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Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
R0ar is an Optimistic Rollup utilizing the OP Stack focusing on DeFi.
R0ar is an Optimistic Rollup utilizing the OP Stack focusing on DeFi.
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.
Currently the system permits invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. More details in project overview.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree..
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (0x192668f6b57DeB9D46e6DE87caD7065a052fe1b4) | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismPortal (0x2c6AF306F8D0Cd6d9E76D43b2DC9a4E60a7f446e) | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (0x465833609d9ff2Cb9A070b0d71b700F318C97293) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (0x5b0e75a52862881b4077C865B244CC17cD2b531b) | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AddressManager (0x66e58c9D0b42110E956F54aA850C0d629f4B56C5) | |
| +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1StandardBridge (0x683ca289a8418Cb090E42929A73a263d7b81DfC2) | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SystemConfig (0x689db31D7C367ed2c264994c0838a82EdD6Bc9AA) | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (0x73bD898CD5b1dE0Ad1ED5Bf51aaEb52129F697d8) | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (0x82e66E285aeAd8C06D8b5d6f2a46fd6fAb9097e6) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (0x9bB00Bc6388Ec810d79cD0e8D5C33edFD4Fd1fa8) | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L2OutputOracle (0xb7850CFa577332EB839840e1411962AC3Dd2f183) | |
| +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (0xC5D5B6fCD5FdBdA41Ae640aC9881dC949aEd36d0) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (0xe7C8a3Dd5A03E01e92bD019bBd89bd67aCeC036F) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (0xF014d8028A7028352baD6226A4894Ae596e2846c) | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (0xF24e68552ED9F4024E1cEBa8ECB8715F62Bb9259) | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract GnosisSafe (0xf758e2272FCe1330d8a1De38D5128A47B4041752) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract FaultDisputeGame (0xFED2F84E3e18e24EE6aa5f375edBA79782FDA6D2) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. | |
Standard op chain.
Standard op chain.
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (0x192668f6b57DeB9D46e6DE87caD7065a052fe1b4) | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismPortal (0x2c6AF306F8D0Cd6d9E76D43b2DC9a4E60a7f446e) | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (0x465833609d9ff2Cb9A070b0d71b700F318C97293) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (0x5b0e75a52862881b4077C865B244CC17cD2b531b) | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AddressManager (0x66e58c9D0b42110E956F54aA850C0d629f4B56C5) | |
| +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1StandardBridge (0x683ca289a8418Cb090E42929A73a263d7b81DfC2) | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SystemConfig (0x689db31D7C367ed2c264994c0838a82EdD6Bc9AA) | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (0x73bD898CD5b1dE0Ad1ED5Bf51aaEb52129F697d8) | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintablERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (0x82e66E285aeAd8C06D8b5d6f2a46fd6fAb9097e6) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (0x8E2dF5BfA8F8840C588662eE2D1b727b3982CdCA) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (0x9bB00Bc6388Ec810d79cD0e8D5C33edFD4Fd1fa8) | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L2OutputOracle (0xb7850CFa577332EB839840e1411962AC3Dd2f183) | |
| +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (0xC5D5B6fCD5FdBdA41Ae640aC9881dC949aEd36d0) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (0xe7C8a3Dd5A03E01e92bD019bBd89bd67aCeC036F) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (0xF014d8028A7028352baD6226A4894Ae596e2846c) | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (0xF24e68552ED9F4024E1cEBa8ECB8715F62Bb9259) | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract GnosisSafe (0xf758e2272FCe1330d8a1De38D5128A47B4041752) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract FaultDisputeGame (0xFED2F84E3e18e24EE6aa5f375edBA79782FDA6D2) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. | |
The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of 7d to complete.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

Member of GnosisSafe.


The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals.

Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.
Contains a list of proposed state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. which Proposers assert to be a result of blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. execution. Currently only the PROPOSERIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. address can submit new state roots.
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.
Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.
Logic of the dispute game. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).