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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

Soon Alpha Mainnet logo
Soon Alpha Mainnet

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About

SOON is a Layer 2 chain built on top of the SOON Stack. It innovates with a Decoupled SVM that separates Solana's execution (needed for the SOON SVM) from its consensus (not needed since SOON settles on Ethereum), yielding performance and flexibility...

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $390.60 K1.01%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.080.12%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    SOON is a Layer 2 chain built on top of the SOON Stack. It innovates with a Decoupled SVM that separates Solana's execution (needed for the SOON SVM) from its consensus (not needed since SOON settles on Ethereum), yielding performance and flexibility...

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Past Day UOPS
    0.080.12%
    Past Day Ops count
    7.17 K
    Total Ops
    10.61 M
    since 2025 Jan 03
    Max. UOPS
    6.82
    2025 May 28
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    1.00
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Total cost
    $2.00 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.000620
    Avg cost per day
    $5.47
    Data posted

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereumEthereumEigenDAEigenDA.

    Data source: API provided by EigenLayer

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Data posted
    1.77 GiB
    Avg size per day
    5.53 MiB
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    642.84 B
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2026 Jul 20 — Aug 19

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    17 hours
    Avg. state updates interval
    4 days
    Past 30 days anomalies
    100% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 1mo 9d (from 2026 Jul 11, 06:43 UTC ). These typically occur every 43m 15s on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 16d 13h (from 2026 May 11, 12:52 UTC until 2026 May 28, 02:44 UTC). These typically occur every 43m 15s on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 15d 9h (from 2026 Mar 24, 05:09 UTC until 2026 Apr 08, 14:56 UTC). These typically occur every 43m 15s on average.

    Risk summary
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL),
    2. the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be frozen if

    1. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    None

    Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the ServiceManager DA bridge data roots onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage
    Soon Alpha Mainnet
    Soon Alpha Mainnet is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    Data is posted to EigenDA

    Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. Since the ServiceManager bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    1. EigenDA Docs - Overview
    2. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    3. BatchInbox - address
    4. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: EigenDA logoEigenDA
    State validation
    No state validation

    OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.

    • Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function
    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    9
    Last upgrade
    21d 11h ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    6mo 2d
    Updates
    2026 July 30, 22:22 UTC
    High severity
    54changes

    State validation reverted from the Kailua ZK fault proof system to the permissioned L2OutputOracle: the OptimismPortal implementation was replaced and now reads state roots from the L2OutputOracle instead of the DisputeGameFactory. Only the permissioned proposer can submit state roots and rotate its own address. The SoonMultisig (challenger) can delete proposed outputs, change the 3-day finalization period and the submission interval, and rotate the challenger address. DisputeGameFactory, KailuaGame, KailuaTreasury, FaultDisputeGame, PermissionedDisputeGame and RiscZeroVerifier are no longer referenced. - OptimismPortal 3.11.0-beta.2 - 2.8.1-beta.1 (SOON fork): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6/eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA Batcher rotated. The last batch was posted to the batch inbox on 2026-07-11 and the new batcher has not posted since.

    State validation reverted from the Kailua ZK fault proof system to the permissioned L2OutputOracle: the OptimismPortal implementation was replaced and now reads state roots from the L2OutputOracle instead of the DisputeGameFactory. Only the permissioned proposer can submit state roots and rotate its own address. The SoonMultisig (challenger) can delete proposed outputs, change the 3-day finalization period and the submission interval, and rotate the challenger address. DisputeGameFactory, KailuaGame, KailuaTreasury, FaultDisputeGame, PermissionedDisputeGame and RiscZeroVerifier are no longer referenced.

    • OptimismPortal 3.11.0-beta.2 -> 2.8.1-beta.1 (SOON fork): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6/eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA

    Batcher rotated. The last batch was posted to the batch inbox on 2026-07-11 and the new batcher has not posted since.

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x1E69C2522Dc139c9fC74E6ecb89373d435E70Dd8) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0xae0Fbdd7CEC6036F3364000eE6d2a60BdAbb10c6"
    + "eth:0x267576444F8504B23B98F2b3C0e31bB32eB6Eb7a"
    values.sequencerInbox:
    - "eth:0xfF000000000000000000000000000000000000FF"
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.sequencerPubkeyInfos.1:
    + [6544083,"0xa8caa55df61160c0561d0e762b4d460df8c9e44578963e04741132e6a9044f10"]
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract RiscZeroVerifier (eth:0x455218fa82e96A6adCcf182EE8A90A93BE7a6Bc6) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x57d53F9715A0A8bEBDFf74b72eCE85950CcfD087) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    contract OptimismPortal (eth:0x5A0702C7EbbEC83802b35DB737FCcDc5fc6c5E07) [opstack/OptimismPortal_soon] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This version (originally from SOON) of the OptimismPortal is modified to support Solana addresses. It disallows ERC20 token deposits and L1->L2 transactions that would create a contract. Withdrawals can be frozen / blacklisted by a permissioned actor. Has a MIN_BRIDGE_VALUE set to 0.001 ETH.
    name:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    + "OptimismPortal"
    template:
    - "opstack/OptimismPortal2_soon"
    + "opstack/OptimismPortal_soon"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x020cd1f3781cbab14e8093d3fa6bc9d2b4079839f36be9eb7adaf2a099f4f41e"
    + "0xd8927de1b0bb795177ecf745c74d3cdfcb0990dbaafe9c16803b5fddac9de99d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6"
    + "eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-07-29T02:34:11.000Z","0xe885648ef6a4a0df9bb07233d1cd890015d0c00cdd713e388eadd58fd149803c",["eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 5
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    - "eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2"
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    - 864000
    values.paused:
    - true
    + false
    values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
    - 864000
    values.RespectedGameString:
    - "KailuaGame"
    values.respectedGameType:
    - 2000
    values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt:
    - 1765180799
    values.version:
    - "3.11.0-beta.2"
    + "2.8.1-beta.1"
    values.l2Oracle:
    + "eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448"
    fieldMeta.respectedGameType:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.paused:
    - {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused."}
    implementationNames.eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA:
    + "OptimismPortal"
    usedTypes.1:
    - {"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"FaultDisputeGame","1":"PermissionedDisputeGame","2000":"KailuaGame"}}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract KailuaGame (eth:0x62CFb085Ce639a7C3896E51548378cFE5829Bd32) [risc0/KailuaGame]
    +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 2000. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x7d34832fc0cc6ed718a993CAAb4c6CAdaE9763A2) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    values.paused:
    - true
    + false
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.5:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2","role":"admin"}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0xAa17a7021054a984199a5bC40538f3DD6d04d36e) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xbB138cE37870443d5b2B02a36619D3478738E0f6) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    values.paused:
    - true
    + false
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory]
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xD02631b334FfDCD5674217e57fe524c44B341DD4) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
    values.paused:
    - true
    + false
    }
    contract SoonMultisig (eth:0xD686D498a67Bb96FAa4afA3b2b1Cf182f5c3A701) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","description":"Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.","role":".challenger"}
    receivedPermissions.1:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","description":"Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.","role":".CHALLENGER"}
    receivedPermissions.2:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","description":"change the finalization period (challenge period).","role":".challenger"}
    receivedPermissions.5:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d"}]}
    receivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d"}]}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xd6E6c8bd7A86C2ba6e846D8ae2f9cC013c533beb) [risc0/KailuaTreasury_soon]
    +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.01 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory.
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xe822c3d76ac133f7d9f12c39c1BF28a797624AA9) [opstack/L1StandardBridge_soon] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ETH from host chain to this chain. This version (originally from SOON) is modified to support Solana addresses. It requires specifying the destination SOL address and removes support for ERC20 tokens.
    values.paused:
    - true
    + false
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448) [opstack/L2OutputOracle_soon]
    +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
    2026 July 14, 15:59 UTC
    High severity
    29changes

    SOON paused on 2026-07-12; reason unknown. Guardian EOA rotated ( 0x7fFB…1593 → 0xcb17…B911 ), the new guardian was also added to SoonMultisig (member[3]), then it called pause on the SuperchainConfigFake — OptimismPortal2, L1CrossDomainMessenger, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge all read paused: true through it. OptimismPortal2 impl upgraded (tx); disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds and proofMaturityDelaySeconds extended 8h → 10d. SystemConfig opStackDA.isUsingEigenDA set to false (was "v3" ) — EigenDA disabled.

    SOON paused on 2026-07-12; reason unknown. Guardian EOA rotated (0x7fFB…1593 → 0xcb17…B911), the new guardian was also added to SoonMultisig (member[3]), then it called pause on the SuperchainConfigFake — OptimismPortal2, L1CrossDomainMessenger, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge all read paused: true through it. OptimismPortal2 impl upgraded (tx); disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds and proofMaturityDelaySeconds extended 8h → 10d. SystemConfig opStackDA.isUsingEigenDA set to false (was "v3") — EigenDA disabled.

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x1E69C2522Dc139c9fC74E6ecb89373d435E70Dd8) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.opStackDA.isUsingEigenDA:
    - "v3"
    + false
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x5A0702C7EbbEC83802b35DB737FCcDc5fc6c5E07) [opstack/OptimismPortal2_soon] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This version (originally from SOON) of the OptimismPortal is modified to support Solana addresses. It disallows ERC20 token deposits and L1->L2 transactions that would create a contract. Withdrawals can be frozen / blacklisted by a permissioned actor. Has a MIN_BRIDGE_VALUE set to 0.001 ETH.
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x29174FC953F163452093aFa9eE3904168C74b2E7"
    + "eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-07-12T16:28:23.000Z","0xa4ccaddf2ef0b79355fce160a4241d1b637cb32d6a1b6b7c12eea57f32577f0c",["eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    - 28800
    + 864000
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0x7fFB604c57FAFbAeaE6587DF035a0DB032301593"
    + "eth:0xcb17B5F3Cf75eb40F0Addf97B0D457922f10B911"
    +++ description: Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.paused:
    - false
    + true
    values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
    - 28800
    + 864000
    implementationNames.eth:0x29174FC953F163452093aFa9eE3904168C74b2E7:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xcd87F6B5B03A73733ab5A9cbB56951600f3330A6:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x7d34832fc0cc6ed718a993CAAb4c6CAdaE9763A2) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    values.paused:
    - false
    + true
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xbB138cE37870443d5b2B02a36619D3478738E0f6) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    values.paused:
    - false
    + true
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xD02631b334FfDCD5674217e57fe524c44B341DD4) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0x7fFB604c57FAFbAeaE6587DF035a0DB032301593"
    + "eth:0xcb17B5F3Cf75eb40F0Addf97B0D457922f10B911"
    values.paused:
    - false
    + true
    }
    contract SoonMultisig (eth:0xD686D498a67Bb96FAa4afA3b2b1Cf182f5c3A701) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "eth:0x7b4d0e4d7C961CF967e88f600399d610736DeE51"
    + "eth:0xcb17B5F3Cf75eb40F0Addf97B0D457922f10B911"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xe822c3d76ac133f7d9f12c39c1BF28a797624AA9) [opstack/L1StandardBridge_soon] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ETH from host chain to this chain. This version (originally from SOON) is modified to support Solana addresses. It requires specifying the destination SOL address and removes support for ERC20 tokens.
    values.paused:
    - false
    + true
    }
    2025 December 12, 15:40 UTC
    High severity
    39changes

    OptimismPortal replaced with OptimismPortal2 using dispute games. Significant change compared to standard OptimismPortal2 is the possibility for a Guardian to freeze withdrawals with updateWithdrawalFrozenState().

    OptimismPortal replaced with OptimismPortal2 using dispute games. Significant change compared to standard OptimismPortal2 is the possibility for a Guardian to freeze withdrawals with updateWithdrawalFrozenState().

    - Status: DELETED
    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448)
    +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x5A0702C7EbbEC83802b35DB737FCcDc5fc6c5E07) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This version (originally from SOON) of the OptimismPortal is modified to support Solana addresses. It disallows ERC20 token deposits and L1->L2 transactions that would create a contract. Withdrawals can be frozen / blacklisted by a permissioned actor. Has a MIN_BRIDGE_VALUE set to 0.001 ETH.
    name:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    template:
    - "opstack/OptimismPortal_soon"
    + "opstack/OptimismPortal2_soon"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x8970317120da471aba019c65d0f23fec669b03ba35e9eceec59a50a85bb53201"
    + "0x110afdef90725a52a9718b18c76ee94eedc98dbaa26f8818c43489caa0c4096d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA"
    + "eth:0x29174FC953F163452093aFa9eE3904168C74b2E7"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2025-12-08T07:12:35.000Z","0xd73f4c3b5fed189876a719ed9a80e649b30e2eabba32d6e642deab3bc7f1e149",["eth:0x29174FC953F163452093aFa9eE3904168C74b2E7"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 3
    values.l2Oracle:
    - "eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448"
    values.version:
    - "2.8.1-beta.1"
    + "3.11.0-beta.2"
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    + "eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2"
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    + 28800
    values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
    + 28800
    values.RespectedGameString:
    + "KailuaGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    + 2000
    values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt:
    + 1765180799
    fieldMeta.respectedGameType:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.paused:
    + {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused."}
    implementationNames.eth:0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    implementationNames.eth:0x29174FC953F163452093aFa9eE3904168C74b2E7:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    usedTypes.1:
    + {"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"FaultDisputeGame","1":"PermissionedDisputeGame","2000":"KailuaGame"}}
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d) {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.5:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract SoonMultisig (eth:0xD686D498a67Bb96FAa4afA3b2b1Cf182f5c3A701) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    - {"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":".challenger"}
    receivedPermissions.1:
    - {"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":".CHALLENGER"}
    receivedPermissions.2:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","description":"change the finalization period (challenge period).","role":".challenger"}
    receivedPermissions.5:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d"}]}
    receivedPermissions.6:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d"}]}
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifier (eth:0x455218fa82e96A6adCcf182EE8A90A93BE7a6Bc6)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x57d53F9715A0A8bEBDFf74b72eCE85950CcfD087)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaGame (eth:0x62CFb085Ce639a7C3896E51548378cFE5829Bd32)
    +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 2000. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0xAa17a7021054a984199a5bC40538f3DD6d04d36e)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xcf0f094b6765eD31038003831F7f75bD07Bd49c2)
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xd6E6c8bd7A86C2ba6e846D8ae2f9cC013c533beb)
    +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.01 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory.
    2025 July 14, 12:46 UTC
    10changes

    Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

    Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

    New and verified contracts

    + Status: CREATED
    contract L2OutputOracle (0x017A4D5A1F670F5a9dfEBD0F0cB25C2C44a82448)
    +++ description: Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SystemConfig (0x1E69C2522Dc139c9fC74E6ecb89373d435E70Dd8)
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OptimismPortal (0x5A0702C7EbbEC83802b35DB737FCcDc5fc6c5E07)
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This version (originally from SOON) of the OptimismPortal is modified to support Solana addresses. It disallows ERC20 token deposits and L1->L2 transactions that would create a contract. Withdrawals can be frozen / blacklisted by a permissioned actor. Has a MIN_BRIDGE_VALUE set to 0.001 ETH.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (0x7d34832fc0cc6ed718a993CAAb4c6CAdaE9763A2)
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (0x90b2Da5f99C0ca658067D621E3694C2Ec49C233d)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AddressManager (0xA131FB9Ac1D86651Cf863baaE9190A787Aef56dd)
    +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (0xbB138cE37870443d5b2B02a36619D3478738E0f6)
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SuperchainConfig (0xD02631b334FfDCD5674217e57fe524c44B341DD4)
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SoonMultisig (0xD686D498a67Bb96FAa4afA3b2b1Cf182f5c3A701)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1StandardBridge (0xe822c3d76ac133f7d9f12c39c1BF28a797624AA9)
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ETH from host chain to this chain. This version (originally from SOON) is modified to support Solana addresses. It requires specifying the destination SOL address and removes support for ERC20 tokens.
    2025 May 30, 05:44 UTC
    4changes

    signer change.

    signer change.

    contract SoonMultisig (0xD686D498a67Bb96FAa4afA3b2b1Cf182f5c3A701) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "0x939cd11e4fCeAA2De82eEf7E4aC918Bf556D676B"
    + "0x7b4d0e4d7C961CF967e88f600399d610736DeE51"
    values.$members.2:
    - "0x7b4d0e4d7C961CF967e88f600399d610736DeE51"
    + "0x7b12Dc6d2b7F13d1283E9CCe9eC818C09CB02432"
    }
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address
    2. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular messaging

    The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 3d to complete.

    • Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

    1. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function
    3. L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    Solana Virtual Machine is supported

    OP stack chains are usually pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. But Soon implements the rust-based Solana virtual machine (SVM) which uses parallel processing.

    1. Soon Docs - Decoupled SVM
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    SoonMultisig0xD686…A701

    A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • L2OutputOracle
      • SystemConfig
      • OptimismPortal
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • SuperchainConfig
      • L1StandardBridge
    • Can interact with L2OutputOracle
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings

    Participants (4):

    0xd1bc…9BB80x7b12…24320x6437…0643EOA 1
    EOA 10xcb17…B911

    Member of SoonMultisig.

    • Can interact with OptimismPortal
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
      • freeze specific withdrawals
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
    EOA 20xF563…513b
    • Can interact with L2OutputOracle
      • Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 30x2675…Eb7a
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    L2OutputOracle0x017A…2448Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
      • challenger: SoonMultisig
      • proposer: EOA 2
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    SystemConfig0x1E69…0Dd8Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
      • batcherHash: EOA 3
      • owner: SoonMultisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    OptimismPortal
    Escrow
    0x5A07…5E07Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This version (originally from SOON) of the OptimismPortal is modified to support Solana addresses. It disallows ERC20 token deposits and L1->L2 transactions that would create a contract. Withdrawals can be frozen / blacklisted by a permissioned actor. Has a MIN_BRIDGE_VALUE set to 0.001 ETH.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
      • guardian: EOA 1
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    SuperchainConfig0xD026…1DD4Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
      • guardian: EOA 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    L1ERC721Bridge0x7d34…63A2Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0xbB13…E0f6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0xe822…4AA9Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ETH from host chain to this chain. This version (originally from SOON) is modified to support Solana addresses. It requires specifying the destination SOL address and removes support for ERC20 tokens.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SoonMultisig

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    SoonMultisig with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0x90b2…233d
    • Roles:
      • owner: SoonMultisig

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).