Privacy

Summary Protocol description Value Locked Flows Assets Breakdown Risk summary Upgrades & Governance Updates Permissions Smart contracts

Zama Confidential Tokens

About

Zama Confidential Tokens is an app that wraps ERC-20 assets into confidential tokens and hides balances and transfer amounts using Zama FHEVM on Ethereum.

Total Value Locked

$58.79 Macross 8 assets and 8 buckets

TVL

$58.79 M

Assets tracked

Buckets tracked

Deposits 7D

Deposits 30D

345

Deposits Total

3.24 K

Trusted setup

Exit window

Privacy

Reproducibility

Attributes

FHEPrivate amountsAny amountDeFi

About

Zama Confidential Tokens is an app that wraps ERC-20 assets into confidential tokens and hides balances and transfer amounts using Zama FHEVM on Ethereum.

Protocol description

Zama Confidential Tokens is an account-based confidential token system on Ethereum, using the Zama FHE protocol. It is based on ERC-7984. Users deposit regular ERC-20 tokens into asset-specific escrows and receive confidential tokens whose balances and internal transfer amounts are represented as encrypted handles.

‘Confidential’ here means from: and to: addresses and transfer timestamps always remain public. Only balances and transfer amounts are hidden. Each confidential token aggregates encrypted balances for a single underlying asset, so the hidden state is the amount and balance data, not the public address graph.

Zama Confidential Tokens architecture

Architecture

The Zama FHE protocol uses fully homomorphic encryption to let smart contracts operate on encrypted values. Balances are stored as encrypted handles instead of plaintext balances, and FHEVM system contracts are called for encrypted arithmetic, comparisons, transfers, minting, or burning, but most of the actual FHE execution happens offchain.

The FHE coprocessor is an offchain service that performs FHE-related work the EVM cannot execute directly. Encrypted user inputs are accepted onchain only after the InputVerifier checks signatures from the coprocessor signer set (currently 1/1). The coprocessor is constrained on what it can commit onchain by the smart contract, but it is not trustless and can affect validity if compromised.

The ACL is the onchain access-control registry for encrypted handles. It records which accounts or contracts are allowed to use a ciphertext handle, which prevents arbitrary users from reusing encrypted values they do not control.

The (T)KMS is the threshold key-management service used for private and public decryptions. It holds the FHE secret key and functions like a multisig; the current Ethereum verifier context (KMS signer set) has a public-decryption threshold of 7/13. KMS signer sets and thresholds are managed onchain in the ProtocolConfig contract, where governance can create and destroy contexts and retune the thresholds of any live context — including the current one — without rotating it. Each context can be different but retains its full permissions until explicitly invalidated onchain. A malicious new Ethereum verifier context, or the threshold of any retained Ethereum verifier context, can attest an inflated amount for an attacker’s real unwrap handle and drain pooled backing deposited by other users. The KMS Signers are operated by Zama, Dfns, Figment, Fireblocks, InfStones, Unit410, LayerZero, Ledger, Omakase, Stake Capital, OpenZeppelin, Etherscan, and Conduit.

The onchain KMS signer addresses are ECDSA credentials used to attest KMS outputs; they are not the FHE key shares. Zama states that KMS MPC nodes run inside AWS Nitro Enclaves, and its offchain software maps node signing keys to MPC parties, but the contracts do not verify Nitro attestations or prove that a configured signer runs inside a TEE, holds an FHE key share, or participated in the threshold computation. Changing an onchain KMS context only changes which signatures are accepted; it neither triggers nor verifies redistribution or destruction of FHE key shares.

There are many moving parts and offchain components in the Zama FHE protocol on which Zama Confidential Tokens is built. The Zama Gateway, an L3 on Arbitrum, is currently used for coordination/aggregation and ciphertext-metadata. FHE key- and CRS-generation is orchestrated onchain on Ethereum through the KMSGeneration contract: governance triggers a generation, and KMS node responses are accepted at a signature threshold configured in ProtocolConfig. Ethereum does not trust the Gateway’s state directly and independently verifies operator signatures before accepting inputs or withdrawals, but current relayer and operator workflows depend on Gateway availability to produce those proofs.

Privacy considerations

Deposits and withdrawals are public privacy boundaries. A wrap emits the confidential-token recipient and the rounded clear underlying-token amount. The recipient can be different from the depositor, but that relationship is still visible in the deposit event. Withdrawals then reveal the recipient and amount.

Within a confidential token, holders can make confidential transfers between transparent EVM addresses. These transfers reveal the parties and encrypted ciphertext handles, but not the clear amount or resulting balances. The confidential balances and transfer amounts of users can be decrypted retroactively if enough KMS key shares are combined.

The smart contracts do not fully validate FHE offchain work, which makes the KMS and coprocessor each trusted for security, privacy and liveness. Encrypted user inputs are accepted through the InputVerifier, which requires 1/1 coprocessor signatures. Public decryptions are accepted through the KMSVerifier, which requires the threshold of any selected non-invalidated context (signer set), not necessarily the displayed current 7/13 context. Decentralization of the critical offchain services is announced in the docs but not implemented onchain (e.g. coprocessors, fraud proofs, slashing, zk proofs).

Practical privacy also depends on timing, amounts, address reuse, wallet/RPC providers, and any frontend or service used to create encrypted inputs. Users are advised to research OPSEC best practice.

Fees

There currently is no protocol fee. Users still pay Ethereum gas for each action, including confidential token transfers, and may pay costs charged by external wallets, relayers, or services used to create or submit transactions.

Compliance

Compliance is enforced in each confidential token contract. The owner can block and unblock local users, and confidential token contracts can be configured to call an underlying-token denylist function (the owner can change or disable this hook at any time). These checks apply to direct deposits, ERC-1363 callback deposits, confidential transfers, unwrap requests, and unwrap finalization.

The owner can also appoint a pauser for each confidential token that can halt wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization, and confidential transfers; only the owner can unpause. Furthermore, the owner can appoint observer accounts that receive a wildcard, non-expiring user-decryption delegation over all of the token’s encrypted handles — effectively a full view key for its balances and transfer amounts, honored by the KMS based on the onchain ACL state. Currently, no pausers or observers are configured on any confidential token.

Because confidential tokens are backed by underlying tokens held in their contract addresses, issuer or token-admin controls over those underlyings remain a dependency. If an underlying token admin blocks a confidential token address, the escrowed token can become stuck. If a user address is blocked by an underlying token and the confidential token has a transitive denylist hook configured, that address can be prevented from depositing, transferring, or completing withdrawals.

Anonymity set

Zama Confidential Tokens does not use fixed-denomination notes. For a given finalized withdrawal, the set of prior deposits that could have funded the withdrawing account through the public address graph is its effective anonymity set: deposits credited to the same address, or to addresses that visibly transferred confidential tokens to it before the withdrawal. Amounts are private inside the confidential token, so links within the remaining candidate set can remain ambiguous, but deposits and finalized withdrawals expose each boundary amount and endpoint address. Integration with DeFi and its use from inside the confidential token increases the anonymity set.

As mentioned in ‘Privacy Considerations’, the mostly centralized offchain services that cannot be circumvented can corrupt practical privacy, independent of the abstract measurable anonymity set.

Value Locked

2025 Dec 27 — 2026 Sep 06

Flows

2026 May 12 — Sep 06

Assets Breakdown

Asset	Deposits 7D	Deposits 30D	Deposits Total	Value Locked
steakcUSDC	10 $1.21 M	33 $18.88 M	220 $81.12 M	$33.92 M
ZAMA	5 $15.36 K	22 $16.50 K	66 $35.08 K	$7.67 M
USDT	13 $71.74 K	51 $285.25 K	216 $1.51 M	$7.63 M
bbqTGBP	0 $0.00	0 $0.00	1 $5.07 M	$5.10 M
USDC	42 $2.01 M	232 $20.38 M	2.68 K $92.84 M	$4.35 M
WETH	0 $0.00	6 $42.07 K	56 $195.50 K	$52.78 K
XAUt	1 $0.22	1 $0.22	3 $0.75	$44.35 K
tGBP	0 $0.00	0 $0.00	2 $10.16 K	$10.37 K
Total	71 $3.31 M	345 $39.60 M	3.24 K $180.79 M	$58.79 M

Risk summary

Funds can be stolen if

a malicious upgrade compromises the confidential token contracts or FHEVM contracts with their escrowed underlying tokens.
the threshold of the current or any non-destroyed historical Ethereum KMS context attests an inflated unwrap amount, allowing pooled underlying deposited before or after that context existed to be released. Governance can also install a malicious context or lower the threshold of any live context in place; 7/13 describes only the current context.
the 1/1 coprocessor input verification path accepts invalid encrypted inputs that bypass confidential balance checks.

Funds can be lost if

an underlying token admin blacklists a confidential token address or otherwise prevents transfers from the contract.
a user is blocked by the confidential token owner or by a configured underlying-token denylist before finalization/withdrawal.
a confidential token is paused by an owner-appointed pauser and not unpaused by the owner, halting confidential transfers, unwrap requests, and unwrap finalization (no pauser is currently set on any confidential token).
offchain ciphertext data required by the coprocessor or KMS for encrypted handles becomes unavailable and cannot be reconstructed.

Privacy can be lost if

enough KMS operators with usable key shares collude or are compromised and decrypt private ciphertext handles. 7/13 describes only the current verifier context, while retained contexts can have different memberships and thresholds.
the confidential token owner appoints an observer: observers receive a wildcard, non-expiring user-decryption delegation over all of that token’s encrypted handles and can decrypt its balances and transfer amounts (no observers are currently configured on any confidential token).
the offchain coprocessor, wallet, relayer, frontend, or RPC path records enough metadata to link a user to encrypted inputs or transactions.
deposits and withdrawals are linked by clear boundary amounts, recipient graph, timing, or address reuse.

Upgrades & Governance

Zama Confidential Tokens governance is implemented through an Aragon ‘DAO’ deployment controlled by two multisigs: ZamaGovMultisigA with a 9/17 threshold and ZamaGovMultisigB with a 3/5 threshold. The Gateway contracts are controlled separately by the SafeL2 multisig listed in the permissions section. These accounts can upgrade contracts or change critical configuration without a timelock. On the Gateway, the owner multisig can create and destroy KMS contexts, change the thresholds of any live context, and disable or remove registered host chains, halting Gateway workflows for those chains.

Confidential token owners and underlying token owners can freeze users. Confidential token owners can further appoint a pauser that halts all confidential transfers, wrapping, and unwrapping of their token (only the owner can unpause), change or disable the underlying-token denylist hook, and appoint observers that gain wildcard decryption access to all balances and transfer amounts of their token. Currently, no pausers or observers are configured. The Ethereum ACL owner can manage ACL-level account blocking, unpause the ACL, change HCU limits, and — through the ProtocolConfig contract — create KMS contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, retune the thresholds of any live context (including the current one) in place, and trigger or abort FHE key- and CRS-generation in the KMSGeneration contract. A new context immediately becomes the default verifier authority and can attest unwrap amounts for assets deposited before it existed. Superseded contexts remain equally authoritative for all past and future ciphertext handles until the ACL owner explicitly destroys them; the current context cannot be destroyed. Changing an onchain KMS context changes only the accepted ECDSA credentials and does not trigger or verify resharing or destruction of the underlying FHE key shares.

Offchain components like the coprocessor and KMS are trusted for liveness, privacy and security and are currently not decentralized.

Updates

2026 August 27, 12:35 UTC

High severity

171changes

All nine confidential token wrappers were upgraded to a shared new implementation named ConfidentialWrapper (eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8). Compared to the previous ConfidentialWrapperV3 , the upgrade adds two subsystems: 1. Observers: the owner can add/remove observer accounts that receive a wildcard, non-expiring user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles, i.e. they can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of the wrapper. 2. Pausing: an owner-set pauser address can pause wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers; only the owner can unpause.

All nine confidential token wrappers were upgraded to a shared new implementation named ConfidentialWrapper (eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8). Compared to the previous ConfidentialWrapperV3, the upgrade adds two subsystems:

Observers: the owner can add/remove observer accounts that receive a wildcard, non-expiring user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles, i.e. they can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of the wrapper.
Pausing: an owner-set pauser address can pause wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers; only the owner can unpause.

	contract ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper (eth:0x66Bf74E96900D1a19c7070D939D124f2F565C458) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":false,"selector":"0x00000000"}
+	"0x00000000"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ConfidentialXAUTWrapper (eth:0x73cc9aF9d6BEFdb3c3fAf8a5E8c05Cb95FdaEEf1) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":true,"selector":"0xfbac3951"}
+	"0xfbac3951"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ConfidentialZAMAWrapper (eth:0x80CB147Fd86dC6dEe3Eee7e4Cee33d1397d98071) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":false,"selector":"0x00000000"}
+	"0x00000000"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ConfidentialBRONWrapper (eth:0x85dE671c3bec1aDeD752c3Cea943521181C826bc) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":false,"selector":"0x00000000"}
+	"0x00000000"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ConfidentialTGBPWrapper (eth:0xa873750ccBafD5ec7Dd13bfD5237d7129832eDD9) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":true,"selector":"0x97f735d5"}
+	"0x97f735d5"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ConfidentialUSDTWrapper (eth:0xAe0207C757Aa2B4019Ad96edD0092ddc63EF0c50) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":true,"selector":"0x59bf1abe"}
+	"0x59bf1abe"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract DAO (eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3) [zama/ZamaDAO] {
	+++ description: Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches.
	directlyReceivedPermissions.1.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.4.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.5.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.6.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.7.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.8.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.12.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.17.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.18.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	}

	contract ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper (eth:0xBA4cFF6ED6F7Cb2A58776dECa4E984b498446762) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":false,"selector":"0x00000000"}
+	"0x00000000"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ZamaGovMultisigB (eth:0xBc860b6a4C860C5424B84A056E53ACFb2C99a38F) [zama/Multisig] {
	+++ description: Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
	receivedPermissions.1.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.4.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.5.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.6.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.7.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.8.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.14.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.19.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.20.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	}

	contract ConfidentialWETHWrapper (eth:0xda9396b82634Ea99243cE51258B6A5Ae512D4893) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":false,"selector":"0x00000000"}
+	"0x00000000"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

	contract ZamaGovMultisigA (eth:0xE43c73aAb2b6aBBad6d0461997ce1cfea5ABe66f) [zama/Multisig] {
	+++ description: Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
	receivedPermissions.1.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.4.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.5.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.6.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.7.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.8.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.14.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.19.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	receivedPermissions.20.description:
-	"block and unblock users, and transfer ownership."
+	"block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership."
	}

	contract ConfidentialUSDCWrapper (eth:0xe978F22157048E5DB8E5d07971376e86671672B2) [zama/ConfidentialWrapper] {
	+++ description: ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.
	template:
-	"zama/ConfidentialWrapperV3"
+	"zama/ConfidentialWrapper"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc6ef75f9a2275b9cfb58b0322dfb55b63e1630022b171af50f1851ee8052447b"
+	"0x111b5cc66fc29cac57ed685c50a509014181cbf98122b5fd89c0449eea3fab5f"
	description:
-	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, and optional underlying-token denylist checks."
+	"ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5"
+	"eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-25T15:59:35.000Z","0x55c55172da4c231406a41da3838bff87dc9b361c62f208fe0e60994a1b82b0b0",["eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	+++ description: Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector:
-	{"isSet":true,"selector":"0xfe575a87"}
+	"0xfe575a87"
	+++ description: Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.observers:
+	[]
	+++ description: Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.
	values.paused:
+	false
	+++ description: Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.
	values.pauser:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.getUnderlyingDenyListSelector.description:
-	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled, the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
+	"Underlying-token denylist hook used by the wrapper. If enabled (non-zero), the wrapper calls this selector on the underlying token before restricted operations."
	fieldMeta.observers:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Accounts holding a wildcard user-decryption delegation over all wrapper-owned encrypted handles. Observers can decrypt every confidential balance and transfer amount of this wrapper, so adding one changes its privacy guarantees.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.pauser:
+	{"description":"Address allowed to pause the wrapper (zero address means pausing is disabled). Only the owner can unpause.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.paused:
+	{"description":"Whether wrapping, unwrapping, unwrap finalization and confidential transfers are currently halted.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x5226fe30Fa7Bf20C1Cd33F125f77D0c42d3c23b5:
-	"ConfidentialWrapperV3"
	implementationNames.eth:0x2ABad2203Eba104b52cf040cCcFA100Df15687F8:
+	"ConfidentialWrapper"
	}

2026 August 25, 08:53 UTC

2changes

Add multisig signer.

	contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2"
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"4 of 10 (40%)"
+	"4 of 11 (36%)"
	}

2026 August 12, 12:56 UTC

High severity

160changes

Zama FHEVM host-chain upgrade (the Ethereum-side counterpart of the 2026-08-07 Gateway upgrade that moved KMS management off the Gateway): ZamaGovMultisigB executed a DAO (ACL owner) proposal that upgraded four host contracts and initialized two new ones in a single transaction. Governance is unchanged — everything below remains controlled by the Aragon DAO without a timelock. - KMSVerifier v0.2.0 - v0.3.0 (implementation diff): all KMS context management (signer sets, thresholds, context create/destroy) is removed from the verifier and moved to the new ProtocolConfig contract. The KMSVerifier is now a stateless proof checker whose signer- and threshold-reads delegate to ProtocolConfig. Public decryption proofs can still select any non-destroyed context via extraData v1. - New ProtocolConfig v0.1.0 (proxy eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4, impl eth:0x25c76298Fb4d15bFADce4798519a7B37ac0076E7): ACL-owner-governed registry of KMS nodes (signer + tx-sender + metadata) and contexts, now with four separate per-context thresholds: publicDecryption (7), userDecryption (9), kmsGen and mpc. exactly one context is live. the ACL owner can now retune the thresholds of any live context — including the current one — in place, mirroring GatewayConfig v0.6.0 on the Gateway. - New KMSGeneration v0.1.0 (proxy eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa, impl eth:0x5DD95e97287672b5d86dd3a427E855099E5AC940): FHE key- and CRS-generation is now orchestrated onchain on Ethereum (previously not orchestrated onchain at all after being removed from the Gateway KMSGeneration v0.5.0). The ACL owner triggers keygen/crsgen and can abort them; KMS nodes respond with EIP-712 signatures that reach consensus at the ProtocolConfig kmsGen threshold. - ACL v0.3.0 - v0.4.0 (implementation diff): adds wildcard user-decryption delegation — a user can delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once - FHEVMExecutor v0.3.0 - v0.4.0 (implementation diff): adds two n-ary encrypted operations, fheSum (sum over up to 100/60 ciphertexts depending on width) and fheIsIn (encrypted set membership), with per-element ACL checks on inputs. - HCULimit v0.2.0 - v0.3.0 (implementation diff): adds HCU pricing for the new fheSum/fheIsIn operations and a guard reserving the zero transient-storage slot for the per-transaction HCU accumulator (a handle of 0x0 can no longer read/write it). Limits themselves are unchanged (empty reinitializer).

KMSVerifier v0.2.0 -> v0.3.0 (implementation diff): all KMS context management (signer sets, thresholds, context create/destroy) is removed from the verifier and moved to the new ProtocolConfig contract. The KMSVerifier is now a stateless proof checker whose signer- and threshold-reads delegate to ProtocolConfig. Public decryption proofs can still select any non-destroyed context via extraData v1.
New ProtocolConfig v0.1.0 (proxy eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4, impl eth:0x25c76298Fb4d15bFADce4798519a7B37ac0076E7): ACL-owner-governed registry of KMS nodes (signer + tx-sender + metadata) and contexts, now with four separate per-context thresholds: publicDecryption (7), userDecryption (9), kmsGen and mpc. exactly one context is live. the ACL owner can now retune the thresholds of any live context — including the current one — in place, mirroring GatewayConfig v0.6.0 on the Gateway.
New KMSGeneration v0.1.0 (proxy eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa, impl eth:0x5DD95e97287672b5d86dd3a427E855099E5AC940): FHE key- and CRS-generation is now orchestrated onchain on Ethereum (previously not orchestrated onchain at all after being removed from the Gateway KMSGeneration v0.5.0). The ACL owner triggers keygen/crsgen and can abort them; KMS nodes respond with EIP-712 signatures that reach consensus at the ProtocolConfig kmsGen threshold.
ACL v0.3.0 -> v0.4.0 (implementation diff): adds wildcard user-decryption delegation — a user can delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once
FHEVMExecutor v0.3.0 -> v0.4.0 (implementation diff): adds two n-ary encrypted operations, fheSum (sum over up to 100/60 ciphertexts depending on width) and fheIsIn (encrypted set membership), with per-element ACL checks on inputs.
HCULimit v0.2.0 -> v0.3.0 (implementation diff): adds HCU pricing for the new fheSum/fheIsIn operations and a guard reserving the zero transient-storage slot for the per-transaction HCU accumulator (a handle of 0x0 can no longer read/write it). Limits themselves are unchanged (empty reinitializer).

	contract HCULimit (eth:0x3b4da65e45Fda2CAa0285A735ab4361a44F171E2) [zama/ZamaHCULimit_v0_3_0] {
	+++ description: Tracks and enforces per-transaction and per-block homomorphic computation unit limits for FHEVM operation requests. v0.3.0 adds pricing for the fheSum and fheIsIn operations.
	template:
-	"zama/ZamaHCULimit_v0_2_0"
+	"zama/ZamaHCULimit_v0_3_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc52e1b93c97602e6da1f1925e14fc5454426a778875655ec17910be5e217b98e"
+	"0x7ca7880da7a551111a41d9a1673890e2a6c1dd27c3cdf51a82f893b410b2d038"
	description:
-	"Tracks and enforces per-transaction and per-block homomorphic computation unit limits for FHEVM operation requests."
+	"Tracks and enforces per-transaction and per-block homomorphic computation unit limits for FHEVM operation requests. v0.3.0 adds pricing for the fheSum and fheIsIn operations."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x0F2B7e8F19ADc874F21e27ADAA4B22FC00a0B442"
+	"eth:0x69A91389006443448d8E90Fd84B6bDF5ae253837"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0x69A91389006443448d8E90Fd84B6bDF5ae253837"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.getVersion:
-	"HCULimit v0.2.0"
+	"HCULimit v0.3.0"
	implementationNames.eth:0x0F2B7e8F19ADc874F21e27ADAA4B22FC00a0B442:
-	"HCULimit"
	implementationNames.eth:0x69A91389006443448d8E90Fd84B6bDF5ae253837:
+	"HCULimit"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract KMSVerifier (eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03) [zama/ZamaKMSVerifier_v0_3_0] {
	+++ description: Ethereum host-chain verifier for public decryption results produced through the Zama Gateway Decryption contract. Since v0.3.0 it is a stateless proof checker: KMS signer sets and thresholds are read from the ProtocolConfig contract, and confidential token wrappers accept a decrypted value when it is signed by the threshold of the current or any explicitly selected non-destroyed KMS context.
	template:
-	"zama/ZamaKMSVerifier_v0_2_0"
+	"zama/ZamaKMSVerifier_v0_3_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xa40292fe461810a065f80e305f6b85ab3ca2cfd416dc965d4791a111554cf638"
+	"0x83222b4971c6b79adbd52cb7d500d84b7d2d59886f828b6a1cdc128dcd2bb9d1"
	description:
-	"Ethereum host-chain verifier for public decryption results produced through the Zama Gateway Decryption contract. Confidential token wrappers accept a decrypted value when it is signed by the threshold of the current or any retained non-destroyed KMS context."
+	"Ethereum host-chain verifier for public decryption results produced through the Zama Gateway Decryption contract. Since v0.3.0 it is a stateless proof checker: KMS signer sets and thresholds are read from the ProtocolConfig contract, and confidential token wrappers accept a decrypted value when it is signed by the threshold of the current or any explicitly selected non-destroyed KMS context."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xd0d0C7E1bc1E2F6Cd00E3b4B1083DdD9969155FD"
+	"eth:0x390683dEa46a61786f4F0807bf3559038Cf43Fa4"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0x390683dEa46a61786f4F0807bf3559038Cf43Fa4"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.createdKmsContexts:
-	[]
	values.getVersion:
-	"KMSVerifier v0.2.0"
+	"KMSVerifier v0.3.0"
	values.initialKmsContextId:
-	"3166189940082864718613269121331309980362851143201109172953918312716374638593"
	values.initialKmsContextSigners:
-	["eth:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f","eth:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965","eth:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3","eth:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f","eth:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905","eth:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921","eth:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D","eth:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8","eth:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f","eth:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58","eth:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC","eth:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385","eth:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb"]
	+++ description: ProtocolConfig contract that stores the KMS contexts (signer sets and thresholds) this verifier reads during proof verification. Referenced as a compile-time constant without a getter.
	values.protocolConfig:
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	fieldMeta.aclOwner.severity:
-	"HIGH"
	fieldMeta.aclOwner.description:
-	"Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account can create a new KMS signer context that immediately becomes the default verifier authority, and can destroy any non-current context."
+	"Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account is authorized by onlyACLOwner for KMSVerifier upgrades. Context and threshold management moved to ProtocolConfig in v0.3.0."
	fieldMeta.getKmsSigners.severity:
-	"HIGH"
	fieldMeta.getKmsSigners.description:
-	"KMS signers in the current context. Permission coverage is also indexed through initialKmsContextSigners and createdKmsContexts so superseded contexts remain visible."
+	"KMS signers in the current context, read through from ProtocolConfig where they are indexed for permissions and monitoring."
	fieldMeta.initialKmsContextId:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Identifier of the first v0.2 KMS context created from the source-defined context counter during initialization or migration.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.initialKmsContextSigners:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Signers in the first v0.2 KMS context. This code-defined context remains authorized for public decryption proofs after later rotations unless the ACL owner explicitly destroys it.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContexts:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Non-destroyed KMS contexts created after the v0.2 migration, reconstructed from context creation and destruction events. Each context is an immutable signer and threshold snapshot that can attest results for any ciphertext handle; it is not scoped to ciphertext age or key ID.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.getThreshold.severity:
-	"HIGH"
	fieldMeta.getThreshold.description:
-	"Minimum number of KMS signatures from the current context required to accept a public decryption result. Retained contexts keep their own immutable thresholds."
+	"Minimum number of unique valid KMS signatures required to accept a public decryption result, read through from the ProtocolConfig public-decryption threshold of the current context."
	fieldMeta.getCurrentKmsContextId.severity:
-	"HIGH"
	fieldMeta.getCurrentKmsContextId.description:
-	"Identifier of the context used when proof extraData is empty or starts with version 0. Version 1 extraData can explicitly select any non-destroyed historical context, including for ciphertexts created after that context was superseded."
+	"Identifier of the context used when proof extraData is empty or starts with version 0. Version 1 extraData can explicitly select any non-destroyed context, including for ciphertexts created after that context was superseded."
	fieldMeta.protocolConfig:
+	{"description":"ProtocolConfig contract that stores the KMS contexts (signer sets and thresholds) this verifier reads during proof verification. Referenced as a compile-time constant without a getter.","type":"EXTERNAL"}
	implementationNames.eth:0xd0d0C7E1bc1E2F6Cd00E3b4B1083DdD9969155FD:
-	"KMSVerifier"
	implementationNames.eth:0x390683dEa46a61786f4F0807bf3559038Cf43Fa4:
+	"KMSVerifier"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract DAO (eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3) [zama/ZamaDAO] {
	+++ description: Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches.
	directlyReceivedPermissions.5:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03","description":"create KMS signer contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, and destroy non-current contexts. A malicious context can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.15.description:
-	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, manage PauserSet membership, and create or destroy KMSVerifier signer contexts."
+	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, and manage PauserSet membership."
	directlyReceivedPermissions.16:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"create KMS contexts with arbitrary node sets and thresholds that immediately become the default verifier authority, destroy non-current contexts, and retune the per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) of any live context including the current one. A malicious context or lowered threshold can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.22:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"trigger and abort FHE key and CRS generation rounds executed by the KMS nodes.","role":".aclOwner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.36:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"upgrade the ProtocolConfig implementation.","role":".aclOwner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.42:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"upgrade the KMSGeneration implementation.","role":".aclOwner"}
	}

	EOA (eth:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract ZamaGovMultisigB (eth:0xBc860b6a4C860C5424B84A056E53ACFb2C99a38F) [zama/Multisig] {
	+++ description: Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
	receivedPermissions.5:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03","description":"create KMS signer contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, and destroy non-current contexts. A malicious context can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.17.description:
-	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, manage PauserSet membership, and create or destroy KMSVerifier signer contexts."
+	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, and manage PauserSet membership."
	receivedPermissions.18:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"create KMS contexts with arbitrary node sets and thresholds that immediately become the default verifier authority, destroy non-current contexts, and retune the per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) of any live context including the current one. A malicious context or lowered threshold can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.24:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"trigger and abort FHE key and CRS generation rounds executed by the KMS nodes.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.38:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"upgrade the ProtocolConfig implementation.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.44:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"upgrade the KMSGeneration implementation.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	}

	EOA (eth:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract ACL (eth:0xcA2E8f1F656CD25C01F05d0b243Ab1ecd4a8ffb6) [zama/ZamaACL_v0_4_0] {
	+++ description: Ethereum host-chain access-control registry for encrypted handles, storing handle allowances and delegation state for ciphertext references. Its public-decryption and user-delegation events are mirrored into the Gateway MultichainACL by coprocessor consensus. Since v0.4.0 users can delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once via a wildcard delegation.
	template:
-	"zama/ZamaACL_v0_3_0"
+	"zama/ZamaACL_v0_4_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x47f47986a3024b31fa3caee357720f4fba4ea3fae419ff53eebe1a66e87d69ef"
+	"0xa69c606dd333427d22d0b664b3c7b39118934dd95a2b7b37c737e37b39bba7e5"
	description:
-	"Ethereum host-chain access-control registry for encrypted handles, storing handle allowances and delegation state for ciphertext references. Its public-decryption and user-delegation events are mirrored into the Gateway MultichainACL by coprocessor consensus."
+	"Ethereum host-chain access-control registry for encrypted handles, storing handle allowances and delegation state for ciphertext references. Its public-decryption and user-delegation events are mirrored into the Gateway MultichainACL by coprocessor consensus. Since v0.4.0 users can delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once via a wildcard delegation."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x3F6D970d30E1FFE9657aa8072C82dA10eef1c3D6"
+	"eth:0x9A017e0ba4c19A325D5a89f5dd2112e605E85418"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0x9A017e0ba4c19A325D5a89f5dd2112e605E85418"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	5
	values.getVersion:
-	"ACL v0.3.0"
+	"ACL v0.4.0"
	+++ description: Sentinel contract address that a user can pass to delegateForUserDecryption to delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once. The wildcard does not bypass per-handle allowances.
	values.WILDCARD_DELEGATION_ADDRESS:
+	"eth:0xFFfFfFffFFfffFFfFFfFFFFFffFFFffffFfFFFfF"
	fieldMeta.owner.description:
-	"Owner of the ACL and host-contract owner checked by onlyACLOwner in the Zama verifier and helper contracts."
+	"Owner of the ACL and host-contract owner checked by onlyACLOwner in the Zama verifier and helper contracts, including ProtocolConfig and KMSGeneration."
	fieldMeta.WILDCARD_DELEGATION_ADDRESS:
+	{"description":"Sentinel contract address that a user can pass to delegateForUserDecryption to delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once. The wildcard does not bypass per-handle allowances."}
	implementationNames.eth:0x3F6D970d30E1FFE9657aa8072C82dA10eef1c3D6:
-	"ACL"
	implementationNames.eth:0x9A017e0ba4c19A325D5a89f5dd2112e605E85418:
+	"ACL"
	}

	contract ProtocolConfig (eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4) [zama/ZamaProtocolConfig] {
	+++ description: Ethereum host-chain registry of KMS node sets, per-context thresholds, and context lifecycle, introduced in the v0.3.0 KMSVerifier upgrade. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders and signers; the four per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) can be retuned by the ACL owner for any live context, including the current one. A newly created context becomes current immediately; older contexts remain selectable for public decryption proofs until destroyed.
	name:
-	"EmptyUUPSProxy"
+	"ProtocolConfig"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc71891567f1a766aa3a25d1830c5362e3bcf7682574b11b20a51401acb718db4"
+	"0x3ded50e4089de288e1a23ff043bc49ad1ab743d9c4d68dff679355192bc0edbd"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xC94790325C61A7D98e90d835ea89777d64b17492"
+	"eth:0x25c76298Fb4d15bFADce4798519a7B37ac0076E7"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0x25c76298Fb4d15bFADce4798519a7B37ac0076E7"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	+++ description: Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account is authorized by onlyACLOwner for all ProtocolConfig administration.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.aclOwner:
+	"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"
	+++ description: KMS contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration, reconstructed from NewKmsContext and KmsContextDestroyed events with their node sets and creation thresholds. The context created by initializeFromMigration does not emit this event and is indexed through the live getters and project overrides. Thresholds can be retuned per context after creation.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.createdKmsContexts:
+	[]
	+++ description: KMS signers from contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration. They remain authorized for public decryption proofs that select their context until the ACL owner destroys that context.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.createdKmsContextSigners:
+	[]
	+++ description: KMS transaction senders from contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration. They remain authorized to submit key- and CRS-generation responses for their context until the ACL owner destroys that context.
	values.createdKmsContextTxSenders:
+	[]
	+++ description: KMS node transaction-sender addresses in the current context. These accounts submit key- and CRS-generation responses to the Ethereum KMSGeneration contract.
	values.currentKmsTxSenders:
+	["eth:0x711EBE8aA590f9C9904ff279239E89dB2eFbC890","eth:0xB4CE988D382425F64c99A352375F72A5f1cf6FFB","eth:0x4eC7200E392B97913cbD6d8160B011406EB019F1","eth:0xEd1D622bd59d657580aBAc65312b40B4B2dA6236","eth:0x74a1E2e87a4026b7B8b5252c747E514159515e9a","eth:0x0e25B8DB74c754C8275C0B219ba2A6CD7c59E31D","eth:0x577Fd21e4BC7D644A4177C4B89146e1Ab394De04","eth:0xbaac6F9DD84bFB303F05B4DE45A88Eec86855BD0","eth:0x43e4c21cf9d24Dc5b4e00031349EC213A2ba8340","eth:0xC105B5933446658D226582f7A112F49a70b54364","eth:0xbcF4943A856497FB2345409D35f4d1eae9A0363E","eth:0xD227C4B573800EdA3bAdA6DAC872E9134E012e6D","eth:0x487e41623b7FeB464ff79F7326DCa791c9a1c5EC"]
	+++ description: KMS contexts destroyed by the ACL owner. Destroyed contexts are invalid: their per-context getters revert and public decryption proofs can no longer select them.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.destroyedKmsContexts:
+	[]
	+++ description: Identifier of the current KMS context, used by verifiers when a proof does not explicitly select a historical context.
	values.getCurrentKmsContextId:
+	"3166189940082864718613269121331309980362851143201109172953918312716374638593"
	+++ description: Minimum number of KMS responses from the current context required to reach consensus on key- and CRS-generation results in KMSGeneration.
	values.getKmsGenThreshold:
+	7
	+++ description: KMS signer addresses in the current context. Their signatures are accepted by the Ethereum KMSVerifier for public decryption results and by KMSGeneration for key- and CRS-generation responses. Signers from other live contexts remain authorized for proofs that select their context until that context is destroyed.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getKmsSigners:
+	["eth:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f","eth:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965","eth:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3","eth:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f","eth:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905","eth:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921","eth:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D","eth:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8","eth:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f","eth:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58","eth:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC","eth:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385","eth:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb"]
	+++ description: MPC threshold recorded for the current context. The KMS SDK derives its effective MPC threshold from the nodes it knows about instead of reading this value.
	values.getMpcThreshold:
+	4
	+++ description: Minimum number of KMS signatures from the current context required to accept a public decryption result. Retunable in place by the ACL owner without rotating the context.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getPublicDecryptionThreshold:
+	7
	+++ description: Minimum number of KMS signatures from the current context required for user decryption verification. Retunable in place by the ACL owner without rotating the context.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.getUserDecryptionThreshold:
+	9
	values.getVersion:
+	"ProtocolConfig v0.1.0"
	+++ description: Live public-decryption threshold of the migrated context, retunable in place by the ACL owner. It remains security-critical after future rotations while the context is live. This call reverts once the context is destroyed; remove the field then.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.migratedKmsContextPublicDecryptionThreshold:
+	7
	+++ description: Live KMS signer set of the migrated context. Node membership is immutable, so these signers remain authorized for proofs selecting this context after future rotations. This call reverts once the context is destroyed; remove the field then.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.migratedKmsContextSigners:
+	["eth:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f","eth:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965","eth:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3","eth:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f","eth:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905","eth:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921","eth:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D","eth:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8","eth:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f","eth:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58","eth:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC","eth:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385","eth:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb"]
	+++ description: Live user-decryption threshold of the migrated context, retunable in place by the ACL owner. This call reverts once the context is destroyed; remove the field then.
	values.migratedKmsContextUserDecryptionThreshold:
+	9
	errors:
-	{"migratedKmsContextPublicDecryptionThreshold":"Processing error occurred.","migratedKmsContextSigners":"Processing error occurred.","migratedKmsContextUserDecryptionThreshold":"Processing error occurred.","proxiableUUID":"Processing error occurred."}
	fieldMeta.aclOwner:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account is authorized by onlyACLOwner for all ProtocolConfig administration.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.getKmsSigners:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS signer addresses in the current context. Their signatures are accepted by the Ethereum KMSVerifier for public decryption results and by KMSGeneration for key- and CRS-generation responses. Signers from other live contexts remain authorized for proofs that select their context until that context is destroyed.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.currentKmsTxSenders:
+	{"description":"KMS node transaction-sender addresses in the current context. These accounts submit key- and CRS-generation responses to the Ethereum KMSGeneration contract.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.getPublicDecryptionThreshold:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Minimum number of KMS signatures from the current context required to accept a public decryption result. Retunable in place by the ACL owner without rotating the context.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getUserDecryptionThreshold:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Minimum number of KMS signatures from the current context required for user decryption verification. Retunable in place by the ACL owner without rotating the context.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getKmsGenThreshold:
+	{"description":"Minimum number of KMS responses from the current context required to reach consensus on key- and CRS-generation results in KMSGeneration.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getMpcThreshold:
+	{"description":"MPC threshold recorded for the current context. The KMS SDK derives its effective MPC threshold from the nodes it knows about instead of reading this value.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getCurrentKmsContextId:
+	{"description":"Identifier of the current KMS context, used by verifiers when a proof does not explicitly select a historical context.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContexts:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration, reconstructed from NewKmsContext and KmsContextDestroyed events with their node sets and creation thresholds. The context created by initializeFromMigration does not emit this event and is indexed through the live getters and project overrides. Thresholds can be retuned per context after creation.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContextSigners:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS signers from contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration. They remain authorized for public decryption proofs that select their context until the ACL owner destroys that context.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContextTxSenders:
+	{"description":"KMS transaction senders from contexts created after the ProtocolConfig migration. They remain authorized to submit key- and CRS-generation responses for their context until the ACL owner destroys that context.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.destroyedKmsContexts:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS contexts destroyed by the ACL owner. Destroyed contexts are invalid: their per-context getters revert and public decryption proofs can no longer select them.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.eth:0xC94790325C61A7D98e90d835ea89777d64b17492:
-	"EmptyUUPSProxy"
	implementationNames.eth:0x25c76298Fb4d15bFADce4798519a7B37ac0076E7:
+	"ProtocolConfig"
	template:
+	"zama/ZamaProtocolConfig"
	description:
+	"Ethereum host-chain registry of KMS node sets, per-context thresholds, and context lifecycle, introduced in the v0.3.0 KMSVerifier upgrade. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders and signers; the four per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) can be retuned by the ACL owner for any live context, including the current one. A newly created context becomes current immediately; older contexts remain selectable for public decryption proofs until destroyed."
	category:
+	{"name":"Local Infrastructure","priority":5}
	}

	contract FHEVMExecutor (eth:0xD82385dADa1ae3E969447f20A3164F6213100e75) [zama/ZamaFHEVMExecutor_v0_4_0] {
	+++ description: FHEVM executor that accepts encrypted operation requests, accounts for computation usage, and stores ciphertext handles for operation results. v0.4.0 adds the n-ary encrypted operations fheSum and fheIsIn (encrypted set membership) over bounded ciphertext collections.
	template:
-	"zama/ZamaFHEVMExecutor_v0_3_0"
+	"zama/ZamaFHEVMExecutor_v0_4_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xf475718e9125acfc2f69d3c9cca8cedb9a15c644da7490f7f5fe0ae2690a77cc"
+	"0x8521799e0a57218bcbd587c2f46222a266bbcbe2f27780cc0bf6ed66eb9cda1f"
	description:
-	"FHEVM executor that accepts encrypted operation requests, accounts for computation usage, and stores ciphertext handles for operation results."
+	"FHEVM executor that accepts encrypted operation requests, accounts for computation usage, and stores ciphertext handles for operation results. v0.4.0 adds the n-ary encrypted operations fheSum and fheIsIn (encrypted set membership) over bounded ciphertext collections."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xC38aAfCBB73Fd4bd6f995275079C4Add9C1687E5"
+	"eth:0xf444B2B5e45cD07F1E735122F53A2d70A8c81dB5"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0xf444B2B5e45cD07F1E735122F53A2d70A8c81dB5"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	5
	values.getVersion:
-	"FHEVMExecutor v0.3.0"
+	"FHEVMExecutor v0.4.0"
	implementationNames.eth:0xC38aAfCBB73Fd4bd6f995275079C4Add9C1687E5:
-	"FHEVMExecutor"
	implementationNames.eth:0xf444B2B5e45cD07F1E735122F53A2d70A8c81dB5:
+	"FHEVMExecutor"
	}

	EOA (eth:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	EOA (eth:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract ZamaGovMultisigA (eth:0xE43c73aAb2b6aBBad6d0461997ce1cfea5ABe66f) [zama/Multisig] {
	+++ description: Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
	receivedPermissions.5:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03","description":"create KMS signer contexts with arbitrary signer sets and thresholds, and destroy non-current contexts. A malicious context can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.17.description:
-	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, manage PauserSet membership, and create or destroy KMSVerifier signer contexts."
+	"transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, and manage PauserSet membership."
	receivedPermissions.18:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"create KMS contexts with arbitrary node sets and thresholds that immediately become the default verifier authority, destroy non-current contexts, and retune the per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) of any live context including the current one. A malicious context or lowered threshold can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.24:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"trigger and abort FHE key and CRS generation rounds executed by the KMS nodes.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.38:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4","description":"upgrade the ProtocolConfig implementation.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	receivedPermissions.44:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","description":"upgrade the KMSGeneration implementation.","role":".aclOwner","via":[{"address":"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"}]}
	}

	EOA (eth:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier."
+	"sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration."
	receivedPermissions.0.from:
-	"eth:0x77627828a55156b04Ac0DC0eb30467f1a552BB03"
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	}

	contract KMSGeneration (eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa) [zama/ZamaKMSGeneration] {
	+++ description: Orchestrates FHE key and CRS generation on the Ethereum host chain, taking over the workflows removed from the Gateway KMSGeneration in v0.5.0. The ACL owner triggers and aborts generations; KMS node transaction senders registered in ProtocolConfig submit EIP-712-signed responses that activate a key or CRS once the ProtocolConfig key-generation threshold is reached.
	name:
-	"EmptyUUPSProxy"
+	"KMSGeneration"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc71891567f1a766aa3a25d1830c5362e3bcf7682574b11b20a51401acb718db4"
+	"0x265ec46d9bb4498caf973d6a60d3cbbe1f3ceff12597fcd3140bdff9e6322f76"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xC94790325C61A7D98e90d835ea89777d64b17492"
+	"eth:0x5DD95e97287672b5d86dd3a427E855099E5AC940"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-08-10T11:50:47.000Z","0x3a73cbfe82d45d522aafa83acbc4a44dd89a2b409530e3a52d0076009a036c78",["eth:0x5DD95e97287672b5d86dd3a427E855099E5AC940"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	+++ description: Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account is authorized by onlyACLOwner for KMSGeneration administration.
	values.aclOwner:
+	"eth:0xB6D69D5F334d8B97B194617B53c6aB62f8681Ef3"
	+++ description: EIP-712 domain against which KMS key- and CRS-generation response signatures are verified.
	values.eip712Domain:
+	{"fields":"0x0f","name":"KMSGeneration","version":"1","chainId":1,"verifyingContract":"eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa","salt":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","extensions":[]}
	+++ description: Identifier of the currently active CRS generated through this contract.
	values.getActiveCrsId:
+	"2261564242916331941866620800950935700259179388000792266395655937654553313281"
	+++ description: Identifier of the currently active FHE key generated through this contract.
	values.getActiveKeyId:
+	"1809251394333065553493296640760748560207343510400633813116524750123642650625"
	values.getCrsCounter:
+	"2261564242916331941866620800950935700259179388000792266395655937654553313281"
	values.getKeyCounter:
+	"1809251394333065553493296640760748560207343510400633813116524750123642650625"
	values.getVersion:
+	"KMSGeneration v0.1.0"
	+++ description: ProtocolConfig contract providing the KMS node set and the key-generation consensus threshold. Referenced as a compile-time constant without a getter.
	values.protocolConfig:
+	"eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4"
	errors:
-	{"proxiableUUID":"Processing error occurred."}
	implementationNames.eth:0xC94790325C61A7D98e90d835ea89777d64b17492:
-	"EmptyUUPSProxy"
	implementationNames.eth:0x5DD95e97287672b5d86dd3a427E855099E5AC940:
+	"KMSGeneration"
	template:
+	"zama/ZamaKMSGeneration"
	description:
+	"Orchestrates FHE key and CRS generation on the Ethereum host chain, taking over the workflows removed from the Gateway KMSGeneration in v0.5.0. The ACL owner triggers and aborts generations; KMS node transaction senders registered in ProtocolConfig submit EIP-712-signed responses that activate a key or CRS once the ProtocolConfig key-generation threshold is reached."
	fieldMeta:
+	{"protocolConfig":{"description":"ProtocolConfig contract providing the KMS node set and the key-generation consensus threshold. Referenced as a compile-time constant without a getter.","type":"EXTERNAL"},"aclOwner":{"description":"Owner of the Zama ACL contract. This account is authorized by onlyACLOwner for KMSGeneration administration.","type":"PERMISSION"},"getActiveKeyId":{"description":"Identifier of the currently active FHE key generated through this contract."},"getActiveCrsId":{"description":"Identifier of the currently active CRS generated through this contract."},"eip712Domain":{"description":"EIP-712 domain against which KMS key- and CRS-generation response signatures are verified."}}
	category:
+	{"name":"Local Infrastructure","priority":5}
	}

New and verified contracts

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EmptyUUPSProxy (eth:0xD8236B57394f90726b26aB25D38CeAC776E1a7C4) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EmptyUUPSProxy (eth:0xf102cC9A9D2174630c394f5b7B7D63104E348daa) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

2026 August 07, 12:55 UTC

High severity

133changes

Zama Gateway upgrade: a larger upgrade that touches key generation and is only half deployed. - Decryption v0.4.0 - v0.5.0: requests now pin a KMS context at request time and responses must reference the pinned context - GatewayConfig v0.5.0 - v0.6.0: the owner can now destroy non-current KMS contexts (immediately invalidating them for decryption), retune thresholds of any live context (context-scoped events), and disable/enable/remove host chains. Coprocessor updates now require InputVerification to be paused. - KMSGeneration v0.4.0 - v0.5.0: now view-only; all key/CRS/PRSS/resharing workflows were removed from the gateway after their move to Ethereum (getActiveKeyId/getActiveCrsId are gone). - InputVerification v0.3.0 - v0.4.0 and CiphertextCommits v0.3.0 - v0.4.0: minor; both now reject requests/handles from disabled host chains, and CiphertextCommits dropped its KMSGeneration reference. - a Polygon host chain (chainId 137) is now registered in GatewayConfig.

Zama Gateway upgrade: a larger upgrade that touches key generation and is only half deployed.

Decryption v0.4.0 -> v0.5.0: requests now pin a KMS context at request time and responses must reference the pinned context
GatewayConfig v0.5.0 -> v0.6.0: the owner can now destroy non-current KMS contexts (immediately invalidating them for decryption), retune thresholds of any live context (context-scoped events), and disable/enable/remove host chains. Coprocessor updates now require InputVerification to be paused.
KMSGeneration v0.4.0 -> v0.5.0: now view-only; all key/CRS/PRSS/resharing workflows were removed from the gateway after their move to Ethereum (getActiveKeyId/getActiveCrsId are gone).
InputVerification v0.3.0 -> v0.4.0 and CiphertextCommits v0.3.0 -> v0.4.0: minor; both now reject requests/handles from disabled host chains, and CiphertextCommits dropped its KMSGeneration reference.
a Polygon host chain (chainId 137) is now registered in GatewayConfig.

	EOA (zama:0x0e25B8DB74c754C8275C0B219ba2A6CD7c59E31D) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	contract Decryption (zama:0x0f6024a97684f7d90ddb0fAAD79cB15F2C888D24) [zama/Decryption_v0_5_0] {
	+++ description: Gateway contract that orchestrates public and user decryption requests and checks committed ciphertext material. Each request pins a KMS context at request time (explicitly through extraData or the then-current context) and rejects unknown or destroyed contexts; responses must reference the pinned context. Requests recorded before v0.5.0 fall back to the context declared by each response. KMS nodes enforce host-chain ACL state offchain, and Ethereum KMSVerifier verifies public results against this contract's EIP-712 domain.
	template:
-	"zama/Decryption_v0_4_0"
+	"zama/Decryption_v0_5_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xcd821ac822a19a355acde1dd7ce435e2a6e16e21017756b899c058ee64552e28"
+	"0x1dd2af26cc2be12ff30232e8df9c95ec66fcbc987f40372ad56a9d8f1073260c"
	description:
-	"Gateway contract that orchestrates public and user decryption requests and checks committed ciphertext material. Each response independently selects a KMS context through extraData, or uses the context current when the response executes; requests do not store a context. KMS nodes enforce host-chain ACL state offchain, and Ethereum KMSVerifier verifies public results against this contract's EIP-712 domain."
+	"Gateway contract that orchestrates public and user decryption requests and checks committed ciphertext material. Each request pins a KMS context at request time (explicitly through extraData or the then-current context) and rejects unknown or destroyed contexts; responses must reference the pinned context. Requests recorded before v0.5.0 fall back to the context declared by each response. KMS nodes enforce host-chain ACL state offchain, and Ethereum KMSVerifier verifies public results against this contract's EIP-712 domain."
	values.$implementation:
-	"zama:0x943CEfD1A00d3ae5b298bB10D4EddA09B279C8B0"
+	"zama:0x86F8e9626cCff3f2eB3dA248F33DfF43531DBFD8"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-08-06T17:11:04.000Z","0x350755101263bed64dc377ef6f3ef07f95f97918b689967a60ee625d0d9e025c",["zama:0x86F8e9626cCff3f2eB3dA248F33DfF43531DBFD8"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	5
	values.getVersion:
-	"Decryption v0.4.0"
+	"Decryption v0.5.0"
	fieldMeta.gatewayMultichainACL.description:
-	"MultichainACL contract containing the gateway-side host-chain ACL mirror. The upgraded Decryption contract no longer checks it onchain and relies on KMS nodes to enforce ACL state."
+	"MultichainACL contract containing the gateway-side host-chain ACL mirror. Decryption does not check it onchain and relies on KMS nodes to enforce ACL state."
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsTxSenders.description:
-	"KMS transaction-sender addresses configured in the current GatewayConfig context. Historical context senders can also submit responses when response extraData explicitly selects their retained context. Post-migration contexts are indexed on GatewayConfig; migration-created membership requires a project override because no creation event was emitted."
+	"KMS transaction-sender addresses configured in the current GatewayConfig context. Senders from other live contexts can still submit responses to requests that pinned their context; destroying a context revokes this. Post-migration contexts are indexed on GatewayConfig; migration-created membership requires a project override because no creation event was emitted."
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsSigners.description:
-	"KMS signer addresses configured in the current GatewayConfig context. Historical context signers can also sign responses when response extraData explicitly selects their retained context. Post-migration contexts are indexed on GatewayConfig; migration-created membership requires a project override because no creation event was emitted."
+	"KMS signer addresses configured in the current GatewayConfig context. Signers from other live contexts can still sign responses to requests that pinned their context; destroying a context revokes this. Post-migration contexts are indexed on GatewayConfig; migration-created membership requires a project override because no creation event was emitted."
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsContextId.description:
-	"Current GatewayConfig KMS context used by responses whose extraData is empty or starts with version 0. Requests do not bind this value, so a rotation can change the context used to answer an already pending request."
+	"Current GatewayConfig KMS context, pinned by new requests whose extraData is empty or starts with version 0. The pin is stored per request, so a later rotation does not change the context or thresholds used to answer a pending request. Requests recorded before v0.5.0 have no pin and fall back to the context declared by each response."
	fieldMeta.gatewayPublicDecryptionThreshold.description:
-	"Minimum matching-signature count for the current context. Public responses are grouped by a digest containing raw extraData; identical empty or version 0 extraData can accumulate responses across a context rotation while the last response selects the threshold checked."
+	"Minimum matching-signature count for public decryption consensus in the current context. Each request is answered under the threshold of its pinned context, which the GatewayConfig owner can retune per context."
	fieldMeta.gatewayUserDecryptionThreshold.description:
-	"Minimum response count for the current context. User response counts are stored per request rather than per context, so valid shares submitted under different contexts can be combined and the last response selects the threshold checked."
+	"Minimum response count for user decryption consensus in the current context. Each request is answered under the threshold of its pinned context, which the GatewayConfig owner can retune per context."
	implementationNames.zama:0x943CEfD1A00d3ae5b298bB10D4EddA09B279C8B0:
-	"Decryption"
	implementationNames.zama:0x86F8e9626cCff3f2eB3dA248F33DfF43531DBFD8:
+	"Decryption"
	}

	contract KMSGeneration (zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3) [zama/KMSGeneration_v0_5_0] {
	+++ description: View-only gateway contract retaining historical queries for previously generated FHE keys and CRS materials. All state-changing key-generation, CRS-generation, PRSS, and key-resharing workflows were removed in v0.5.0 after their move to Ethereum.
	template:
-	"zama/KMSGeneration"
+	"zama/KMSGeneration_v0_5_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x24b946dbf9b33a087ddcfba5bef6adfb4fb85c47ee48d0f3d35487b5a76900dc"
+	"0x19abe2dec360556cd7dd3bbf0197f56dcaf76dc5889859f0e18046a971c70498"
	description:
-	"Gateway contract that orchestrates FHE key generation, CRS generation, PRSS initialization, and key resharing through threshold KMS responses."
+	"View-only gateway contract retaining historical queries for previously generated FHE keys and CRS materials. All state-changing key-generation, CRS-generation, PRSS, and key-resharing workflows were removed in v0.5.0 after their move to Ethereum."
	values.$implementation:
-	"zama:0x3d345DFc156381E6060Cdf652cDf7f92DF94fAFF"
+	"zama:0x68CEb7709aC1bcD60e36c4144a243A445A2cb076"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-06T17:11:04.000Z","0x350755101263bed64dc377ef6f3ef07f95f97918b689967a60ee625d0d9e025c",["zama:0x68CEb7709aC1bcD60e36c4144a243A445A2cb076"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.gatewayKmsGenThreshold:
-	7
	values.gatewayKmsSigners:
-	["zama:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f","zama:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965","zama:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3","zama:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f","zama:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905","zama:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921","zama:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D","zama:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8","zama:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f","zama:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58","zama:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC","zama:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385","zama:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb"]
	values.gatewayKmsTxSenders:
-	["zama:0x711EBE8aA590f9C9904ff279239E89dB2eFbC890","zama:0xB4CE988D382425F64c99A352375F72A5f1cf6FFB","zama:0x4eC7200E392B97913cbD6d8160B011406EB019F1","zama:0xEd1D622bd59d657580aBAc65312b40B4B2dA6236","zama:0x74a1E2e87a4026b7B8b5252c747E514159515e9a","zama:0x0e25B8DB74c754C8275C0B219ba2A6CD7c59E31D","zama:0x577Fd21e4BC7D644A4177C4B89146e1Ab394De04","zama:0xbaac6F9DD84bFB303F05B4DE45A88Eec86855BD0","zama:0x43e4c21cf9d24Dc5b4e00031349EC213A2ba8340","zama:0xC105B5933446658D226582f7A112F49a70b54364","zama:0xbcF4943A856497FB2345409D35f4d1eae9A0363E","zama:0xD227C4B573800EdA3bAdA6DAC872E9134E012e6D","zama:0x487e41623b7FeB464ff79F7326DCa791c9a1c5EC"]
	values.getActiveCrsId:
-	"2261564242916331941866620800950935700259179388000792266395655937654553313281"
	values.getActiveKeyId:
-	"1809251394333065553493296640760748560207343510400633813116524750123642650625"
	values.getVersion:
-	"KMSGeneration v0.4.0"
+	"KMSGeneration v0.5.0"
	fieldMeta.gatewayConfig.description:
-	"GatewayConfig contract used as the source of truth for the gateway owner, KMS set, and KMS generation threshold."
+	"GatewayConfig contract used as the source of truth for the gateway owner and for resolving KMS node storage URLs in historical material queries."
	fieldMeta.gatewayOwner.description:
-	"Owner of GatewayConfig. This account authorizes KMSGeneration upgrades and can trigger key, CRS, PRSS, and key-resharing workflows."
+	"Owner of GatewayConfig. This account authorizes KMSGeneration upgrades."
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsTxSenders:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS transaction-sender addresses configured in GatewayConfig. These accounts may submit preprocessing keygen, keygen, and CRS generation responses.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsSigners:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS signer addresses configured in GatewayConfig. Their EIP-712 signatures determine whether key and CRS generation responses reach threshold.","type":"PERMISSION"}
	fieldMeta.gatewayKmsGenThreshold:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Minimum number of matching KMS responses required before key or CRS generation reaches consensus.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getActiveKeyId:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Identifier of the active FHE key generated through KMS consensus.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.getActiveCrsId:
-	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Identifier of the active CRS generated through KMS consensus.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.eip712Domain.description:
-	"EIP-712 domain used when validating KMS signatures over key-generation and CRS-generation responses."
+	"EIP-712 domain retained from the KMS generation workflows removed in v0.5.0."
	implementationNames.zama:0x3d345DFc156381E6060Cdf652cDf7f92DF94fAFF:
-	"KMSGeneration"
	implementationNames.zama:0x68CEb7709aC1bcD60e36c4144a243A445A2cb076:
+	"KMSGeneration"
	}

	EOA (zama:0x41b19EB4585450db79ac03ba9503106EC7895905) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x43e4c21cf9d24Dc5b4e00031349EC213A2ba8340) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x487e41623b7FeB464ff79F7326DCa791c9a1c5EC) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x4eC7200E392B97913cbD6d8160B011406EB019F1) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x577Fd21e4BC7D644A4177C4B89146e1Ab394De04) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x5d0e7033774dD43eE546D49b72Bd0B561E52f7C8) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	contract SafeL2 (zama:0x5f0F86BcEad6976711C9B131bCa5D30E767fe2bE) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: Gateway owner Safe. Its LayerZero governance module is outside the Zama Gateway protocol surface covered here.
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"start KMS key generation, CRS generation, PRSS initialization, and key resharing.","role":".gatewayOwner"}
	receivedPermissions.5.description:
-	"create KMS contexts that immediately become current, update current thresholds and other gateway configuration, transfer ownership, and unpause gateway workflow contracts. Historical KMS contexts cannot be removed in this version."
+	"create KMS contexts that immediately become current, destroy historical KMS contexts, update thresholds of any live context, manage coprocessors, custodians and host chains, transfer ownership, and unpause gateway workflow contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x6016DCA5e91e62826e3FEA1Fb0a763602dc1E385) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x6e5f02Cd4B33f0Cf4ED5326ac9eE25e5aA8c4921) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x711EBE8aA590f9C9904ff279239E89dB2eFbC890) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x74a1E2e87a4026b7B8b5252c747E514159515e9a) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x7C17BE232e5968BDa9516478B798b9E90D013fCC) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x7C5Eeb4D8CED0101799B8Cc212eE874097364F58) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x915055c5F05C0d88BCdf1e3DfBA18aBD2a18350f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0x966188a1f697F6A1B5cfA51495DD8A8A7b5CdB8D) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xB4CE988D382425F64c99A352375F72A5f1cf6FFB) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xB7978e602D2AF68258dA614AF949E014BF0DE0eb) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xbaac6F9DD84bFB303F05B4DE45A88Eec86855BD0) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xbcF4943A856497FB2345409D35f4d1eae9A0363E) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xbf05c17BEB0BF2F2c78Cd491A53a148e035279C3) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xC105B5933446658D226582f7A112F49a70b54364) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	contract InputVerification (zama:0xcB1bB072f38bdAF0F328CdEf1Fc6eDa1DF029287) [zama/InputVerification] {
	+++ description: Gateway contract that receives encrypted input verification requests from registered and enabled host chains, collects coprocessor responses, and emits a threshold-signed attestation once coprocessor consensus is reached. Ethereum InputVerifier verifies attestations against this contract's EIP-712 domain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x52c38ce781ecef28b118222541c9b079f2ae7d6402452584e620e84ca347875f"
+	"0x58bb055397e294a46ebccbc53c94bb2494bf05acd7ad77f2fb7cc46b3ef1eb92"
	values.$implementation:
-	"zama:0xA08c4367eB984945da2dad5BF7d94D1B2863197A"
+	"zama:0xf9f0F5ef8301CF1573EBe0F45E13A4CabB621821"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-06T17:11:04.000Z","0x350755101263bed64dc377ef6f3ef07f95f97918b689967a60ee625d0d9e025c",["zama:0xf9f0F5ef8301CF1573EBe0F45E13A4CabB621821"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.getVersion:
-	"InputVerification v0.3.0"
+	"InputVerification v0.4.0"
	implementationNames.zama:0xA08c4367eB984945da2dad5BF7d94D1B2863197A:
-	"InputVerification"
	implementationNames.zama:0xf9f0F5ef8301CF1573EBe0F45E13A4CabB621821:
+	"InputVerification"
	}

	EOA (zama:0xD227C4B573800EdA3bAdA6DAC872E9134E012e6D) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

	contract CiphertextCommits (zama:0xd82cF70FC102028cd01acB87D0E107780ae4F41F) [zama/CiphertextCommits] {
	+++ description: Gateway contract that stores ciphertext and SNS ciphertext digests after coprocessor consensus, allowing decryption requests to reference committed ciphertext material. Digests referencing unregistered or disabled host chains are rejected.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x70a834887489420cb7ea7044739bcc74d735be01e262a27ea23132992d21a898"
+	"0xa3aa22a184258ca16a5d83ce495ae0d307d4c5ec9fda8a7622d4f95728f4af03"
	values.$implementation:
-	"zama:0xC92f2dc7eF79728ed32e745020EF463270217e78"
+	"zama:0xB373Ae42736E3C266D4A5D090c00c7f0Bda06622"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-08-06T17:11:04.000Z","0x350755101263bed64dc377ef6f3ef07f95f97918b689967a60ee625d0d9e025c",["zama:0xB373Ae42736E3C266D4A5D090c00c7f0Bda06622"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.getVersion:
-	"CiphertextCommits v0.3.0"
+	"CiphertextCommits v0.4.0"
	implementationNames.zama:0xC92f2dc7eF79728ed32e745020EF463270217e78:
-	"CiphertextCommits"
	implementationNames.zama:0xB373Ae42736E3C266D4A5D090c00c7f0Bda06622:
+	"CiphertextCommits"
	}

	EOA (zama:0xdC472efa1642D5afB684aAaa546E22FB24AAB965) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	contract GatewayConfig (zama:0xDE537Be194777A56f8B19d14079E6a78249390ab) [zama/GatewayConfig_v0_6_0] {
	+++ description: Central configuration contract for the Zama Gateway. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders, signers, and workflow thresholds; the owner can create new contexts, retune the thresholds of any live context, and destroy non-current contexts, which immediately invalidates them for decryption. Registered host chains can be disabled, re-enabled, or removed by the owner.
	template:
-	"zama/GatewayConfig_v0_5_0"
+	"zama/GatewayConfig_v0_6_0"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1089121569189032b8cee0dae0c71eedecf7757f712a6d14ef684915093c6747"
+	"0xe903576aaecdd97c5036c6bc029149a11b44484c78d9c6b0d802a882d4744597"
	description:
-	"Central configuration contract for the Zama Gateway. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders, signers, and workflow thresholds; historical contexts remain stored and selectable by Decryption because this version has no context-destruction function."
+	"Central configuration contract for the Zama Gateway. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders, signers, and workflow thresholds; the owner can create new contexts, retune the thresholds of any live context, and destroy non-current contexts, which immediately invalidates them for decryption. Registered host chains can be disabled, re-enabled, or removed by the owner."
	values.$implementation:
-	"zama:0x2294E3C211238Ae31E2824576CCd7f996CC7Dc00"
+	"zama:0x1950aD98e834f6c07553365196d4CddeD179c536"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-08-06T17:11:04.000Z","0x350755101263bed64dc377ef6f3ef07f95f97918b689967a60ee625d0d9e025c",["zama:0x1950aD98e834f6c07553365196d4CddeD179c536"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	5
	+++ description: Registered host chains and their host-chain FHEVMExecutor and ACL endpoints. Returned addresses belong to the listed host chain, not to the gateway chain; Ethereum entries are exposed as formatted cross-chain references in ethereumHostChains.
	values.getHostChains.1:
+	{"chainId":137,"fhevmExecutorAddress":"zama:0xAB0075E77fe06083f52bdf10e2ccDB3712483057","aclAddress":"zama:0x6737F17e31cf26a1b62fb0362acC5a16CB156F49","name":"polygon","website":"https://polygonscan.com"}
	values.getVersion:
-	"GatewayConfig v0.5.0"
+	"GatewayConfig v0.6.0"
	+++ description: KMS contexts destroyed by the owner. Destroyed contexts are invalid: their per-context getters revert, new requests cannot pin them, and pending requests pinned to them can no longer reach consensus.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.destroyedKmsContexts:
+	[]
	+++ description: Registered host chains currently disabled by the owner. Gateway workflows reject requests and ciphertext handles referencing disabled chains; a chain must be disabled before it can be removed.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.disabledHostChains:
+	[]
	fieldMeta.owner.description:
-	"Owner of GatewayConfig. This account creates KMS contexts, changes the current context's thresholds, manages coprocessors, custodians and host chains, transfers ownership, and unpauses gateway contracts. A newly created context becomes current immediately, while all older contexts remain selectable by Decryption."
+	"Owner of GatewayConfig. This account creates and destroys KMS contexts, changes the thresholds of any live context, manages coprocessors, custodians and host chains (including disabling and removing them), transfers ownership, and unpauses gateway contracts. A newly created context becomes current immediately; older contexts remain selectable by Decryption requests until destroyed."
	fieldMeta.inputVerification.description:
-	"InputVerification workflow contract paused and unpaused by GatewayConfig."
+	"InputVerification workflow contract paused and unpaused by GatewayConfig. Coprocessor set and threshold updates require this contract to be paused first."
	fieldMeta.ethereumHostChains.description:
-	"Ethereum host-chain endpoints registered in GatewayConfig, derived from getHostChains entries with chainId 1. These are the L1 FHEVMExecutor and ACL contracts whose state is used by the Gateway workflows."
+	"Ethereum host-chain endpoints registered in GatewayConfig, derived from getHostChains entries with chainId 1. These are the L1 FHEVMExecutor and ACL contracts whose state is used by the Gateway workflows. Disabled-but-not-removed chains still appear here; see disabledHostChains."
	fieldMeta.getKmsTxSenders.description:
-	"KMS transaction-sender addresses in the current Gateway context. Historical context senders remain authorized for Decryption responses that explicitly select their context; post-migration contexts are indexed here and the migrated context is indexed on Decryption."
+	"KMS transaction-sender addresses in the current Gateway context. Senders from other live contexts remain authorized for Decryption requests that pinned their context until the context is destroyed; post-migration contexts are indexed here and the migrated context is indexed on Decryption."
	fieldMeta.getKmsSigners.description:
-	"KMS signer addresses in the current Gateway context. Historical context signers remain authorized for explicitly selected Decryption responses; post-migration contexts are indexed here and the migrated context is indexed on Decryption."
+	"KMS signer addresses in the current Gateway context. Signers from other live contexts remain authorized for Decryption requests that pinned their context until the context is destroyed; post-migration contexts are indexed here and the migrated context is indexed on Decryption."
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContexts.description:
-	"KMS contexts created after migration, reconstructed from UpdateKmsContext events with their node set and creation thresholds. Nodes remain authorized for Decryption indefinitely; later threshold-update events do not identify a context, so final historical thresholds must be read through context-specific getters or project overrides."
+	"KMS contexts created after migration, reconstructed from UpdateKmsContext events with their node set and creation thresholds. Contexts stay selectable by Decryption requests until destroyed (see destroyedKmsContexts). Thresholds can be retuned per context after creation; current values must be read through context-specific getters or project overrides."
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContextTxSenders.description:
-	"KMS transaction senders from contexts created after migration. They remain authorized for Decryption responses that select their context because GatewayConfig has no context-destruction function."
+	"KMS transaction senders from contexts created after migration. They remain authorized for Decryption requests that pinned their context until the owner destroys that context."
	fieldMeta.createdKmsContextSigners.description:
-	"KMS signers from contexts created after migration. They remain authorized for Decryption responses that select their context because GatewayConfig has no context-destruction function."
+	"KMS signers from contexts created after migration. They remain authorized for Decryption requests that pinned their context until the owner destroys that context."
	fieldMeta.getMpcThreshold.description:
-	"MPC threshold for KMS key material generation in the current context."
+	"MPC threshold for KMS key material generation in the current context. The owner can retune it per context."
	fieldMeta.getCurrentKmsContextId.description:
-	"Identifier of the context used when a Decryption response has empty or version 0 extraData. Version 1 responses can explicitly select any historical context, and requests do not store or bind a context."
+	"Identifier of the context pinned by new Decryption requests whose extraData is empty or starts with version 0. Version 1 request extraData can explicitly pin any live context; responses must match the pinned context."
	fieldMeta.getPublicDecryptionThresholdForContext.description:
-	"Minimum number of KMS signatures required for public decryption consensus in the current context."
+	"Minimum number of KMS signatures required for public decryption consensus in the current context. The owner can retune it per context."
	fieldMeta.getUserDecryptionThresholdForContext.description:
-	"Minimum number of KMS shares required for user decryption consensus in the current context."
+	"Minimum number of KMS shares required for user decryption consensus in the current context. The owner can retune it per context."
	fieldMeta.getKmsGenThreshold.description:
-	"Minimum number of KMS signatures required for key and CRS generation consensus in the current context."
+	"Minimum number of KMS signatures required for key and CRS generation consensus in the current context. Consumed by the Ethereum-side KMS generation since gateway KMSGeneration v0.5.0."
	fieldMeta.getCoprocessorMajorityThreshold.description:
-	"Minimum number of matching coprocessor messages required for gateway coprocessor consensus."
+	"Minimum number of matching coprocessor messages required for gateway coprocessor consensus. Updates require InputVerification to be paused first."
	fieldMeta.destroyedKmsContexts:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"KMS contexts destroyed by the owner. Destroyed contexts are invalid: their per-context getters revert, new requests cannot pin them, and pending requests pinned to them can no longer reach consensus.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	fieldMeta.disabledHostChains:
+	{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Registered host chains currently disabled by the owner. Gateway workflows reject requests and ciphertext handles referencing disabled chains; a chain must be disabled before it can be removed.","type":"RISK_PARAMETER"}
	implementationNames.zama:0x2294E3C211238Ae31E2824576CCd7f996CC7Dc00:
-	"GatewayConfig"
	implementationNames.zama:0x1950aD98e834f6c07553365196d4CddeD179c536:
+	"GatewayConfig"
	}

	EOA (zama:0xDFc9Dcb3D206AA164770874f36a4B5AD2EE5194f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xe9f7ecfF21a2e0Ca58eA26ae869FEF38ab49ed6f) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"sign KMS key-generation and CRS-generation material accepted by KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsSigners"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"sign KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation material accepted by gateway contracts."
+	"sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts."
	}

	EOA (zama:0xEd1D622bd59d657580aBAc65312b40B4B2dA6236) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"zama:0x290947F9fed2d91fdB22f35E162aDfA744b7aEe3","description":"submit KMS key-generation and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration.","role":".gatewayKmsTxSenders"}
	receivedPermissions.2.description:
-	"submit KMS decryption, key-generation, and CRS-generation responses to gateway contracts."
+	"submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts."
	}

2026 August 04, 11:55 UTC

5changes

ZamaGovMultisigB executed a proposal rotating two ZamaGovMultisigA members while preserving its 9-of-17 threshold.

	contract ZamaGovMultisigA (eth:0xE43c73aAb2b6aBBad6d0461997ce1cfea5ABe66f) [zama/Multisig] {
	+++ description: Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.
	+++ description: Current multisig members reconstructed from MembersAdded and MembersRemoved events.
	values.$members.5:
-	"eth:0x32f3D0D7E20Ca11Cad21f32Dad91506ea89f5897"
	+++ description: Current multisig members reconstructed from MembersAdded and MembersRemoved events.
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0xE53e32a669357Ab0360103d8f294812B914AF9e4"
	+++ description: Current multisig members reconstructed from MembersAdded and MembersRemoved events.
	values.$members.15:
+	"eth:0xc49376C4D044011eEce6eE69eFAe06f0Cc2bd008"
	+++ description: Current multisig members reconstructed from MembersAdded and MembersRemoved events.
	values.$members.16:
+	"eth:0x27B1c34F2aeEc91F9704BD1CE288E5c667F29045"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Safe (eth:0xE53e32a669357Ab0360103d8f294812B914AF9e4) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

ZamaGovMultisigB0xBc86…a38F

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- HCULimit DAO
- ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (Coprocessor) DAO
- ConfidentialXAUTWrapper DAO
- KMSVerifier DAO
- ConfidentialZAMAWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialBRONWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialTGBPWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDTWrapper DAO
- DAO DAO
- ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper DAO
- ACL DAO
- InputVerifier DAO
- ProtocolConfig DAO
- FHEVMExecutor DAO
- ConfidentialWETHWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (KMS) DAO
- ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry DAO
- KMSGeneration DAO
Can interact with HCULimit
- change the per-block and per-transaction HCU limits and manage callers that bypass the per-block limit DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with Staking (Coprocessor)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialXAUTWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialZAMAWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialBRONWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialUSDTWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with DAO
- change multisig plugin settings DAO - or - acting directly
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration DAO - or - acting directly
- grant and revoke DAO permissions DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with PauserSet
- add, remove, or swap accounts that can pause the ACL DAO
Can interact with ACL
- transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, and manage PauserSet membership DAO
Can interact with InputVerifier
- set the coprocessor signer set and signature threshold used for encrypted input verification DAO
Can interact with ProtocolConfig
- create KMS contexts with arbitrary node sets and thresholds that immediately become the default verifier authority, destroy non-current contexts, and retune the per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) of any live context including the current one. A malicious context or lowered threshold can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialWETHWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with Staking (KMS)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry
- manage addresses in the registry DAO
Can interact with KMSGeneration
- trigger and abort FHE key and CRS generation rounds executed by the KMS nodes DAO

Participants (5):

EOA 60 0xf299…fBBE EOA 57 EOA 59 EOA 58

ZamaGovMultisigA0xE43c…e66f

A Multisig with 9/17 threshold. Aragon multisig plugin for creating proposals and collecting approvals against a configurable threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- HCULimit DAO
- ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (Coprocessor) DAO
- ConfidentialXAUTWrapper DAO
- KMSVerifier DAO
- ConfidentialZAMAWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialBRONWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialTGBPWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDTWrapper DAO
- DAO DAO
- ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper DAO
- ACL DAO
- InputVerifier DAO
- ProtocolConfig DAO
- FHEVMExecutor DAO
- ConfidentialWETHWrapper DAO
- ConfidentialUSDCWrapper DAO
- Staking (KMS) DAO
- ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry DAO
- KMSGeneration DAO
Can interact with HCULimit
- change the per-block and per-transaction HCU limits and manage callers that bypass the per-block limit DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with Staking (Coprocessor)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialXAUTWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialZAMAWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialBRONWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialUSDTWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with DAO
- change multisig plugin settings DAO - or - acting directly
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration DAO - or - acting directly
- grant and revoke DAO permissions DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with PauserSet
- add, remove, or swap accounts that can pause the ACL DAO
Can interact with ACL
- transfer ACL ownership, unpause the ACL, block or unblock accounts, and manage PauserSet membership DAO
Can interact with InputVerifier
- set the coprocessor signer set and signature threshold used for encrypted input verification DAO
Can interact with ProtocolConfig
- create KMS contexts with arbitrary node sets and thresholds that immediately become the default verifier authority, destroy non-current contexts, and retune the per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) of any live context including the current one. A malicious context or lowered threshold can attest an inflated unwrap amount and drain pooled wrapper backing DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialWETHWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialUSDCWrapper
- block and unblock users, add and remove observers (wildcard decryption access to all balances of this wrapper), set the pauser and the underlying denylist selector, unpause, and transfer ownership DAO
Can interact with Staking (KMS)
- grant and revoke manager accounts, transfer or renounce the default admin role, and change the default admin transfer delay DAO
- set the reward rate, set the unstake cooldown period, and add or remove reward-eligible staking accounts DAO
Can interact with ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry
- manage addresses in the registry DAO
Can interact with KMSGeneration
- trigger and abort FHE key and CRS generation rounds executed by the KMS nodes DAO

Participants (17):

ZamaGovMemberDAO 0x644f…8a1e 0x0321…E62e 0x0f81…4ae6 0x931F…b000 0xc2e5…E709 Safe 0x23Cd…D96b Conduit Multisig 1 Safe EOA 59 EOA 58 Safe 0xE9AA…5BdB 0xD92e…C8AE 0xc493…d008 0x27B1…9045

ZamaGovMemberDAO0x31bB…382C

Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches. Member of ZamaGovMultisigA.

Can interact with ZamaGovMemberDAO
- change multisig plugin settings
- change multisig plugin target execution configuration

13 EOAs

EOA 30 EOA 33 EOA 34 EOA 35 EOA 36 EOA 40 EOA 41 EOA 46 EOA 48 EOA 49 EOA 51 EOA 52 EOA 56

Can interact with ProtocolConfig
- submit KMS key- and CRS-generation responses to KMSGeneration

EOA 310x373E…AE44

Can interact with InputVerifier
- sign encrypted input verification bundles accepted by the InputVerifier

13 EOAs

EOA 32 EOA 37 EOA 38 EOA 39 EOA 42 EOA 43 EOA 44 EOA 45 EOA 47 EOA 50 EOA 53 EOA 54 EOA 55

Can interact with ProtocolConfig
- sign public decryption results accepted by the KMSVerifier and key- and CRS-generation responses accepted by KMSGeneration

2 EOAs

EOA 57 EOA 60

Member of ZamaGovMultisigB.

Can interact with PauserSet
- pause the ACL

2 EOAs

EOA 58 EOA 59

Member of ZamaGovMultisigB, ZamaGovMultisigA.

Can interact with PauserSet
- pause the ACL

Zama Gateway

Actors:

SafeL20x5f0F…e2bE

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. Gateway owner Safe. Its LayerZero governance module is outside the Zama Gateway protocol surface covered here.

Can upgrade with no delay
- MultichainACL
- Decryption
- KMSGeneration
- ProtocolPayment
- InputVerification
- CiphertextCommits
- GatewayConfig
Can interact with Decryption
- unpause Decryption
Can interact with GatewayPauserSet
- add, remove, or swap gateway pausers
Can interact with ProtocolPayment
- set gateway fee prices for input verification, public decryption, and user decryption
Can interact with InputVerification
- unpause InputVerification
Can interact with GatewayConfig
- create KMS contexts that immediately become current, destroy historical KMS contexts, update thresholds of any live context, manage coprocessors, custodians and host chains, transfer ownership, and unpause gateway workflow contracts

Participants (5):

EOA 64 0xf299…fBBE EOA 61 EOA 63 EOA 62

EOA 10x0000…0000

Can upgrade with no delay
- MultichainACL
- Decryption
- KMSGeneration
- ProtocolPayment
- InputVerification
- CiphertextCommits
Can interact with GatewayConfig
- accept GatewayConfig ownership

EOA 20x373E…AE44

Can interact with MultichainACL
- submit public-decryption allowances, account handle allowances, and user-decryption delegation or revocation messages to MultichainACL
Can interact with InputVerification
- sign encrypted input proof verification responses accepted by InputVerification
- submit coprocessor proof verification and rejection responses to InputVerification
Can interact with CiphertextCommits
- submit ciphertext and SNS ciphertext digests to CiphertextCommits
Can interact with GatewayConfig
- sign encrypted input proof verification responses accepted by the gateway
- submit coprocessor responses, ACL mirror updates, and ciphertext material commitments to gateway contracts

EOA 30x0000…0001

Can interact with GatewayConfig
- participate in gateway key custody workflows
- sign gateway key custody material

13 EOAs

EOA 4 EOA 6 EOA 7 EOA 8 EOA 9 EOA 13 EOA 14 EOA 19 EOA 21 EOA 22 EOA 24 EOA 25 EOA 29

Can interact with Decryption
- submit KMS decryption responses to Decryption
Can interact with GatewayConfig
- submit KMS decryption responses to gateway contracts

13 EOAs

EOA 5 EOA 10 EOA 11 EOA 12 EOA 15 EOA 16 EOA 17 EOA 18 EOA 20 EOA 23 EOA 26 EOA 27 EOA 28

Can interact with Decryption
- sign public decryption results and user decryption shares accepted by Decryption
Can interact with GatewayConfig
- sign KMS decryption material accepted by gateway contracts

4 EOAs

EOA 61 EOA 62 EOA 63 EOA 64

Member of SafeL2.

Can interact with GatewayPauserSet
- pause GatewayConfig and pausable gateway workflow contracts

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

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Ethereum

HCULimit0x3b4d…71E2 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Tracks and enforces per-transaction and per-block homomorphic computation unit limits for FHEVM operation requests. v0.3.0 adds pricing for the fheSum and fheIsIn operations.

Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialSteakcUSDCWrapper0x66Bf…C458 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

ERC-20 wrapper that escrows an underlying token and issues confidential balances. It supports encrypted transfers, wrapping, unwrapping, local blocking, optional underlying-token denylist checks, owner-managed observers with wildcard decryption access, and pausing.

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialXAUTWrapper0x73cc…EEf1 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

KMSVerifier0x7762…BB03 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Ethereum host-chain verifier for public decryption results produced through the Zama Gateway Decryption contract. Since v0.3.0 it is a stateless proof checker: KMS signer sets and thresholds are read from the ProtocolConfig contract, and confidential token wrappers accept a decrypted value when it is signed by the threshold of the current or any explicitly selected non-destroyed KMS context.

Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialZAMAWrapper0x80CB…8071 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialBRONWrapper0x85dE…26bc Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialTGBPWrapper0xa873…eDD9 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialUSDTWrapper0xAe02…0c50 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialBbqTGBPWrapper0xBA4c…6762 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ACL0xcA2E…ffb6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Ethereum host-chain access-control registry for encrypted handles, storing handle allowances and delegation state for ciphertext references. Its public-decryption and user-delegation events are mirrored into the Gateway MultichainACL by coprocessor consensus. Since v0.4.0 users can delegate user decryption of their handles across all app contracts at once via a wildcard delegation.

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

InputVerifier0xCe0F…8EA2 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Ethereum host-chain verifier for encrypted input attestations produced by the Zama Gateway InputVerification contract. The FHEVMExecutor calls it before accepting user-provided ciphertext handles.

Roles:
- getCoprocessorSigners: EOA 31
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ProtocolConfig0xD823…a7C4 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Ethereum host-chain registry of KMS node sets, per-context thresholds, and context lifecycle, introduced in the v0.3.0 KMSVerifier upgrade. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders and signers; the four per-context thresholds (public decryption, user decryption, key generation, MPC) can be retuned by the ACL owner for any live context, including the current one. A newly created context becomes current immediately; older contexts remain selectable for public decryption proofs until destroyed.

Roles:
- currentKmsTxSenders: EOA 30, EOA 33, EOA 34, EOA 35, EOA 36, EOA 40, EOA 41, EOA 46, EOA 48, EOA 49, EOA 51, EOA 52, EOA 56
- getKmsSigners: EOA 32, EOA 37, EOA 38, EOA 39, EOA 42, EOA 43, EOA 44, EOA 45, EOA 47, EOA 50, EOA 53, EOA 54, EOA 55
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

FHEVMExecutor0xD823…0e75 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

FHEVM executor that accepts encrypted operation requests, accounts for computation usage, and stores ciphertext handles for operation results. v0.4.0 adds the n-ary encrypted operations fheSum and fheIsIn (encrypted set membership) over bounded ciphertext collections.

Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialWETHWrapper0xda93…4893 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialUSDCWrapper0xe978…72B2 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

ConfidentialTokenWrappersRegistry0xeb50…bBA0 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Registry for Zama confidential token wrappers.

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- owner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

KMSGeneration0xf102…8daa Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Orchestrates FHE key and CRS generation on the Ethereum host chain, taking over the workflows removed from the Gateway KMSGeneration in v0.5.0. The ACL owner triggers and aborts generations; KMS node transaction senders registered in ProtocolConfig submit EIP-712-signed responses that activate a key or CRS once the ProtocolConfig key-generation threshold is reached.

Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

DAO0xB6D6…1Ef3 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Aragon DAO that stores governance state and executes proposal action batches.

Roles:
- daoExecutors: ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- daoRootHolders: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- daoUpgraders: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- multisigSettingsAdmins: DAO, ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- multisigTargetConfigAdmins: DAO, ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

PauserSet0xbBfE…586C

Maintains the pauser account set used in pause-control checks.

Roles:
- lOwner: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- pausers: EOA 57, EOA 58, EOA 59, EOA 60

Staking (Coprocessor)0x7147…6AE8 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Staking contract that escrows ZAMA, issues non-transferable staked voting tokens, and mints protocol rewards to eligible stakers at a configurable reward rate.

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- defaultAdmin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- managerRoleMembers: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

Staking (KMS)0xe9b1…F4Ab Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Staking contract that escrows ZAMA, issues non-transferable staked voting tokens, and mints protocol rewards to eligible stakers at a configurable reward rate.

Roles:
- admin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- defaultAdmin: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB
- managerRoleMembers: DAO; ultimately ZamaGovMultisigA, ZamaGovMultisigB

Can be upgraded by:

ZamaGovMultisigB with no delay ZamaGovMultisigA with no delay

Zama Gateway

MultichainACL0x055d…2468 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Gateway-side ACL mirror that records coprocessor consensus for host-chain public decryption permissions, account handle allowances, and delegated user-decryption access. For Ethereum, it mirrors ACL events emitted by the L1 ACL contract registered in GatewayConfig.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

Decryption0x0f60…8D24 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Gateway contract that orchestrates public and user decryption requests and checks committed ciphertext material. Each request pins a KMS context at request time (explicitly through extraData or the then-current context) and rejects unknown or destroyed contexts; responses must reference the pinned context. Requests recorded before v0.5.0 fall back to the context declared by each response. KMS nodes enforce host-chain ACL state offchain, and Ethereum KMSVerifier verifies public results against this contract’s EIP-712 domain.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayKmsSigners: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 12, EOA 15, EOA 16, EOA 17, EOA 18, EOA 20, EOA 23, EOA 26, EOA 27, EOA 28, EOA 5
- gatewayKmsTxSenders: EOA 13, EOA 14, EOA 19, EOA 21, EOA 22, EOA 24, EOA 25, EOA 29, EOA 4, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

KMSGeneration0x2909…aEe3 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

View-only gateway contract retaining historical queries for previously generated FHE keys and CRS materials. All state-changing key-generation, CRS-generation, PRSS, and key-resharing workflows were removed in v0.5.0 after their move to Ethereum.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

ProtocolPayment0x7E17…7e89 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Gateway fee contract that charges ZAMA fees for encrypted input verification, public decryption, and user decryption requests, then forwards the collected fees to the configured fee burner sender.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

InputVerification0xcB1b…9287 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Gateway contract that receives encrypted input verification requests from registered and enabled host chains, collects coprocessor responses, and emits a threshold-signed attestation once coprocessor consensus is reached. Ethereum InputVerifier verifies attestations against this contract’s EIP-712 domain.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorSigners: EOA 2
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

CiphertextCommits0xd82c…F41F Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Gateway contract that stores ciphertext and SNS ciphertext digests after coprocessor consensus, allowing decryption requests to reference committed ciphertext material. Digests referencing unregistered or disabled host chains are rejected.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- gatewayCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- gatewayOwner: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

GatewayConfig0xDE53…90ab Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Central configuration contract for the Zama Gateway. A KMS context snapshots node transaction senders, signers, and workflow thresholds; the owner can create new contexts, retune the thresholds of any live context, and destroy non-current contexts, which immediately invalidates them for decryption. Registered host chains can be disabled, re-enabled, or removed by the owner.

Roles:
- admin: SafeL2
- getCoprocessorSigners: EOA 2
- getCoprocessorTxSenders: EOA 2
- getCustodianSigners: EOA 3
- getCustodianTxSenders: EOA 3
- getKmsSigners: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 12, EOA 15, EOA 16, EOA 17, EOA 18, EOA 20, EOA 23, EOA 26, EOA 27, EOA 28, EOA 5
- getKmsTxSenders: EOA 13, EOA 14, EOA 19, EOA 21, EOA 22, EOA 24, EOA 25, EOA 29, EOA 4, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9
- owner: SafeL2
- pendingOwner: EOA 1