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Mode Network
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About
Mode is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup building the AIFi economy. Their mission is to scale DeFi to billions of users through onchain agents and AI powered financial applications to build a more open, efficient, and inclusive financial future.
Badges
About
Mode is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup building the AIFi economy. Their mission is to scale DeFi to billions of users through onchain agents and AI powered financial applications to build a more open, efficient, and inclusive financial future.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Funds can be stolen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EthereumUpdates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge period) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 September 16, 07:39 UTC53changesExited Superchain governance (Maintenance Upgrade Proposal), executed by the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner: ProxyAdmin and DisputeGameFactory owner and the guardian role moved to the Conduit Multisig 1, and superchainConfig was repointed from the shared Superchain instance to the Conduit-operated fork (pauses expire after 3mo 1d). Same change on metal, mode and zora.
Exited Superchain governance (Maintenance Upgrade Proposal), executed by the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner: ProxyAdmin and DisputeGameFactory owner and the guardian role moved to the Conduit Multisig 1, and superchainConfig was repointed from the shared Superchain instance to the Conduit-operated fork (pauses expire after 3mo 1d). Same change on metal, mode and zora.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract LivenessModule (eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748) [gnosisSafeModules/LivenessModule] | |
| +++ description: used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 takes ownership of the multisig | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract Optimism Guardian Multisig (eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract LivenessGuard (eth:0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25) [gnosisSafeModules/LivenessGuard] | |
| +++ description: Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners. | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x2901dA832a4D0297FF0691100A8E496626cc626D) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| } | |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC","description":"Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).","role":".guardian"} |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x50eF494573f28Cad6B64C31b7a00Cdaa48306e15","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.3: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x6f13EFadABD9269D6cEAd22b448d434A1f1B433E","description":"Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.","role":".challengerFromDGF"} |
| receivedPermissions.4: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.5: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2901dA832a4D0297FF0691100A8E496626cc626D","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.6: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x5e6432F18Bc5d497B1Ab2288a025Fbf9D69E2221","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.7: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x69216395A62dFb243C05EF4F1C27AF8655096a95","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.8: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6f13EFadABD9269D6cEAd22b448d434A1f1B433E","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.9: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x735aDBbE72226BD52e818E7181953f42E3b0FF21","description":"upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.","role":".$admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x8B34b14c7c7123459Cf3076b8Cb929BE097d0C07","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x95bDCA6c8EdEB69C98Bd5bd17660BaCef1298A6f","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.12: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.13: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xEB9d917868276cee5457609dbBF470FdE41BADE8","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7","role":".owner"},{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5","role":".owner"}] |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SuperchainProxyAdmin (eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04) [global/ProxyAdmin] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x5e6432F18Bc5d497B1Ab2288a025Fbf9D69E2221) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.14: | |
| + | ["2026-09-14T17:41:23.000Z","0x51a87bdeb0fbace19135195333144298987fd53084ab5c8520b27972aba235cf",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.15: | |
| + | ["2026-09-14T17:41:23.000Z","0x51a87bdeb0fbace19135195333144298987fd53084ab5c8520b27972aba235cf",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 14 |
| + | 16 |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x69216395A62dFb243C05EF4F1C27AF8655096a95) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6f13EFadABD9269D6cEAd22b448d434A1f1B433E) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation. | |
| values.challengerFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfaeb9d917868276cee5457609dbbf470fde41bade8e90e1bd2c7a4547f4a318017a5403cc81f73d03a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000868b674f64d64ddc198db83cd9047df54bf89ccd0ddb9ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| + | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfaeb9d917868276cee5457609dbbf470fde41bade8e90e1bd2c7a4547f4a318017a5403cc81f73d03a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000868b674f64d64ddc198db83cd9047df54bf89ccd0ddb4a4962275df8c60a80d3a25faec5aa7de116a746" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x735aDBbE72226BD52e818E7181953f42E3b0FF21) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754) [opstack/DeputyPauseModule] | |
| +++ description: Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module. | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8B34b14c7c7123459Cf3076b8Cb929BE097d0C07) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x95bDCA6c8EdEB69C98Bd5bd17660BaCef1298A6f) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SaferSafes (eth:0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a) [gnosisSafeModules/SaferSafes] | |
| +++ description: A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling. | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AddressManager (eth:0xdE1FCfB0851916CA5101820A69b13a4E276bd81F) [opstack/AddressManager] | |
| +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts. | |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a) [opstack/DelayedWETH] { | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| values.config: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| } | |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xEB9d917868276cee5457609dbBF470FdE41BADE8) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| + | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| + | "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5) [global/ProxyAdmin] | |
| +++ description: None | |
2026 September 10, 12:49 UTC1changeOptimism Security Council: Member rotated.
Optimism Security Council: Member rotated.
| contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.9: | |
| - | "eth:0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7" |
| + | "eth:0xd91530dB01c60C6B3b824707D33fb0771aB85930" |
| } | |
2026 August 27, 12:38 UTC2changesConduit Multisig 1: member added; threshold 4/10 → 4/11.
Conduit Multisig 1: member added; threshold 4/10 → 4/11.
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 10 (40%)" |
| + | "4 of 11 (36%)" |
| } | |
2026 July 17, 10:10 UTC4changesOpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } | |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } | |
2026 July 01, 09:38 UTCHigh severity123changesUpgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0): core L1 contracts upgraded to their v7 implementations (OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig, DisputeGameFactory, AnchorStateRegistry, bridges, etc.). The chain remains on permissioned fault proofs (respected game type 1); it did not move to CANNON KONA.
Upgrade 19b “Karst” (op-contracts/v7.0.0): core L1 contracts upgraded to their v7 implementations (OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig, DisputeGameFactory, AnchorStateRegistry, bridges, etc.). The chain remains on permissioned fault proofs (respected game type 1); it did not move to CANNON_KONA.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x1C823D585B2b4325A0DB845cEBe32FC7Ad67514a) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x2901dA832a4D0297FF0691100A8E496626cc626D) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2" |
| + | "0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| + | "eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 10 |
| + | 12 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.9.0" |
| + | "2.9.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1C823D585B2b4325A0DB845cEBe32FC7Ad67514a","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.8: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a","role":"admin"} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1C823D585B2b4325A0DB845cEBe32FC7Ad67514a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7"}]} |
| } | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x5e6432F18Bc5d497B1Ab2288a025Fbf9D69E2221) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085" |
| + | "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2" |
| + | "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.13: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 12 |
| + | 14 |
| values.batchInbox: | |
| - | "eth:0x24E59d9d3Bd73ccC28Dc54062AF7EF7bFF58Bd67" |
| + | "eth:0x00a225151f800043f81caBeA4b0ff77D3da974DF" |
| values.delayedWETH: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a" |
| values.getAddresses.delayedWETH: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a" |
| values.getAddresses.opcm: | |
| + | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.13.1" |
| + | "3.14.2" |
| values.lastUsedOPCM: | |
| + | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| values.lastUsedOPCMVersion: | |
| + | "7.1.17" |
| values.OPCM_SLOT: | |
| + | "0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x69216395A62dFb243C05EF4F1C27AF8655096a95) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e" |
| + | "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| + | "eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.2" |
| + | "1.11.0" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x470d87b1dae09a454A43D1fD772A561a03276aB7" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6f13EFadABD9269D6cEAd22b448d434A1f1B433E) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/DisputeGameFactory" |
| + | "opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538" |
| + | "0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78" |
| description: | |
| - | "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them." |
| + | "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c" |
| + | "eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 7 |
| values.game2000: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.gameImpls: | |
| - | ["eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"] |
| values.initBonds: | |
| - | [0,0,0,0,0] |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb908eb9d917868276cee5457609dbbf470fde41bade81c823d585b2b4325a0db845cebe32fc7ad67514a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000868b674f64d64ddc198db83cd9047df54bf89ccd0ddb9ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| + | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfaeb9d917868276cee5457609dbbf470fde41bade8e90e1bd2c7a4547f4a318017a5403cc81f73d03a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000868b674f64d64ddc198db83cd9047df54bf89ccd0ddb9ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.4.0" |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| values.wethFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x1C823D585B2b4325A0DB845cEBe32FC7Ad67514a" |
| + | "eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game0: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1: | |
| + | "eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game621: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game8: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.game8Args: | |
| + | "0x" |
| values.game8Vm: | |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| values.initBondGame0: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame1: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame621: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame8: | |
| + | 0 |
| fieldMeta.gameImpls: | |
| - | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game2000: | |
| - | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game621: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game0: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game1: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game8: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| usedTypes.0: | |
| + | {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}} |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x735aDBbE72226BD52e818E7181953f42E3b0FF21) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d" |
| + | "0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| + | "eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.8.0" |
| + | "2.8.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8B34b14c7c7123459Cf3076b8Cb929BE097d0C07) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21" |
| + | "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B" |
| + | "eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.14: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.15: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 14 |
| + | 16 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.2.0" |
| + | "5.6.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28" |
| + | "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| + | "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.4.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x95bDCA6c8EdEB69C98Bd5bd17660BaCef1298A6f) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6" |
| + | "0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| + | "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 11 |
| + | 13 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.11.0" |
| + | "2.11.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xEB9d917868276cee5457609dbBF470FdE41BADE8) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13" |
| + | "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47" |
| + | "0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122" |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5" |
| + | "eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 4 |
| values.absolutePrestateFromGame: | |
| - | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e" |
| values.challengePeriodFromOracle: | |
| - | 86400 |
| values.oracleFromVm: | |
| - | "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.7.0" |
| + | "3.9.0" |
| values.vmFromGame: | |
| - | "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908" |
| values.wethFromGame: | |
| - | "eth:0x1C823D585B2b4325A0DB845cEBe32FC7Ad67514a" |
| fieldMeta.retirementTimestamp: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5: | |
| - | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281: | |
| + | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| usedTypes.0.arg.621: | |
| + | "AggregateVerifier" |
| usedTypes.0.arg.8: | |
| + | "FaultDisputeGame" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xE90e1bD2C7a4547f4A318017a5403cc81F73D03a) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
- Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer
Participants (11):
0x9402…53F20xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe- Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
- Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
Ethereum
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
- challengerFromDGF: Conduit Multisig 1
- proposerFromDGF: EOA 1
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
- guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
- Roles:
- owner: Conduit Multisig 1
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).