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Layer 2s
SummaryRisksValueActivityLivenessCostsArchivedCompare

Summary

Value SecuredView details
Details
$0.00

— / 1 year

0.00 UOPS
Value SecuredView details
Details
$0.00

— / 1 year

Proof System

Rollups are L2s that periodically post state commitments to Ethereum. These commitments are validated by either Validity Proofs or are accepted optimistically and can be challenged via Fraud Proof mechanism within a certain fraud proof window. Additionally L2 data is also posted to Ethereum, hence there are no additional trust assumptions introduced.

Risks
1
Mantle logo
Mantle
Mantle
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Self sequence
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Cannot withdraw
ValidityThis project is based on OP Stack's code base.
SP1 Hypercube
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$1.24 B4.34%
49.2% with additional trust assumptions
1.91935%
2
Lighter logo
Lighter
Exchange
Lighter
Exchange
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Force via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Use escape hatch
Validity
Lighter
Stage 0
Appchain
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$1.04 B0.31%
0.00% with additional trust assumptions
1.88 K7.83%
3
Starknet logo
Starknet
Starknet
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Log via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 7d
Proposer Failure
Security Council minority
ValidityThis project is based on Starknet's code base.
Stwo
Stage 1
Limited training wheels
The project does not pass the walkaway test: users are not able to exit in the presence of malicious operators if the Security Council disappears.
Items missing for Stage 2
  • Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
  • The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$353.11 M4.96%
27.3% with additional trust assumptions
1.1532.1%
4
Linea logo
Linea
Linea
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
No mechanism
State Validation
Validity proofs (SN)
Data Availability
Onchain
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Cannot withdraw
Validity
Linea
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$327.56 M2.07%
64.5% with additional trust assumptions
0.1787.5%
5
ZKsync Era logo
ZKsync Era
ZKsync Era
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 5d
Proposer Failure
Replace proposer
ValidityThis project is based on ZK Stack's code base.
Boojum
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.

    While the Security Council is properly set up and is able to recover from a misbehaving operator, the majority is required, meaning that a compromised quorum-blocking minority can prevent users from exiting. Recovery actions are not straightforward and require complex protocol upgrades.

Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$232.01 M9.18%
5.18% with additional trust assumptions
0.169.53%
6
Katana logo
Katana
Katana
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Self sequence
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Cannot withdraw
ValidityThis project is based on the Agglayer CDK code base.This project is based on OP Stack's code base.
SP1 Turbo
Stage 0
Full training wheels
The requirement for available node software is under review
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$44.62 M8.54%
48.4% with additional trust assumptions
0.668.65%
7
Scroll logo
Scroll
Scroll
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Self sequence
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Self propose
Validity
OpenVM
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$37.18 M2.73%
6.72% with additional trust assumptions
0.196.48%
8
Abstract logo
Abstract
Abstract
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 5d
Proposer Failure
Replace proposer
ValidityThis project is based on ZK Stack's code base.
Boojum
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.

    While the Security Council is properly set up and is able to recover from a misbehaving operator, the majority is required, meaning that a compromised quorum-blocking minority can prevent users from exiting. Recovery actions are not straightforward and require complex protocol upgrades.

Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$18.04 M9.51%
35.1% with additional trust assumptions
0.553.87%
9
ADI Chain logo
ADI Chain
ADI Chain
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs (ST, SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
Emergency: None
Regular: 3d
Proposer Failure
Cannot withdraw
ValidityThis project is based on ZK Stack's code base.
Airbender
Stage 0
Full training wheels
The requirement for available node software is under review
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$11.78 M1.12%
49.5% with additional trust assumptions
0.159.65%
10
Taiko Alethia logo
Taiko Alethia
Taiko Alethia
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Enqueue via L1
State Validation
Validity proofs
Data Availability
Onchain
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Cannot withdraw
ValidityThis project is based on Taiko's code base.
SP1 Hypercube / RISC Zero
Stage 0
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$10.81 M10.0%
2.00% with additional trust assumptions
0.510.63%
11
INTMAX logo
INTMAX
Payments
INTMAX
Payments
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Self sequence
State Validation
Validity proofs (SN)
Data Availability
Self custodied
Exit Window
None
Proposer Failure
Self propose
Validity
INTMAX
Stage 0
Appchain
Full training wheels
Items missing for Stage 1
  • Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
$120 K2.33%
0.00% with additional trust assumptions
No data
12
Aztec Network v6 logo
Aztec v6
Aztec v6
Risk analysis
Sequencer Failure
Decentralized Sequencer Set
State Validation
Validity proofs (SN)
Data Availability
Onchain (SD)
Exit Window
∞
Proposer Failure
Self Propose
Validity
Barretenberg
Stage 2
No training wheels
The project passes the walkaway test: users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even if the Security Council disappears.
Please mind, stages do not reflect project security
<$1K295%
0.00% with additional trust assumptions
No data