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Sequencing
Rotating block production across independent operators improves real-time censorship resistance, while deterministic host-chain inclusion provides eventual censorship resistance. No system shown here combines both guarantees today.
Decentralized Sequencing
Columns
Columns
# | name | Set
size | Block production
access | Min. stake /
entry rate | Block
time | Block
production | Proposer / committee
rotation | Deterministic
CR | Additional
CR | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 |  | 12 seconds | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 |  | 3237 sequencers 586.92 M AZTEC | Open | No | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3 |  | Open | 5s | No | Shutter encrypted mempool beta | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4 |  | 105 validators 3.56 B POL | 2s | No | No | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Inclusion delay by censorship fraction
T99 inclusion delay in a static sequencer set by censoring fraction of sequencer/validator stake
Points mark the largest attributed entities' cumulative stakes. A line stopping before the 50% limit indicates that any more censorship will prevent inclusion completely. This is usually due to the sequencer network's consensus mechanism stopping block production at that threshold.
Centralized sequencing
Inclusion columns show how a user bypasses censorship by the centralized operator while the chain is live. Exit covers the worst case where state proposers stop. Delays assume Ethereum includes the required L1 transactions.
Columns
Columns
# | name | Trusted
preconfirmation | Trusted
ordering | Sequencer | RT
CR | Forced
inclusion | Inclusion
delay | Inclusion
mechanics | Exit
delay | Exit
economics | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 |  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 |  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3 |  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4 |  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
A system combining decentralized sequencing for real-time censorship resistance with deterministic L1 inclusion for eventual censorship resistance would provide the strongest overall protection. No live system shown here offers that combination yet.