees
There currently is no protocol fee. Users still pay Ethereum gas for each action, including confidential token transfers, and may pay costs charged by external wallets, relayers, or services used to create or submit transactions.
Compliance
Compliance is enforced in each confidential token contract. The owner can block and unblock local users, and confidential token contracts can be configured to call an underlying-token denylist function. These checks apply to direct deposits, ERC-1363 callback deposits, confidential transfers, unwrap requests, and unwrap finalization.
Because confidential tokens are backed by underlying tokens held in their contract addresses, issuer or token-admin controls over those underlyings remain a dependency. If an underlying token admin blocks a confidential token address, the escrowed token can become stuck. If a user address is blocked by an underlying token and the confidential token has a transitive denylist hook configured, that address can be prevented from depositing, transferring, or completing withdrawals.
Anonymity set
Zama Confidential Tokens does not use fixed-denomination notes. For a given finalized withdrawal, the set of prior deposits that could have funded the withdrawing account through the public address graph is its effective anonymity set: deposits credited to the same address, or to addresses that visibly transferred confidential tokens to it before the withdrawal. Amounts are private inside the confidential token, so links within the remaining candidate set can remain ambiguous, but deposits and finalized withdrawals expose each boundary amount and endpoint address. Integration with DeFi and its use from inside the confidential token increases the anonymity set.
As mentioned in ‘Privacy Considerations’, the mostly centralized offchain services that cannot be circumvented can corrupt practical privacy, independent of the abstract measurable anonymity set.
2025 Dec 27 — 2026 Jul 27
2026 May 12 — Jul 27
Asset | Deposits 7D | Deposits 30D | Deposits Total | Value Locked |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 steakcUSDC | 8 $3.81 M | 36 $34.62 M | 176 $44.44 M | $19.80 M |
 ZAMA | 6 $1.90 K | 17 $13.77 K | 37 $17.54 K | $11.73 M |
 USDT | 20 $306.23 K | 57 $716.95 K | 145 $870.66 K | $7.90 M |
 USDC | 95 $3.74 M | 393 $35.89 M | 2.36 K $53.52 M | $5.16 M |
 bbqTGBP | 0 $0.00 | 0 $0.00 | 1 $5.07 M | $5.03 M |
 WETH | 2 $1.00 K | 16 $63.52 K | 46 $103.46 K | $41.03 K |
 XAUt | 0 $0.00 | 0 $0.00 | 2 $0.53 | $40.77 K |
| tGBP | 0 $0.00 | 0 $0.00 | 2 $10.16 K | $10.23 K |
| Total | 131 $7.86 M | 519 $71.31 M | 2.77 K $104.03 M | $49.73 M |
Funds can be stolen if
- a malicious upgrade compromises the confidential token contracts or FHEVM contracts with their escrowed underlying tokens.
- the threshold of the current or any non-destroyed historical Ethereum KMS context attests an inflated unwrap amount, allowing pooled underlying deposited before or after that context existed to be released. Governance can also install a malicious context; 7/13 describes only the current context.
- the 1/1 coprocessor input verification path accepts invalid encrypted inputs that bypass confidential balance checks.
Funds can be lost if
- an underlying token admin blacklists a confidential token address or otherwise prevents transfers from the contract.
- a user is blocked by the confidential token owner or by a configured underlying-token denylist before finalization/withdrawal.
- offchain ciphertext data required by the coprocessor or KMS for encrypted handles becomes unavailable and cannot be reconstructed.
Privacy can be lost if
- enough KMS operators with usable key shares collude or are compromised and decrypt private ciphertext handles. 7/13 describes only the current verifier context, while retained contexts can have different memberships and thresholds.
- the offchain coprocessor, wallet, relayer, frontend, or RPC path records enough metadata to link a user to encrypted inputs or transactions.
- deposits and withdrawals are linked by clear boundary amounts, recipient graph, timing, or address reuse.
Zama Confidential Tokens governance is implemented through an Aragon ‘DAO’ deployment controlled by two multisigs: ZamaGovMultisigA with a 9/17 threshold and ZamaGovMultisigB with a 3/5 threshold. The Gateway contracts are controlled separately by the SafeL2 multisig listed in the permissions section. These accounts can upgrade contracts or change critical configuration without a timelock.
Confidential token owners and underlying token owners can freeze users. The Ethereum ACL owner can manage ACL-level account blocking, unpause the ACL, change HCU limits, and create KMS contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds. A new context immediately becomes the default verifier authority and can attest unwrap amounts for assets deposited before it existed. Superseded contexts remain equally authoritative for all past and future ciphertext handles until the ACL owner explicitly destroys them; the current context cannot be destroyed. Changing an onchain KMS context changes only the accepted ECDSA credentials and does not trigger or verify resharing or destruction of the underlying FHE key shares.
Offchain components like the coprocessor and KMS are trusted for liveness, privacy and security and are currently not decentralized.
Transparent setup
Detailed description
Transparent proving systems require no trusted setups and have no additional setup-related trust assumptions.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- HCULimit DAO
- ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (Coprocessor) DAO
- ConfidentialXAUTWrapper DAO
- KMSVerifier DAO
- ConfidentialZAMAWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialBRONWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialTGBPWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDTWrapper DAO
- DAO DAO
- ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper DAO
- ACL DAO
- InputVerifier DAO
- FHEVMExecutor DAO
- ConfidentialWETHWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (KMS) DAO
- ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry DAO
- Can interact with HCULimit
- Can interact with ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with Staking (Coprocessor)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialXAUTWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with KMSVerifier
- create KMS signer contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, and destroy non-current contexts. A malicious context can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialZAMAWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialBRONWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialUSDTWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with DAO
- change multisig plugin settings DAO - or - acting directly
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration DAO - or - acting directly
- grant and revoke DAO permissions DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with PauserSet
- add, remove, or swap accounts that can pause the ACL DAO
- Can interact with ACL
- transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, manage PauserSet membership, and create or destroy KMSVerifier signer contexts DAO
- Can interact with InputVerifier
- set the coprocessor signer set and signature threshold used for encrypted input verification DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialWETHWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with Staking (KMS)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry
- manage addresses in the registry DAO
A Multisig with 9/17 threshold. Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- HCULimit DAO
- ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (Coprocessor) DAO
- ConfidentialXAUTWrapper DAO
- KMSVerifier DAO
- ConfidentialZAMAWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialBRONWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialTGBPWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDTWrapper DAO
- DAO DAO
- ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper DAO
- ACL DAO
- InputVerifier DAO
- FHEVMExecutor DAO
- ConfidentialWETHWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (KMS) DAO
- ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry DAO
- Can interact with HCULimit
- Can interact with ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with Staking (Coprocessor)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialXAUTWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with KMSVerifier
- create KMS signer contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, and destroy non-current contexts. A malicious context can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialZAMAWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialBRONWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialUSDTWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with DAO
- change multisig plugin settings DAO - or - acting directly
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration DAO - or - acting directly
- grant and revoke DAO permissions DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with PauserSet
- add, remove, or swap accounts that can pause the ACL DAO
- Can interact with ACL
- transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, manage PauserSet membership, and create or destroy KMSVerifier signer contexts DAO
- Can interact with InputVerifier
- set the coprocessor signer set and signature threshold used for encrypted input verification DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialWETHWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, and transfer ownership DAO
- Can interact with Staking (KMS)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
- Can interact with ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry
- manage addresses in the registry DAO
Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches. Member of ZamaGovMultisigA.
- Can interact with ZamaGovMemberDAO
- change multisig plugin settings
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration
- Can interact with InputVerifier
- sign encrypted input verification bundles accepted by the InputVerifier
Zama Gateway
Actors:
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. Gateway owner Safe. Its LayerZero governance module is outside the Zama Gateway protocol surface covered here.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- MultichainACL
- Decryption
- KMSGeneration
- ProtocolPayment
- InputVerification
- CiphertextCommits
- GatewayConfig
- Can interact with Decryption
- unpause Decryption
- Can interact with KMSGeneration
- start KMS key generation, CRS generation, PRSS initialization, and key resharing
- Can interact with GatewayPauserSet
- add, remove, or swap gateway pausers
- Can interact with ProtocolPayment
- set gateway fee prices for input verification, public decryption, and user decryption
- Can interact with InputVerification
- unpause InputVerification
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- create KMS contexts that immediately become current, update current thresholds and other gateway configuration, transfer ownership, and unpause gateway workflow contracts. Historical KMS contexts cannot be removed in this version
- Can upgrade with no delay
- MultichainACL
- Decryption
- KMSGeneration
- ProtocolPayment
- InputVerification
- CiphertextCommits
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- accept GatewayConfig ownership
- Can interact with MultichainACL
- submit public-decryption allowances, account handle allowances, and user-decryption delegation or revocation messages to MultichainACL
- Can interact with InputVerification
- sign encrypted input proof verification responses accepted by InputVerification
- submit coprocessor proof verification and rejection responses to InputVerification
- Can interact with CiphertextCommits
- submit ciphertext and SNS ciphertext digests to CiphertextCommits
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- sign encrypted input proof verification responses accepted by the gateway
- submit coprocessor responses, ACL mirror updates, and ciphertext material commitments to gateway contracts
- Can interact with Decryption
- submit KMS decryption responses to Decryption
- Can interact with KMSGeneration
- submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts
- Can interact with Decryption
- sign public decryption results and user decryption shares accepted by Decryption
- Can interact with KMSGeneration
- sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts
- Can interact with GatewayConfig
- participate in gateway key custody workflows
- sign gateway key custody material
Ethereum
Tracks and enforces per-transaction and per-block homomorphic computation unit limits for FHEVM operation requests.
- Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Ethereum host-chain verifier for public decryption results produced through the Zama Gateway Decryption contract. Confidential token wrappers accept a decrypted value when it is signed by the threshold of the current or any retained non-destroyed KMS context.
- Roles:
- getKmsSigners: EOA 31, EOA 32, EOA 33, EOA 34, EOA 35, EOA 36, EOA 37, EOA 38, EOA 39, EOA 40, EOA 41, EOA 42, EOA 43
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Ethereum host-chain access-control registry for encrypted handles, storing handle allowances and delegation state for ciphertext references. Its public-decryption and user-delegation events are mirrored into the Gateway MultichainACL by coprocessor consensus.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Ethereum host-chain verifier for encrypted input attestations produced by the Zama Gateway InputVerification contract. The FHEVMExecutor calls it before accepting user-provided ciphertext handles.
- Roles:
- getCoprocessorSigners: EOA 30
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
FHEVM executor that accepts encrypted operation requests, accounts for computation usage, and stores ciphertext handles for operation results.
- Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Registry for Zama confidential token wrappers.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches.
- Roles:
- daoExecutors: ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- daoRootHolders: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- daoUpgraders: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- multisigSettingsAdmins: DAO, ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- multisigTargetConfigAdmins: DAO, ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Maintains the pauser account set used in pause-control checks.
- Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- pausers: EOA 45, EOA 46, EOA 47, EOA 48, Safe; ultimately EOA 44, EOA 49
Staking contract that escrows ZAMA, issues non-transferable staked voting tokens, and mints protocol rewards to eligible stakers at a configurable reward rate.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- defaultAdmin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- managerRoleMembers: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Staking contract that escrows ZAMA, issues non-transferable staked voting tokens, and mints protocol rewards to eligible stakers at a configurable reward rate.
- Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- defaultAdmin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- managerRoleMembers: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
Zama Gateway
Gateway-side ACL mirror that records coprocessor consensus for host-chain public decryption permissions, account handle allowances, and delegated user-decryption access. For Ethereum, it mirrors ACL events emitted by the L1 ACL contract registered in GatewayConfig.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Gateway contract that orchestrates public and user decryption requests and checks committed ciphertext material. Each response independently selects a KMS context through extraData, or uses the context current when the response executes; requests do not store a context. KMS nodes enforce host-chain ACL state offchain, and Ethereum KMSVerifier verifies public results against this contract’s EIP-712 domain.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayKmsSigners: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 14, EOA 15, EOA 16, EOA 17, EOA 19, EOA 22, EOA 25, EOA 26, EOA 27, EOA 4, EOA 9
- gatewayKmsTxSenders: EOA 12, EOA 13, EOA 18, EOA 20, EOA 21, EOA 23, EOA 24, EOA 28, EOA 3, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Gateway contract that orchestrates FHE key generation, CRS generation, PRSS initialization, and key resharing through threshold KMS responses.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayKmsSigners: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 14, EOA 15, EOA 16, EOA 17, EOA 19, EOA 22, EOA 25, EOA 26, EOA 27, EOA 4, EOA 9
- gatewayKmsTxSenders: EOA 12, EOA 13, EOA 18, EOA 20, EOA 21, EOA 23, EOA 24, EOA 28, EOA 3, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Gateway fee contract that charges ZAMA fees for encrypted input verification, public decryption, and user decryption requests, then forwards the collected fees to the configured fee burner sender.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Gateway contract that receives encrypted input verification requests from registered host chains, collects coprocessor responses, and emits a threshold-signed attestation once coprocessor consensus is reached. Ethereum InputVerifier verifies attestations against this contract’s EIP-712 domain.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorSigners: EOA 2
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Gateway contract that stores ciphertext and SNS ciphertext digests after coprocessor consensus, allowing decryption requests to reference committed ciphertext material.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
Central configuration contract for the Zama Gateway. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders, signers, and workflow thresholds; historical contexts remain stored and selectable by Decryption because this version has no context-destruction function.
- Roles:
- admin: SafeL2
- getCoprocessorSigners: EOA 2
- getCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- getCustodianSigners: EOA 29
- getCustodianTxSenders: EOA 29
- getKmsSigners: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 14, EOA 15, EOA 16, EOA 17, EOA 19, EOA 22, EOA 25, EOA 26, EOA 27, EOA 4, EOA 9
- getKmsTxSenders: EOA 12, EOA 13, EOA 18, EOA 20, EOA 21, EOA 23, EOA 24, EOA 28, EOA 3, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
- owner: SafeL2
- pendingOwner: EOA 1
Maintains the set of accounts allowed to pause gateway contracts. The set is managed by the GatewayConfig owner.
- Roles:
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2
- pausers: EOA 50, EOA 51, EOA 52, EOA 53