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A system shutdown was triggered on 2025-06-27. This irreversible action freezes the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. state and allows users to withdraw their funds with the help of the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades.. Degate announced that they will withdraw all funds automatically. If the operator does not cooperate, a withdrawal mode can still be activated, allowing users to withdraw their funds on their own by providing merkle proofsHashing the pairs of values at each level and climbing up the (Merkle) Tree until you obtain the root hash. Merkle proofs help check if the data belongs to a set without having to store the entire set..
DeGate is a ZK Rollup enabling a decentralized order book exchange. DeGate smart contracts are forked from Loopring V3.
DeGate is a ZK Rollup enabling a decentralized order book exchange. DeGate smart contracts are forked from Loopring V3.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Shutdown mode activated
2025 Jun 26th
Shutdown mode prevents further state updates and allows users to withdraw their funds.
DeGate Mainnet Beta Redeploy
2023 Nov 13th
DeGate redeploys Mainnet Beta due to a bug, with the ability to upgrade the smart contracts.
Users can force the sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. with a 0.01 ETH fee. If the sequencer is down for more than 15d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. The sequencer can censor individual deposits, but in such case after 15d users can get their funds back.
SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setupGeneration of a piece of data that must then be used for some cryptographic protocol to run. Generating this data requires some secret information. The "trust" comes from the fact the secret must be destroyed after the ceremony, otherwise cryptographic properties of the protocol could be broken. Once the data is generated, and the secrets are forgotten, no further participation from the creators of the ceremony is required. There are two types of trusted setups for SNARKs: (i) trusted setup per circuit where it is generated from scratch for each circuit, (ii) trusted universal setup per proving system where it can be used for several circuits..
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
Users have 1mo to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 1mo 15d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 15d to be processed.
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.
Rollup operators cannot compromise the system, but being application-specific might bring additional risk.
Degate provides an orderbook decentralized exchange for spot trading. Arbitrary contracts are not supported.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published onchain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.
No compression is used.
The system does not begin with a genesis state; instead, it initiates from a zero state, as referenced in CreateEmptyState.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.
Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. requires a circuitA program written for the purpose of being proven within a proving system. A circuit is a mathematical representation of the computation to be executed, arithmetic circuits and zkVM execution trace are examples of circuits. Circuits can be written in different languages, ranging from low-level to high-level. specific trusted setupGeneration of a piece of data that must then be used for some cryptographic protocol to run. Generating this data requires some secret information. The "trust" comes from the fact the secret must be destroyed after the ceremony, otherwise cryptographic properties of the protocol could be broken. Once the data is generated, and the secrets are forgotten, no further participation from the creators of the ceremony is required. There are two types of trusted setups for SNARKs: (i) trusted setup per circuit where it is generated from scratch for each circuit, (ii) trusted universal setup per proving system where it can be used for several circuits., so they run their own ceremony. The first phase is run using Powers of Tau ceremony. Some of the instructions on how to regenerate the verification keys can be found here.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeWithdrawals (eth:0x00e6E9b711E53149D49D43d0EC16Bf18a1EDC569) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeAdmins (eth:0x0a5d144ADF62e18eE222f2D05a2Bf2037ce8EeAe) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeAdmins (eth:0x1fCA54B4Bd42Db7afd1b23Bc8A823Afc11701533) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeTokens (eth:0x2Bf7021a3Aa041e1a8a5082DB720d0202C70A3aE) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeBlocks (eth:0x4AD92EE2019A6A26c9E38caEDd46503BD7f79C10) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeGenesis (eth:0x57f2BAa929EcE41D8B6FDc4c7f7b60B95522AbcB) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeGenesis (eth:0x5e7858588C52E42c08a933d5C85A8e9c9A040B9e) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeTokens (eth:0x8c43b69036C1B21378DfC5660d6B8785B2bfF58A) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeBalances (eth:0x9Cc1BC87D0A767153FbfE9EfFa40825345e933B5) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeWithdrawals (eth:0x9FB27470d766A29Ac126CF99eE103087a4072e33) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeBlocks (eth:0xf614aeCEf0209Fb1A2751c6A5cddE4BD7853F396) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeBalances (eth:0xF799e5CEF24528b9409502E99f5837ee3446D11d) | |
| +++ description: None | |
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract TimeLock1 (0x0D2eC0a5858730E7D49f5B4aE6f2C665e46c1d9d) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Multisig2 (0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DefaultDepositContract (0x54D7aE423Edb07282645e740C046B9373970a168) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Multisig1 (0x7B0d44D5b2eF3A8B168FAfdcc321FAb0D9d5d08C) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract LoopringV3 (0x9385aCd9d78dFE854c543294770d0C94c2B07EDC) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract LoopringIOExchangeOwner (0x9b93e47b7F61ad1358Bd47Cd01206708E85AE5eD) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ExchangeV3 (0x9C07A72177c5A05410cA338823e790876E79D73B) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract BlockVerifier (0xE3B7fE3ce0fa54C5AC7F48E7ED9E52dA045bE4d6) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract TimeLock2 (0xf2991507952d9594E71A44A54fb19f3109D213A5) | |
| +++ description: None | |
exchange shutdown, added headerwarn and milestone: A system shutdown was triggered on 2025-06-27. This irreversible action freezes the L2 state and allows users to withdraw their funds with the help of the operator. Degate announced that they will withdraw all funds automatically. If the operator does not cooperate, a withdrawal mode can still be activated, allowing users to withdraw their funds on their own by providing merkle proofs.
exchange shutdown, added headerwarn and milestone:
A system shutdown was triggered on 2025-06-27. This irreversible action freezes the L2 state and allows users to withdraw their funds with the help of the operator. Degate announced that they will withdraw all funds automatically. If the operator does not cooperate, a withdrawal mode can still be activated, allowing users to withdraw their funds on their own by providing merkle proofs.
| contract ExchangeV3 (0x9C07A72177c5A05410cA338823e790876E79D73B) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.isShutdown: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| values.shutdownTriggered.0: | |
| + | 1750935659 |
| } | |
The owner has accepted the ownership of the contract, which is now the same multisig used for upgrades. The EOA that was there before is now only the owner of the BlockVerifier, but it has no power since all the methods with the onlyOwner modifier have been deleted from Loopring's original codebase.
The owner has accepted the ownership of the contract, which is now the same multisig used for upgrades. The EOA that was there before is now only the owner of the BlockVerifier, but it has no power since all the methods with the onlyOwner modifier have been deleted from Loopring’s original codebase.
| contract DefaultDepositContract (0x54D7aE423Edb07282645e740C046B9373970a168) { | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "0xacD3A62F3eED1BfE4fF0eC8240d645c1F5477F82" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| + | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| } | |
| contract LoopringV3 (0x9385aCd9d78dFE854c543294770d0C94c2B07EDC) { | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "0xacD3A62F3eED1BfE4fF0eC8240d645c1F5477F82" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| + | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| } | |
| contract LoopringIOExchangeOwner (0x9b93e47b7F61ad1358Bd47Cd01206708E85AE5eD) { | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "0xacD3A62F3eED1BfE4fF0eC8240d645c1F5477F82" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| + | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| } | |
Owner is being changed. They are using Claimable instead of Ownable, which is the same thing but the new pending owner has to accept the ownership.
Owner is being changed. They are using Claimable instead of Ownable, which is the same thing but the new pending owner has to accept the ownership.
| contract DefaultDepositContract (0x54D7aE423Edb07282645e740C046B9373970a168) { | |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| } | |
| contract LoopringV3 (0x9385aCd9d78dFE854c543294770d0C94c2B07EDC) { | |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| } | |
| contract LoopringIOExchangeOwner (0x9b93e47b7F61ad1358Bd47Cd01206708E85AE5eD) { | |
| values.pendingOwner: | |
| - | "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "0x2028834B2c0A36A918c10937EeA71BE4f932da52" |
| } | |
The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds.
If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
If the 15d deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into Withdrawal Mode, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. transaction.

This address is the owner of the BlockVerifier contract.
Actors who can submit new blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., updating the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. state on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
Actor allowed to upgrade the ExchangeV3 and DefaultDepositContract contracts. This address is the owner of the following contracts: LoopringIOExchangeOwner, LoopringV3, DefaultDepositContract. Can add or remove blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. submitters. Can change the forced withdrawal fee up to 0.25 ETH. Can change a way that balance is calculated per contract during the deposit, allowing the support of non-standard tokens.


Main ExchangeV3 contract.
Contract used by the ProverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. to submit exchange blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. with zkSNARK proofs that are later processed and verified by the BlockVerifier contract.
ERC 20 token basic deposit contract. Handles user deposits and withdrawals.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Contract for setting exchange fee parameters.
zkSNARK VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. based on ethsnarks library.
This timelock contract is set as the proxyOwner of the ExchangeV3 contract. There is a 1mo 15d time delayIn regards to upgradeability, a predefined amount of time that must elapse before the rollup smart contracts or parameters are updated. This protects users from malicious upgrades by giving them time to exit the rollup before upgrades come into effect. Note that time delays only make sense if users' exits cannot be censored. for upgrading the contract.
This timelock contract is set as the proxyOwner of the DefaultDepositContract contract. There is a 1mo 15d time delayIn regards to upgradeability, a predefined amount of time that must elapse before the rollup smart contracts or parameters are updated. This protects users from malicious upgrades by giving them time to exit the rollup before upgrades come into effect. Note that time delays only make sense if users' exits cannot be censored. for upgrading the contract.