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Boba Network
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About
Boba is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup built by the Enya team as core contributors to the Boba Foundation.
Badges
About
Boba is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup built by the Enya team as core contributors to the Boba Foundation.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 1h 59m (from 2026 Sep 25, 17:34 UTC until 2026 Sep 25, 19:33 UTC). These typically occur every 1h on average.
No State updates were performed for 2h 14m (from 2026 Sep 25, 15:20 UTC until 2026 Sep 25, 17:34 UTC). These typically occur every 1h on average.
Boba Anchorage Upgrade
2024 Apr 16th
Boba upgrades to Bedrock (OP Stack) and to EIP-4844 data blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. for L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium..
Funds can be stolen if
MEV can be extracted if
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EthereumUpdates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Program Hashes
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Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 June 23, 10:20 UTCHigh severity48changesUpgraded to known contract versions.
Upgraded to known contract versions.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc" |
| + | "0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| + | "eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| values.getAddresses.delayedWETH: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.11.0" |
| + | "3.13.1" |
| values.DELAYED_WETH_SLOT: | |
| + | "0x51547f31a231e1007dca33017faa3da20d959b95087c588a7768bfb922fd58ff" |
| values.delayedWETH: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.isCustomGasToken: | |
| + | false |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xf808a203af41f7932eb8e39985e56a7c75c940a260fb17d76d1003a3793281b5" |
| + | "0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E" |
| + | "eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.5.0" |
| + | "3.7.0" |
| values.getStartingAnchorRoot: | |
| + | {"root":"0x2c34e864f2a351359bedec879d0541119ac2800e42a16eb45885b542edeb8b25","l2SequenceNumber":31187733} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E: | |
| - | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5: | |
| + | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 11 |
| + | 12 |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d" |
| + | "0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| + | "eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.1.1" |
| + | "5.2.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6" |
| + | "0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| + | "eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-06-02T17:11:47.000Z","0xbb91d07f76f6b4f9e6d536329fe67efc6d26be58d0e5f9505d338b60225cd1ea",["eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.challengerFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x67b2426fB1ba42c6168e53E1e40E116A4E963d60" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670" |
| + | "eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0x" |
| + | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb90838073f4d9100908e35ca6d85595d78c4eac3a4b17e021d19c9949109919dcb522df6baec1d6638a60000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000120f115011037999b39f0f89a40722ac8887a5f051567b2426fb1ba42c6168e53e1e40e116a4e963d60" |
| values.proposerFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0xf115011037999B39F0f89A40722AC8887a5f0515" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.3.0" |
| + | "1.4.0" |
| values.wethFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
2026 May 25, 13:24 UTCHigh severity62changesOP Stack Upgrade 17 (op-contracts/v5.0.0) — adds Jovian-hardfork minBaseFee and daFootprintGasScalar config to SystemConfig, refreshes Cannon for op-program Go 1.24, and swaps in the OP-Mainnet-shared MIPS FPVM. Executed 2026-05-21 by Boba Multisig (self-operated). Implementation rotations: - OptimismPortal2 5.0.0 → 5.1.1 — diff - SystemConfig 3.7.0 → 3.11.0 — diff (adds daFootprintGasScalar , minBaseFee ) - DisputeGameFactory 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 — diff (PermissionedDisputeGame impl redeployed) - L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.10.0 → 2.11.0 — diff - L1StandardBridge 2.7.0 → 2.8.0 — diff - L1ERC721Bridge 2.8.0 → 2.9.0 — diff - SuperchainConfig (local fork) 2.3.0 → 2.4.0 — diff - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1 → 1.10.2 — diff MIPS FPVM swapped to the shared 0x6463dEE3… (pre-existing); old MIPS retired. All contracts remain templatized.
OP Stack Upgrade 17 (op-contracts/v5.0.0) — adds Jovian-hardfork minBaseFee and daFootprintGasScalar config to SystemConfig, refreshes Cannon for op-program Go 1.24, and swaps in the OP-Mainnet-shared MIPS FPVM. Executed 2026-05-21 by Boba Multisig (self-operated). Implementation rotations:
- OptimismPortal2 5.0.0 → 5.1.1 — diff
- SystemConfig 3.7.0 → 3.11.0 — diff (adds
daFootprintGasScalar,minBaseFee) - DisputeGameFactory 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 — diff (PermissionedDisputeGame impl redeployed)
- L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.10.0 → 2.11.0 — diff
- L1StandardBridge 2.7.0 → 2.8.0 — diff
- L1ERC721Bridge 2.8.0 → 2.9.0 — diff
- SuperchainConfig (local fork) 2.3.0 → 2.4.0 — diff
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1 → 1.10.2 — diff
MIPS FPVM swapped to the shared 0x6463dEE3… (pre-existing); old MIPS retired. All contracts remain templatized.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x2fe946108f24ddfa96c7feaf21d4c6dd66c8b3f7c4cbb23e9344ea06e73e8ad5" |
| + | "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.7.0" |
| + | "3.11.0" |
| values.daFootprintGasScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| + | 0 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x38811adfaa2c3c1a79fd731951dfcb607841950cdc119cd765fadcc62bc8e61d" |
| + | "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F" |
| + | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.1" |
| + | "1.10.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x41241fec96b435c5be890fb46cf7083bcdea2929a2319776b2b4c345157cca83" |
| + | "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6" |
| + | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 10 |
| + | 11 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.10.0" |
| + | "2.11.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9914d3a9740b6c5148ddd6fe3fd05b3002a6b198b95c29a083d156590756cc50" |
| + | "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999" |
| + | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.0.0" |
| + | "5.1.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4b6112b20005468606b7ad8a57a804691831c75294e9c4285fb4ec919dc97adb" |
| + | "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4" |
| + | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.4.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xe22ab87b389c247bfa7f37a4e2dae609f73d58f6f816fcce4b71ce73fd68e0c3" |
| + | "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696" |
| + | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.8.0" |
| + | "2.9.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7f3570779a89b4af4e8b7ffada16c3089994f35ea1fea21b2163861908749e88" |
| + | "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb" |
| + | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.7.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xdfa3b1f4fa753fd7160333c8075b29324bfc8f7c0764ca98384afe6e33790856" |
| + | "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D" |
| + | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a" |
| + | "eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "EXPECT_REVERT" |
| + | "0x" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.2.0" |
| + | "1.3.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
2026 May 05, 17:21 UTCHigh severity108changesMajor OP Stack contracts upgrade on bobanetwork. Core contract upgrades: - SystemConfig v2.5.0 → v3.7.0 : max gas 200M → 500M; new fields paused , l2ChainId , guardian , proxyAdmin / proxyAdminOwner , superchainConfig , initVersion ; getAddresses no longer exposes disputeGameFactory (the DisputeGameFactory contract itself still exists at 0xF45a5f1e... , just no longer reached through SystemConfig). - OptimismPortal2 v3.10.0 → v5.0.0 (via 3.13/3.14 hops). Gains anchorStateRegistry pointing to a newly-tracked AnchorStateRegistry at 0x38073f4D... . - L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.6.0 → v2.10.0 . - DelayedWETH rotated : old 0x4e27966e... deleted, new 0x7e021d19... (v1.5.0) created. - SuperchainConfig (boba's local fork at 0x996ffD62... ) implementation upgraded to a pause-expiry variant. Added new shape hash to opstack/SuperchainConfigFake expiry/shapes.json to restore the template. - Boba Multisig permissions reshuffled — lost old interact on the deleted DelayedWETH; gained upgrade over the new AnchorStateRegistry and new DelayedWETH (both via the same ProxyAdmin).
Major OP Stack contracts upgrade on bobanetwork.
Core contract upgrades:
- SystemConfig
v2.5.0 → v3.7.0: max gas 200M → 500M; new fieldspaused,l2ChainId,guardian,proxyAdmin/proxyAdminOwner,superchainConfig,initVersion;getAddressesno longer exposesdisputeGameFactory(the DisputeGameFactory contract itself still exists at0xF45a5f1e..., just no longer reached through SystemConfig). - OptimismPortal2
v3.10.0 → v5.0.0(via 3.13/3.14 hops). GainsanchorStateRegistrypointing to a newly-tracked AnchorStateRegistry at0x38073f4D.... - L1CrossDomainMessenger
v2.6.0 → v2.10.0. - DelayedWETH rotated: old
0x4e27966e...deleted, new0x7e021d19...(v1.5.0) created. - SuperchainConfig (boba’s local fork at
0x996ffD62...) implementation upgraded to a pause-expiry variant. Added new shape hash toopstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry/shapes.jsonto restore the template. - Boba Multisig permissions reshuffled — lost old
interacton the deleted DelayedWETH; gainedupgradeover the new AnchorStateRegistry and new DelayedWETH (both via the same ProxyAdmin).
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x921de6fc906d159fdcef862d2b9559063f5e7b9b7588fa5f33153360ddf296e7" |
| + | "0xc64176b1425d9639f5082ecef5e30b3b365111e2be71596ab1bd831edba65bd9" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647" |
| + | "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.DISPUTE_GAME_FACTORY_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x52322a25d9f59ea17656545543306b7aef62bc0cc53a0e65ccfa0c75b97aa906" |
| values.getAddresses.disputeGameFactory: | |
| - | "eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852" |
| values.maximumGasLimit: | |
| - | 200000000 |
| + | 500000000 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.5.0" |
| + | "3.7.0" |
| values.guardian: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2ChainId: | |
| + | 288 |
| values.paused: | |
| + | false |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| contract Boba Multisig (eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","description":"can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency.","role":".owner"} |
| receivedPermissions.3: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.5: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.7: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x03bcdc719cb7bd0a1377c01bb50b30a6122b308f673b7d7b15a3bb8628e6bd8c" |
| + | "0x12cf78bcfa479caaee8133c0f935dcdcc333cdc116805f6b81bd80f6ba52128c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B" |
| + | "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 9 |
| + | 10 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.6.0" |
| + | "2.10.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.2: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.3: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.6: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.9: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin"} |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xc483ef9e0a5ec2a0450732e743b3784de0cd3876b8fadfce14c0805a0846d26b" |
| + | "0x8ca0818fc584e81a5cead0efc1c32f3273182323dcbd08a60779d55cb0aa90c9" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4" |
| + | "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 6 |
| values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt: | |
| - | 1750959851 |
| + | 1777917431 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.14.0" |
| + | "5.0.0" |
| values.anchorStateRegistry: | |
| + | "eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1" |
| values.ethLockbox: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake" |
| + | "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x03dba37173051b02bc81487e181c791bcf1aef664c249e5d035f11f488bdd686" |
| + | "0x5a0e73c7d129cc83e1c387b55df0141890c02d2cb4111b8a1b6376d737d88f6b" |
| description: | |
| - | "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system." |
| + | "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7" |
| + | "eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.GUARDIAN_SLOT: | |
| - | "0xd30e835d3f35624761057ff5b27d558f97bd5be034621e62240e5c0b784abe68" |
| values.PAUSED_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x54176ff9944c4784e5857ec4e5ef560a462c483bf534eda43f91bb01a470b1b6" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.2.0" |
| + | "2.3.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 2 |
| values.pauseExpiry: | |
| + | 7884000 |
| values.pauseExpiryFmt: | |
| + | "3mo 1d" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| category.name: | |
| - | "Governance" |
| + | "Shared Infrastructure" |
| category.priority: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| fieldMeta: | |
| + | {"paused":{"severity":"HIGH"}} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837" |
| + | "0xab560cdc633c64552a47cd693ebc9aaab91fe80bec99e9e89b9d13d89a994c22" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013" |
| + | "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4e15d99844dc5a4304c2396a66c95ec41218ea311c8e524b118fad7beed0bb53" |
| + | "0x29b630d028d2dfddff75dc128b41ae51836c874dcd31a62c9d7313599e6261fb" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A" |
| + | "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.7.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xF027F4A985560fb13324e943edf55ad6F1d15Dc1) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285" |
| + | "0x93342e3d1e616bd6c727a5f73b09c0811bdab764dc9ad7346278593fb66b3689" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0" |
| + | "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4" |
| + | "eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.0.1" |
| + | "1.2.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
2026 March 30, 17:26 UTCHigh severity43changesUpgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796 Implementation diffs: - SystemConfig (2.4.0 → 2.5.0): diff - L1CrossDomainMessenger (2.5.0 → 2.6.0): diff - OptimismPortal2 (3.13.0 → 3.14.0): diff - L1ERC721Bridge (2.3.1 → 2.4.0): diff - L1StandardBridge (2.2.2 → 2.3.0): diff - MIPS → MIPS64 (MT-Cannon, MIPS32 single-threaded replaced by MIPS64 multi-threaded): diff - PermissionedDisputeGame (replaced): diff
Upgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796
Implementation diffs:
- SystemConfig (2.4.0 → 2.5.0): diff
- L1CrossDomainMessenger (2.5.0 → 2.6.0): diff
- OptimismPortal2 (3.13.0 → 3.14.0): diff
- L1ERC721Bridge (2.3.1 → 2.4.0): diff
- L1StandardBridge (2.2.2 → 2.3.0): diff
- MIPS → MIPS64 (MT-Cannon, MIPS32 single-threaded replaced by MIPS64 multi-threaded): diff
- PermissionedDisputeGame (replaced): diff
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x6e293d82eb36a83fb5d8b06268cd4fbf46027b87eea77fcc68f78e4b010a3774" |
| + | "0x921de6fc906d159fdcef862d2b9559063f5e7b9b7588fa5f33153360ddf296e7" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc" |
| + | "eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.5.0" |
| values.operatorFeeConstant: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.operatorFeeScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xfaa50769db48b1d2c04c06a8a0a4771b87b3c0ff20a508115bfdb2b576fdb454" |
| + | "0x03bcdc719cb7bd0a1377c01bb50b30a6122b308f673b7d7b15a3bb8628e6bd8c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231" |
| + | "eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.5.0" |
| + | "2.6.0" |
| values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 260 |
| values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 40 |
| values.TX_BASE_GAS: | |
| + | 21000 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x67ee16b5b6c32cdcc862bea390e45017908e6945cfaa01d3ef75dc9de7c9d946" |
| + | "0xc483ef9e0a5ec2a0450732e743b3784de0cd3876b8fadfce14c0805a0846d26b" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd" |
| + | "eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.13.0" |
| + | "3.14.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9de28f19e0d1200bf0afda5ab90c9d2dffa44a775e71cfe9232ee1808338996c" |
| + | "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47" |
| + | "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.1" |
| + | "2.4.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4a2d83507f25be218f504b76815e4494138af88734cc54d34666c631aea88af5" |
| + | "0x4e15d99844dc5a4304c2396a66c95ec41218ea311c8e524b118fad7beed0bb53" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6" |
| + | "eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.2.2" |
| + | "2.3.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2" |
| + | "eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xF027F4A985560fb13324e943edf55ad6F1d15Dc1) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
2026 March 25, 10:03 UTCHigh severity82changesUpgrade 13: OPCM and Incident Response Improvements. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-13-opcm-and-incident-response-improvements/9739
Upgrade 13: OPCM and Incident Response Improvements. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-13-opcm-and-incident-response-improvements/9739
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xf2ca03f1fb80fdb3c1281ea41b46245c8e6811a03a9ad7129f60cfedaac0e231" |
| + | "0x6e293d82eb36a83fb5d8b06268cd4fbf46027b87eea77fcc68f78e4b010a3774" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375" |
| + | "eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.gasPayingToken: | |
| - | {"addr_":"eth:0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE","decimals_":18} |
| values.gasPayingTokenName: | |
| - | "Ether" |
| values.gasPayingTokenSymbol: | |
| - | "ETH" |
| values.isCustomGasToken: | |
| - | false |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.4.0" |
| values.getAddresses: | |
| + | {"l1CrossDomainMessenger":"eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e","l1ERC721Bridge":"eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e","l1StandardBridge":"eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00","disputeGameFactory":"eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852","optimismPortal":"eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e","optimismMintableERC20Factory":"eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3) { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4c5ac4e53576924cabbd2a471f368a541bc3f4b1f53fa41a389692fcc62f6176" |
| + | "0x9650b4bba6299e410f01a369a95a2c57e1c3ca35f0d80c13f4f59fc468f370e5" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846" |
| + | "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.9.0" |
| + | "1.10.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } | |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6) { | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xfff6f4cca21febd4323222e2ca87ec8b78edfdeeca942468fbf331e537815484" |
| + | "0x1c7d0fda5ed6d8fc7f5b5f7df5e307f0fcfd173fa5833ea9fce8875d5d44d86a" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087" |
| + | "eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.delay: | |
| - | 604800 |
| + | 302400 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.1.0" |
| + | "1.3.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087: | |
| - | "DelayedWETH" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e: | |
| + | "DelayedWETH" |
| } | |
| contract Boba Multisig (eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x5fE03a12C1236F9C22Cb6479778DDAa4bce6299C) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| EOA (eth:0x67b2426fB1ba42c6168e53E1e40E116A4E963d60) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64","role":".challenger"}] |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1cc8a3b7de3d2c54c4706bb3f3015714d3b56647fc9fbfd6f8b068f5f63c1c25" |
| + | "0xfaa50769db48b1d2c04c06a8a0a4771b87b3c0ff20a508115bfdb2b576fdb454" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65" |
| + | "eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.5.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.8: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.9: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin"} |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x41be46bdb67af1b7af90e1bd70a1fcd31a3352282beb83b846a5189675c37ac1" |
| + | "0x67ee16b5b6c32cdcc862bea390e45017908e6945cfaa01d3ef75dc9de7c9d946" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B" |
| + | "eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.10.0" |
| + | "3.13.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3ac96c9c95e25f689f65a50f24b325e3f891029cb1cea96dc642418bbb535b1d" |
| + | "0x03dba37173051b02bc81487e181c791bcf1aef664c249e5d035f11f488bdd686" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xe4e0f760409EB1661db76a4365c0803C3630270f" |
| + | "eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.1.0" |
| + | "1.2.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe4e0f760409EB1661db76a4365c0803C3630270f: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x9c065e11870B891D214Bc2Da7EF1f9DDFA1BE277) | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x482ec6e91304ac39a3fb4505634427bddfddee23b8e93a4f7f995ca5083ae3c3" |
| + | "0x9de28f19e0d1200bf0afda5ab90c9d2dffa44a775e71cfe9232ee1808338996c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d" |
| + | "eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.1.0" |
| + | "2.3.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1010ff7f40ab4d53e6d9996aefa04423dabe9d0e22fac2d02b330ed3aa2c5740" |
| + | "0x4a2d83507f25be218f504b76815e4494138af88734cc54d34666c631aea88af5" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF" |
| + | "eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.1.0" |
| + | "2.2.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| EOA (eth:0xf115011037999B39F0f89A40722AC8887a5f0515) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"propose","from":"eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64","role":".proposer"}] |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7f307d6191215a72b6c24c01b3c2fc87c84f7fb346790132e58736caa2d1dd14" |
| + | "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B" |
| + | "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64" |
| + | "eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.0.0" |
| + | "1.0.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. | |
The system has a centralized operator
The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
Ethereum
Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: EOA 2
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
- guardian: Boba Multisig
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.
- Roles:
- owner: Boba Multisig
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Program Hashes
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